Conference 7.286::digital

From BusinessWeek 28-Apr-97

WHY THE FASTEST CHIP DIDN'T WIN 

Digital's superspeedy Alpha outraces the Pentium. But so far, it can't crack
the mass market 


Last summer, executives from Digital Equipment Corp. fanned out across the
country. They traveled light, carrying the latest samples of the company's
powerful Alpha computer chip encased in plastic sleeves the size of credit
cards. Their mission: To talk computer makers, including Compaq Computer Corp.
and IBM, into using the chip as the engine for speedy new machines.

But after 10 months on the road, it's beginning to look more like mission
impossible. While Alpha boasts bragging rights as the world's fastest
microprocessor--twice the speed of Intel Corp.'s popular Pentium chip--Compaq
and IBM just aren't interested. Alpha's raw computing power, they say, isn't
enough to make up for its minuscule market share and lack of software.
''What's the gain for the pain?'' asks Mike Perez, vice-president of Compaq's
server-products division. The leading PC maker estimates it would have to
spend $50 million just to retool its manufacturing plant for Alpha.
''Searching for absolute performance may be an interesting technical
exercise,'' he says, ''but it's not where we want to be from a broad business
standpoint.''

WHITTLED AWAY. After five years, Digital executives are still knocking on
doors and still coming away almost empty-handed. They insist that Alpha's big
break is just around the corner. But the chances of that happening are getting
slimmer by the day. Despite spending an estimated $2.5 billion to develop and
promote Alpha, the chip ranks dead last in market share with less than 1% of
the $18 billion microprocessor market, vs. Intel's 92%. And with new
generations of lower-cost chips due this year, including Intel's Pentium II in
May, Alpha's performance advantage is being whittled away.

It couldn't happen at a worse time. The early sales spurt of Digital's own
Alpha computers has slowed to a crawl. On Apr. 17, when Digital reported
revenues for the third quarter ended Mar. 31, sales of Alpha computers grew an
anemic 3%--the third straight quarter of single-digit increases. Digital stock
is taking a beating, down 32%, from 38 on Jan. 30 to 25 1/2 on Apr. 15. Says
analyst George Weiss of the Gartner Group Inc.: ''If Alpha does not generate
volume soon, the question arises: What is the Digital advantage and why are
they blowing it?''

Good question. In an industry so thoroughly shaped by bigger-better-faster
technology, how could a superior computer chip fail to catch on? Clearly,
Digital takes the rap for its own missteps. But behind Alpha's poor market
showing lies a broader business lesson: New technologies, no matter how
whizzy, have an increasingly tough time finding acceptance against
well-entrenched competitors, like Intel. Despite the quick-change nature of
the computer industry, a huge installed base can be an impenetrable fortress.

HESITATION. Not that Digital didn't contribute to its weak Alpha showing.
BUSINESS WEEK interviews with current and former Alpha executives show the
company hesitated backing the chip in its early days--a crucial error--before
charging full speed ahead. And the company squandered a performance lead
through a series of other blunders, ranging from a lack of software to take
advantage of the chip's speed to internal haggling over pricing.

Digital sees it differently. CEO Robert B. Palmer admits Alpha has not lived
up to the company's original hopes, but he insists its best days are ahead. As
a sign of the chip's viability, he points to the $7 billion worth of Alpha
computers that Digital has sold since their introduction in 1992. What's more,
Palmer is proud of the fact he has continued investing in Alpha, keeping it
technically tip-top for five years, despite company losses totaling $5.4
billion over the same period.

There is no question Alpha came at a critical time. When Digital launched the
chip on Feb. 25, 1992, the company was losing $8 million a day. Its reputation
as a provider of world-class technology was sinking fast. So Digital execs
seized on Alpha as the core of their comeback plan for a wide range of
machines, from powerful PCs to large-scale computers.

But even before Alpha hit the market, Digital fumbled. The company had shown
off early versions of the chip at an industry conference in February, 1991,
and engineers at Apple Computer Inc. were impressed. Apple was in the market
for a new chip supplier, and Alpha looked promising.

