[Search for users] [Overall Top Noters] [List of all Conferences] [Download this site]

Conference back40::soapbox

Title:Soapbox. Just Soapbox.
Notice:No more new notes
Moderator:WAHOO::LEVESQUEONS
Created:Thu Nov 17 1994
Last Modified:Fri Jun 06 1997
Last Successful Update:Fri Jun 06 1997
Number of topics:862
Total number of notes:339684

207.0. "PGP, Cryptography" by RUSURE::EDP (Always mount a scratch monkey.) Tue Dec 20 1994 13:22

From:	US2RMC::"[email protected]" "MAIL-11 Daemon" 15-DEC-1994 16:00:34.96
To:	[email protected]
CC:	
Subj:	Zimmermann legal defense fund (fwd)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


            Phil Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund Appeal

    In November, 1976, Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie announced
their discovery of public-key cryptography by beginning their paper
with the sentence: "We stand today on the brink of a revolution in
cryptography."

    We stand today on the brink of an important battle in the
revolution they unleased.  Philip Zimmermann, who encoded and released
the most popular and successful program to flow from that discovery,
Pretty Good Privacy ("PGP"), may be about to go to court.

    It has been over fourteen months now since Phil was first informed
that he was the subject of a grand jury investigation being mounted by
the San Jose, CA, office of US Customs into the international
distribution, over the Internet, of the original version of the
program.  On January 12th, Phil's legal team will meet for the first
time with William Keane, Assistant US Attorney for the Northern
District of California, who is in charge of the grand jury
investigation, in San Jose.  An indictment, if one is pursued by the
government after this meeting, could be handed down very shortly
thereafter.

    If indicted, Phil would likely be charged with violating statute 22
USC 2778 of the US Code, "Control of arms exports and imports."  This
is the federal statute behind the regulation known as ITAR,
"International Traffic in Arms Regulations," 22 CFR 120.1 et seq. of
the Code of Federal Regulations.  Specifically, the indictment would
allege that Phil violated 22 USC 2778 by exporting an item listed as a
"munition" in 22 CFR 120.1 et seq. without having a license to do so.
That item is cryptographic software -- PGP.

    At stake, of course, is far more than establishing whether Phil
violated federal law or not.  The case presents significant issues and
will establish legal precedent, a fact known to everyone involved.
According to his lead counsel, Phil Dubois, the US government hopes to
establish the proposition that anyone having anything at all to do with
an illegal export -- even someone like Phil, whose only involvement was
writing the program and making it available to US citizens and who has
no idea who actually exported it -- has committed a federal felony
offense.  The government also hopes to establish the proposition that
posting a "munition" on a BBS or on the Internet is exportation.  If
the government wins its case, the judgment will have a profound
chilling effect on the US software industry, on the free flow of
information on the emerging global networks, and in particular upon the
grassroots movement to put effective cryptography in the hands of
ordinary citizens.  The US government will, in effect, resurrect
Checkpoint Charlie -- on the Information Superhighway.

    By now, most of us who are reading this know about Phil and the
case, whether by having the program and reading the doc files or by
seeing reports in the Wall Steet Journal, Time, Scientific American,
the New York Times, Wired, US News and World Report, and hundreds of
other news outlets; on Usenet groups like talk.crypto.politics or
alt.security.pgp; or by listening to Phil give talks such as the one he
gave at CFP '94 in Chicago.  We know that PGP has made great strides
since version 1.0, and is now a sophisticated encryption and
key-management package which has become the de facto standard in both
micro and mainframe environments.  We know that Phil and the PGP
development team successfully negotiated a commercial license with
Viacrypt, and, through the efforts of MIT, a noncommercial license for
PGP with RSA Data Security, the holders of the patent on the RSA
algorithm on which PGP is based, thus freeing the program from the
shadow of allegations of patent infringement.  We know that programs
such as PGP represent one of our best bulwarks in the Information Age
against the intrusions of public and private information gatherers.  We
know that PGP is a key tool in insuring that the "Information
Superhighway" will open the world to us, without opening us to the
world.

    What we may not all know is the price Phil has had to pay for his
courage and willingness to challenge the crypto status quo.  For years
now Phil has been the point man in the ongoing campaign for freely
available effective cryptography for the everyday computer user.  The
costs, personal and professional, to him have been great.  He wrote the
original code for PGP 1.0 by sacrificing months of valuable time from
his consulting career and exhausting his savings.  He continues to
devote large amounts of his time to testifying before Congress, doing
public speaking engagements around the world, and agitating for
"cryptography for the masses," largely at his own expense.  He is now
working, still for free, on the next step in PGP technology, PGP Phone,
which will turn every PC with a sound card and a modem into a secure
telephone.  And we know that, just last month, he was searched and
interrogated in the absence of counsel by US Customs officials upon his
return from a speaking tour in Europe.

