Conference 7.286::digital

2425.0. "Parting advice..." by MR4DEC::VANTREECK (I'm only subhuman.) Fri Mar 19 1993 15:58

As many of you know, I'm leaving Digital this month. I've been asked by one of
Digital's foremost experts in quality to write a farewell message giving some of
my last thoughts that might help Digital. I could write book on this, but I'll
stifle myself to two topics: 1) quality in the eyes of the customer and 2)
balancing the focus on cost containment with a focus on growth. In each topic,
I'll identify the problems and propose a fix.

o  Quality in the eyes of the customer

    Most of you would consider it common sense figure out how to do
    something and then organize to do it. You wouldn't organize and then
    figure out how to do something within the constraints of the
    organization! But, Digital executives and management are building
    organizations before defining how to do things....

    Before organizing, we must define the objective. What is the objective?
    We want to be #1 in satisfying customers! The measure of achieving this
    objective is being #1 in market share and profits. How do we achieve
    this objective? And then how do we organize to facilitate achieving
    this objective?

    One way Digital can achieve being #1 in customer satisfaction is using
    some published, proven processes. These processes are a specified set
    of steps and techniques, for obtaining information on what the customer
    wants and delivering what the customer wants. These are sometimes
    called "voice of the customer" processes.

    Examples of processes for capturing what the customer wants are QFD and
    contextual inquiry. A process for determining the best kinds of
    distribution channels and promotion (maximizing return on investment)
    and forecasting for a product or service is "market for results". A
    process like "future mapping" helps a company better predict future
    changes in the market - what the customers will prefer in the future.
    Digital can increase quality in the eyes of the customer by using
    "voice of the customer" processes. 

    The purpose of an organization is to achieve an objective - being #1 at
    satisfying customers. When you put an organization in place before
    defining the processes to achieve the objective, the organization
    drives the process. And those processes are the "bureaucratic"
    processes everyone hates. It's those kinds of processes that inevitably
    serve the bureaucrats of the organization rather than the customer.

    At Digital, we: organize, shoehorn the process into the organization -
    if a process is used, and only use the output of a process if it fits
    within the existing organization. It will require a major culture
    change to organize around "voice of the customer" process and organize
    around what the process indicates as the best way to achieve customer
    satisfaction.

    I'll give a brief example of why defining the organization before
    defining the processes (how you need to do things) doesn't work. After
    after using some process to identify the target market, cost of sale,
    level of sales expertise required, etc., a small marketing group's
    staff comes to the conclusion that they need to sell through a VAR
    distribution channel to maximize market share and profits. But their
    parent organization lacks that channel. And the small group lacks the
    funding and staffing to support a VAR channel.

    The result is the group's management order them to sell what they have
    through their current non-specialized field sales channel. New products
    and services are chosen based on the organization's existing
    distribution channels rather than where they could ideally maximize
    market share and profits. Of course, sales are lower than desired. And
    groups are punished (no merit raises, reduced funding, layoffs, etc.).

    The most common way of solving this in Digital is working across
    organizational lines with another group. But those groups are
    invariably driven first by their own organization's needs, thus there
    is continual conflict as they are pulled in too many directions. Mid-
    level managers in Digital spend more time trying to influence groups in
    other organizations than managing their own groups. There is a lack of
    focus on all levels. Of course, sales are lower than desired. And
    groups are punished (no merit raises, reduced funding, layoffs, etc.).

    In Digital, there is a high level of frustration at the staff level
    caused by having to work with other groups that are not in the same
    business. Each group has different priorities. This makes it very
    difficult to get everyone moving in the same direction. We need to tear
    down the organizational walls between groups and put all the people
    required for a business within the same walls. This is the only way to
    build effective cross-functional teams. It's the only way to achieve
    focus. Focus on what the customer wants is how you become #1!

    GM's Saturn business is an example of putting all the people involved
    in the business within the same organizational walls. It successfully
    facilitated cross-functional consensus with low over head. And Saturn
    is large success!

    Also, these "voice of the customer" processes need to be standardized
    and enforced throughout the corporation. Standardization and
    enforcement provides a consistent base level of generated quality
    throughout the company. Lack of consistent quality in the eyes of the
    customer adversely impacts Digital's reputation, market share and
    profits.