In late June, John Sculley, then Apple's CEO, invited Kenneth H. Olsen,
Digital's founder and president, to dinner. Sculley had a proposition: Apple's
Macintosh computers were starting to run out of gas, and he wanted to do a
complete redesign with Alpha at the heart of the new Macs.

But Olsen had doubts about Alpha. His unshakable faith in the VAX computer,
which had turned Digital into IBM's most formidable competitor in the 1980s,
made him reluctant to phase it out too soon in favor of Alpha. Olsen asked a
team of Digital's top engineers to extend the computer's design for another
generation--and he rejected Sculley's proposal.

A few months later, Apple announced that its new Macs would run on the PowerPC
chip, a competing design by IBM and Motorola Inc. Sculley says one Digital
director later told him that Digital's board was ''distressed that nothing
came of these discussions and that Digital lost a great opportunity.'' The
Alpha faction at Digital was crestfallen. ''Ken did not want the future of the
company riding on Alpha,'' says William R. Demmer, a former vice-president of
Digital's Alpha and VAX businesses who retired in 1995. Too bad. With Apple as
a customer, Digital would have had 3.4% of the microprocessor market, although
a distant No.2 to Intel. Olsen did not respond to repeated requests for an
interview.

MEMORY HOG. By late July, 1992, Olsen's misgivings about Alpha ceased to be an
issue. The company had ended its fiscal year with a $2.1 billion loss, and
Digital's board asked the 66-year-old founder to step down. His replacement
was Bob Palmer, a Texan who had spent the bulk of his career in computer
chips, most recently as head of manufacturing.

With Olsen gone, Digital's senior management quickly settled on a strategy of
trying to license the Alpha design. ''We had to get a major chip player to
accept Alpha and drive it into the marketplace,'' says John F. Smith, then
Digital's senior vice-president of operations and now president of PerSeptive
Biosystems Inc., a pharmaceutical equipment maker. Smith and other Digital
execs didn't think they had a chance persuading computer companies to use
Alpha--unless a big chipmaker was behind it.

So Smith went to the biggest maker of chips in the business--Intel. In the
fall of 1992, Smith called Andrew S. Grove, CEO and president of Intel. Grove
was well aware of the technical merits of Alpha, but it did not take him long
to pass on licensing the chip. Adopting Alpha, even as a high-end addition to
Intel's commodity business, would require a costly overhaul of Intel's design
and manufacturing processes. ''We didn't want to branch out to an incompatible
deal,'' Grove says.

Nor did Texas Instruments, Motorola, and NEC. So Digital set out for even
bigger game--Microsoft. Digital executives were pushing for Microsoft to adapt
its next-generation software, Windows NT, to Alpha. Palmer met with Microsoft
CEO William H. Gates III and agreed to make NT a central part of Digital's
computer business. In return, Microsoft agreed to release a version of NT for
Alpha at the same time it came out with versions for Intel and the MIPS chip
designed by Silicon Graphics Inc.

Digital executives were elated. They constructed their business plans for
fiscal 1993 around the assumption that NT would quickly drive Alpha into
high-volume markets, including corporate PCs. That meant pouring tremendous
resources into fine-tuning Alpha to work with Microsoft's software.

But in early 1993, when Digital engineers eagerly loaded test versions of NT
onto their computers, it quickly became apparent that the software needed far
too much computer memory to run on a typical PC--or even a $5,000 Alpha
machine. That put NT beyond the reach of the mass market that Digital had been
counting on for Alpha.

A mad scramble erupted inside Digital. Palmer ordered a crash program to bring
out Alpha computers running a stripped-down version of Digital's Unix
operating system, a rival to NT. But many customers doubted Digital's
commitment to Unix would last once Microsoft solved its NT problems. Revenue
fell, and Digital posted a $224 million loss that year. By focusing Alpha on
NT, Digital ''lost three years in the market,'' says Edward J. Zander,
president of Sun Microsystems Computer Corp.

