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Conference repair::reserve_forces

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Created:Wed Nov 15 1989
Last Modified:Thu Jan 01 1970
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132.0. "OR model for casualties in the gulf." by BRABAM::PHILPOTT (Col I F 'Tsingtao Dhum' Philpott) Mon Nov 12 1990 13:14

    
    The British and American forces have just revised the expected casualty
    rates for the possible conflict in the Gulf.
    
    Since WWII we have worked on an assumption of 10% "hospitalized
    casualties" - this has just been uprated to 14%.
    
    Now depending on the model for engagement that you use you get
    different figures for the expected casualty rate, but the model I ran
    over the weekend came up with
    
    Dead:		60,000
    Hospitalized:      140,000
    walking wounded:   250,000
    MIA:		20,000
    
    For a one year campaign.
    
    The question is: can public opinion sustain such losses?
    
    /. Ian .\
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132.1seem highMSBCS::TARMEYMon Nov 12 1990 13:3217
    RE: .0
    
    .....can public opinion sustain the losses?
    
    Depends on whether or not the public perceives we are winning or not. 
    What your model shows is the 'cost' side only.  
    
    Unfortunately, public opinion will be driven be the PR folks.  
    
    What are the factors that went into the model?  Where the expected
    losses mainly ground forces?  How did the Air Arm come out?
    
    Knowing very little about our combined strengths and weaknesses, for a
    one year compaign, these numbers feel very high.  I wonder if they are
    because "they're" so good, or "we're" so bad.
    
    	Bill Tarmey
132.2BRABAM::PHILPOTTCol I F 'Tsingtao Dhum' PhilpottMon Nov 12 1990 14:2922
    
    The model was ground forces only.
    
    Factors included: heat and dehydration (especially for casualties), gas
    and bio weapons (a 5% possibility) and difficulties in evacuation.
    
    No the model doesn't rate then as "so good" or us as "so bad" - the
    problems that led to an increase in the casualty rates over earlier
    NATO scenarios are almost all climatic.
    
    I believe the air and naval analysis should still be the same as before
    (though Saddam has threatened to tear downed fliers limb from limb
    which won't improve their survival rates :-|)
    
    I only raised the point here because it has begun to appear on the news
    in Britain (the hospital figures were mentioned on a news bulletin over
    the weekend - the treage implications don't seem to have dawned on the
    journalists yet).
    
    /. Ian .\
    
    
132.3Casualty Assessment...8713::J_BUTLERUSAR...and ready...Mon Nov 12 1990 14:4652
    Obviously, I do not know your model, nor its algorithms, but
    having been involved in casualty assessment and planning in
    "another life," I think your figures on the dead may be a bit high...
    unless you are considering friendly AND opposing forces. Your ratios
    of KIA:WIA do seem very similar to the ratios I have used.
    
    If you consider civilians too, and add the use of NBC weapons,
    your figures (for the dead) are probably low.
    
    Colonel, do your figures for MIA include POW and MIA, or just true
    MIA (ones whose disposition cannot be determined within 30 days
    or so?) 
    
    "Walking wounded" figures over a 1-year campaign will include those
    folks who are wounded more than once, too. Many are returned to
    duty, so while the numbers appear large, they could be feasible
    if you consider "wound incidents" as opposed to wounded individuals.
    
    A significant planning factor we used was based on the time the
    soldier was out of action. "Walking wounded" are returned to their
    duties on the same day they were wounded (less than 24 hours). 
    The treatment is either completed at the scene or at the next
    echelon's aid station.
    
    We differentiated further between those returned to duty 24-72 hours
    after receiving the would, those returned 3 days to 2 weeks after
    the wound, and those taking longer than 2 weeks to return.
    
    At the higher echelons (Division and up) we also considered wounds
    taking longer than 30 days to recover as being evacuated
    out-of-theater. These were "true" losses to the force structure
    when calculating the required replacement rate.
    
    I would expect the return-to-duty rate to be higher in the "western"
    forces, and lower in the "regional" forces, simply based on the
    quality and quantity of medical care available.
    
    If you could factor in the availability of munitions resupply,
    and assume a reduced resupply capacity for the Iraqis, then both
    sides' casualty rates would drop further as the conflict extends
    past, say, 90 days. Iraqi casualty figures for MIA/POW would increase,
    but KIA/WIA would decrease.
    
    I'll see if I can find some of my old (and obviously unclassified)
    references and make an entry later this week as results from another
    model.
    
    Regards!
    
    John B.
    
    
132.4on the surface, anywayMSBCS::TARMEYMon Nov 12 1990 15:0110
    
    A question to those more knowledgeable than me:
    
    Has Iraq signed, agreed to, subscribe to, -  whatever the proper
    terminology is - the Geneva Convention?
    
    If there is to be war, I would not like to see (again) the two sides
    playing by different rules.
    
    	Bill Tarmey
132.5BRABAM::PHILPOTTCol I F 'Tsingtao Dhum' PhilpottMon Nov 12 1990 15:2735
When I said I ran the model I meant it literally, but I didn't write the model.

We are currently bringing a VAX 9000 on stream and the simulation model (written
in SIMULA if anybody cares) was given to us as a test, because the department 
that wrote it want a 9000 also.

Given that I am not any sort of expert on this, and the figures I quoted came 
from a debriefing over a double scotch in the bar...

The figures are supposedly for non-Arab belligerant military land forces only 
(incidentally according to this mornings news the Royal Navy are citing an
expectation of KIA at double the normal NATO scenario levels, though I don't
know why - kamekaze?).

Wounded does indeed include those who are returned to action after treatment.

Those returned within 24 hours are "treaged out" of the figures - they probably
won't ever get to a field hospital for treatment - the wounded-and-treated-in 
hospital figures are essentially for those who need the services of a field 
hospital. There was a breakdown of numbers according to how long they would 
take to return to duty and also estimates of those who would need to be moved 
to a hospital ship, base hospital or out of theatre. I don't recall the 
breakdown, but if these numbers are significant (how's that for ducking the 
question) it could account for the fact that Britain and the US are talking 
about massive reinforcements setting out for the gulf before the first 
engagement has taken place.

The MIA figure quoted is a hybrid of MIA and POW, largely because it is 
anticipated that it will be difficult to establish disposition of MIAs given
Iraqi attitudes. 

Anyway, I appreciate your responce. I'll see if any unclassified figures show
up that I can add more detail with.

/. Ian .\
132.6Perhaps an oversight..USCTR1::RTRUEBLOODRollyn Trueblood DTN 297-6553Mon Nov 12 1990 16:044
**The figures are supposedly for non-Arab belligerant military land forces**

Does the model assume the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), the Egyptians, 
and our other Arab allies are not deployed in their current positions?
132.7BRABAM::PHILPOTTCol I F 'Tsingtao Dhum' PhilpottMon Nov 12 1990 16:169
The people who put the model together "assumed" that the Arab forces would not
engage, but rather would form a rear echelon defense force to prevent an Iraqi 
breakthrough whilst the US/UK/French forces invaded Kuwait and fought the
Iraqis directly. Casualties amongst the Arabs under this model are limited to
bombing etc...

Anyway, like I said I didn't write the simulation...

/. Ian .\