[Search for users] [Overall Top Noters] [List of all Conferences] [Download this site]

Conference 7.286::digital

Title:The Digital way of working
Moderator:QUARK::LIONELON
Created:Fri Feb 14 1986
Last Modified:Fri Jun 06 1997
Last Successful Update:Fri Jun 06 1997
Number of topics:5321
Total number of notes:139771

4535.0. "Digital's New Attitude Puts It Back In Game" by QUARK::LIONEL (Free advice is worth every cent) Tue Apr 09 1996 20:51

    [I thought readers here would find this interesting - Steve]
    
Digital's New Attitude Puts It Back In Game

  By Audrey Choi
  Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
  MAYNARD, Mass. -- When Microsoft Corp. came out with its cutting-edge computer
operating system known as Windows NT, the program looked suspiciously familiar
to software engineers at Digital Equipment Corp.
  Years before, Digital had created VMS, a high-powered operating system for its
minicomputers that had fueled much of the company's growth in the 1970s and
'80s. To Digital engineers, the resemblance was more than a coincidence. In
fact, one of the creators of VMS now worked for Microsoft and had masterminded
Windows NT.
  Executives at Digital -- traditionally a bristly competitor that took pride in
going its own way -- talked lawsuits. They talked copyright violations. They
talked war with the software behemoth.
  Digital Chief Executive Robert B. Palmer talked peace. Therein lies the tale
of Digital's comeback from oblivion.
  Mr. Palmer, 55 years old, who took over the reins of the company from founder
Ken Olsen in 1992 at a time when Digital's future was very much in doubt, is a
realist. A battle with Microsoft would be expensive; a victory, Pyrrhic. What
would Digital win if it won? At best a delay in Microsoft's marketing of Windows
NT.
  Instead, Mr. Palmer worked out a deal that has proved to be a key new growth
area for Digital: Microsoft would adapt its hot-shot Windows NT to run on
computers using Digital's flagship Alpha chip, alongside -- in some cases even
tightly integrated with -- VMS. Microsoft would also pitch in an estimated $50
million to $100 million to train Digital engineers to support Microsoft
products, including NT. And Microsoft would allow a Digital engineering group to
set up shop in Redmond, Wash., near its headquarters to help develop software
for Alpha machines.
  In one fell swoop, the alliance, announced jointly in August by Mr. Palmer and
Microsoft CEO Bill Gates, relieved one of Digital's biggest headaches: stopping
the hemorrhage of VMS customers -- a massive installed base of some 450,000
corporate users -- who were worried that few new applications would be written
for VMS. Microsoft, of course, didn't do this out of a newfound excess of
benevolence: It gained entry to a base of large corporate customers who
otherwise wouldn't trust their corporate network to off-the-shelf software.
  Analysts estimate that Digital's new NT-related business has already grown to
$250 million in annual revenue. Digital executives say sales of its Alpha
systems shipping with NT are growing at "triple-digit rates." And the close
affiliation with the software powerhouse has had a halo effect on Digital, now
seen anew in the high-tech industry as a vital company to contend with.
  To be sure, Digital's recovery under Mr. Palmer has been neither smooth nor
complete. Sinking sales of personal computers forced the company to warn
investors last month that earnings for the fiscal third quarter ended March 31
would fall about 20% beneath the range of analyst expectations. That caused
Digital's stock to plunge $11.25, to $56, in just one day. (The stock closed at
$53.25 yesterday.) Analysts estimate the PC unit, which had just managed to
squeak into the black the previous quarter, had a loss of around $60 million
last quarter.

Digital's New Attitude -2-: Shake `N Bake Restructuring

The decision to partner with Microsoft isn't without risks. With many of
Digital's products -- from PCs to workstations to servers -- heavily focused on
the emerging Windows NT market, the company is no longer entirely the master of
its own fate. Once Digital helps VMS customers convert to NT, which can run on a
wide variety of hardware from different makers, there is no guarantee that those
customers will continue to buy hardware from Digital. Indeed, when Microsoft
backed away from the OS/2 operating system years ago, it badly hurt
International Business Machines Corp., its one-time partner.