Still, the future of Alpha--and Digital--increasingly depended on NT. And
Digital's relationship with Microsoft was growing more complex. In mid-1993,
Digital engineers looking into early versions of NT noticed that some portions
of the program bore a striking resemblance to an advanced operating system
called Mica that Digital had developed, but canceled in 1988. Mica was the
brainchild of Dave Cutler, a former Digital software star who joined Microsoft
in 1988 and was now the chief architect of NT.

Palmer decided that Digital had a legal claim against Microsoft. But, insiders
say, instead of filing suit, Palmer chose to use the threat of legal action to
spur Microsoft into improving Alpha's prospects. Microsoft execs won't
comment, saying it concerns legal matters. Still, Palmer's gambit appears to
have worked. By the spring of 1995 the two companies hammered out details of a
broad agreement for Digital to provide NT network installation services for
Microsoft. Announced with great fanfare by Digital in August, 1995, the
alliance included payments by Microsoft estimated at $65 million to $100
million to help train Digital NT technicians.

On the surface, that appeared to help boost Digital into a prime spot for
milking NT's strong growth. Since October, Microsoft has also dropped its
support of two rival chips--the PowerPC, made by IBM and Motorola, and MIPS.
But this crucial alliance may now be fraying. On Mar. 19, Microsoft announced
a joint marketing and services agreement with Digital's archrival,
Hewlett-Packard Co. The Palo Alto (Calif.) company will hawk NT in large
corporations--the role Digital once held exclusively.

In retrospect, former Digital executives say, the company would have had more
success if it had lowered the price of Alpha computers. By late 1994,
engineers had found a way to deliver a $4,995 ''AlphaStation'' aimed at the
fast-growing workstation market. But a clash broke out among Digital's senior
management because of fears that this could damage the 50%-plus gross margins
Digital enjoyed on high-end computers, one of the few bright spots in its
gloomy financial outlook.

''SPLIT PERSONALITY.'' Digital's PC Business Unit was none too happy about the
prospect of low-cost Alpha machines, either. Execs there lobbied against it,
saying it would undercut prospects for building a big business around
Intel-based PCs. When the Alpha- Station finally hit the market, it bore a
$7,995 price tag. ''Digital has always had a split personality,'' says Enrico
Pesatori, who left Digital last summer after the PC Business Unit he headed
suffered continuing losses. ''Every Intel server sold means an Alpha server
that is not sold.''

Today, Digital's Intel-based machines running NT outsell its Alpha computers 9
to 1 in the high-volume market for low-cost servers, says the Gartner Group.
That's because software for NT has to be specifically tuned for Digital's
Alpha chip, a task few software developers are interested in taking on given
the small volume of Alpha-based computers. Even longtime Digital customers,
such as Toys 'R' Us Inc., are building NT networks linking thousands of
locations on Intel computers instead of Alphas. ''The biggest reason is the
lack of software,'' says Matthew J. Lombardi, vice-president for information
technology at Toys 'R' Us.

Of course, Digital is more than Alpha and Intel-based computers. The company,
for example, is expected to post revenues of $5.8 billion in services this
year, while networking and computer storage systems should contribute roughly
$1.4 billion. But it is Alpha that distinguishes Digital from its competitors,
offering the company its best hope for returning to star status.

And Alpha's best opportunity, Palmer insists, lies in the future. In
mid-March, the company introduced a low-cost version of the Alpha chip priced
from $295 to $495--some $100 less than its previous minimum price. That makes
Alpha affordable, for the first time, in PCs costing less than $2,600. Digital
is hoping that this, combined with a Samsung Electronics Co. alliance to make
and market Alpha, will help the chip crack the volume computer market. ''Alpha
will carry Digital for 20 years while other chip technologies have fallen by
the wayside,'' Palmer says.