    Phil's legal team consists of his lead counsel, Philip Dubois of
Boulder, CO; Kenneth Bass of Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, in
Washington, DC, first counsel for intelligence policy for the Justice
Department under President Carter; Eben Moglen, professor of law at
Columbia and Harvard Universities; Curt Karnow, a former assistant US
attorney and intellectual property law specialist at Landels, Ripley &
Diamond in San Francisco; and Thomas Nolan, noted criminal defense
attorney in Menlo Park.

    While this is a stellar legal team, what makes it even more
extraordinary is that several of its members have given their time for
free to Phil's case.  Still, while their time has been donated so far,
other expenses -- travel, lodging, telephone, and other costs -- have
fallen to Phil.  If the indictment is handed down, time and costs will
soar, and the members of the team currently working pro bono may no
longer be able to.  Justice does not come cheap in this country, but
Phil deserves the best justice money can buy him.

    This is where you and I come in.  Phil Dubois estimates that the
costs of the case, leaving aside the lawyers' fees, will run from
US$100,000 - $150,000.  If Phil's team must charge for their services,
the total cost of the litigation may range as high as US$300,000.  The
legal defense fund is already several thousand dollars in the red and
the airline tickets to San Jose haven't even been purchased yet.

    In September, 1993 I wrote a letter urging us all to support Phil,
shortly after the first subpoenas were issued by Customs.  Today the
need is greater than ever, and I'm repeating the call.

    Phil has assumed the burden and risk of being the first to develop
truly effective tools with which we all might secure our communications
against prying eyes, in a political environment increasingly hostile to
such an idea -- an environment in which Clipper chips and digital
telephony bills are our own government's answer to our concerns.  Now
is the time for us all to step forward and help shoulder that burden
with him.

    It is time more than ever.  I call on all of us, both here in the
US and abroad, to help defend Phil and perhaps establish a
groundbreaking legal precedent.  PGP now has an installed base of
hundreds of thousands of users.  PGP works.  It must -- no other
"crypto" package, of the hundreds available on the Internet and BBS's
worldwide, has ever been subjected to the governmental attention PGP
has.  How much is PGP worth to you?  How much is the complete security
of your thoughts, writings, ideas, communications, your life's work,
worth to you?  The price of a retail application package?i  Send it.
More?  Send it.  Whatever you can spare: send it.

    A legal trust fund, the Philip Zimmermann Defense Fund (PZDF), has
been established with Phil Dubois in Boulder.  Donations will be
accepted in any reliable form, check, money order, or wire transfer,
and in any currency, as well as by credit card.

    You may give anonymously or not, but PLEASE - give generously.  If
you admire PGP, what it was intended to do and the ideals which
animated its creation, express your support with a contribution to this
fund.

                           *    *    *

    Here are the details:

    To send a check or money order by mail, make it payable, NOT to Phil
Zimmermann, but to "Philip L. Dubois, Attorney Trust Account."  Mail the
check or money order to the following address:

    Philip Dubois
    2305 Broadway
    Boulder, CO USA 80304
    (Phone #: 303-444-3885)

    To send a wire transfer, your bank will need the following
information:

    Bank: VectraBank
    Routing #: 107004365
    Account #: 0113830
    Account Name: "Philip L. Dubois, Attorney Trust Account"

    Now here's the neat bit.  You can make a donation to the PZDF by
Internet mail on your VISA or MasterCard.  Worried about snoopers
intercepting your e-mail?  Don't worry -- use PGP.

    Simply compose a message in plain ASCII text giving the following:
the recipient ("Philip L. Dubois, Attorney Trust Account"); the bank
name of your VISA or MasterCard; the name which appears on it (yours,
hopefully :-)); a telephone number at which you can be reached in case
of problems; the card number; date of expiry; and, most important, the
amount you wish to donate.  (Make this last item as large as possible.)
Then use PGP to encrypt and ASCII-armor the message using Phil Dubois's
public key, enclosed below.  (You can also sign the message if you
like.)i  E-mail the output file to Phil Dubois ([email protected]).
Please be sure to use a "Subject:" line reading something like "Phil
Zimmermann Defense Fund" so he'll know to decrypt it right away.

    Here is Phil Dubois's public key:

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.7

mQCNAiyaTboAAAEEAL3DOizygcxAe6OyfcuMZh2XnyfqmLKFDAoX0/FJ4+d2frw8
5TuXc/k5qfDWi+AQCdJaNVT8jlg6bS0HD55gLoV+b6VZxzIpHWKqXncA9iudfZmR
rtx4Es82n8pTBtxa7vcQPhCXfjfl+lOMrICkRuD/xB/9X1/XRbZ7C+AHeDONAAUR
tCFQaGlsaXAgTC4gRHVib2lzIDxkdWJvaXNAY3NuLm9yZz6JAJUCBRAsw4TxZXmE
uMepZt0BAT0OA/9IoCBZLFpF9lhV1+epBi49hykiHefRdQwbHmLa9kO0guepdkyF
i8kqJLEqPEUIrRtiZVHiOLLwkTRrFHV7q9lAuETJMDIDifeV1O/TGVjMiIFGKOuN
dzByyidjqdlPFtPZtFbzffi9BomTb8O3xm2cBomxxqsV82U3HDdAXaY5Xw==
=5uit
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

