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Title: | The Digital way of working |
|
Moderator: | QUARK::LIONEL ON |
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Created: | Fri Feb 14 1986 |
Last Modified: | Fri Jun 06 1997 |
Last Successful Update: | Fri Jun 06 1997 |
Number of topics: | 5321 |
Total number of notes: | 139771 |
1342.0. "Looking to the future" by GYRATE::DWESSELS (of all the things I've lost, I miss my mind the most) Thu Jan 10 1991 16:52
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FORTUNE MAGAZINE
JAN. 1991
****************************************************************************
REPRINT:
DIGITAL'S DARING COMEBACK PLAN
BY Stratford P. Sherman
With its market eroding and its stock clobbered, the No. 2 U.S.
computer maker is investing billions in new technology. CEO Ken Olsen
is betting the company.
The management challenge that Ken Olsen now confronts at
Digital Equipment Corp. is taking the measure of his brawny self-
assurance. Relying on little more than his own strong will as a lever,
the company's founder and chief executive is trying to move an
organization of 123,500 souls the way a woodsman might shift a boulder:
with a combination of basic engineering and brute force. "People are
always reluctant to change," says Olsen, 64, a vividly intelligent man
with merry blue eyes and the rounded bulk of a retired lumberjack. "Teasing
them, tricking them, manipulating them- that's all part of the job of
management."
Digital certainly needs moving. Having risen since its 1957
startup to 27th on the FORTUNE 500 by engineering superior computers
and software, the company has fallen victim to its own success. Just
as the popularity of its VAX family of computers reached a peak in the
late Eighties, a formidable new type of desktop computer - the
workstation - took the business market by storm. Offering radically
increased power at a much lower cost, workstation technology inspired
corporate buyers to question the value of minicomputers - much as
Digital's minis had challenged low-end mainframes in the 1970s.
Instead of rushing to offer competitive workstations, the company
initially responded with scorn, losing billions of dollars of potential
orders from such loyal customers as Boeing and National Semiconductor.
The lesson, though obvious, bears repeating: If anyone is going to
make your products obsolete, it had better be you.
The Maynard Massachusetts, company is still paying the penalty
for having lost touch with customers. In the fiscal year that ended in
June, the company's revenues came in an estimated $1 billion under
budget while expenses soared. Says a rueful Olsen: "You can be sure
our plan was perfect - it's just that the assumptions were wrong.
"Even before a one-time restructuring charge of $550 million, last
year's earning dropped to less than a third of their 1988 level. The
price of Digital's stock has been plunging like a falling safe, from
$199 per share three years ago to a recent $56. At one point in 1987,
shares of Digital, No. 2 in the U.S. and No.1 IBM were both trading
around $165; this December the stock market valued an IBM share at
$111, twice Digital's price.
Digital's dilemma is how to attract new customers without
alienating loyal buyers. Since the spread of cheap workstations, just
about the only folks eager to buy a VAX are those who already have
invested heavily in the older technology. The VAX customer base
includes most of the world's big companies and adds up to over
400,000 systems averaging several computers each. But to grow, Digital
needs new customers. Defending itself in the crucial low end of the
computer market, Digital has cobbled together its own line of
workstations and even resells Tandy PCs. To succeed in the long run,
however, the company somehow must integrate the popular features of
workstations into its whole array of VAX computers.
That is precisely Olsen's plan. He is betting the company's
revival on a technological grand design centered on a new product
line, including computers code-named Alpha. Designed to match the
power of workstations, Alpha represents a financial and technical
challenge substantial enough to strain even Digital's hitherto ample
resources. But the strategy makes sense, and according to Digital
watcher Terry Shannon International Data Corp., a Mass. market
research firm, "They have the technical wherewithal to bring this
product to market."
Even so, the execution won't be easy. Like many technical
types who end up running companies, Olsen is what Danny Miller a
Canadian business professor, call in his book THE ICAUS PARADOX
"a tinkerer," who focuses on providing levels of quality that
customers may not care about. And if Olsen may produce the right
machines, his beleaguered sales force will have to overcome enormous
obstacles to market them. At best, his plan probably won't begin
to improve earnings greatly until 1992.
Digital's financial discomfort is what brings the element of
brute force to Olsen's program of change. the company is trying to cut
costs by an estimated $1 billion annually. The first layoffs in
Digital's 33-year history are expected early in 1991, a move that
should improve the company's notoriously low productivity. "We're well
past the denial phase," says William Strecker, head of engineering
and a member of Digital's six-man executive committee."We don't have
to explain to people anymore why they have to change.
