Conference tnpubs::xwell

17.0. "A Few Reminiscences" by DELNI::JONG (Steve Jong/NaC Pubs) Fri Oct 02 1987 11:59

    In response to a query about what it was like working for companies
    other than Digital, I entered this note in the DIGITAL Notes file.
    
    				* * * * * * 
    
    	I worked in Honeywell's minicomputer group as a technical
	writer for ten years before coming to Digital.  Things went
	downhill sharply over that period; I hope there was no
	connection!  Seriously, that period corresponds to Honeywell's
	marketplace defeat on the mainframe front (losing to IBM) and
	the minicomputer front (losing to Digital et al).  What follows
	are strictly my own recollections and opinions.
	
	When I started at Honeywell in 1976, it was a multibillion-
	dollar conglomerate, and one of the top computer vendors (our
	slogan was "The Other Computer Company"), while Digital was
	just a smaller niche-market competitor.  Now, Honeywell is
	formally leaving the computer business, and Digital is Number 3
	with a bullet.  Losing is certainly a different perspective
	from what DECcies have known over the past few years.

	Honeywell Information Systems Division (1955-1987) was always a
	troubled stepchild of Honeywell, Incorporated.  Created through
	acquisitions of castoffs from Raytheon, General Electric, and
	Xerox, we struggled to integrate product lines while attempting
	to compete across the board with IBM.  The corporate offices in
	Minneapolis never quite knew what to do with us.  Honeywell
	Control Systems has always been the market leader; Honeywell
	Aerospace and Defense is strongly competitive in its markets.
	Honeywell Information Systems barely broke even.

	Our perspective in the minicomputer group was that we had very
	good hardware, but not enough good software.  We were in the
	business market, so we did things like COBOL, transaction
	processing, and database well.  Digital had the scientific
	market, and we didn't interfere.  We thought we could take over
	Wang's share of the office-automation market, because we could
	integrate DP and WP better.  I think that strategy is having
	mixed success today.  It seemed the sales force always found an
	excuse to sell a mainframe, for a fat commission, instead of a
	mini, for a relatively puny commission.  Overall, Honeywell's
	sales stagnated, while Digital's sales (for example)
	skyrocketed.  After literally years of rumored pullouts,
	Honeywell pulled the plug last year and sold most of
	Information Systems to NEC and Group Bull.

	There is a sharp difference in corporate culture between
	Honeywell Information Systems and Digital.  The tangible
	differences between market failure and market success include
	layoffs, accelerating from unexpected shocks to yearly
	prunings; cancelled employee events (no more Family Day at
	Canobie Lake Park); real hiring freezes, salary freezes, and
	salary-action pushouts; and a constant stream of negative
	comments from the press.  It bred a frustration that there
	weren't enough resources to keep up, a frantic pace as we
	released products on a quickening pace to maintain the illusion
	that we were viable, and an attendant cynicism about what
	management was doing.  

	Honeywell is over a century old.  Some of its managers seem
	to have been founders.  As is the case with older companies,
	Honeywell is top-heavy with managers.  This hurts productivity.
	Imagine one section head for every six workers, one manager for
	every three section heads, one director for every three
	managers, one vice-president for every three directors, one
	group vice-president for every three vice-presidents, and so on
	up.  With less than 40,000 employees there, I had more layers
	of management between me and the chairman of the board than I
	now have between me and Ken Olsen in a company of over 100,000
	employees.  
	
	Having too many managers also clogs action.  Everything has to
	be studied, approved, and implemented.  Sometimes this is
	superior to the Digital style of mass consensus, but sometimes
	it isn't.  The best example is the simplest.  Once upon a time,
	the mini leader was not Digital but--you guessed it--Honeywell.
	This happened when we acquired Computer Controls Corporation,
	and the rights to its products, in the mid-1960's.  Management
	considered the potential market for minicomputers, decided
	there was none, and continued to sell IBM 1401-busting OS/2000
	systems.
	
	Finally, management overpopulation promoted savage political
	infighting, as the managers, like oversexed lemmings, competed
	for their share of the scarce turf.  Sometimes managers would
	infuriate you because you knew they were just professional
	managers, and technically incompetent; they would do an equally
	bad job managing factories, people, or inventories.  The
	Digital credo, "Do the right thing," is always thrust at you,
	and people genuinely try to adhere to it.  There was nothing of
	the sort at Honeywell (probably there's nothing of the sort at
	most companies, to be fair); often, the politically correct
	action was taken.  At least it was acknowledged; sometimes as
	Digital, the same things seem to happen, but everyone denies
	it.

	I touched on resource problems before.  You probably think you
	have it tough where you are.  Let me assure you that things
	could be worse.  Digital is an engineer's Nirvana, where you
	can get two or even three terminals/workstations/computers in
	your office.  That is very rare.  Digital is turning away
	applicants, even as a salary laggard.  Honeywell suffered
	(and still suffers) from a hemmorhage of talent, even though it
	of necessity pays well.  Advertise for a programmer who knows
	VMS, and you'll get a lot of applicants; advertise for a
	programmer who knows MOD 400, and twiddle your thumbs.  It's
	that way for technical writers, support people, and testers,
	too; that's what market share does to you.  
	
	Having so many resources, and having a matrix management style,
	Digital seems to practice a strange (to me) sort of internal
	competition to bring new products to market.  It's safe to
	assume that there are at least two groups at Digital working on
	new products in every market segment!  Only the strong survive.
	At Honeywell, we simply didn't have the resources to work that
	way.  I still don't know if the practice is wasteful or not.

	I don't think the people at Digital are superior in any way to
	the people who were at Honeywell.  In fact, some Digital people
	seem both parochial in their viewpoint and spoiled by the
	company's success.  There's an attitude that "we're the best
	company and the best workers." It's understandable; it's just
	not true.

    Steve,
    
    You've said a mouthful, and I strongly agree with nearly everything you
    wrote.  If there's an issue to be raised, it would be to split some
    hairs over the quality of the remaining talent at Honeywell. 
    
    There's a basic difference in demographics between the two companies.
    Digital has continued to hire bright young college graduates over the
    last decade, while Honeywell hired nearly none other than the AEP folks
    (many of whom are now here at Digital).  During the assorted layoffs
    and salary freezes/delays, Honeywell managed to squeeze out most of its
    mediocre performers, but also lost many of its most talented younger
    engineers. 
    
    The result is that the remaining engineering staff is overworked and
    relatively senior.  Instead of innovating, they're just holding on,
    hoping for retirement to relieve their intellectual and emotional
    burdens.  Without the next generation of "young Turks", the future
    doesn't look very promising.
    
    To address the relative quality issue directly, one of the (several)
    burdens which I had at Honeywell which haven't been much of a problem
    here at Digital has to do with the ability to trust my peers' work.
    At Honeywell, there were a number of very good people who you could
    count on to do what needed to be done in a timely fashion.  They,
    unfortunately, weren't in the majority.  Here, they seem to be.