                           *    *    *

    This campaign letter will be posted in a number of Usenet groups.
I will also be turning it into a FAQ-formatted document, which will be
posted monthly in the relevant groups and which will be available by
anonymous ftp from ftp://ftp.math.luc.edu/pub/hmiller/PGP/pzdf.FAQ.  If
you come upon, or up with, any other ways in which we can help raise funds
for Phil, drop me a line at [email protected] and let me know, so that I
can put it in the FAQ.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQCVAwUBLu6xOtEdYC5Hk8UpAQEhFwP+JrEyY1LvnPmcjp+oLGmIAUbZixJj3QfE
T3KpjnNotoJ7/CtWF1EjhjHN8IXPgcQcyF3p38ekysARDv0MA4tzXhL1Egdq/7QV
L8XW2z0PjWgu8X/Om0eXZkIOGeaoBvP/e/qDYEIcWXtxrwokYcEtoNCR/KQoZw+A
6NnK1nwxnLw=
=Ez3J
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Hugh Miller, Ph.D.                                     Voice: 312-508-2727
Asst. Professor of Philosophy                            FAX: 312-508-2292
Loyola University Chicago                               Home: 312-338-2689
6525 N. Sheridan Rd.                               E-mail: [email protected]
Chicago, IL 60626                         WWW: http://www.luc.edu/~hmiller
PGP Public Key 4793C529:  FC D2 08 BB 0C 6D CB C8  0B F9 BA 55 62 19 40 21

Note: I have verified that the public key listed here for Philip Dubois in
fact matches his previously published key.  -- GDM

       Gary McGath
       [email protected]



% ====== Internet headers and postmarks (see DECWRL::GATEWAY.DOC) ======
% Received: from inet-gw-3.pa.dec.com by us2rmc.zko.dec.com (5.65/rmc-22feb94) id AA06021; Thu, 15 Dec 94 16:00:55 -050
% Received: from mv.MV.COM by inet-gw-3.pa.dec.com (5.65/10Aug94) id AA00316; Thu, 15 Dec 94 12:58:40 -080
% Received: by mv.mv.com (8.6.9/mv(b)/mem-940616) id PAA18275 for efnh-announce-ll; Thu, 15 Dec 1994 15:27:34 -050
% Received: from [192.80.84.60] by mv.mv.com (8.6.9/mv(b)/mem-940616) id PAA18228 for <[email protected]>; Thu, 15 Dec 1994 15:27:09 -050
% Message-Id: <[email protected]>
% Mime-Version: 1.0
% Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
% Date: Thu, 15 Dec 1994 15:29:52 -0500
% To: [email protected]
% From: [email protected] (Gary McGath)
% Subject: Zimmermann legal defense fund (fwd)
% Sender: [email protected]
% Precedence: bulk
% Reply-To: [email protected]
T.RTitleUserPersonal
Name
DateLines
207.2Consider merits ?GAAS::BRAUCHERThu Dec 15 1994 16:539
    
    Forget about the solicitation part for a minute.
    
    If cryptographic software is a "munition" (if frogs grew fur), as
    the government claims, then wouldn't you have the right to keep
    and bear it (the precious second) ?  Perhaps this is the judicial
    test y'all's been waitin fer...
    
      bb
207.3WAHOO::LEVESQUEprepayah to suffahFri Dec 16 1994 07:205
    Sounds like a bogus attempt on the part of big brother to  prevent us
    from having any privacy whatsoever. But Janet Reno's interested in
    prying into every aspect of our private lives, especially the flow of
    information between private individuals. Why they could be talking
    about guns after all...
207.4CSOA1::LEECHannuit coeptis novus ordo seclorumFri Dec 16 1994 09:1913
    Big brother wants to nail him before he can finish his next
    project...the secure phone throught the computer thing.  Just imaging,
    the FBI, BATF, CIA, et-al would be unable to spy on your phone
    conversations with ease.  Please note that in the last box there was a 
    discussion on phone tap legislation...big brother wants communications 
    technology set up a certain way so they can spy on everyone.
    
    It is my guess that justice will NOT be served in this case, and the
    little guy (and the American public) will get screwed yet again.  We
    are too apethetic to do anything about it, though, and the government
    powers know it.
    
    -steve
207.5DASHER::RALSTONAin&#039;t Life Fun!Fri Dec 16 1994 09:5116
    Back to the basenote.
    
    Phil will lose. The only unregulated industry in this country is the
    computer industry. The government powermongers have been searching for
    a way to get their claws on an industry that has made great strides in
    achievement, unobstructed by government interference. Government and
    all bureaucrats would give their eye teeth to steal the honest power
    generated by the computer industry. As this progresses watch the
    bureaucrats start to find all matter of false reports in order to
    convince the american public that the computer industry, including the
    internet, needs to be controlled. When this happens the industry will
    grind to a halt, putting a stop to the great values that have been
    produced. Further advances will be stifled as happened in the medical,
    transportation, food, and education industries.
    