Digital came of age selling minicomputers to customers who
didn't need much hand-holding, mainly scientific labs and corporate
engineering departments. Over the past decade its VAX machines grew to
dominate sales so completely-accounting for up to 90% of the
total-that Digital became almost a one-product-line company., Amid the
complexities of big-time computing, the lines' simplicity delighted
customers. Says Olsen: "When we had a monolithic product line we
really pushed it hard. But a temporary marketing thing is all it was.
It was never meant to be a religious issue."
With the minicomputer market drying up, traditional mini
makers such as Data General and Prime Computer are losing money. aware
that Digital needed to set itself apart, Olsen decided almost ten
years ago to push the company out of what then seemed a cozy niched.
Henceforth it would try to offer a full range of products and just as
important-services, such as the customized system design that big
corporate customers often require. That meant playing Avis to IBM's
Hertz, taking on a rival five times Digital's size. Innocuous as it
may have seemed at the time, Olsen's decision implied a redesign of
his entire company. To compete effectively with IBM, Digital is having
to alter almost everything: its product line, distribution, pricing,
cost structure, organization, even its beliefs. Says Olsen: "I used to
laugh at IBM for changing its organization all the time, Now I respect
them."
Olsen manages Digital as a Japanese might, investing heavily
in promising long-term projects at the expense of current results.
Late in 1989 the company introduced the first VAX mainframe, the model
9000. Despite widespread doubts about its future, the mainframe
business is far from dead; it's the middle of the market that is
hurting. The 9000's introduction has been troubled: The first machines
were shipped nine months late and in December the company had to
retrofit them to fix a snag. Though Digital's profit margins are
being squeezed hard- the company posted its first-ever quarterly loss
in June- VAX products still generate enormous amounts of cash, and
Digital's balance sheet remains nearly debt-free. That has enabled
Olsen to spend up to $1.6 billion annually on R&D and $1 billion on
capital projects, mostly related to Alpha.
The Alpha line is still what software jocks like to call
vaporware. According to International Data's Shannon, the first box
probably won't be shipped for at least 15 months, and the complete
line may not appear for two years after that. So Digital is racing
against the clock; By the time Alpha arrives analysts believe the
bountiful VAX revenue stream may have started to diminish.
Olsen's strategy represents a stunning turnabout. He spent
years resisting the idea of "open systems," the industry's hottest
buzzword; now he is trying to redefine the term. In a hypothetical
open system, everyone agrees, computers and software made by
different companies would communicated and share files freely. But
Sun Microsystems, the workstation leader, has popularized a much
narrower definition: computing built specifically around AT&T's
UNIX operating system.
An operating system is the layer of software that mediates
between any computer and the applications software it is running,
such as a spreadsheet program. In the PC world, operating systems are
what define much of the difference between an IBM-compatible computer
and an Apple Macintosh. In the world of what Ken Olsen calls "real
computers," producers usually designed new operating systems to go with
their new machines, creating a briar patch of incompatible proprietary
systems. Like a child, each operating system may be perfectly well
behaved within the confines of its own sandbox, but it won't share its
toys with the other kids.
For a computer maker, the advantage of a proprietary system is
that it locks in the customer: that is why so much cash continues to
flow in from Digital's older products. Companies such as Bankers Trust
spend two-thirds of their computing budgets buying and customizing
software, and they usually can't afford to adapt programs and files
based on one operating system to make them work with another.
According to Domenic LaCava, A Digital vice president, the company's
antiquated PDP-11 line, introduced way back in 1969, still generates
over $900 million in annual sales. Sheltered from competition,
computers running on proprietary systems generally provide profit
margins of 60%of more, vs. 40% for standard UNIX workstations.
Digital has sold its own version of UNIX with VAX machines
for years, but 90% of its revenues grow out of its proprietary
operating system, called VMS. The most successful system software in
history, measured by unit sales, VMS works on every single VAX
computer from workstation to mainframe. That unique degree of
communality made it easy and relatively cheap for VAX customers to
expand: They simply bought more VAXs and plugged them in. William
Demmer, the vice president in charge of VAX/VMS products, says VMS was
designed to last forever.