A couple of years ago, he predicted one in five computers running Microsoft's
Windows NT software would be powered by Alpha. The number today is closer to 1
in 20, according to the Gartner Group. So far, though, only 27 small companies
have plans for low-cost Alpha computers, the largest being German PC maker
Vobis Microcomputer. Vobis tried to launch an Alpha workstation in the German
market four years ago but abandoned the campaign after selling fewer than 500
machines in two months. Vobis CEO Gert Huegler, though, is now willing to give
Alpha a second chance because, he says, it delivers better performance than
Intel. Also key: Digital has an answer to the software shortage--so-called
''translator'' software that enables Alpha to run programs written for Intel
chips.

Even so, Huegler figures that Vobis will be lucky if sales of the $4,000 Alpha
machines amount to 5% of the company's overall revenues of $1.3 billion. And
if it doesn't--so what, he says. ''We can switch it on or switch it off,''
Huegler adds.

Unless more computer makers start flipping the switch on Alpha, Digital may
wind up with the world's fastest microprocessor and the smallest installed
base of customers.

By Paul C. Judge in Boston, with Andy Reinhardt in San Francisco and Gary
McWilliams in Houston 
[Posted by WWW Notes gateway]

    > Too bad. With Apple as a customer, Digital would have had 3.4% of 
    > the microprocessor market
    
    Moot point but with ALPA under the hood of a MAC it is very unlikely 
    that APPLE would have the same market share as they currently have.
    
    db

    While I will admit that our marketing definately needs to improve, I
    have seen some recent ad's which are not to bad ..
    
    Anyway ..
    
    The flip side to this story in .1 is that the x86 is peaking out right 
    now and HP/Intel are starting to realize this.
    
    Reference PC Week staff editorial at:
    http://www.pcweek.com/opinion/0414/14chip.html
    
    Other PC Magazine +ve Alpha press lately -
    http://www.pcmag.com/features/grworks/rev3.htm
    
    A few more tidbits ..
    
    NT5 has a whole bunch more encryption in it's IO's, and this means
    better positioning for Alpha over Intel. In current NT versions,
    file/print is just taking IO from disk over PCI to network to PC, but
    NT5 encryption will mean an added stop at cpu for encrypting/
    decrypting .. big change in workload coming ..
    
    IPv6 (replacement for IPv4 - current Internet std) is now in beta and 
    is even discussed in some MS whitepapers, so it is now on their radar
    screens. Oh, by the way, did I mention it has a 64bit aligned
    architecture ?
    
    Also, if anyone doubts Oracle's big plans to takeover NT db market
    using NT5 / VLM, reference:
    http://www.oracle.com:81/NT/news/html/digital.html
    
    Lotus is also very hot for Alpha NT as Notes is getting very good
    results with Alpha .. reference: (just love this pointer syntax)
    
    http://www2.lotus.com/alliances.nsf/d7a72d18ac332b21852563ed004be33e/
    e27e5fb36ad844f5852564340067a195?OpenDocument
    
    fwiw, my recommendation for Customers who want 2 years work out of 
    their new HW purchases is 32 bit clients and 64 bit servers ...
    
    Regards,
    
    / Kerry

    It all just doesn't matter.
    
    
    SOFTWARE makes hardware HAPPEN!
    
    People run APPLICATIONS, not fast or slow PCs.
    
    If it doesn't run your package, it may as well be a paperweight.
    
    Again, when they delivered an AXP to our demo room 5 years ago and it
    had *NO* software to run (not even demos) we were told to "go fish" for
    demos on the net, build 'em ourselves.  Great, focus on building demos
    instead of the customer for a field organization, that's GREAT use of
    company resources.
    
    Until we have some OTHER things in our portfolio (i.e. like storage and
    networks), staking our future on alfer is risky at best. 
    
    The article is *NOT* disappointing - it's real.  More in the 3M area
    need to read it and get in gear to change the company.