Mr. Palmer acknowledges the perils, but says the risks of not joining forces
with Microsoft would have been greater. Digital would surely lose more customers
if it offered them no alternatives to VMS, he argues. Even if Digital does lose
some hardware customers, moving close to Microsoft has meant added revenues
providing service to customers of Windows 95 and other Microsoft products
besides NT.

Mr. Palmer doesn't harbor any illusions that the marriage is anything beyond a
shrewdly calculated union: "What we're doing is in our best interest; what [Mr.
Gates] is doing is in his best interest. As long as you can keep that going,
these things work."

Mr. Palmer's penchant for strategic alliances puts Digital on the cusp of the
trend toward increasingly complex partnering that is rapidly becoming the way to
succeed in today's technology industry. Today, Mr. Palmer is expected to
announce an alliance with MCI Communications Corp. and Microsoft to provide
products and services to companies needing internal networking systems.

"The model that existed in the 1970s and that we carried on too long in the
1980s was that you do everything yourself. Don't share technology, don't
cooperate with other companies. Get all the benefit by being the do-all be-all
end-all yourself," Mr. Palmer says. "That model doesn't work in the 1990s."

In 1992, Mr. Palmer inherited a company in a tailspin. His predecessor, Mr.
Olsen, was an illustrious iconoclast who delighted in thumbing his nose at
competitors' technologies. Mr. Olsen brought the company to greatness with a
stranglehold on the minicomputer market. The frugal New Englander, who drove a
Ford compact because it got good mileage, didn't believe in layoffs and was
widely loved in the company. But he refused to acknowledge the PC revolution,
and the advent of an open -- as opposed to proprietary --
philosophy of computing.

By 1992, Digital had amassed $4 billion in losses, was bleeding $3 million every
24 hours, and had had 22 consecutive quarters of expense growth outpacing
revenue growth. Many customers, worried that Digital might not be around much
longer, began looking for other hardware makers.

Seeking an antidote, Digital's board replaced Mr. Olsen with his polar opposite:
Mr. Palmer, who had been running Digital's semiconductor unit and later its
manufacturing operations. Impeccably coiffed, clad in designer suits and driving
a Porsche Carrera, the steely Texan brought Digital into the '90s.

Digital's New Attitude -3-: CEO Palmer Turns To Pacts

Mr. Palmer moved the company away from its closed proprietary-business model to
mass markets and open systems. He abandoned the no-layoffs policy and slashed
60,000 jobs, about half the Digital work force. And he pared down the company to
its bare essentials, lopping off noncore businesses and consolidating
manufacturing facilities to less than a third of their original size.

"I try to focus on what has to be done and separate it from how hard it is to
do," says Mr. Palmer. He acknowledges that his decisions haven't always been
popular or even immediately successful, but adds that "the very survival of the
enterprise was in question in 1992 . . . so you can't wait until you know
perfectly [what to do]. You gotta move."

Mr. Palmer began life as a poor boy from a broken home in rural Texas, who
nevertheless emerged as high-school valedictorian, put himself through college
and graduate school at Texas Tech University in Lubbock and later became a
co-founder of Mostek Corp., a semiconductor company. As a leader now of a large
corporation, he is uncompromising in demanding results from subordinates.

"We can be the closest of friends and all of that, but you have to make your
numbers," Mr. Palmer says simply. Some 20 years ago, at Mostek, he had to fire a
close friend. "It was painful for him and for me," he says. "So subsequent to
that, I make a point not to socialize or get too close."

Last summer, he fired Bernhard Auer, then head of the PC business, for failing
to meet growth targets. Several months later, he fired Larry Cabrinety, head of
Digital's components and peripherals business, for similar reasons. Managers
well know Palmer's refrain: "Make your numbers or I'm sure your successor will."