When Sun Microsystems started out in 1982 it had no operating
system at all. Shrewdly, the new company adopted AT&T's UNIX and
pushed it as an industry standard. Although strictly speaking a
proprietary system, UNIX offers two important advantages. Unlike
Digital's VMS, UNIX is available to anyone who pays a license fee to
AT&T. Another key feature: UNIX works with almost any type of
hardware, from a PC to a Cray supercomputer. Measured by the ratio of
price to performance, Sun's Sparc workstations beat comparable VAX
machines by a factor of at least 3 and sometimes as much as 10.
Bargain-minded customers flocked to Sun. Many computer buyers came to
view Digital's money-minting proprietary system as a bit of a rip-off.
The unprecedented power of the Sparc workstation depends on a
new architecture for microprocessor chips, called RISC. It breaks
complex commands down to a few simple instructions that can be
executed at blinding speed. Thus far, RISC technology has shown up
mainly on workstations running UNIX, but there is no necessary
connection between RISC and UNIX. It also turns out that in many
commercial applications, such as transaction processing, UNIX is
considerable less powerful and reliable than Digital's VMS.
In late October, Olsen dropped his first public hints about
the Alpha line. Digital, he said is designing new generation of VAX
machines powered by RISC chips. The company is also drastically
revising the VMS operating system and related software to make Alpha
compatible not only with all existing VMS programs, but potentially
also with software running on UNIX and every other major operating
system- even Macintosh and MS-DOS, used on IBM PCs.
Suddenly, Digital's approach to open systems seems even more
open that Sun's: It does not require a single standardized operating
system. Instead, it depends on a set of industry-standard designs for
those elements of an operating system that interact with either the
computer hardware or the person at the keyboard.
Changing the VMS operating system to meet those industry
standards is an undertaking of monumental complexity. Thousands of
Digital software engineers are involved in the task of rewriting VMS's
ten million lines of code-each of which must work perfectly on every
type of VAX-and applications software that runs on VMS. If they
succeed, their efforts will enable Olsen to turn the tables on Sun: A
computer running on VMS will be able to swap programs freely with any
computer running any operating system that follows the same publicly
available standards. "we're the biggest supporters of open systems,"
claims Olsen. "That's because almost no one else can afford to do it."
One who agrees is Marc Schulman, a respected analyst at Union
Bank of Switzerland's U.S. securities subsidiary. Says he: "I believe
Digital is intensely committed to open systems. I'm very satisfied
that its strategy will produce a pronounced recovery for the company-
not right away, but sometime in calendar 1991." That gutsy call is
backed by sharp reasoning: The momentum toward open systems is
unstoppable, he argues, and the companies with the most to gain
from it are those, including Digital, with proprietary operating systems.
Freer competition should benefit the most powerful products.
Getting its new message across to customers will be Digital's
greatest challenge. From Olsen on down, the company is a marketer's
nightmare. Joseph DiNucci, formerly a Digital sales manager, is
credited with pushing the company into RISC/UNIX workstations; he is
now a vice president at MIPS Computer Systems, which sells RISC chips
to Digital. DiNucci remembers the first time he heard Olsen speak: "He
said, 'I believe technology is everything-if you design a good enough
product you don't even need a salesman.' I said to myself, 'I came to
the wrong company.'"
Like the company he created, Digital's old boy just isn't the
marketing type: Self-confident to a fault, he does and says what he
wants, sometimes at Digital's expense. "We always say the customers
are right," says Olsen, wrinkling his broad nose as if he'd smelled a
rotten fish. " But they are not always right." A committed Christian,
Olsen hews to basic values in matters of management too. His
opposition to layoffs and commission-based pay for salesmen is
legendary. He encourages academic-style intellectual freedom among his
subordinates, who may debate major decisions for months or years-while
customers go elsewhere.
Given Digital's awful stock performance, uncertain prospects,
and breathtakingly quirky leadership, some consultants and former
employees think the company would be better off if Olsen, now 64, were
to retire. No way, responds the founder. "I plan to be here 20 more
years," he says with a sly grin. "I'm always aiming at the company
being self-running without me, but it hasn't happened so far." In fact
Olsen has encouraged so many strong executives to leave that no
obviously credible heir remains.
