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Conference csc32::consolemanager

Title:POLYCENTER Console Manager
Notice:Kits, Scans, Docs on CSC32:: as PCM$KITS:,PCM$DOCS:, PCM$SCANS:
Moderator:CSC32::BUTTERWORTH
Created:Thu Aug 06 1992
Last Modified:Fri Jun 06 1997
Last Successful Update:Fri Jun 06 1997
Number of topics:1541
Total number of notes:6564

195.0. "Security Features?" by SQGUK::NOFERINI () Wed Feb 23 1994 13:59

    Hi,
    
    looking in the User Guide of PCM it seems that the only security
    features provided by the product is the definition of the user profiles
    and of the assigned privileges.
    
    There is anybody who can say me if there are some other security 
    features I was not able to find out from the PCM UG?
    
    Thanks in advance.
    
    							Anna
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195.1OPG::PHILIPAnd through the square window...Wed Feb 23 1994 14:2310
Anna,

  What you have read in the User guide is all there is.

  Were you looking for something specific? Have we forgotten
  something you or your customer requires?

Cheers,
Phil

195.2same question, different question.SQGUK::NOFERINIThu Feb 24 1994 10:1323
    Phil,
    
    let me ask the question in different fashion.
    
    The PCM is composed by processes and data file. There are two way to
    protect the software and the data:
    
    1. Using the standard features for security provided by the operating 
    system (file protection, for istance).
    
    2. Defining the user name in the profile database.
    
    Are these security features enough to protect the software/product and
    the data by any intrusion?
    
    At the moment I have no specific requirements from the customer. My
    question was only to get more information as possible about the
    product.
    
    Thanks.
    
    							Anna
                                                            
195.3Security mechanism.OPG::SIMONThu Feb 24 1994 11:0625
On UNIX

The files used by CM are granted access only to root for write as are the
sockets used for IPC.

In order that the normal user may access the files and sockets protected from
him the console image is setuid. This image in tern calls the images required to
perform the CM functions.

No shell escapes exist as such in any of the CM functions which means we are
within the security requirements.

VMS.

We again restrict file and mailbox access and use Installed images to provide
the required privs.


In both cases the overlaying security is provided by the CM database in that the 
CM images each check the user privs before allowing the relevant function to be
called.

Hope that is clearer.

Cheers Simon...
195.4thanksSQGUK::NOFERINIThu Feb 24 1994 16:451
    
195.5access restriction by system/group ?HANSBC::BACHNERTwo beer or not two beer.. (Shakesbeer)Mon Feb 28 1994 13:3716
I just had a look at the User Guide to find out details about security, access
restriction etc.

I found that the access restrictions (e.g. may transmit break signal, may
archive console data, ...) are only settable per user and not per system/group.

Did I miss something ?  Though I don't currently have an immediate request, I
can think of the following situation:

Systems are divided into two groups with a manager (group) assigned to each
group of systems. Each manager group should have full access to "their" group of
systems, with restricted (monitoring) access to the other group of systems. As I
interprete the User Guide, this is not possible - correct ?

Thanks for your help,
Hans.
195.6OPG::PHILIPAnd through the square window...Mon Feb 28 1994 14:0225
Hans,

>>I found that the access restrictions (e.g. may transmit break signal, may
>>archive console data, ...) are only settable per user and not per system/group.
>>
>>Did I miss something ?  Though I don't currently have an immediate request, I
>>can think of the following situation:

  You didnt miss anything. Giving a system BREAK privilege would not be the
  correct thing to do as it would mean ANY user with access to the system would
  have the ability to send the BREAK signal.

>>Systems are divided into two groups with a manager (group) assigned to each
>>group of systems. Each manager group should have full access to "their" group of
>>systems, with restricted (monitoring) access to the other group of systems. As I
>>interprete the User Guide, this is not possible - correct ?

  You are correct, this is not possible in V1.1

  User groups are not something we thought of, however, if you submit a Phase 0
  request when Phase 0 is announced for V1.1+, we will certainly consider
  implementing such a feature.

Cheers,
Phil
195.7more details to .5HANSBC::BACHNERTwo beer or not two beer.. (Shakesbeer)Mon Feb 28 1994 14:1927
Phil,

thanks for the speedy reply !

I'm afraid I did not express my question clearly enough. I'll use an example to
illustrate my idea:

I have two groups of systems: "Production" and "Development". For simplicity of
the example, there are two system managers: J_DOE who is responsible for the
"Production" group, and J_SMITH who is responsible for the "Development" group.
What I am thinking of is the following setup:

J_DOE has full access to "his" production group, and monitoring access to the
development group.

J_SMITH has full access to "his" development group, and monitoring access to the
production group.

I did not want to enable BREAK simply on the system level, but on a per user/per
system level, i.e. allow a specific user different level of access to different
(groups of) systems.

BTW, the concept of user groups which you found in my request seems to be a good
one as well, even if my suggestion wasn't meant to go that far ;-)

Cheers,
Hans.
195.8OPG::PHILIPAnd through the square window...Mon Feb 28 1994 14:309
Hans,

  Well that certainly clarifies things, as well as making it more
  difficult for us to implement!! My request still stands though,
  can you please submit a formal Phase 0 request when we announce
  Phase 0 for V1.2

Cheers,
Phil