    ...Tom
207.6If alt.sex.* becomes the main source of traffic, watch outTNPUBS::JONGSteveFri Dec 16 1994 10:0811
   Well, I don't subscribe to the world view Tom expresses.  I, of course,
   have one of my own.  If the Internet falls under government regulation,
   it will be because of some excess or outrage.  I don't think it's likely
   to happen, but I submit that with combination of a Republican (as in
   family-values, sexual-purity, and anti-crime) Congress and the explosive
   growth of sex-oriented newsgroups, picture-exchange clubs, and
   (apocryphal) FTP sites on the Internet might be the combination that
   triggers the action.
   
   Either that, or the heat in alt.discussion.politics.newt-gingrich will
   get too intense 8^)
207.1RUSURE::EDPAlways mount a scratch monkey.Tue Dec 20 1994 13:2310
    This topic is for discussion of cryptography, the export of PGP, and
    the government's investigation thereof.  Discussion of Digital's
    solicitation policy should go in topic 183.
    
    
    				-- edp
    
    
Public key fingerprint:  8e ad 63 61 ba 0c 26 86  32 0a 7d 28 db e7 6f 75
To find PGP, read note 2688.4 in Humane::IBMPC_Shareware.
207.7WECARE::GRIFFINJohn Griffin ZKO1-3/B31 381-1159Tue Dec 20 1994 15:2711
    The Sunday New York Times Magazine ran a feature stroy on Whitfield
    Diffie, public key cryptography and the Clipper chip controversy, 
    I think, in the March-April timeframe of 1994. The story portrayed
    Diffie as congressional witness and activist, and talked about other
    players in the cryptography world (some of whom have significant
    financial investments at stake).
    
    I took a course in cryptography with Diffie a few years ago at
    Northeastern. Clear, well-organized lectures -- he's immensely
    knowledgeable about the history of cryptography, as well as the
    mathematics of it. 
207.8PENUTS::DDESMAISONStoo few argsTue Dec 20 1994 15:283
  re last 5 - relevant replies moved here from the "Solicitations" topic

207.9TOOK::MORRISONBob M. LKG1-3/A11 226-7570Sat Jan 14 1995 18:4317
>             <<< Note 207.5 by DASHER::RALSTON "Ain't Life Fun!" >>>

>    produced. Further advances will be stifled as happened in the medical,
>    transportation, food, and education industries.
    
  I understand how government interference has "stifled" the medical (drugs,
devices, etc.) industry. How has it stifled advances in transportation?
  Sorry to rathole this topic, but I am very interested in transportation
(specifically, rail).
  Re PGP: I wonder if the plaintiff can get off the hook if he agrees not to
develop PGP Phone?
  I sort of understand why the government feels they must have the capability
to eavesdrop on all communications: paper, voice phone, and Internet. Are
they pursuing this as an export issue because there are no laws on the books
to prevent PGP from being used in the U.S., but they know if PGP can't be ex-
ported, it in effect renders it unusable within the U.S. as well?
  Please keep us posted in this topic on what happens in this case.
207.10RUSURE::EDPAlways mount a scratch monkey.Tue Aug 22 1995 15:24124
    Nutters are crazy, and we can always trust the government to tell the
    truth.  Sure.  Except that while the administration was telling us
    Clipper would remain voluntary, the FBI, NSA, and DoJ had concluded it
    must not remain voluntary.
    
    
    				-- edp
    
Public key fingerprint:  8e ad 63 61 ba 0c 26 86  32 0a 7d 28 db e7 6f 75
To find PGP, read note 2688.4 in Humane::IBMPC_Shareware.
    
    
From:	US2RMC::"[email protected]" "PRIVACY Forum" 19-AUG-1995 20:18:46.32
To:	[email protected]
    
PRIVACY Forum Digest     Saturday, 19 August 1995     Volume 04 : Issue 18

Date: 16 Aug 1995 15:57:13 
From: "Dave Banisar" <[email protected]>
Subject: FBI Files on Clipper Release

FOR RELEASE:  August 16, 1995, 2:00 p.m. EST

CONTACT: David Sobel (202) 544-9240

               FBI FILES: CLIPPER MUST BE MANDATORY

	WASHINGTON, DC - Newly-released government documents show 
that key federal agencies concluded more than two years ago that 
the "Clipper Chip" encryption initiative will only succeed if 
alternative security techniques are outlawed.  The Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) obtained the documents from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation under the Freedom of Information 
Act.  EPIC, a non-profit research group, received hundreds of 
pages of material from FBI files concerning Clipper and 
cryptography.