    .4 -
    
    >>>
    Again, when they delivered an AXP to our demo room 5 years ago and it
    had *NO* software to run (not even demos) we were told to "go fish" for
    demos on the net, build 'em ourselves.  
    >>>
    
    ?? Perhaps I missed something, but what possible relevance does
    comparing a situation of 5 years ago with todays reality ? 5 years
    is ancient history - sort of like comparing today with 286/386
    environment..
    
    >>>
    Until we have some OTHER things in our portfolio (i.e. like storage and
    networks), staking our future on alfer is risky at best. 
    >>>
    
    Are you trying to say we don't have storage or network solutions ????
    
    >>>
    The article is *NOT* disappointing - it's real.  More in the 3M area
    need to read it and get in gear to change the company.
    >>>
    
    Again, while I agree our marketing could certainly improve (todays
    ad's are definately better than 6 months ago, so it is improving..), 
    I do not agree that this article is real life - it is based on one
    persons msconceptions of what is really happening ... and our many
    doom and gloomers within Digital accepting it as fact.
    
    Bottom line is that we are (IMO) entering a new phase whereby Intel
    loses it's monopoly to AMD, Cyrix and Alpha and other chips such as
    Strong Arm... see .3 for pointers on articles whereby even the press
    are starting to wonder ..
    
    Also, reference the following review of current chip technology:
    http://www.heise.de/ct/english/9705154/
    
    Ok - so obviously , the sw needs to be there - that is absolutely
    correct. However, given most of MS's sw will be on Alpha shortly
    (BO, Word, Excel, VB, VC++, IE etc), Pro/Engineer, Softimage (other CAD
    partners as well- with the exception of Autocad who I beleive will be
    coming back to the fold shortly IMO), LOTUS Notes, Oracle (big
    time-reference http://www.oracle.com:81/NT/news/html/digital.html)
    are all examples where the SW is coming big time.
    
    Now, if the trend was really dying, would Borland have just announced
    they are doing a major port to Alpha ? Reference:
    http://www.borland.com/about/press/1997/digital.html and 
    http://www.digital.com/PR00T0/
    
    What about the TV industry starting to accept Alpha ? Reference:
    http://www.digital.com/PR00SR/
    
    Now that we are going back to the old model of a simplified sales
    force focussing on solutions (what a novel idea), many of our
    internal issues should also disappear..
    
    I've said it before and I still believe it - now is a good time to 
    buy DIGITAL stock :-)
    
    Course, someone might accuse me of being an optimist, but it's a lot
    easier than walking around with a rain cloud over my head !
    
    :-)
    
    / Kerry

    re .-1
    
    The importance is that 5 years ago we didn't have software for it -
    TODAY we don't have an extensive portfolio for it (because we pissed
    off MANY of our partners who walked away from us).
    
    NOTHING HAS CHANGED IN 5 YEARS!  In spite of the masses of engineers,
    marketeers etc., NOTHING has changed!  
    
    Yes, I know, it's not true at one level....software has come on board
    like Nt etc...but still from a marketing point of view NOTHING HAS
    CHANGED.  We keep focusing on SPEED and not what the USER or folks in
    the field really need.
    
    Folks choose INTEL for safety - we've proven ourselves too unstable for
    people to deal with in a rational 'bet your business' manner with this.
    
    But, in VNS we have 'another reorganization' which will solve things...
    
    pfft.
    j

    re: -6
    
    >>>
    The importance is that 5 years ago we didn't have software for it -
    TODAY we don't have an extensive portfolio for it ...
    >>>
    
    We do have an extensive sw porfolio, albeit not as large as Intel. The
    main point to keep in mind is that the momentum is growing, NOT
    shrinking ! If this were the case, would Borland have just announced 
    their first major port to Alpha NT ? Would Lotus and Oracle be pushing
    their stuff on NT/Alpha as strongly as they are if they did not
    perceive Alpha as a way of obtaining a competitive advantage ?
    