The result is that Digital has logged five consecutive quarters of
profitability, revenue is growing and, despite some recent seesawing of its
stock, its market capitalization is up more than $5.5 billion since mid-1994, to
about $8 billion.

Steven Milunovich, a technology analyst at Morgan Stanley & Co. in New York,
predicts Digital will earn $537 million on revenue of $15.3 billion for its
current fiscal year ending June 30 -- the most since 1989. Next year, he
predicts, net income will rise to $884 million on $16.8 billion in revenue.

Sealing the Microsoft alliance is just one of the more recent developments that
reveal the change in corporate philosophy and strategy that Mr. Palmer has
brought to Digital.

In 1994, he made another decision that led to another alliance, this one with
Oracle Corp. For years Digital had provided customers with database applications
-- which allow users to sort quickly through huge stores of data -- often
throwing the software in for free to customers, rather than see them buy other
companies' products. This put Digital in direct competition with Oracle, the
industry leader in database software.

Rather than continuing to butt heads, Mr. Palmer made a bold move: He decided to
sell Digital's database business to Oracle for $108 million. Digital insiders
now say there was a vital quid pro quo in the contract: Oracle would develop a
database application to take advantage of Digital's high-speed Alpha chip.

In April 1995, Oracle Chairman Larry Ellison held a joint news conference with
Mr. Palmer, proclaiming that Oracle software running on Digital Alpha servers
provided the best database performance in the world -- quicker and more reliable
than a mainframe computer, at a fraction of the price. "That was honest to God
one of the most fun days I've had," Mr. Palmer notes, breaking into a boyish
grin.

Digital's New Attitude -4-: Oracle Alliance Pays Off

Since then, Oracle's competitors have raced to come out with their own versions
of database software to run on Alpha. And Digital server sales have soared.
Since Digital began shipping high-end computers used to run large databases in
June, it has sold more than 1,000 of the machines, which go for upward of
$100,000 each.

The Oracle alliance "has been very important to our recovery and opened an
entirely new market that never would have happened if we had said, `No, we're
going to fight it out with Oracle,'" Mr. Palmer says. On April 17, Messrs.
Palmer and Ellison will again share a stage to announce new collaborative
products.

Changing Digital's culture has been neither easy nor painless. Some company
insiders complain that Mr. Palmer has changed too much too fast. The first 18
months of his tenure seemed to be the era of perpetual corporate
reorganizations. First he formed nine "customer focused" units focusing on
specific industries. A year later, when that plan proved unsuccessful, he
reorganized the company into "strategic business units," diminishing the role of
the industry groups. Four months after that, in April 1994, when the company was
hit with a quarterly loss three times as large as expected, Mr. Palmer pushed
through yet another reorganization -- now abolishing the industry groups and
forming five independent business units around product lines, while slashing the
work force further.

"It was like restructuring by `Shake 'N Bake,'" recalls Don Hunt, who worked
with Mr. Palmer in manufacturing for many years, before taking early retirement.
Alex Jeyschune, who worked for 16 years at Digital until late 1994, recalls a
saying that arose: "Paint yourself green, lie in the grass and listen for the
lawn mower."

Mr. Palmer acknowledges he made mistakes. "I would be the last person to affirm
that I was so brilliant that I knew exactly what to do," he says. Mirroring
Digital's new advertising tagline, "Whatever it takes," Mr. Palmer doesn't claim
to have the answers, just to scramble far and fast enough to find them.

While Mr. Olsen would deliberate for months before changing course, "Bob's way
is to propose something in the morning, implement in the afternoon and evaluate
by the evening," says Vincent Mullarkey, Digital's chief financial officer.

Mr. Palmer describes his journey at Digital like a cross-country drive: "You can
try to plot in great detail every stoplight between here and San Francisco. And
you're going to get there approximately never. Other people like myself would
say, I know it's roughly west, so I'm going to start heading west."

