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Conference turris::digital_unix

Title:DIGITAL UNIX(FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEC OSF/1)
Notice:Welcome to the Digital UNIX Conference
Moderator:SMURF::DENHAM
Created:Thu Mar 16 1995
Last Modified:Fri Jun 06 1997
Last Successful Update:Fri Jun 06 1997
Number of topics:10068
Total number of notes:35879

9798.0. "Refrainf from dumping all information on 3.2.G" by GENIE::MUKHERJEE () Tue May 13 1997 09:35

Hi,

Is it possible to prevent certain information from being dumped when a system crashes?

There are a few 3.2.G based AS 400 that are used as X.400 gateways.  These are loaded
with some encrypted keys that are used in the transaction routines.  The customer is
concerned that when a system dump takes place, it should not reveal the keys.

Anyone know how to do this?

We have built the kernel without the KDEBUG option.  Is this a good idea or are there
negative impacts to this?

The customer is highly concerned about security and does not want passwords or keys
revealed in a dump.  BTW - the system has C2 activated with only <5 users.

Are there any other items that we should remove from the system that would hinder people
from debugging the kernel?  We have not installed the C compiler, but have not checked to see if
DBX is loaded by default.  

Thanks,
Arjo
T.RTitleUserPersonal
Name
DateLines
9798.1Readable (80 column) version of base noteSMURF::PBECKPaul BeckTue May 13 1997 13:3130
                     <<< Note 9798.0 by GENIE::MUKHERJEE >>>
              -< Refrainf from dumping all information on 3.2.G >-

Hi,

Is it possible to prevent certain information from being dumped when a
system crashes?

There are a few 3.2.G based AS 400 that are used as X.400 gateways.  These
are loaded with some encrypted keys that are used in the transaction
routines.  The customer is concerned that when a system dump takes place, it
should not reveal the keys.

Anyone know how to do this?

We have built the kernel without the KDEBUG option.  Is this a good idea or
are there negative impacts to this?

The customer is highly concerned about security and does not want passwords
or keys revealed in a dump.  BTW - the system has C2 activated with only <5
users.

Are there any other items that we should remove from the system that would
hinder people from debugging the kernel?  We have not installed the C
compiler, but have not checked to see if DBX is loaded by default.  

Thanks,
Arjo


9798.2Make the dump as secure as the memory.WTFN::SCALESDespair is appropriate and inevitable.Tue May 13 1997 23:0112
.1> Is it possible to prevent certain information from being dumped when a
.1> system crashes?

I doubt it.  However, it should be possible to ensure that the dump itself is 
secure.

Perhaps I'm missing something major, but it seems like if you can control access
to the system, then you've won the battle.  (I.e., normal security precautions
about limiting root access should suffice, no??)


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