The case against Olsen rests on two main criticisms- that he is
out of touch with the industry, and that he lacks the particular
management skills a company grown as large as Digital needs. Gordon
Bell, one of the strong men Olsen drove out, believes only the first
criticism is valid. As head of engineering, Bell led the VAX
development team; he later ran the National Science Foundation's
computer research program. He is clearly not objective, but his
trenchant views are respected. Says Bell; "Olsen is their No.1
problem."
Relevant or not, the proposition that Olsen is out of touch is
easy to support. An anachronism in the age of PCs, Olsen doesn't use a
computer for business. A poor typist, he even dictates his electronic
mail to a secretary. Says Olsen: "If I find a use for a computer, I'll
get one." Nevertheless, he was a big backer of Digital's disastrous
foray into PCs in 1982. The company produces three machines with three
different operating systems, none compatible with the IBMs that became
the industry standard. The result: a market share in PCs under 1%.
Olsen says the biggest users of Digital-designed PCs are the Soviets,
who stole the technology and produces some one million units.
Olsen also killed several promising early development programs
in workstations and RISC chips. Many talented Digital executives left
to work for SUN. Says one: "Sun would not have existed if Digital had
done its job right." Olsen concedes the point, but argues that
focusing on VAX paid off because it financed the company's stunning
growth in 1980s and the Alpha R&D.
The second criticism of Olsen is more chilling. Says Dale
Kutnick of Meta Group, a computer consultant to many FORTUNE 500
companies: "Ken is brilliant and a good leader, but they need plain
old management of the kind that IBM builds: big-company professional
management. Digital is barely on the edge of control in terms of the
way it does business."
Olsen firmly believes that a more focused organization, not
new management is what's needed to solve Digital's problems. To that
end, he is giving P&L responsibility to the account managers assigned
to each major customer. He has also been reshuffling executives and
has begun retraining the company's 24,000 salespeople. To force costs
lower, Olsen is demanding that managers measure the cost of each of
the company's products and services against those of the competition
and find ways to price them competitively.
One thing won't change: Olsen's heavy reliance on Digital's
engineering expertise. Digital is the only computer company in history
with the technical discipline to integrate so broad a product line
around a single operating system; it is widely regarded as the premier
provider of complex networked systems. That skill could prove crucial
in the new world of open computing, as big companies struggle to tie
together their hitherto isolated PCs, Macintoshes, workstations, minis
and mainframes.
For all his winning self-deprecation, Olsen is a prideful man,
like some of the New England Puritans who are his spiritual
inspiration. But his plans appear sound, and his conservative fiscal
policies have left Digital remarkably well positioned to finance the
corporate reformation he has in mind. If Olsen can hang on to his job
and bring his present plans to fruition, he has a real chance to
restore the company to its accustomed position of industry leadership.
***********************************************************************
T.R | Title | User | Personal Name | Date | Lines |
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1342.1 | | COOKIE::LENNARD | | Fri Jan 11 1991 11:51 | 3 |
| An outstanding analysis, probably the best I've ever seen. I strongly
agree that what we need more than anything else is "big company"
management. I strongly fear that it'll never happen.
|
1342.2 | eliminate the non-contributors...! | WILKIE::GORDON | | Fri Jan 11 1991 12:00 | 11 |
| re: .1
instead of "big company management" another possible solution is to
break into seperate divisions and allow the "DEC way..(whatever that
is)" of management to do what it did best before the company became
so large that it was no longer effective. Along the same lines if a
division is mismanaged and not profitable it disappears....this way
the divisions that contribute to the profitability of the company can
continue to do waht they do best instead of having to "politic" with
every other group in the company that may or maynot be a contributor..
|
1342.3 | | COOKIE::LENNARD | | Fri Jan 11 1991 12:33 | 6 |
| re .2 I like your idea. I know very specifically that we could have
been much more successful in the Government Systems business a few
years ago if we had been divisionalized. Interestingly enough, Wang
continues to win significant guvmint business through their Federal
Systems DIVISION. But once again, this ain't gonna happen with the
present management we have.
|
1342.4 | only lessons from history...!! | WILKIE::GORDON | | Fri Jan 11 1991 13:10 | 24 |
| re: .3
I cannot take credit for anything other than trying to apply the
lessons of history to "our" problem. As best I can remember other
very successful companies have been the route we have taken the past
15 years and the most successful solution seemed to be breaking the
company into divisions that were seperate enities. I'm sure there we
some that were not successful doing this but I look at the GM's/Ford's/
Standard Oil/IBM/Chase Manhatten(sp?) etc. and they all seem to have
"improved their management problems" when reaching a certain threshold
by using this technique. I can believe that DEC's Government Systems
Group could be extremely more profitable and better able to address
the "customers" problems with solutions if they did not have to deal
with some of the "roadblocks" that the present structure presents.