"Dow Jones News Service"
"Copyright(c) 1996, Dow Jones & Company, Inc."
T.RTitleUserPersonal
Name
DateLines
4535.1tennis.ivo.dec.com::KAMKam WWSE 714/261.4133 DTN/535.4133 IVOTue Apr 09 1996 22:134
    Was Palmer shrewd enough to negotiate a royality for our technologies? 
    If so, then the total migration to Microsoft products benefits Digital. 
    If not, then it's only a matter of time before we migrate our install 
    base to Microsoft.
4535.2Hmmmm...CHEFS::RICKETTSKRebelwithoutapauseWed Apr 10 1996 07:0524
    >> "Make your numbers or I'm sure your successor will"
    
      So what numbers is Bernhard Auer's successor making then? And will
    *his* successor do any better if the numbers (or the underlying
    strategy, if there is one) are unrealistic?
    
      It is all very well saying things like that, and good to see that
    even members of the SLT pay for mistakes. However, implemented wrongly
    that approach will force short-term decision-making that will undermine
    long-term success, or even survival. If your job depends upon making
    your numbers for the current quarter, and the only way you can do that
    is to cut costs by getting rid of people that you will need to support
    the continuing operation, what do you do? Almost any idiot can make
    numbers in the short term by 'mining' the installed base without regard
    for customer satisfaction, closing R&D and generally minimising the
    current costs. But those current costs are the seed corn for future
    revenue. If you eat all the seed corn now, you may not be hungry for a
    while longer; but you'll be starving come next harvest time.
    
      Maybe BP's strategy is correct; I don't know. But I don't feel any
    happier about his grasp of what is actually going on at the lower
    levels in this corporation after reading this.
    
    Ken
4535.3You CAN Make a DifferenceNCMAIL::YANUSCWed Apr 10 1996 09:1225
    RE: .2
    
    Ken,  Your points are very valid, and likely reflect what many in the
    field fear, and more than likely understand, is happening day in and
    day out at Digital.  The only point I would like to make is that Bob
    Palmer is somehow out of touch with what is happening at the lower
    levels of the company.  With his work schedule, which is probably
    frenetic, his understanding of what is happening in the trenches is
    only as good as what is filtered through management and his staff. 
    Therein may lie the problem, if those layers filter out anything but
    the positives, which many suspect has been happening for a long time.
    
    If anyone feels that something of importance to the company's survival
    needs to be raised to Bob's level (and doesn't want their message to
    be filtered as above), raise it yourself.  Don't wait for others to do
    it for us.  My understanding is that Bob makes use of the e-mail
    systems and other tools available to all of us.  I personally have been
    responded to on previous messages, and have been pleased with the
    responses.  Sure, the replies were likely penned by a subordinate, but
    also likely reflected Bob's personal views.
    
    The bottom line is that many employees agree with your points.  But now
    let's do something about the situation.
    
    Chuck 
4535.4MKTCRV::KMANNERINGSWed Apr 10 1996 13:2640
    >If anyone feels that something of importance to the company's survival
    >needs to be raised to Bob's level (and doesn't want their message
    >tobe filtered as above), raise it yourself.
    
    The point about the top management not knowing what is going on in the
    trenches is an old one, indeed, it comes from the first world war. 
    The thing is, just sending an e-mail to Bob is not the whole solution.
    The important thing is to correct what is going wrong and to
    communicate the feeling within the organisation that those at the top
    are concerned to stop things going wrong at the bottom and take
    initiatives themselves to ensure that this is the case. 
    
    Let me give an example. One day I was standing waiting for a  high
    speed train at Frankfurt railway station. It was 5 minutes late and the
    whole country was talking about how the new high-speed trains were
    late. Suddenly a friend who was with me tapped me on the arm and said,
    "look at that, there is the chief of the entire German Railway company
    talking to the driver. He wants to know exactly why it is late, and you
    can be sure he won't be asking his executives what the problem is,
    he'll be telling them."  
    