    Frequent reviews of those processes and continually refining them will
    give Digital a competitive edge! Unfortunately, there aren't even any
    small organizations in this company with standardized and enforced use
    of such processes.

    Consider this same problem at a very different angle: How many times
    have you sat in meetings, where the same issues and ideas seem to
    resurface a hundred times without resolution? This happens when there
    is: 1) no "group-think" process that structures how every person in the
    group analyzes the problem of what the customer wants (no "voice of the
    customer" process), and 2) inadequate data on what the customer wants.

    Without the group-think processes and good data, everyone "shoots from
    the hip". There is no consensus. When a consensus is not reached, the
    issues are usually elevated up a level in management to obtain a
    command decision - which is also a shooting from the hip.

    From my experience, there is never enough data to reach a consensus on
    every little thing. When there is no consensus, it is better to try it
    one way (preferably on a prototype for market testing) as an experiment
    and be prepared to quickly make changes based on the market feedback.
    Bubbling up the issue to management for a command decision shows a lack
    of skill in the manager to reach a consensus to at least try something.

    Management can drive to consensus decisions at the staff level by being
    skilled at what I call "group-think" processes. These group-think
    processes are some of the previously mentioned "voice of the
    customer" processes like QFD and market for results. They determine the
    products, services, promotion, distribution channels, etc. needed to
    maximize maximize customer satisfaction, i.e., maximize our market
    share and profits.

    You might think management being risk-averse would seek out and train
    everyone on group-think processes and processes for obtaining good
    data. But management generally feel they are "responsible" and thus
    want the "control" of having things done "my way." Even when there
    is consensus, I've seen many instances of managers overriding that
    consensus. This is top-down management. Bottom-up management via
    consensus at the staff level would be a major cultural change in many
    parts of Digital.

    Because staff are closest to the customer's problems, management must
    learn to trust the decisions of the staff - not dictate to the staff.
    Management need to be skilled facilitators at driving team consensus
    and mentoring. And the consensus must be valued and trusted.

    If you made decisions that drove you out of a job, you could say "I
    screwed up." What do you do when you have no say in the decisions? You
    are disempowered. You lose interest in your work. Your job just becomes
    something you have to do to put food on the table and keep a roof over
    yourself and family - and nothing more.

    The staff start to feel that most managers are ignorant egotists
    ordering them to do stupid things. The management wonder why there is
    so much resistance to their important business strategies. An "us
    versus them" attitude has formed and reinforces the management versus
    staff stratification.

    Large numbers of staff tend to be laid off when management screw up in
    their top-down decisions. As a result, the "us versus them" attitude is
    exacerbated. Last week there was a one day warning strike at Digital in
    Germany. It is top-down driven companies that cause strikes and
    unionization. Staff feel they must protect themselves from the
    management. That warning strike indicates a hardening of the "us versus
    them" attitude.

    When decisions on how to work and how to organize are made top-down,
    you get a company of robots. People do what they are told - a bunch of
    brown-nosing, yes-persons. Critical information is not bubbled up to
    the top so that changes can be made. Disempowered people wait for
    decisions from top. This makes the company slow to react. With top-down
    decisions there is no creativity at the staff level. Lack of creativity
    and slow to react is certain death for any high tech company.

    I'll give an example of the top-down culture in one of Digital's
    largest marketing groups. A couple of years ago, Ira Machefsky
    delivered a presentation to a full auditorium of marketing staff in
    Marlborough MA on Sun's strategies, performance, market trends, and our
    lack of effective response.

    After the presentation, he was very surprised to learn that many in the
    full auditorium of marketing staff were already aware of most of what
    he presented. He asked why nothing was being done. It was pointed out
    to him that: 1) There wasn't a single manager in that large crowd. 2)
    Management did not value the staff-level input, which they had already
    given.

    When staff there told management about the problems and what needed to
    be done, management never responded. Information critical to Digital's
    success was not bubbled up from lower level management. Management
    failed to empower their staff to become more effective competitors to
    Sun. Management failed to empower their staff to better satisfy
    customers as measured by lost market share in workstations.

    Instead, mid-managers got their orders on how they were to operate, and
    they in turn gave orders to subordinates on how to operate. It was very
    clear, if you raised too much disagreement, your job is in jeopardy -
    "You are not a team player." Mid-level management adopt the top-down
    "style" of senior management, because it's clear that senior managers
    pick team players with the same "style". As the top-down culture
    increased, the "us against them" attitude has also increased.