	The conclusions contained in the documents appear to conflict 
with frequent Administration claims that use of Clipper technology 
will remain "voluntary."  Critics of the government's initiative, 
including EPIC, have long maintained that the Clipper "key-escrow 
encryption" technique would only serve its stated purpose if made 
mandatory.  According to the FBI documents, that view is shared by 
the Bureau, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Department 
of Justice (DOJ).

	In a "briefing document" titled "Encryption: The Threat, 
Applications and Potential Solutions," and sent to the National 
Security Council in February 1993, the FBI, NSA and DOJ concluded 
that:

     Technical solutions, such as they are, will only work if 
     they are incorporated into *all* encryption products.  
     To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the 
     use of Government-approved encryption products or 
     adherence to Government encryption criteria is required.

	Likewise, an undated FBI report titled "Impact of Emerging 
Telecommunications Technologies on Law Enforcement" observes that 
"[a]lthough the export of encryption products by the United States 
is controlled, domestic use is not regulated."  The report 
concludes that "a national policy embodied in legislation is 
needed."  Such a policy, according to the FBI, must ensure "real-
time decryption by law enforcement" and "prohibit[] cryptography 
that cannot meet the Government standard."

	The FBI conclusions stand in stark contrast to public 
assurances that the government does not intend to prohibit the use 
of non-escrowed encryption.  Testifying before a Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on May 3, 1994, Assistant Attorney General Jo Ann 
Harris asserted that:

     As the Administration has made clear on a number of 
     occasions, the key-escrow encryption initiative is a 
     voluntary one; we have absolutely no intention of 
     mandating private use of a particular kind of 
     cryptography, nor of criminalizing the private use of 
     certain kinds of cryptography.

 	According to EPIC Legal Counsel David Sobel, the newly-
disclosed information "demonstrates that the architects of the 
Clipper program -- NSA and the FBI -- have always recognized that 
key-escrow must eventually be mandated.  As privacy advocates and 
industry have always said, Clipper does nothing for law 
enforcement unless the alternatives are outlawed."

	Scanned images of several key documents are available via the 
World Wide Web at the EPIC Home Page:

		http://www.epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/

                              -30-

David Banisar ([email protected])        *  202-544-9240 (tel)
Electronic Privacy Information Center   *  202-547-5482 (fax)
666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301     *  HTTP://epic.org
Washington, DC 20003                    *  ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org 

   [ This information should of course be a surprise to nobody who has
     followed this topic.  Such conclusions were obvious from the start, and
     various concerns regarding encryption have been made clear enough in
     past Congressional testimony and reports.  However, there is a
     considerable jump between concluding that Clipper will fail without
     legislation banning other encryption, and actually submitting such
     legislation, passing it, and having it withstand court scrutiny.

     The opposition to such an attempt would no doubt be quite dramatic, to
     put it mildly.  Since it's clear that there's really no way to stop all
     non-Clipper encryption, it seems likely that legislative efforts would
     concentrate on banning non-compliant encryption in hardware devices, in
     conjunction with the commission of crimes, and similar specified
     areas.  In the case of crimes, onerous additional penalties might be
     enacted to discourage use of such systems--just as penalties are much
     higher for committing many crimes with firearms. 

     Regardless of any "limitations" to the intended focus of such
     legislative efforts, the effect of any such moves to ban non-Clipper
     encryption could be chilling to personal privacy, industry, commerce,
     and other areas of daily life, to a degree that's difficult to
     underestimate as we pass into the true information age.

     Comments on all sides of this issue are invited.

					-- MODERATOR ]
207.11RUSURE::EDPAlways mount a scratch monkey.Wed Aug 23 1995 09:379
    Yoo hoo, Bill Licea-Kane, oh seeker of truth.  What's the word for when
    two or more people communicate to commit a wrongful act?
    
    
    				-- edp
    
    
Public key fingerprint:  8e ad 63 61 ba 0c 26 86  32 0a 7d 28 db e7 6f 75
To find PGP, read note 2688.4 in Humane::IBMPC_Shareware.
207.12CALLME::MR_TOPAZWed Aug 23 1995 10:091
       Salary-planning?
207.13SPSEG::COVINGTONThere is chaos under the heavens...Wed Aug 23 1995 10:194
    Bahahahaha!
    <----------
    
    
207.14Civil Disobedience in support of personal privacyCOVERT::COVERTJohn R. CovertWed Aug 23 1995 15:1053
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 1995 14:17:36 -0600
From: Don Henson <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: Over 350 'Munitions T-shirts' Shipped

We have thus far shipped over 350 of the RSA/Perl Munition T-shirts. 
Orders are still pouring in. Don't be left out. Order your's today.

Now you can wear a TSHIRT that has been classified as a MUNITION by the 
US Goverment. That's right! The US International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) makes exporting cyrptographic materials illegal. 
ITAR further defines export as providing cryptographic information to a 
non-US/Canadian citizen even if you are inside the US at the time. 
Providing information is further defined as telling or showing 
information to a non-US/Canadian citizen. The Munitions Tshirt has a 
Perl implementation of the RSA algorithm (the one used by PGP) printed 
on the front along with a bar-code of the same algorithm.