    From the little bit of the company I can see it seems like there are
    many things going on which are a hugh improvement on say 5 years ago,
    but I wonder if there is that attention to detail at the bottom which
    is so crucial, and which has such an effect on employees. Imagine what
    the train driver felt like and what he told his pals.  There have been
    many examples raised in this conference, but I would pick just one. 
    Digital lives from selling. Top salesmen are like diamonds. You look
    after them, treasure them, the top performers bring in the bucks year
    after year, so whatever else you do, look after them. So why was a top
    salesman like the Greyhawk let go, just a few months after being
    selected and rewarded as a top performer? 
         
    Just firing a VP down the line who doesn't make his numbers is not the 
    answer. We have to have the mindset that we get it right as a team all
    the time, whatever it takes. 
    
    Then we can all have a payrise, please, that'll do nicely...
    
    Kevin       
4535.5We have to play the gameSTOWOA::tavo.ogo.dec.com::ODIAZOctavio DiazWed Apr 10 1996 18:2117
I agree that Palmer and all senior management are putting more focus on the short 
term than the long term, but unfortunately if they don't do that there may be no 
long term to worry about.

We are in many ways at the mercy of external influences, be it investors, the stock 
market, financial institutions, etc. and in Digital's situation, still 
somewhat fragile and trying to establish ourselves again as a viable system vendor, 
if we don't show short term results, our long terms prospects don't look very good 
in their eyes.

Unless you have a commanding position in the market and tons of cash, you kind of 
have to play their game.




4535.6.5 formatted for 80 columnsQUARK::LIONELFree advice is worth every centWed Apr 10 1996 21:4220
             <<< HUMANE::DISK$SCSI:[NOTES$LIBRARY]DIGITAL.NOTE;1 >>>
                        -< The Digital way of working >-
================================================================================
Note 4535.5        Digital's New Attitude Puts It Back In Game            5 of 5
STOWOA::tavo.ogo.dec.com::ODIAZ "Octavio Diaz"       17 lines  10-APR-1996 17:21
                         -< We have to play the game >-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I agree that Palmer and all senior management are putting more focus on the
short  term than the long term, but unfortunately if they don't do that there
may be no  long term to worry about.

We are in many ways at the mercy of external influences, be it investors, the
stock  market, financial institutions, etc. and in Digital's situation, still 
somewhat fragile and trying to establish ourselves again as a viable system
vendor,  if we don't show short term results, our long terms prospects don't
look very good  in their eyes.

Unless you have a commanding position in the market and tons of cash, you kind
of  have to play their game.
4535.7These lastest announcements will make it hard to hit the TeamLinks quotas.XANADU::16.29.16.85::STJEANBob St.JeanThu Apr 11 1996 01:1539
I hope that Mr. Palmer doesn't go and start firing account teams
for not making their TeamLinks, ALL-IN-1 and MailWorks quotas.
Remember that these are often tied into Alpha and PC sales.  It 
seems that every 3 to 6 months Digital's management pulls off 
some kind of stunt that freaks out the existing customers or potential
customers.  At best it only causes delays in closing sales.  At
worst it causes us to lose the sale altogether.

I'm referring to the ill conceived or poorly executed mail strategy
announcements that cause great concern to our customers.  It makes
the sales, product management and engineers involved with TeamLinks
and related products go into damage control mode.  First it was
with the original MS/DEC alliance and the statements about DEC
implementing Exchange in house.  We managed to deal with that.  Then
it happened again with the cancellation of the NT OfficeServer, 
something that was announced and was generating great interest from
our customers.