    Digital is reorganizing from a large, monolithic top-down company to
    bunch of smaller top-down business units. Will dividing into business
    units and assigning better profit and loss accountability change the
    top-down culture? Not likely. Will it be any more effective at
    maximizing customer satisfaction than moving a business from one large
    building to a campus of small buildings? Not likely. Digital's
    reorganization is simply exchanging one bureaucracy for another
    bureaucracy.

    I foresee a short term return to profitability provided by the staff
    reductions. Alpha will maintain the profitability for little while. But
    the lost creativity and lost ability to react quickly (caused by the
    top-down management culture) can not be masked more than eighteen
    months in a highly competitive market with short product cycle times.

    How does one change a top-down culture? Again the answer is "voice of
    the customer", group-think processes. If such processes are standard
    and enforced, then the "voice of the customer" drives the organization
    rather than the personal goals and opinions of bureaucrats driving the
    organization.

    Here are four simple steps on how to organize on based "voice of the
    customer" processes and what those processes indicate we need to
    implement.

    1) Decide what businesses you in - based on the kinds of "service" or
    benefit your products and services provide (top-down design by senior
    executives and board). Note: Contrary to what our CEO says, "silicon"
    is not a business at Digital. Networking is not a business at Digital.

    The early train companies didn't invest in planes or trucks, because
    they were in the "train" business rather than the cargo transportation
    business. Customers want their cargo transported to a destination. They
    care about price, delivery speed, and safety - not the actual method
    used to get it there (train, plane, or truck). Likewise, customers buy
    something to run their software - not silicon, not Alpha chips, not
    Intel chips, not Motorola chips. Customers want to access the data in
    their department's database - not networking.

    Computing might be considered a business at Digital. Sharing
    information might be considered a business at Digital.

    2) Make one organization for each business (top-down design by
    executives). There are no organizations outside of the business units.
    A business has all the resources it needs.

    It's okay to contract out to another business - but not to another
    group in an organization which is not part of your business unit. For
    example, it makes sense for a group producing word processor software
    to contract distribution through a direct marketing group - if that
    direct marketing group is a "business". If the direct marketing is just
    another group within some larger organization, then there is no focus!
    The direct marketing group's priorities are not satisfying your group
    as a customer. It's priorities are driven by it's parent organization's
    business.

    3) Identify your customers by segmenting the markets based first by
    application area, second by customer type (end-user, maintainer,
    budgeter, etc.), third by nature of the target customer (personal,
    home, small business, medium business, large business, style/culture,
    etc.), next by industry, geography, etc.. Pick the most strategic
    segments and assign one organization to each (bottom-up design by the
    staff in a business).

    4) Use "voice of the customer", group-think processes to determine
    kinds of products, services, distribution channels, kinds of promotion,
    etc. that are most important for maximizing business in that market
    segment. Then, build groups within that organization to provide the
    products, services, distribution channels, promotion, etc. for that
    market segment (bottom-up design by the staff in each organization).

    Digital's recent reorganization has not done #1 well. Some of the
    "businesses" seem to be based on market segmentation rather than an
    identifiable service or benefit to the customer. Digital fails at #2.
    The direct sales force and engineering are separate organizations from
    the business units - no focus. Engineering and sales are pulled in too
    many directions by requests from the various business units. It has
    failed at #3. The market segmentation is being done by management
    instead of by people closer to the products/services/customer and
    instead of using good processes to identify the segments. It has failed
    at #4. There was no use of well defined processes for determining what
    the customer wants and how to get it to them. And thus the
    organizations are not tuned to providing what the customer wants.

    On scale from "A" to "F" ("F" for fails), I'd give Digital a "D-" (very
    poor, barely passing) on it's reorganization. The good news is that
    it's better than the previous organizational "F".