    Reference:
    http://www.borland.com/about/press/1997/digital.html (Borland)
    http://www.oracle.com:81/NT/news/html/digital.html
    http://www2.lotus.com/alliances.nsf/d7a72d18ac332b21852563ed004be33e/
    e27e5fb36ad844f5852564340067a195?OpenDocument
    
    For those who think Intel is not concerned, reference:
    http://www.heise.de/ct/english/9705154/
    http://www.pcweek.com/opinion/0414/14chip.html
    
    While software app's are extremely important, new functions such as
    security (encryption etc), 3D graphics, WEB access, network objects
    are all pushing Intel HW to the limits ... DIGITAL now has even
    PC Magazine giving good reviews on Alpha (see my note above on new
    SW app's coming ..) ie. http://www.pcmag.com/features/grworks/rev3.htm
    
    For a good summary of Alpha applications, reference:
    www.enorex.com
    http://www.enorex.com/alpha/software.htm
    
    Anyway, time to move on .. 
    
    Regards,
    
    / Kerry
    
    

    it's not targeted nor easy to get/articulate.  Target it and quit
    telling folks "go look for.." put it IN THEIR FACE with marketing and
    then the picture will change.
    
    We need to STOP telling people "go fish and go lookup" and start
    marketing/selling to folks...
    
    

    Bob can't be too disappointed by the BW article... great picture.
    K

    I was most disheartened by the table accompanying the article:
    
    TABLE: Speed Isn't Everything 
    
    Microprocessor worldwide market share, 1996
    
                   CHIP         SHARE       MANUFACTURERS
                   X86          92.8%       INTEL, AMD, CYRIX
                                            (INCLUDES 386, 486, PENTIUM)
                   POWERPC       3.3        IBM, MOTOROLA
                   MIPS          2.1        TOSHIBA, NKK, NEC
                   SPARC         1.2        TEXAS INSTRUMENTS, FUJITSU
                   68000         0.4        MOTOROLA
                   ALPHA         0.1        DIGITAL
    
                   DATA: SEMICO RESEARCH CORP.

    Just out of curiosity, do the .-1 numbers refer to "all" processors, or
    just desk-top or office machines?
    
    Very large numbers of processors are used for things other than
    "computers".  Actually, I believe the number of 8 bit processors being
    sold dwarfs all of the processors listed in the previous note, because
    they're used in immense numbers in automobiles, appliences, copying
    machines, etc.
    
    I would not be at all surprised to find that a large number of x86
    family processors are used 'industrially', and don't really compete
    directly with the Alpha chip as it's marketed now.  (Fair numbers of
    68000 family processors are used this way, too.)
    

    To continue with the tradition of pointers to good and bad news about
    DEC:
    
    http://www.forbes.com/forbes/97/0505/5909045a.htm
    
    	Steve

    Forbes piece: "StrongArm... sales are growing at 30% annually".
    
    Given they weren't shipping a year ago, shouldn't we claim a MUCH
    higher percentage growth number...?
    ;-)

    
    Hot off the Microsoft WEB pages ... now this ought to drive the HP
    folks (especially their HP UX WS types) right up a tree :-) 
    
    http://www.microsoft.com/corpinfo/press/1997/apr97/digital.htm
    
    So much for the HP alliance - as stated many times before, MS does
    what is best for their business ... and so they should. Just as we
    do with Oracle, Lotus, and now others such as Borland.
    
    Regards,
    
    / Kerry

FWIW, one Douglas J. Nakakihara gives his opinion of "Alpha Vs. Intel" a bit
down the page from http://www.microtimes.com/159/soapbox.html#_2 . He speaks
quite positively about FX!32.

    So PA-RISC isn't even on the radar screen?
    
    Let's see - if HP buys Digital, they get a RISC NT (and a 1997ish
    64-bit RISC NT strategy), a 64-bit UNIX w/ database apps, enhanced
    Microsoft relationship, another proprietary (BUT profitable) O/S, and
    a faster (and better...) RISC microprocessor.
    A bit bigger to swallow than Apollo was...
    

|                   ALPHA         0.1        DIGITAL

C'mon, cheer up. It could actually be 0.144 that got rounded.
Who knows, perhaps they did the spread sheet on a Pentium.