Now we have to contend with the lastest announcement in the media 
that Digital is deploying Exchange to 50,000 desktops (or is the
40,000 figure the one to believe).  There was no mention of Digital's 
own groupware systems (TeamLinks, ALL-IN-1, MailWorks and OfficeServer),
if they will still exist within our company, what level of investment, 
etc...  This last announcement will also confuse the UNIX and OpenVMS 
base, since these platforms were not mentioned at all.

The customers and account teams are very concerned.  Eventually our 
damage control will not work anymore.  Who will buy a mail system 
from Digital if we don't even use it widely within our company?  What
other company in the email business uses its competitor's mail system
inhouse, brags about it, and expects to get away with it?  Mail
solutions are complex to sell, and customers look for a company's 
commitment.  All the talk in the world will not help, since Digital
cannot seem to get its story straight.

Too bad...

Bob

4535.8We have to play the game well to winMKTCRV::KMANNERINGSThu Apr 11 1996 07:1313
    re .6
    
    >We are in many ways at the mercy of external influences
    
    This is no excuse for poor quality. Sure we have been given a tough
    time by the market, but so have others. Some have gone bust and some
    will go bust in the future. If the market gets bad, then you have to
    retreat and conserve resources so you are in shape to go forward again
    when the tide changes. Doing that with quality is the challenge,
    probably more of a challenge than expanding and going forward. Just
    having the resolve to take tough decisions is not enough.
    
    Kevin  
4535.9Why we don't get the results.ACISS1::ROCUSHTue Apr 16 1996 12:5714
    The comment about having a successful sales force and retaining
    successful reps raises a very fundamental question about how we
    organize the sales force.  I am presntly in one of the most competitive
    markets, and making some progress in selling Alpha products.  I am no
    where satisfied with the results so far.  There may be a few factors
    mitigating agains tthe wild success we should be having.  In the past
    18 months I have had 6 different managers, none of which had experience
    in the market or product.  I have also had the geography, accounts and
    measument system changed three times in the last 18 months.  So judging
    success is a lot more than just looking at the numbers.
    
    BTW, I knew Greyhawk quite well and reality is much different than
    perception.
    
4535.10MAIL2::RICCIARDIBe a graceful Parvenu...Tue Apr 16 1996 13:311
    What reality is that?
4535.11Your answerACISS1::ROCUSHTue Apr 16 1996 20:084
    .10
    
    The reality of whether someone is a successful rep or not.
    
4535.12Perceptions can differCHEFS::RICKETTSKRebelwithoutapauseWed Apr 17 1996 06:399
    Re. .9, .11
    
      Are you saying that he was perceived (or perceived himself) to be a
    successful rep., but wasn't (IYHO)? Or that he was (again IYHO) successful,
    but not seen as such by some others (management? peers?)? The former case
    seems to me to be implied by your remark in .9. If I am misinterpreting
    you, please correct me.
    
    Ken
4535.13Hope this helps.ACISS1::ROCUSHWed Apr 17 1996 10:416
    .12
    
    Having worked very close with him I have a unique ability to evaluate
    performance.  As my mother used to say, "If you can't say anything nice
    about someone say nothing."
    
4535.14MAIL2::RICCIARDIBe a graceful Parvenu...Wed Apr 17 1996 12:091
    Hmmm.  I'm not surprised.
4535.15lets keep to the point ...ESSC::KMANNERINGSWed Apr 17 1996 12:5536
    Re the last few:
    
    I was basing my comment on the following in the Goodbye Greyhawk note
    
           > So Digital is now laying off one of its most successful
           > salesmen? One of the select few who as recently as October
           > was sent to the exclusive DECathlon retreat in Bali as a
           > reward for great work and inspiration for more?
    
    That makes it clear that the company thought he was a top notcher,
    whatever anyone else thinks, and my discussion is with the policy of 
    the company not looking after good salesmen. So the question of whether 
    Greyhawk was or was not top rep is irrelevant, and not really fair, as
    he cannot reply. The company thought he was good, but the company let
    him go, that is my point. 
    