    Maybe some of the business units will understand what I'm saying. Maybe
    some will change their ways: Create teams of experts on methods and
    processes for finding what the customer wants and delivering what the
    customer wants; define corporate standards that are required to be used
    by everyone (the project does not go to next step without proof of
    having followed the standard processes); build the organizations to
    facilitate those processes and to facilitate what those processes
    indicate are needed to satisfy our customers; train the organization on
    those processes; audit them; and use quantitative measurements to
    refine those processes. Once the processes are defined and people
    trained, maybe they'll allow the organization to build itself from the
    bottom up rather than dictating how to organize, continually refine the
    organization to better satisfy the customer, based on results from
    "voice of the customer" processes.

o  Balancing focus on cost containment with a focus on growth

    Our executives say they are also focusing on growth. If Digital were,
    in fact, focusing on growth there would be strong focus on being first
    in new high-growth application areas.

    A dozen companies had PCs on the market before Digital. Several vendors
    had workstations before Digital. Apollo had clustering before Digital.
    Sun popularized clustering with their McDonald's version (NFS/Yellow
    Pages). Tandem and Stratus had fault tolerant computers many years
    before Digital. Digital has consistently been a laggard in all
    high-growth segments of the computer business.

    A famous hockey player, Wayne Gretzky, said his winning technique was
    to skate to where the puck will be, rather than to where the puck is.
    Digital's track record for being where the puck will be is one of the
    industry's worst.

    Is the "new" Digital any better? Other companies are readying wireless
    portable computers of many types. They are demonstrating them at
    tradeshows. Digital has none - just a group watching the market - no
    product schedules. Other companies are building and testing versions of
    HDTV. Digital has no HDTV product plans.

    Others are creating operating systems, networking, software development
    environments for those wireless portables and HDTVs. Digital is not.

    Even on the traditional desktop computers, other vendors sell software
    development environments with WYSIWYG GUI development tools, tightly
    integrated debuggers, 4GLs, application development tools for end
    users, etc. Digital is not. Digital had one 4GL product that was
    starting to do well. And it was effectively killed. It's in maintenance
    mode. It's best developers are gone.

    There's an engineering group trying to find some business unit to bless
    building a prototype of an end-user application development to compete
    with what is already being sold by others. Engineering is searching for
    support in the business units because they don't know which businesses
    are in the same business - enabling ordinary people (nonprogrammers) to
    access and manipulate data.

    On the silicon side, the industry is moving to highly integrated chips.
    All industry experts agree that disk controllers, communications
    controllers, etc. are all going to be integrated onto the same chip as
    the CPU. This means mixed analog/digital circuits on one chip. All the
    major silicon vendors, except Digital, have been investing heavily in
    mixed signal silicon technology like BiCMOS.

    Industry experts agree that silicon is to moving end-user, consumer
    products like HDTV, portable wireless units, PCs, consumer electronics,
    and appliances. Yet, Digital has very distant plans for the consumer
    silicon. Digital will probably get to that puck long after everyone
    else.

    There is no evidence that Digital is getting any better at anticipating
    and being where it needs to be. In fact, many of the recent cuts have
    decreased the ability to anticipate and act. A person acting like
    Digital would not make it onto even a teenager's hockey team! So how do
    we move Digital from the game playing maturity of a 5 year old child to
    the adult professional level?

    Future mapping would help Digital identify key industry trends more
    accurately. QFD can be used to clearly map features to customer need.
    Contextual inquiry on prototypes can be used to refine the QFD specs.
    There would be far less money and people wasted on projects that are
    dead ends. It's called "managing risk"...

    We could build the organizations to support the process of identifying
    new products and trends. We could build the organization to support the
    process of identifying, in detail, the market size, growth, mapping
    customer desires to product features, etc..

    Digital has historically placed all it's R&D and marketing into
    replacing it's current generation of products with new products of
    better quality at the same price. For example, replacing computers with
    new ones that are 50% faster for about the same price.

    I suggest that this be augmented with: 1) A fixed percentage of R&D and
    marketing research dedicated to products and services targeting market
    segments, where we currently have no products or services. And 2)
    another fixed percentage should go toward replacing the current
    generation of products with SAME quality at LOWER price (besides our
    current BETTER quality at SAME price).

    A major problem with offering better quality at the same price, is the
    the evolution to a "high-end", niche market product or service.
    Competitors take away the bulk of the market by selling the same
    quality at a lower price. Examples are today's high-end CAD vendors
    that are laying people off, while some low end vendors are growing at
    about 40% a year. The "low-end" vendors offered what was once
    considered the "high-end" years ago. But they offer it at a very low
    price. Likewise, many companies are downsizing from mainframes because
    PCs now offer the performance of what was once considered a mainframe
    for a tiny fraction of the price.