What all the above means is that if you wear the Munitions Tshirt where 
a non-US/Canadian citizen can see it, even if it is inside the US, you 
have just exported cryptographic material (which is already freely 
available outside the US) and have become a criminal in the eyes of the 
US Government. Now you too can become an international arms dealer for 
the price of a tshirt (US$15.95 - US$19.95, depending on size) and the 
guts to wear it.

If you are a non-US/Canadian citizen, you can still own a Munitons 
Tshirt by ordering the tshirt from a source that is outside the US. The 
email response to a request for info (see next paragraph) includes full 
instructions for ordering the tshirt no matter where you live.

For more information on how to own this classic example of civil 
disobedience, just send email to [email protected] with the subject of 
'SHIRT'. (You don't have to be a US/Canadian citizen to request the 
info.) Or, if you have WWW access, just point your Web browser to:

     http://colossus.net/wepinsto/wshome.html

By the way, 25% of the profits from the sale of the tshirt (in the 
US/Canada) goes to the PHIL ZIMMERMANN LEGAL DEFENSE FUND to help 
defend the author of PGP from harassment and possible prosecution by 
the Fedgoons.

And if you get arrested for wearing the Munitions Tshirt, we'll refund 
your purchase price.  :-)

Get your Munitions Tshirt now. Who knows how long they'll stay in 
production!

Don Henson, Managing Director (PGP Key ID = 0X03002DC9)
West El Paso Information Network (WEPIN)
Check out The WEPIN Store at URL:
http://colossus.net/wepinsto/wshome.html
207.15RUSURE::EDPAlways mount a scratch monkey.Wed Aug 23 1995 17:3512
    Re .14:
    
    You're late.  Wore mine yesterday.  Plus I have the Perl script on a 2"
    button.  Does putting it in a pocket constitute carrying a concealed
    weapon?
    
    
    				-- edp
    
    
Public key fingerprint:  8e ad 63 61 ba 0c 26 86  32 0a 7d 28 db e7 6f 75
To find PGP, read note 2688.4 in Humane::IBMPC_Shareware.
207.16DRDAN::KALIKOWDIGITAL=DEC: ReClaim TheName&amp;Glory!Wed Aug 23 1995 23:555
    207.15> Does putting it in a pocket constitute carrying a concealed
            weapon?
    
    Nope, but we thought you were just glad to see us...
    
207.17RUSURE::EDPAlways mount a scratch monkey.Thu Aug 24 1995 10:1842
Article 28581 of alt.privacy:
From: [email protected] (Andre Bacard)
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.privacy,alt.security,alt.journalism
Subject: Chrysler Award to Phil Zimmermann!
Organization: CRL Dialup Internet Access	(415) 705-6060  [Login: guest]
Lines: 33


Hello CyberFolks,
 
The WALL STREET JOURNAL announced that pro-privacy hero Phil Zimmermann
is a winner of the 1995 Chrysler Award. Congratulations Phil! Attached
you'll find details. Thanks to Mike Godwin of EFF for telling me this.
 
See you in the future,
Andre Bacard
======================================================================
[email protected]                    Bacard wrote "The Computer Privacy
Stanford, California                Handbook" [Intro by Mitchell Kapor].
http://www.well.com/user/abacard    Published by Peachpit Press, (800)
Enjoy your privacy...               283-9444, ISBN # 1-56609-171-3.
=======================================================================
 
                    Excerpts from WALL STREET JOURNAL
              (Full-Page Notice from Chrysler Corporation)
                        August 16, 1995, Page A9
 
"For the past three years, Chrysler Corporation has been honoring
outstanding designers. By showcasing great innovations in fields such as
graphic, interactive, product, architectural, and environmental designs,
Chrysler strives to bring well-deserved attention to those designers
whose common attribute is a passionate commitment to their vision."
 
"... Philip Zimmermann is the designer of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), an
E-Mail encryption software. Thanks to the algorithms of PGP, which was
released to the public as free software in 1991, E-mail messages can be
sent securely all over the world without risk of interception by any
third party."
 
 


207.18RUSURE::EDPAlways mount a scratch monkey.Thu Aug 24 1995 10:189
    No comment yet from the Seeker of Truth on the feds being caught in a
    deception.  Guess he's still busy digging that tunnel.
    
    
    				-- edp
    
    
Public key fingerprint:  8e ad 63 61 ba 0c 26 86  32 0a 7d 28 db e7 6f 75
To find PGP, read note 2688.4 in Humane::IBMPC_Shareware.
207.19EST::RANDOLPHTom R. N1OOQThu Aug 24 1995 15:554
Gee, thousands (millions?) of computer users out there already have PGP...
we'll have to ban it so they won't have it anymore!

DUH, I'm from the government, and I'm here to help you.
207.20?PERFOM::LICEA_KANEwhen it&#039;s comin&#039; from the leftMon Aug 28 1995 14:116
    
    You post a document about FBI, DoJ, and NSA position on cryptography.
    
