T.R | Title | User | Personal Name | Date | Lines |
---|
854.1 | Yes, a bug | ZENDIA::DBIGELOW | Innovate, Integrate, Evaporate | Thu Jul 06 1995 19:07 | 9 |
| Yes, this looks like a bug. You can definately edit the PCM database
if you are not a PCM user. The way that it used to work is that
you had to be logged into the system account or root (Unix), so it
looks like we've intriduced a new bug with v1.6.
There should be a new MUP kit for the V1.6 kit which we hope to have
ready with a few weeks.
Dave
|
854.2 | | OPG::PHILIP | And through the square window... | Thu Jul 06 1995 19:38 | 8 |
| Ren�
I have just fixed this, as Dave says, this will be available
in the MUP kit which should be ready for testing next week.
Cheers,
phil
|
854.3 | Still some 'minor' problems. | 54687::WIJKAMP | One day, you won't drink beer, you'll drink GROLSCH | Mon Jul 31 1995 11:56 | 63 |
|
Hello,
After installing the ECO V1 for V1.6, the customer reports stil some
'small' security problems.
First:
When the nice nonprivilegde and unmentioned user starts up a C3 he
receives a nearly empty C3 window, with only lines and periferals and
no systems in sight.
His EXIT and QUIT are grayed out. But he can do a SAVE or SAVE as ...
from the options menu, and so can create a new version of
console$user_defaults:CONSOLE$C3.DAT. (He even owns the file.) Since
this is in a common directory this is not pleasant. The next 'prived'
user receives an empty C3. So a totaly nonprived user can distroy my
hardwork designed C3.
Onother nasty point is that, since EXIT and QUIT do not work, the only
'exit' that is possible is CTRL-Y. (And since I always start C3 as
detached process only a STOP/ID will do.)
Second:
When I do an EXPORT from the editor, a *.port file is created.
When I have users that have no access at all, they are mentioned as
follows in the *.port file:
DELETE_USER:
NAME: Duck
END:
ADD_USER:
NAME: Duck
INFO: Duck test voor Ren�.
MAY_STARTUP: N
MAY_RECONFIGURE: N
MAY_UNLOCK: N
MAY_BREAK: N
MAY_SHUTDOWN: N
MAY_ARCHIVE: N
MAY_EXITC3: N
MAY_EDIT_CFG: N
MAY_ACCESS_ALL_SYSTEMS: Y
MAY_ACCESS_ALL_GROUPS: Y
END:
The missing item is MAY_EDIT_C3 (or some 'symbol' like that).
When doing an import from this file, this user all a sudden has the
right to EDIT C3.
Customer has taken measures to minimize the effect off these unwanted
sideeffects, but like to see a fix.
Thanks again for your answers/help/replies ect. in advance again.
Greetings,
Ren�.
|
854.4 | | 29067::BUTTERWORTH | Gun Control is a steady hand. | Mon Jul 31 1995 15:13 | 24 |
| > console$user_defaults:CONSOLE$C3.DAT. (He even owns the file.) Since
> this is in a common directory this is not pleasant. The next
>'prived' user receives an empty C3. So a totaly nonprived user can distroy
> my hardwork designed C3.
I have two suggestion to workaorund this problem:
Dissallow write access to the CONSOLE$USER_DEFAULTS directory using a
rights-id or UIC based protection.
Define the CONSOLE$USER_DEFAULTS to be a search list that has both a
common directory and a user specific directory in the equivalence
names and disallow write access to the common directory for these
users.
The fix for the C3 will be to stipple out the "Save" button when a user
doesn't have the priviledge to edit the C3. If they aren't allowed to
edit it they shouldn't be allowed to save it either.
I would open a priority 3 IPMT so that the problem is officially
reported.
Regards,
Dan
|
854.5 | Protection does not allow access. | 54687::WIJKAMP | One day, you won't drink beer, you'll drink GROLSCH | Tue Aug 01 1995 04:48 | 47 |
| When the user would have had write access to the
console$user_defaults directory, and read/write access to
CONSOLE$C3.DAT, than you could expect that he had
the possibility to read and write this file, and I
probably would not have entered reply .3.
The Problem is: (I agree that I did not state this clearly before.)