Some will say our present concept of business units is the same thing
but it really is not the same.
By the way since the breakup of AT&T by justice in 1982(?) or there
abouts I view them as presently going throug the shake out period of a
"divisionalization"...it will be another 10 years before it's complete
and even though there are no "ties" by the OC's to MA Bell anymore
the princple and evolution should be the same as in the other cases
cited...
|
1342.5 | say it ain't so, joe | BAGELS::CARROLL | | Fri Jan 11 1991 13:25 | 4 |
|
Does anyone know if KO really made the statements that are attributed
to him the the base note?
|
1342.6 | Wouldn't divisions just "balkanize" DEC? | ICS::NELSONK | | Fri Jan 11 1991 13:40 | 11 |
| Re .5 I don't think Fortune goes around making up quotes from CEOs...
just my humble opinion.
Re .2 et seq., wouldn't breaking up into divisions mean yet another
layer of management? I heard one analyst say a month or so ago that
"DEC's problem is that it has a 1970s style management structure in
which everyone reports to everyone else and nobody is ultimately
responsible." Would separating into divisions foster this
accountability? Or would it just "balkanize" DEC?
Some thoughts....
|
1342.7 | let's stop passing the buck around... | WILKIE::GORDON | | Fri Jan 11 1991 14:12 | 41 |
|
} Re .2 et seq., wouldn't breaking up into divisions mean yet another
} layer of management? I heard one analyst say a month or so ago that
} "DEC's problem is that it has a 1970s style management structure in
} which everyone reports to everyone else and nobody is ultimately
} responsible." Would separating into divisions foster this
} accountability? Or would it just "balkanize" DEC?
These are good points but again I point to history as a guide.
The division of GM(Ford, enter your own) that is responsible
for engines is a business that must make a profit or be gone.(I'm only
guessing this is the structure, it's what I perceive as the most
successful way to do it) The divisions management should be below the
threshold or critical mass to be efficient and profitable. If it exceeds
this the situtiation that caused divisions in the first place is repeated
and you get "balkanized" again.
The idea is to return to a size that is manageable, profitable,
takes responsibility and is accountable for their products/actions/decisions.
That is why the division that does engines does engines not just
for the "parent" compamy but also has to do business with others such as
the government, or other manufactures that require "their" product.
This is just one small example but I do think this is an alternative
that may or maynot be a plus for DEC in it's present situation. Of course
it's not something that just "will happen" and the mistakes made by others
are bound to be repeated, but in the long haul it just might be a good
solution for DEC.
We are presently "balkanized" to the point where not many in
some middle management positions are willing to take the responsibility
or be accountable because they are too busy looking after their careers
or bottom lines. This company was made in the late 60's early 70's by
managers who were willing to take risk if they had a good product or good
idea and take the responsibility and accountability that went with the
risk. This country was made great the same way, until that spirit returns
we are in for a long slow decline...
|
1342.8 | we need smaller parts with greater independence | TAMARA::FLEISCHER | without vision the people perish (381-0899 ZKO3-2/T63) | Fri Jan 11 1991 14:37 | 36 |
| re Note 1342.6 by ICS::NELSONK:
> Re .2 et seq., wouldn't breaking up into divisions mean yet another
> layer of management? I heard one analyst say a month or so ago that
> "DEC's problem is that it has a 1970s style management structure in
> which everyone reports to everyone else and nobody is ultimately
> responsible." Would separating into divisions foster this
> accountability?
Communications and coordination within a division should be
easier without the noisy "context" of the larger corporation;
conversely communications and coordination between divisions
might be more distant and complex.
Thus you need to choose your divisions carefully by grouping
parts together that need to be a coordinated business.
Digital, to grow or just to stay even with the competition,
must continually explore and grow into not one but multiple
new businesses. Some will be big and some will start small
(and may remain small). Some will need to operate very
differently from others. A systems integration business must
operate very differently from a high-volume low-end business.
Divisions that can operate with very different approaches to
business are necessary for a growing multi-billion dollar
company.
