Conference repair::reserve_forces

There are several levels of vetting. In the context of this book they mean
"positive vetting" or "PV"

A PV is a process whereby the subject answers a questionnaire about all his life
who he's known and worked with, where he has lived, names of neighbours, clubs 
and associations he's been in...

The investigating officers then meet and question as many as possible. They 
check bank records, credit histories, criminal records, police "blotters" 
wherever he has lived or worked, talk to university lecturers, check Special
Branch (roughly the British equivalent of the FBI's counter intelligence
operation) and MI5/MI6 records for even passing references. There are then one 
or more personal interviews. 

It is incidentally an expensive process: if Digital wants one of its employees
PV-ed to work on government material it costs Digital about �10,000 for the
privilege.

Somebody I know incidentally was denied clearance because he had once sent
funds to the Jane Fonda peace-in-Vietnam campaign! (Yes they check who you've 
paid money to as well).

The main difficulty is that references (old neighbours) may have died - and 
this is especially a problem if say they died in a car accident. Records may
not be available (ie the subject may have lived abroad for a while creating
a blank spot in the Special Branch files), or worse you may simply not remember
all the details they want.

PV is a prerequisite to clearance: once you've been PV-ed (and it is renewed 
from time to time) you then get clearance for particular information and 
clearance at certain levels for specific projects. It is technically a breech
of the Official Secrets act to disclose to anybody who isn't PV-ed what your
clearance is.

The level below PV is called NV (normal vetting) - you fill in a short form and
they do a check on the police national computer, Special Branch (who use 
non-computerised records) and the various security agencies (Foreign Ministry,
Ministry of Defense etc). This is relatively quick, but easy to defeat if you
were a professioanl agent - it is designed to find security risks, rather than
deep penetration agents.

Above PV there is a vague world of personal clearances that are not legally
discussable, even if I knew anything about them (and I couldn't admit it if 
I did). Fun isn't it. The only publicly released material here refers to "ULTRA"
which was a level of clearance whereby a particular list of people were allowed 
access to decrypted cipher material on the personal authorisations of the
British Prime Minister and the US President.

/. Ian .\

    I read the book "Spy Catcher" while I was on deployment to Morocco
    a couple of years back. Rabat is not what you would call a great
    liberty town so what else was I supposed to do? :-)
    
    In any event, the author made some statements in the book that didn't quite
    ring true. I tend to get a bit skeptical whenever I read, "How I
    Won The War....." type books, a category which I think "Spy Catcher"
    belongs to. Counter-intelligence work is like detective work - it
    is a painstaking, detailed, monotonous process that sometimes yields
    results and sometimes doesn't. It requires great patience and is
    a team effort. If you study the histories of how famous spy cases
    were prosecuted, they almost always stretch out over years. Only
    during wartime is the process speeded up (out of necessity).
    
    Finally, results of counter-intelligence efforts can provide dividends
    to the intelligence community. If, for example, you have uncovered
    a spy ring based out of the Slobovian Embassy which has penetrated
    Ruritanian Naval codes, you don't go out and immediately round up
    the Slobovian spies. You let them operate as if everything was still
    status quo and you use them to feed back false or seemingly accurate
    information to their Slobovian masters which hopefully will after
    a time impede the ability of Slobovia to impose it's will on Ruritania.
    
    That's how the game (and variations on it) is played. That was the
    essence of the XX Committee which controlled Abwehr spies in the
    UK during WWII.
    
    Mark
    RMC USNR

Ian,

Thanks for the detailed and understandable description ov the vetting 
process.  We have similar activities that parallel much of what you 
described.  Without going into details that are not for this conference, we 
have National Agency Checks, NACs; and Background Investigations, BIs, and 
Special Background Investigations, SBIs for Secret and Top Secret 
clearance.  They are both quite expensive as well as very time consuming 
here also.

Mark,

I did find the book rather interesting.  I had just finished reading one of 
Clancy's books, and did not like the writing style as well as in Patriot 
Games.

    As a side note, not to drive us down a security system rathole.  I
    wonder if the process is similar on the east side of the pond.
    
    I left active duty with a security clearance at quite a high level.  I
    don't recall the actual terminology, but it was at least top secret. 
    Anyway, I took a job with a "Major Defense Contractor", working on on
    sensitive type stuff.  At this point, my military clearance was still
    current and had been recently updated.
    
    The company had identification badges much like ours at DEC, but they
    were color coded to show level of security clearance.  This controlled
    where you could go, to whom you could speak, and about what.  The
    Company paid >$10K for a security check on me that took four and a half
    months to complete.  To me, it was an example of the left hand not
    knowing what the right was doing.
    
    By the way, the Company that I worked for was a Contractor to the Navy
    Department, in fact the buildings were Navy Property that the Company
    leased.  My original security clearance was managed through the Navy
    Department.  The Navy managed and paid for the new one.
    
    I can sort of understand different departments/agencies not talking to,
    or accepting output from, each other, but this (to me) was extreme.
    
    But, he says tongue in cheek with just a hint of sarcasm, the system sure 
    works.  It kept the likes John Walker out!
    
    	Bill Tarmey

    Re .4:
    
    There's a flip side to everything and you hit on it, Bill.
    
    The principle of compartmented information is good but it can lead,
    as you described, to the right arm not knowing what the left is
    doing.
    
    Without going into too much detail either (good point, Chief Phil),
    contractor clearances are supposed to be handled via the office
    out of Columbus, OH (the initials of which escape me right now -
    show's what 2 years at DEC has done to my memory). Military clearances
    usually come out of DOD if I'm not mistaken.
    
    To the best of my knowledge, cross-referencing between DOD and the
    agency in Columbus does take place (or is supposed to anyway).
    
    Mark
    RMC USNR

Actually not so much a rathole.

I have an active clearance because of my reserve work.

Some years ago Digital wanted me to work on something at Vickers (who make
British atomic subs) and it needed vetted clearance. I was turned down for
clearance for this because of "synergy" - the powers that be didn't want me
cleared on two different, but vaguely related, aspects of weapons technology.

They are currently trying to get a clearance for me to work on something for 
another defence industry Digital-customer. I wonder if that'll get blocked too?

/. Ian .\

    
    Just as with Ian, I have an active security clearance because of
    my position with the reserves. 
    
    When Digital applied for a lower security clearance for me for work
    here, it took two and a half months to be approved.
    
    Visits to the customer site were to an office two doors away from
    my place of reserve employment.
    
    Roger

I noticed an article in our local paper last week (Manchester Union 
Leader), that the KGB was publicly claiming that ther was indeed a "fifth" 
man, along with the known other four.  they were claiming that he was in a 
separate part of the government than the other four.  They would not share 
additional information, but it appears that the Soviets were making a movie 
about it.

Phil

    Re .8:
    
    They might just be rattling MI5's cage too.....but then again maybe
    not.
    
    In any event, they'll get some mileage from it.
    
    Mark
    RMC USNR