>Per

    They would have done it on an Alpha, but Lotus havent produced a native
    1-2-3 yet.

     re: .0
    
        I hope you still enjoyed the article on Tiger Woods !
    
        What about partnering with the largest swing analyser
        company and signing the guy in with an ad campaign like :
    
           " Only DIGITAL Alpha can trace Tiger's swing !"
    
        Isn't that a mega-buck, high-visibility WW market ?  :-)

    
    Nah.  How about paying Tiger $30 million to do Digital endorsments,
    wear an OpenVMS logo on his hat, and offer targeted accounts the chance
    for the CEO/CIO a round with Tiger and Bob Palmer at the course of
    their choice.
    
    

    Way too late. He's a wholly-owned subsidiary of Nike and will be
    wearing that "swoosh" exclusively for some time to come...

    well then, how about 'Beanie Babies?
    
    :-)

    Beanie Babies are quickly turning into this season's "tickle me elmo". 
    Parents jumping a delivery man bringing the items into the restaurant;
    buying multiple "happy meals" and telling the cashier to "hold the
    food"; travelling to nearby McDonalds because the local one was out of
    Beanie Babies; trading abounds in notesfiles to get a complete set.
    
    Yep, just a few fries short of a Happy Meal.
    
    	Ted

|    well then, how about 'Beanie Babies?

What do you mean? Buy an Alpha and get one Beanie Baby free? :-)
I'm just waiting to see those customers paying and asking if they
can leave the system behind :-)

|Digital engineers looking into early versions of NT noticed that some portions
|of the program bore a striking resemblance to an advanced operating system
|called Mica that Digital had developed, but canceled in 1988. Mica was the
|brainchild of Dave Cutler, a former Digital software star who joined Microsoft
|in 1988 and was now the chief architect of NT.
    
    While this is true, MICA was originally slated to use the DECwindows
    interface ("MICA Working Design Document - PRISM Systems", chapter 56).
    I still have all my PRISM/MICA documentation.  Those were great times!
    
    Mike 

Windows NT also bears a striking resemblance to Cutler's previous OS, VAXELN.

				Steve

>Windows NT also bears a striking resemblance to Cutler's previous OS, VAXELN.

That's for sure.  In some cases not only the general design, but right down
to service calls, argument names and argument order.  Amazing.

ac

    DS trying to line up Taiwan motherboard mnfr's for Alpha again
    www.infoworld.com
    
    TAIPEI -- Digital Equipment officials here on Friday tried to drum up
    support among Taiwanese system and motherboard manufacturers for the
    recently released Alpha 21164PC processors. 
    
    Taiwanese companies could play a crucial role in lowering the cost of
    high-end Windows NT PC systems built around the new chip family, which
    Digital announced last month, company officials said. 
    
    "Your support is very important. You can lower the costs much more
    than we can on our own," said Joseph Chou, strategic marketing manager
    for the Alpha product line at Digital Semiconductor, addressing
    approximately 100 Taiwanese computer industry officials. 
    
    Digital is aiming for system pricing of around $2,600, and officials
    said that 21164PC-powered systems at such price points could offer up
    to double the performance of systems based on Intel's forthcoming
    Pentium II processors. 
    
    The Alpha 21164PC family offers clock speeds as high as 533 MHz,
    while the first Pentium II chips are expected to run at 233 MHz and
    266 MHz, officials said. 
    
    Currently the only available Alpha motherboards are made by Digital,
    but the company hopes to sign up several Taiwanese makers in the near
    future, said Joe LaValle, the Tokyo-based Asia-Pacific area manager
    of Digital Semiconductor. 
    
    At a seminar hereon Friday, Digital demonstrated a system based on a
    466-MHz version of the 21164PC.  Officials said it will be introduced
    in the local market by Leo Systems, a subsidiary of motherboard and PC
    maker First International Computer (FIC). 
    