(I believe that one of the reasons we failed in the PC space
-- and never really tried again -- was that our single
approach to sales and marketing couldn't serve that market
space. True, our products were wrong, but we could have
remedied that quickly. What really killed our attempts in
the PC space was the realization that we would have had to
conduct business in ways that were new and strange to us.)
Bob
|
1342.9 | | SQM::MACDONALD | | Fri Jan 11 1991 15:20 | 45 |
|
Re: .1
I totally agree. What Digital lacks more than anything is a
cadre of experienced big company managers.
Ken's belief, at least as reported by Fortune, that we don't
a revamping of management but must focus more on the technology
is not going to cut it.
Breaking down into divisions won't do it either because our product
lines were at least analogous to divisions and we moved on from there
because our management could not figure out how to keep growing
otherwise. I venture that there is not more than a handful, and
Ken may not be among them, of high-level managers in Digital who
could hold their own in most any mature, big-company environment.
Many of our managers are where they are because they were in a fast
growing company and were the most senior person around when the
growth below them suddenly made them managers. In other words,
there was no ladder for them go climb. They came in and the growth
pushed them to the top. I would bet that most anyone reading this
file knows a high-level manager who would never have gotten to that
level in an older more established company.
Developing technologically complex products is one thing but managing
a large, diverse organization is quite another. Once a company gets
this big there are definitely some management skills that come into
play regardless of the business that you are in. A Lee Iacocca type
could probably manage Chrysler, Digital, or Procter and Gamble and
do well at it, because his skills are in managing a big, diverse
organization. Those are the skills that Fotrune is referring to as
"big-company management" and I think Digital doesn't has very
few people who have them.
Just think of it this way. There are lots of other companies out
there competing in the same economy that we are and not all are
doing poorly. What will get us out of this mess? A new
technowidget? And what do we do when that plays itself out as the
VAX has? If management is not our most fundamental problem,
then why are we in the mess that we are in?
Steve
|
1342.10 | history teaches many lessons | TAMARA::FLEISCHER | without vision the people perish (381-0899 ZKO3-2/T63) | Fri Jan 11 1991 15:40 | 15 |
| re Note 1342.9 by SQM::MACDONALD:
> Breaking down into divisions won't do it either because our product
> lines were at least analogous to divisions and we moved on from there
> because our management could not figure out how to keep growing
> otherwise.
I guess we draw different conclusions from the same "facts".
I regard the success of the past decade as founded upon the
decisions made during those old product-line days. I regard
the malaise of the present as founded upon the "one company,
one product, one strategy, one approach, one decision"
philosophy of the post-product-line era.
Bob
|
1342.11 | | COOKIE::LENNARD | | Fri Jan 11 1991 15:47 | 10 |
| To further belabor the issue of big company management, I agree
strongly with .9 that we probably have only a handful of managers
who could last two weeks in General Electric or Boeing, etc., and
I'm not sure we have any.
The same people who got us in this mess are trying to get us out, and
I don't think they know how. Our senior management is virtually
all home grown, and to a large extent simply rode a growth wave to
higher ground. A lot of 'em were simply in the right place at the
right time, and we are paying the price now.
|
1342.12 | let's keep our chins UP! | FSTVAX::BEAN | Attila the Hun was a LIBERAL! | Sun Jan 13 1991 00:04 | 46 |
| i agree with cookie::lennard (-1), in that most of our managers, from entry
level to top-level, are home-grown and to a large extent were 'in the
right place at the right time' and that the result is, in large part a
contributor to the present problem... but, not to the exclusion of a
lot of other contributors...
i used to work for Burroughs... from 1968 'till i came to DEC in early
'82. i saw tht company struggle with rapid growth in the computing
machine business, and many of it's employees became managers, with a
sort of Burroughs Culture background not too dissimilar to DEC culture.
i am convinced that it is a characteristic of most growth companies,
when they finally slow down, to acquire a new 'stability' and a new
sort of 'culture'... and the success of that company largely depends on
the willingness of its employees to accept change and adapt. IBM
adapted well, when it bet the whole she-bang on computers in the '50s
and acquired a new 'culture'. that company's success today is due in
part to its willingness to change, and to it's ability to change
quickly.
the mood i sense in DEC today is a recalcitrant one... it
reminds me of a spoiled child not wanting to move to a new neighborhood
or start in a new school. i am not encouraged by this feeling, and i
feel it more strongly here than i did in Burroughs. there are pockets
of business where change is anticipated and looked forward too, and
fortunately my unit is one of them... but there seem to be lots of
places where 'the good old days' are longed for.
i fear that unless DEC's employees learn how to change, and adapt to
different business methods, and respond quickly to opportunities and
challenges in a changing economy and business environment, not to
mention changing political structures here and especially abroad, and
learn to take chances, and accept challenges and risks, that the
company will, within five or ten years, go the way of Burroughs, and
other 'old school' companies.