    A fixed percentage of R&D and market research going to each of three
    segments would prevent some of the political battles that tend to cause
    the new market or lower price projects to lose out to "traditional"
    projects. For example, 3% of total revenues goes to "more for the same
    price" R&D, 5% goes to "same for a lower price" R&D, and 2% goes to new
    market segment/application area.

    Organizations can be measured on how well they cannibalize their own
    business with "same for lower price" products and services. It's better
    that Digital eat itself than wait for the competition to eat Digital.
    If a large part of our installed base is converted over to an
    alternative Digital product before the competition arrives with similar
    products and services, then Digital keeps it's installed base and can
    grow by competing outside that installed base. This is in contrast to
    Digital's current bean counter strategy of "not leaving any money on
    the table", "milking the cash cows", etc., until the competition
    creates enough pain (by which time it takes too long to respond).

    Part of that fixed budget should go to marketing research. Many people
    have good ideas, but lack the expertise to put together a good business
    case. They need advocates who can help them better communicate their
    ideas and build a market/business case. When anyone in the company
    comes up with an idea, the market research staff should be available to
    help them estimate market size, growth potential, competition,
    technology risk, etc. and use an objective as possible process to
    prioritize this against other proposed ideas.

    New market segment or application area products and services need to be
    treated like first round venture capital investments (seed funding) for
    startups, where only one out of six new products are successful.
    Digital needs to take large risks to make large gains. Using good
    "voice of the customer" processes can help Digital manage the risk and
    provide a better return on investment than it's competitors.

    The Software Development Tools group in Digital used future mapping. It
    clearly identified some trends toward end user software dominating the
    units and revenues of the market. It identified a shift to direct
    marketing distribution channels for some kinds of products. It worked
    - until top-down management went into over-ride. Management decided
    that "we can't compete" in the end-user software market. "We can't
    compete" in the commodity software market. "We can't be #1 or #2
    there." Management decided to retreat to infrastructure software.

    A lot of people in Digital said, "We can't compete in PCs." and "We
    can't compete in the commodity market." Yet, we're are the fastest
    growing PC vendor today. PC magazines rank our products at the top. A
    lot of people in Digital said "We can't compete in silicon and must
    go outside for high performance CPU chips (like MIPS)." Yet, we're now
    shipping the fastest CPU chips on the market.

    You have the talent. You have the ability to learn quickly and adapt.
    It's a slap in the face when some idiot says, "We can't...". What it
    takes to be #1 is focus! If you focus your resources and learning, you
    can be #1 at anything you want.

o  Dangling points

    Although some of the processes I mentioned above are very simple on
    paper, they require considerable skill in practice. I've met people
    that tried QFD once and said, "It didn't work." Russ Doane, Ed
    Prentice, and others in Digital, have learned the hard way how to
    successfully run QFD sessions. I hope Digital makes good use of their
    experience. I recommend something along the line of Don Clausing's
    version of QFD as the first version of a corporate standard for QFD.

    Digital has some very serious problems that will destroy this company -
    in spite of Alpha and the reorganizations. Some major changes must be
    made quickly.

    Digital has the potential to become #1 at many things. Unlocking that
    potential means being #1 in quality in the eyes of the customer and
    balancing cost containment with investment and process for long term
    growth. But realizing that potential requires major changes - not lip
    service from executives and management.

    There is great potential for you to become a success story and a model
    that all others in our industry would use. The big question in my mind
    is whether you will use a brief return to profitability to:

        a) mask the problems, ignoring what needs to be done to unlock
        that potential;

    or

	b) reinvest the revenues (at the expense of profits) into process
	development, training, auditing, organizing from the bottom-up,
	venture fund new development, etc. for long term growth.

    Note that I said "you". If you don't feel empowered to make the above
    happen, then you know what I mean by "top-down company".

    Digital has enviable resources in money, facilities, technology, and
    people. Keep the faith that you can be #1 at anything you want. There
    are a lot of really good people in this company. You've given me a lot.
    I'll miss you.