This USER (UIC = [123,456]) has no rights to the file, and only
has E access to the directory.
$ dir console$user_defaults/sec
Directory CONSOLE$ROOT:[C3]
CONSOLE$C3.DAT;11 [SYSTEM] (RWED,RWED,,)
$ sh log console$root
"CONSOLE$ROOT" = "$1$DKA100:[CONSOLE.]" (CONSOLE$LOGICAL_NAMES)
$ dir/sec $1$DKA100:[CONSOLE]c3
Directory $1$DKA100:[CONSOLE]
C3.DIR;1 [SYSTEM] (RWE,RWE,RE,E)
So somehow PCM break's 'normal' protection rules.
For my customer this problem is not so big anymore. I convinced
him to add all users to PCM. (Not so many on a CONSOLE-system.)
And after the ECO this stops the access for the users without
access granted.
BUT: Now we have the following side-effect.
During the tests (he is still testing), he did an export with
al his user added, and a number off them with no access at all.
After the IMPORT again, all a sudden this users without ANY access
where allowed to edit C3 again. (All the time this C3.)
He finds this not acceptable. He can't trust the behaviour of
export/import, and has to check things over again.
So the main point is that he still has no 'waterproof' way to
stop users that should not have any access.
Greetings,
Ren�.
|
854.6 | | 29067::BUTTERWORTH | Gun Control is a steady hand. | Tue Aug 01 1995 15:47 | 55 |
| >When the user would have had write access to the
>console$user_defaults directory, and read/write access to
>CONSOLE$C3.DAT, than you could expect that he had
>the possibility to read and write this file, and I
>probably would not have entered reply .3.
Maybe. I took your note to read that "a user should not be able to
modify/destroy a common CONSOLE$C3.DAT file" and basically I was
agreeing you. I think it should be fixed. You asked for a workaround
and I came up with one.
>The Problem is: (I agree that I did not state this clearly before.)
>This USER (UIC = [123,456]) has no rights to the file, and only
>has E access to the directory.
>$ dir console$user_defaults/sec
>Directory CONSOLE$ROOT:[C3]
>CONSOLE$C3.DAT;11 [SYSTEM] (RWED,RWED,,)
>$ sh log console$root
> "CONSOLE$ROOT" = "$1$DKA100:[CONSOLE.]" (CONSOLE$LOGICAL_NAMES)
>$ dir/sec $1$DKA100:[CONSOLE]c3
>Directory $1$DKA100:[CONSOLE]
>C3.DIR;1 [SYSTEM] (RWE,RWE,RE,E)
>So somehow PCM break's 'normal' protection rules.
The C3 is INSTALL'ed with SYSPRV which so it used the SYSTEM protection
field to gain access to the file.
>For my customer this problem is not so big anymore. I convinced
>him to add all users to PCM. (Not so many on a CONSOLE-system.)
>And after the ECO this stops the access for the users without
>access granted.
>BUT: Now we have the following side-effect.
>During the tests (he is still testing), he did an export with
>al his user added, and a number off them with no access at all.
>After the IMPORT again, all a sudden this users without ANY access
>where allowed to edit C3 again. (All the time this C3.)
>He finds this not acceptable. He can't trust the behaviour of
>export/import, and has to check things over again.
Obviously this is a bug and needs to be fixed. Please log an IPMT so
that it gets tracked and fixed.
Regs,
Dan
|
854.7 | An IPMT it will be. | 54687::WIJKAMP | One day, you won't drink beer, you'll drink GROLSCH | Wed Aug 02 1995 09:06 | 22 |
|
Dan,
When I re-read my reply, I'm aware of the unpleasant undertone in
my reply .5. I'm sorry for that, it was not mentioned to sound like
that. The problem with this kind of problems is very often, that you
looked into it for a while, you check a number of possible causes, and
can't find a reason/solution ect.
When you enter a note, you're 3 steps ahead, and you forget to mention
that you checked the first 'obvious' things.
You hope to get a reply, and often you get the obvious one
that you have forgotten, so I think you're right to give a
workaround/advise that seems obvious, when I did not mention that I
checked that. (I have the feeling I start to be a philsopher. -) )
Thanks for your replies.
I agree with you, and raise an IPMT case.
Greetings,
Ren�.
|