We can't return to the old way of doing business, folks. We can lose
ourselves in reverie, and remember the 'good old days'... but, unless
we accept that business is NOT 'as usual', we will suffer a long fall.
opportunities, beyond our wildest dreams of yesteryear are just around
the corner.
just think of what could be done in the USSR... if we act quickly,
decisively, and with courage.
tony
|
1342.13 | scale | LABRYS::CONNELLY | House of the Axe | Mon Jan 14 1991 00:35 | 54 |
| re: .12
I think one thing that relates to what you're talking about with both
Burroughs and DEC is that management models and business models that work
with a certain size company may break for that same company when it grows
large enough due to scalability problems. A lot of programs that are put
in place to realize economies of scale at a smaller size become unmanageable
due to communication breakdowns when the scale increases beyond a certain
factor (sort of like in Brooks's "Mythical Man-Month").
Often you see processes that are put in place to straighten out chaotic
smaller-scale situations take on the appearance of bureaucratic boondoggles
as the scale gets larger. That doesn't say that being "process-oriented"
is wrong (as some Noters here seem to think)--it just says that you can't
make the old processes into an untouchable tabernacle on an altar surrounded
by robed bureaucrat-priests. When the scale changes, the process needs to
be subject to fundamental change, so that it follows from the business need
rather than hampering it.
Reorganizations are SUPPOSED to address this, but they run afoul of the
psychological factors, especially when most of the pool of managers available
to implement the reorganization are "old-timers". They've been rewarded (to
the extent of being promoted into management in the past) for operating in a
certain manner with certain familiar processes. It's hard for even the best
managers (in other words, ignoring the "reorg-opportunists") to stop doing
something that they've historically been rewarded for and not only follow
but actually drive a new way of operating and new processes that put them on
unfamiliar ground.
For instance, a lot of "old-time DECies" who were good at flaunting process
to bail the company out of crises by unorthodox means turn out to be bad at
building the new, more appropriate process because having crises (or even
fomenting them on purpose) has been what's given them their opportunity to
shine in the past. And some other managers who've gotten ahead by fighting
off the "crisis manager" types to introduce some sort of order by creating a
workable process get so heavily invested (psychologically) in "their" process
that they can't stand the thought of changing it in major ways when that
becomes necessary. Yet the swinging pendulum of change is apt to bonk both
types over the head in time.
Clearly every now and then, when the scale factor changes enough, we have to
be able to step back from habits of working the day-to-day problems to look
at the "big picture". What is it that we're really trying to do from a
business perspective? Once we understand that, a lot of the old processes
and personal fiefdoms may have to be thrown out in order to get to a saner
way of doing business. I look at top management as having the responsibility
to lead that effort and articulate it simply enough that every ordinary line
manager and individual contributor can "see the forest for the trees". My
gut feel is that top management at DEC has gotten too involved in coming up
with psycho-babble type "visions" and advertisement-like slogans rather than
presenting simple business models from which operating processes at the lower
management levels would then seem to naturally flow. That's got to change.
paul
|
1342.15 | do you have to BE them to BEAT them? | REGENT::LEVINE | THIS week is NEXT week's LAST week. | Mon Jan 14 1991 10:00 | 20 |
| >>>who could last two weeks in General Electric or Boeing, etc., and
[this is not specifically directed at .11, rather at the concept
that somehow KO's management is flawed. Possibly even directed at
ME...]
Bear this in mind: It is KO's style and decisions that have created
the environment that LETS YOU post notes, using corporate resources,
on company time, that are of an "employee interest" or "recreational"
nature. The same environment that allows you to wear anything you like
to work (for the most part), and allows you to work flex time, and
allows people to "telecommute".