    FIC officials, however, stressed that the subsidiary was only evaluating
    the Alpha chips. 
    
    "No decision has been made to launch Alpha-based PCs in the Taiwan
    market," a company spokesman said.  "The Alpha chips currently do not
    even support the Chinese version of NT." 
    
    Digital is working on Chinese-language support, however, and expects
    the localization effort to bear fruit by November, when the Alpha-based
    systems will be capable of running applications under both the simplified
    and traditional Chinese versions of NT, said John Lin, Digital
    Semiconductor's director for the Greater China region. 
    
    Digital officials said they are also negotiating with Elitegroup
    Computer Systems, another major Taiwan-based motherboard maker, although
    the company last year dropped out of the Alpha motherboard business due
    to lack of customer demand. 
    
    Elitegroup officials could not be reached for comment. 
    
    Taiwan-based makers last year produced more than 31 million PC
    motherboards, making up approximately 70 percent of the world's
    non-captive supply, according to estimates from the government-
    sponsored Market Intelligence Center. 
    
    Digital Equipment Corp., in Maynard, Mass., can be reached (508)
    493-5111 or http://www.alpha.digital.com/. 
    
    Terho Uimonen is the Taipei, Taiwan-based correspondent for the IDG
    News Service, an InfoWorld affiliate. 

    And someone somewhere in DEC/Digital/DIGITAL management decided we
    couldn't port VAXELN to Alpha so we spent a fortune porting someone
    else's OS to Alpha instead. Good here, isn't it ?

    What availability is there of MICA sources for the perusal by engineers
    at Digital? Oughta give a good idea of what Cutler was thinking on the
    eve of going to Microsoft. (If rumors are true it might give a
    REALLY good idea...)
    

    All I have left are the MICA working design document, PRISM system 
    reference manuals, and Pillar compiler manual.  The MICA system was 
    based mostly on the Pillar compiler.  The kernel was a mixture of Pillar 
    and Macro.  Outside the kernel was strictly Pillar.  The kernel was ~8K
    instructions and was not pageable.  Support was in place for 64-bit
    computing on PRISM/Mica, PRISM/Ultrix.  It was to act initially as a 
    compute server for a VAX/VMS front-end.
    
    What is scary is that Pebble, Moraine, Glacier, Cheyenne, etc.,
    could've been on the market 2 full years before Alpha.  Bill Demmer
    cancelled PRISM in favor of the Argonaut project (VAX-based) and Cutler
    resigned in anger.  Demmer's decision effectively closed many
    manufacturing plants too.
    
    Mike

    
    and because Demmer didn't have the stamina that Glorioso had, Argonaut
    was cancelled in lieu of the VAX9000.  The rest is HISTORY!
    
    chet

> and because Demmer didn't have the stamina that Glorioso had, Argonaut
> was cancelled in lieu of the VAX9000.  The rest is HISTORY!

	The fact that VAX9000 was K.O.'s pet project had a lot
more to do with that than stamina levels.  VAX9000 was an expensive
hobby for the corporation, IMHO.  (and it employed me for 4-5 years!)

	Dick

    I saw it from the other side.......  
    
    But the GOOD NEWS is,    TWO DOWN, and how many more to go!!!!!!!
    
    chet

Re .1:

For the SBU's internal response to Business Week's _Why the Fastest Chip Didn't
Win_, see http://sbu.mro.dec.com/bw/ .
				/AHM

    re: rebuttal
    We didn't like the chart in the Business Week article because it
    didn't compare 64-bit-only CPU chips?  ("not apples-to-apples")
    
    Couldn't we come up with something better than that?

Yep, it struck me  as a pretty sad comment (not having read the original,
but only the "rebuttal".  It sure looks like classic Digital
but-that's-not-how-we-view-the-world.  What matters is how *external*
people view Alpha's viability.

        re the rebuttal:

        I still like my Taurus -- far better "price/performance" for
        the roads on which I drive.

        Bob