George Van Treeck
51 Nason St.
Bellingham MA 02019
508-966-3445
    

    An excellent summation.  Have you received any feedback from the
    powers-that-be as to whether they agree or disagree with what you say
    (especially the 18 month or so window-of-opportunity)?

    
    I just sent George the attached. I don't know if he'll get to read it.
    Shame that the company can't seem to value people like him.
    
    Dave
    
From:	SMAUG::GARROD "From VMS -> NT; Unix a mere page from history  19-Mar-1993 1800 -0500" 19-MAR-1993 18:00:17.80
To:	garrod
CC:	
Subj:	Your advice for Digital in DIGITAL.NOTE

    George,

    I just read the note you posted in DIGITAL.NOTE. It really makes a lot
    of sense to me. I think you've dopne Digital a real favour by writing
    it. I've seen your notes in MARKETING and DIGITAL over the years. I
    haven't always agreed with you but I think the majority of what you've
    said has been very far thinking. Pity nobody acted on what you said and
    the problems you pointed out. I also understand from a previous note
    you posted that your outspokedness did not ingratiate you with short
    sighted management. I think that is a shame.

    I wish you the best of luck in whatever you decide to do. Digital is
    losing a very valuable employee.

    I've never met you in person, at least I don't think I have but I feel
    I know you to some small extent through notes. It feels a bit like
    saying goodbye to a friend.

    I wish you the best of luck and I hope you move to a place that can use
    your obvious (at least to me) talent. You will be missed.

    Dave

Well, one of my folks has written to Bob Palmer and Bill Johnson protesting
George leaving. What else do we have to do?
								- Ian W.

What's really starting to annoy me is the strikingly obvious fact that
there are some intelligent, perceptive, and visionary people among the
rank and file who comment here with in-depth analyses and critiques of
Digital's predicament; yet I don't sense the same dedication and
intensity emanating from senior management.  It's becoming apparent
they know something that we don't...  and it's probably unpleasant.

The base-noter has stated several cases which reflect a jagged image
of quality from a broken mirror.  The image in the customer satisfaction
mirror is no better.  Our image is more than just tarnished.  
I think what is being said in .0 is that Digital needs a new mirror.

However -
I don't get the feeling we have such enviable resources.
I don't think we can extol the virtues of quality while selling products
at a lower price with the same quality or lacking quality enhancements.
Unless, of course, we use the slogan "Quality Is Job Two!"

Mike
    
    

    Is George gone already, does anyone know? 
    

    George is still here.  I sit about 50 feet from him.  This is his last 
    week, however.
    
    Mac

    from .3:
    
    > one of my folks has written to Bob Palmer and Bill Johnson protesting
    > George leaving.
    
    For the larger projects I've been involved in we have had someone on
    the team who is the "contructive critic". This person is responsible
    for keeping the rest of the team honest, and calling when they see a
    critical issue being ignored or brushed aside, etc.
     
    George is a very valuable asset to this company as a constructive
    critic, as many of us who have worked with him (or noted with him) will
    attest. While many of us can stay narrowly focused on the work we
    perceive to be before us, George often forces us to look up, see what's
    really going on in the marketplace, and change directions if needed.
    
    I've got to believe that we need this, in a critical way. We need
    critical thinkers with George's background who understand market
    trends, technology directions, and who have thought about where
    computing is headed. 
    
    So his current group is being cut, how about creating a small staff of
    people to perform this "constructive critic" function across the
    company, to help us refine our strategies and keep us aware of how we
    are doing compared to the competition?
    
    /Thorgan

    re.7 nobody _likes_ the devils' advocate.

    Hi George,
    
    You will be missed. From reading your notes in the marketing notes 
    file, I always felt that your arguments were very valid one. I know your 
    group is not going away ! Sometimes the decision making process in this
    company surprises me.
    
    I hope people realize what they are losing ! Good Luck in whatever you
    do.
    
    Best Regards,                               
    
    Jay Srinivasan.
    
    

    re: .8                                             
    
    No, this isn't about being a "devil's advocate", it's about being an
    advocate for what's right for the customer.
    
    This company doesn't need phony devil's advocates who don't sincerely
    believe what they write about, or people who can be counted on to be
    auotmatic critics.
    
    One sign from last year that there was the chance that the old ways of
    Digital were going to change was in the flip-flops around support of
    OSF/1 on MIPS hardware.
    