    So should I therefore conclude that pineapple bombs exist?????
    
    								-mr. bill
207.21RUSURE::EDPAlways mount a scratch monkey.Tue Aug 29 1995 10:2612
    Re .20:
    
    > So should I therefore conclude that pineapple bombs exist?????
    
    Sometimes you feel like a nutter.  Sometimes you don't.
    
    
    				-- edp
    
    
Public key fingerprint:  8e ad 63 61 ba 0c 26 86  32 0a 7d 28 db e7 6f 75
To find PGP, read note 2688.4 in Humane::IBMPC_Shareware.
207.22WAHOO::LEVESQUEthe heat is onTue Aug 29 1995 10:472
    <== Funniest note ever written by edp, with the sole exception of the
    explanation of his p_name.
207.23CALLME::MR_TOPAZTue Aug 29 1995 11:096
       
       > Funniest note ever written by edp
       
       You must have missed his Moderator's Fiat, which was far funnier. 
       Of course, on that occasion he apparently didn't intend to be
       funny.
207.24They still make those cars?????SOLVIT::KRAWIECKIBeen complimented by a toady lately?Tue Aug 29 1995 11:132
    
    > Moderator's Fiat
207.25WAHOO::LEVESQUEthe heat is onTue Aug 29 1995 11:233
    >You must have missed his Moderator's Fiat
    
     Apparently.
207.26DEVLPR::DKILLORANDanimalThu Aug 31 1995 12:1913
"Government is simply asserting its right to read private communications." 

Think this is an interesting quote?  It was made by a Justice Department 
attorney in an interview in which he advocated implimenting the Clipper Chip 
and the outlawing of any other kind of encryption or similar function device.

This is from private e-mail, I haven't seen the article.

The source is Lan Times, August 28, 1995. Cover story, "Big Brother on the 
Net?" by R. Scott Raynovich. The quote itself appears on page 19, where the 
story is continued from the front cover.

207.27EST::RANDOLPHTom R. N1OOQThu Aug 31 1995 12:492
A government with rights... hmm, interesting concept, wonder what country
he's talking about?
207.28STAR::OKELLEYKevin O&#039;Kelley, OpenVMS DCE SecurityThu Aug 31 1995 15:0111
               <<< Note 207.26 by DEVLPR::DKILLORAN "Danimal" >>>


> "Government is simply asserting its right to read private communications." 
>
> Think this is an interesting quote?  It was made by a Justice Department 
> attorney in an interview in which he advocated implimenting the Clipper Chip 
> and the outlawing of any other kind of encryption or similar function device.

Can someone please post the whole article, or at least verify the quote and
post the name of the attorney?  I'd like to send a letter to this person.
207.29exSNOFS2::ROBERTSONwhere there&#039;s smoke there&#039;s toastMon Sep 04 1995 04:4715
                   <<< Note 207.26 by DEVLPR::DKILLORAN "Danimal" >>>
    
    
    > "Government is simply asserting its right to read private
    communications." 
    >
    
    
    Similarly, down here in Oz the govt. wouldn't allow digital phones with
    uncrackable scramblers. The police decided it was in our best interests
    to be able to tap any mobile communication.
    
    
    
    	
207.30SX4GTO::OLSONDBTC Palo AltoMon Jan 15 1996 14:2075
    AP 11 Jan 96 21:34 EST V0928
    
    Copyright 1996 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
   
    SAN FRANCISCO (AP) -- A software writer won't be prosecuted for a
    program he wrote that was put on the Internet and is now widely used by
    computer users to keep their communications secret, the government said
    Thursday. 
   
    Philip Zimmermann's Pretty Good Privacy encryption program turns
    computer messages into a jumble of numbers and letters unreadable to
    anyone except the intended recipient. 
   
    The code is so unbreakable that it is classified as munitions under the
    Arms Export Control Act, making its export without a license a felony. 
   
    Federal prosecutors began investigating Zimmerman in 1993 after the
    program appeared on the Internet global computer network. Zimmerman
    said that others put it there, not him. 
   
    The government opposes export of cryptographic technology for fear it
    will make it harder to monitor electronic communications overseas, and
    domestic law enforcement agencies are concerned such programs could
    keep them from eavesdropping on digital conversations. 
   
    U.S. Attorney Michael J. Yamaguchi announced the decision not to
    prosecute Zimmerman, but didn't say why. If convicted, Zimmermann would
    have faced 51 months in prison. 
   
    "I'm just really pleased that the sword of Damocles is not over me
    anymore and I wonder why it took so long," Zimmermann said in a phone
    interview from his home in Boulder, Colorado. 
   
    "This is not just for spies anymore. It's for the rest of us. The
    information age is here. The rest of us need cryptography to conduct
    our business." 
   
    The case had been closely watched as computer users and the government
    square off over free speech and privacy rights. 
   