If you think most DEC managers would not last two weeks at a typical
major military/aerospace plant, then maybe you'd better look in the
mirror. Would your day to day style and work habits be tolerated in
that rigorous, stratified, hierarchial environment? ( I know mine
probably would not... ).
|
1342.16 | | SQM::MACDONALD | | Mon Jan 14 1991 10:09 | 19 |
|
Re: .14
>Face it, it's taken 9 months to reduce headcount by 6000 people - less
>than 5% of the population! I worked for a company that had a 30% RIF;
>from the time of the first rumor, 'till the last one left was less than
>2 weeks.
Yes, it has taken a long time to do what seems like a small
accomplishment, but transitioning or laying off 6000 people is not
a small job no matter what % of the company it is. Your figures of
a 30% RIF don't tell us much. How big was the company? Laying off
30 out of 100 or even 300 of 1000 is not comparable to the logistical
nightmare of letting go of 6000 of 125K particularly if several
thousand of them are concentrated in one area.
Steve
|
1342.17 | | COOKIE::LENNARD | | Mon Jan 14 1991 11:45 | 18 |
| Re .15, I hear you, but a lot of the so-called goodness factors that
make Digital such an exciting place to work, aren't really all that
important. I'd gladly wear a tie if that's what's required. Also, I
wouldn't really mind stricter controls on conferences like this.
Actually, I left Digital in 1980 to work for a defense contractor....
(Aerojet Electrosystems). Yeh, it was rigid and structured, and a very
nice place to work. I was most impressed with the quality of the
management. They cared a lot about people, and gave you all the tools
you needed to get your job done, without question. Basically, they
had all the perceived "goodies" that Digital did, just with a more
finely honed edge. Bennies far exceeded DEC, BTW.
I worked for IBM, Aerojet and a Community College, so I have some
experience to balance DEC against. If I were allowed only one word
to describe what I think the biggest problem with DEC is.....it would
be SLOPPY.
|
1342.18 | is the grass really greener??? | CSS::GORDON | | Mon Jan 14 1991 12:03 | 7 |
| re: .17
I've seen this story alot since I've been at DEC and always have
trouble figuring out why people who leave DEC always seem to end up
back at DEC???? I think it says something for the way we work here
and for the way work is "structured" in the other companies..
|
1342.19 | Not Relevant | COOKIE::LENNARD | | Mon Jan 14 1991 13:00 | 4 |
| ...I knew it!!! But, thought it would take a little longer for
someone to want to know why I came back. It had absolutely nothing
to do with DEC being a better company. I had an urgent, personal
need to get back East ASAP, and DEC re-hired me almost instantly.
|
1342.20 | please explain | SUPER::HENDRICKS | The only way out is through | Mon Jan 14 1991 21:03 | 26 |
| Can you define sloppy for us?
Is it managers who are sloppy, or individual contributors who are
sloppy?
If I bring my project in on time-under budget-high quality and work 6
(or 18) hours a day to do it, is that sloppy?
Are you saying there is no accountability?
Is anyone at any company able to work at peak performance all the
time...or are people at some companies better at *looking like* they
are on task while we at DEC are allowed to be more honest about when we
are and when we aren't?
According to organizational development metrics from some long ago
class, the larger the organization, the more 'overhead' in
communication and non-productive time. I remember reading that 5-6
hours a day on task out of 8 hours was considered excellent for workers
in a large company like DEC compared to 7-8 hours a day on task for
smaller companies (on the average).
Does sloppy have more to do with how one creates and follows through on
commitments, or what one does with their time hour to hour?
Holly
|
1342.21 | | LABRYS::CONNELLY | House of the Axe | Mon Jan 14 1991 23:26 | 20 |
| re: "burnout"
I think a good organization recognizes that you may have to "burn out"
the top contributors on occasion--and it rewards those contributors in
part by pulling them out of the fire for some R&R, education, "blue sky"
brainstorming, etc. Personally i don't mind working 70-80 hours a week
in short bursts if that effort is verbally acknowledged and then allowed
to give way to "quiet time". It's the open-ended burnout, especially (i
would guess) in service jobs, where the only reward is in more money,
that leads to very unhealthy morale situations. People can only take so
much stress before they start to really falter (see hospital interns for
comparison). Of course, getting NO reward (money or recognition) would
aggravate this to unbearable levels, which is truly bad management, IMO.
Straight 40 hour weeks are rare in this business, i think. But don't
keep piling straws on the camel's back without ever lightening up the
load. Most good performers will bust tail if they know there's some
hope of getting out from under the load for an appreciable amount of time.
paul
|