    My general point is that it is very important to look after the sales
    force carefully. If you DO want to change things radically, then you
    should have the alternative up and running before you cut things.
    Otherwise your quarterly results will suffer and you get into a tailspin.
    
    Also, I think there is something like Esprit de Corps in all
    organisations which is an intangible but precious asset. When things
    happen which are percieved as nonsense by some of the company, it is
    important to deal with those perceptions or you damage the
    organisation. 
    
    So can we concentrate on the questions of quality and performance
    raised here, so we can grow the company again, keep everyone on board,
    and get some payrises together :-)
    
    There was plenty of opportunity to knock the Greyhawk when he was
    around ...   
    
    Kevin
    
4535.16DECathalon not always a good indicationWHOS01::ELKINDSteve Elkind, Digital Consulting @WHOWed Apr 17 1996 22:1614
    I didn't know the Greyhawk, this is not in reference to HIS abilities
    as a sales rep.  
    
    Although many of those who go to DECathalon are successful for both
    themselves and the company, you can't automatically assume it's so. 
    And I'm sure their managers know which is which (although some may not
    care, since they are measured the same way).
    
    While in Sales Support I saw sales reps blow their numbers away by
    taking actions that helped them exceed their numbers or which resulted
    in per-unit-sold bonuses, but which were bad for Digital on a net
    revenue basis.  They were considered successful, since they would get
    to DEC 100 or DECathalon - but they sure didn't help the company's
    bottom line.
4535.17ACISS1::ROCUSHWed Apr 17 1996 22:557
    DECathalon is not necessarily an indicator of successful performance.
    
    I do not think that everything we have done so far has been correct,
    but we are headed in the right direction.  We will need to make
    adjustments along the way, but I would rather see us heading the right
    way.
    
4535.18ESSC::KMANNERINGSThu Apr 18 1996 05:3416
    > DECathalon is not necessarily an indicator of successful performance.
    
    okay, that may be true but it IS an indication that the company think
    that the winners are good sales reps, I mean, they are not deliberately
    rewarding dodos are they? And IF the company think xyz is a good
    sales rep, then they should treasure him or her, and the same goes for
    all good employees. That should be part of the new attitude. Of course
    it is a good idea if the sales effort is organised on a sane,
    team-based, customer oriented way and not for short term gain at the
    cost of damage to intangible assets. 
    
    For those who say we still have a certain amount of hard things to do
    because of mistakes made in the past I would say, the way we do those
    things will determine how we go forward in the right direction. 
    
    Kevin   
4535.19PLAYER::BROWNLCyclopsThu Apr 18 1996 07:297
    Hmmm. I have no idea of Greyhawk's sales abilities, successes or
    otherwise. What I do know is that much of what he said in here made
    sense, struck a chord, and seemed to be worthy of more audience than it
    got. For that reason alone, I think he was a sad loss to the Company.
    IMO, we need more people like that.
    
    Laurie.
4535.20MAIL1::RICCIARDIBe a graceful Parvenu...Thu Apr 18 1996 13:505
    I think it has to do with your performance report/rating.  Greybird
    could have blown his numbers away, yet for some reason (read: data not
    available) his manager rated him a 3.  This 3, or even a 2 now a days,
    can result in your being layed off if you go up against a 1 performer. 
    
4535.21the rating system is probably at faultNASEAM::READIOA Smith &amp; Wesson beats four aces, Tow trucks beat Chapman LocksThu Apr 18 1996 19:0216
Let me say that I do not know the Greyhawk.  This does not relate to him.  
It does, however, illustrate that things are not always as they appear.

When I was in CSSE I had to deal with a "top performer" that everyone 
called "Plan-o-matic".  Our jobs entailed writing service plans.  His were 
not worth the disk space they took up.  However, he was measured on 
quantity, not quality.  Those in a position to rate his performance were 
NOT in a position to measure the effectiveness of his service plans.