    As has become clear, the symbolism of Digital "changing its mind" after
    listening to the customer was more important that the substance of
    actually bringing a tangible product to market.
    
    Companies that listen to their customers are going to do well in the
    90's.  Digital is paralyzed with fear that if it listens to the
    customer, it's not going to like what it will hear.

re Note 2425.7 by IAMOK::HORGAN:

>     So his current group is being cut, how about creating a small staff of
>     people to perform this "constructive critic" function across the
>     company, to help us refine our strategies and keep us aware of how we
>     are doing compared to the competition?
  
        The problem is that in the heat of battle nobody, especially
        management, appreciates a critic even if the critic is
        telling them something they vitally need to hear.  If you put
        them all into one place....

        (I personally have been called, by one of my managers, "the
        most critical person at Digital" -- no, that manager didn't
        mean I was critically needed. :-)

        Here's something to ponder:  the Titanic might have survived
        if it hit the iceberg head-on (it would have lost fewer
        sealed compartments).  It swerved at the last minute.  It
        would have been better if the person at the helm hadn't been
        warned of the iceberg.

        Bob

    Well, if you want to use the Titanic metaphor:  I'd prefer insufficient
    arrogance to be sailing blindly thru iceberg-infested waters.  Hearing
    the voices of our customers (and especially, watching them work before
    starting the conversation, so we know *they* are grounded in reality
    too...) is the best metaphor for radar that I know.
    
    
    As several earlier repliers have mentioned, I too have every once in a
    while (when I found time to look in this Notes file or
    nodemo::Marketing) run across an articulate and informed entry from
    George.  I don't know that I've ever responded in print;  I've
    generally just wanted to think about what he said.  But when I heard he
    expected to be TFSO'd I requested that he grace us with a thoughtful
    final summary of his views, and I'm delighted with what he gave us. 
    I've also posted a copy of it over on metoo::QFD Notes.
    
    
    When I joined Digital 33 years ago I'm afraid I was pretty insensitive,
    and my criticisms were sharper and more painful than was probably wise. 
    Nevertheless, I suspect that they were useful--and I never felt that in
    making them I risked my job.
    
    Over the years I've heard a lot of critics and a lot of criticism. 
    When it has been directed at me, it's hurt.  When it has been directed
    at others, it has hurt them.  In my maturity (that's what I prefer to
    claim....) I have tried to find ways to *show* rather than tell, and
    even to find ways for *others to discover* rather than either tell them
    or show them.  That way I don't get in the line of fire, and the job
    gets done.  Sometimes.
    
    However, I try to keep in touch with my earlier abrasive tendencies
    (and my current abrasive tendencies, when I lose my cool) enough to
    appreciate the contribution of people who just blurt out what they see.
    I'm not saying that George is an example of this necessarily, I'm more
    responding to several earlier replies on this topic that George
    got us going on.  When I stub my toe I want to hit whatever hurt me;
    but if I can call upon a little more wisdom, I might turn on a light or
    move the obstacle or just remind myself to use more care.  Critics
    might be less artful than leaders who get others to learn the same
    thing without the critique.  So I try to lead rather than critique.
    Getting engineers to visit their customers teaches the engineers more
    than I ever could--and they get it in a way that doesn't usually just
    generate heated rhetoric, they get it in a way that leads them to
    effective action.
    
    However, the student is someone who is willing to pay a price to learn.
    If it isn't delivered sugar-coated, someone committed to learn will
    chew on it anyway.  That's the spirit in which I read what George has
    written.  I might not like being told.  I might not like being shown. 
    But it may be good for me.
    
    Thanks for doing this George!  And Bon Voyage to wherever your going
    next.  I will miss your continuing contributions, and I'm sure Digital
    is much the poorer for not having them.
            					Russ

    Let me add my thanks to George and express some of the shock that my
    colleagues and I have experienced in seeing Digital get rid of people
    of obvious talent and vision.It's not a shame,it's short sighted and
    criminal-the new businesses we are being forced into require more
    people and more like George,not less.
    However,if the US is anything like Europe,we practice the OPEN DOOR
    policy but with a minor variation(you know how Europeans need to be
    different..).Over here,the open door is marked "EXIT".Say what you
    like,no problem but expect to be a marked man.
    
    Good luck George!