    Some critics contended it was foolish of the government to claim that
    Zimmerman had broken the law because the same coding information
    forbidden for export electronically may be shipped abroad in print
    form. They also noted that the technology already circulates throughout
    the world, making the law unenforceable. 
   
    "Zimmermann never exported Pretty Good Privacy, so the U.S. Attorney
    seemed to be missing the point. Unfortunately there still is no clear
    ruling from our government as to whether or not making software
    available on the Internet counts as exporting it," said Simson
    Garfinkel, who wrote a book about the program. 
   
    Zimmerman's supporters argued that without encryption, government could
    do widespread eavesdropping, perhaps for political reasons, scanning
    for words and phrases it considers subversive. They acknowledge that a
    few criminals may use programs like PGP to hide out in cyberspace, but
    believe that concern is outweighed by free speech and privacy rights. 
   
    "The case was part of the government effort to crack down on good
    technologies for privacy. We hope the government's decision signals a
    rethinking of federal policy in this very important area," said Marc
    Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington,
    an on-line civil rights watchdog group. 
   
    Others see the 2 1/2-year investigation of Zimmermann as intimidation. 
   
    "It seems to me is that all the U.S. Attorney is saying is that they
    don't want the public relations nightmare of prosecuting Philip
    Zimmermann, but they still want everyone scared so that they won't
    exercise their Constitutional rights," Garfinkel said. 
   
    ------
   
    Pretty Good Privacy is available on the World Wide Web at
    http://www.epic.org/privacy/tools.html
207.31SOLVIT::KRAWIECKIRhubarb... celery gone bloodshot.Mon Jan 15 1996 14:264
    
    
    Zimmermann oughta start yanking his own chains and try to sue...
    
207.32BUSY::SLABOUNTYDon&#039;t like my p_n? 1-800-328-7448Mon Jan 15 1996 14:294
    
    	How would that relate, if at all, to a PGP NOTES file that can
    	be accessed by people from both sides of the Atlantic/Pacific?
    
207.33HIGHD::FLATMANGive2TheMegan&amp;KennethCollegeFundMon Jan 15 1996 14:393
    Anybody know how much Zimmerman spent in defending himself?

    -- Dave
207.34TRLIAN::MIRAB1::REITHIf it&#039;s worth doing, it&#039;s worth overdoingWed Jan 17 1996 12:025
    
    I don't have a number, but he had to stop work for over 2 years, and
    spent thousands on the lawyers (although many hours were pro bono).
    
    	skip
207.35WAHOO::LEVESQUESpott ItjThu Jan 30 1997 09:0559
    Student breaks highest-level encryption code U.S. allows exported
    
    Associated Press, 01/29/97; 23:23 
    
    SAN FRANCISCO (AP) - It's the most secure encryption code the United
    States allows to be exported - and it took a graduate student only 3
    hours to break it, industry officials said Wednesday. 
    
    ``It shows you that any kid with access to computers can crack this
    kind of cryptography,'' said RSA Data Security Inc. spokesman Kurt
    Stammberger, whose company had offered the challenge. ``The
    cryptography software that you are allowed to export is so weak as to
    be useless.'' 
    
    The company put its challenge on the Internet Monday, offering $50,000
    in prizes to crack various levels of encryption codes with electronic
    key lengths ranging from 40 to 256 bits. 
    
    The federal government, worried about security, has barred exports of
    codes higher than 40 bits. Devices with larger numbers of bits are
    stronger and harder to decode. 
    
    Last month, the Clinton administration began allowing companies to
    export encryption devices with 56-bit keys - but only if they have a
    way for law enforcement officials to crack the code and intercept the
    communications. 
    
    Meanwhile, Ian Goldberg, a University of California-Berkeley graduate
    student, took on RSA Data Security's challenge by linking together 250
    idle workstations that allowed him to test 100 billion possible
    ``keys'' per hour. 
    
    That's like trying every possible combination for a safe at high speed,
    and many students and employees of large companies have access to such
    computational power, the school said. 
    
    In 3 hours, Goldberg had decoded the message, which read, ``This is why
    you should use a longer key.'' 
    
    Goldberg, who won $1,000 with his effort, says the moral is clear. 
    
    ``This is the final proof of what we've known for years - 40-bit
    encryption technology is obsolete,'' the student said. 
    
    That puts software exporters in a quandary, said Stammberger. 
    
    Almost all business software now requires built-in encryption, a
    necessity for any company doing business over the Internet. 
    
    But no one will buy U.S. software that can be cracked by a student in 3
    hours, he said. 
    
    ``You're talking about the U.S. giving up its global dominance in
    software because of some outdated Cold War spy agencies,'' Stammberger
    said. ``People in the industry are pretty angry ... The market is
    enormous, literally in the hundreds of billions of dollars.'' 
    
    As of Wednesday afternoon, no one had broken any of the codes higher
    than 40 bits, Stammberger said. 
207.36GOJIRA::JESSOPAnkylosaurs had afterburnersThu Jan 30 1997 14:161
    They'd better kill the kid.  We don't want any security leaks.