We spent years cleaning up after him...even before he was tfso'd.  Thank 
God he went with one of the first waves.  If he hadn't have been in the 
wrong place at the wrong time we'd STILL be dealing with his hot-air service 
plans.

Sometimes those in a position to "rate" someone aren't qualified to do the 
rating in the first place.
4535.22ARCANA::CONNELLYDon&#039;t try this at home, kids!Thu Apr 18 1996 19:3421
re: .17
    
>    I do not think that everything we have done so far has been correct,
>    but we are headed in the right direction.  We will need to make
>    adjustments along the way, but I would rather see us heading the right
>    way.
    
The only constants to our direction that i can see are (since 1992) are
downsizing and disinvestment.  We've blown away more than half of our
employees, cut services (MCS and SI) and direct sales, sold off various
technologies and their engineering groups, pretty much gotten out of
software, jumped into and then backed out of the retail consumer market,
and along the way cut benefits and brought in variable compensation.

It's difficult to say where this direction is taking us.  Maybe we're
trying to become a Sun-like hot UNIX and NT box maker?  Is that your
take?  I'm wondering if we have a picture of whatever the next major
"milestone state" is that our current direction is aimed at.

- paul
4535.23My PrognosticationSHRCTR::PJOHNSONaut disce, aut discedeFri Apr 19 1996 07:205
FWIW, I see Microsoft providing the O/S (whatever the union of NT and
95 will be called) and applications, Digital providing the hottest box
in the business, and MCI servicing the lot.

Pete
4535.24there are two sides to itESSC::KMANNERINGSFri Apr 19 1996 09:2429
    re .22
    
    >The only constants to our direction that i can see are (since 1992) are
    >downsizing and disinvestment.  We've blown away more than half of our
    >employees, cut services (MCS and SI) and direct sales, sold off various
    >technologies and their engineering groups, pretty much gotten out of
    >software, jumped into and then backed out of the retail consumer market,
    >and along the way cut benefits and brought in variable compensation.
    
    I would disagree with the word only in the above, and I think it needs
    to be given context. The fact is that we, and many others in the market
    needed to retreat and shorten the lines in 1990-92.  IMO, we unfortunately
    did not have a management capable of doing that, and instead of
    retreating, went off on various adventures. We then panicked and
    instead of withdrawing slowly and carefully, watching every dollar,
    there was the rout you describe above. 
    
    On the other hand there have been positive things which you leave out. 
    We have obtained a lead in 64-bit computing, we have got a good unix
    operating system on the shelf, and we have some nice bets running with
    the alliance strategy. Some new management has come on board which
    knows something about management, and it shows. This HAS put us back in
    the game. It would be nice to get back to the mindset we had in the
    1980's: "We are not the biggest, but we are the best." In those days
    there was also a different attitude towards the employees. I think we
    should recover some of that too. 
    
    Kevin
            
4535.25PerspectiveMUNDIS::SSHERMANClean living and a fast outfieldFri Apr 19 1996 09:5916
I also did not know the Greyhawk personally, though we have corresponded
electronically (mainly about hockey).

I observe that the noter who started this subthread is located on node
ACISS1, which was the Greyhawk's node during his brief (and apparently
ill-starred) sojourn in Florida.  Whatever may have happened there, it
was one short chapter in a long career.  It is likely that there are
different perspectives, and as noted earlier, the Greyhawk is not here
to tell his side.  Sometimes it is simply a matter of the chemistry not
being right.

For my part, I continue to hold him in high esteem for the role he
played in this notesfile and for the pleasure of corresponding with him.
He was a true original and we are poorer without him.

Steve
4535.26ACISS1::BATTISChicago Bulls-1996 world champsFri Apr 19 1996 10:295
    
    Steve, you are correct. Mr. Rocush and the Greyhawk worked in the
    same building. I happen to know both of them personally.
    
    Mark