Conference turris::womannotes-v3

680.0. "In Search of the 'Just War'" by VMSSPT::NICHOLS (It ain't easy being green) Tue Jan 29 1991 13:25

    			In Search of the Just War
    				John H Yoder
    		from the Boston Globe Focus Section Sunday 27-Jan-1991
    				without permission
    (John H. Yoder is a former president of the Society of Christian Ethics,
    professor of theology in the University of Notre Dame and Fellow of the
    Institute for International Peace Studies.)


    	Since the fourth century, the majority view of Christian theologians
    has been that although war is an evil, it may be justified when it can be
    shown to be less evil than what some enemy threatens to do.  A "just war"
    has become the code designation for that stance, and the conflict in the
    Persian Gulf has reignited the debate over whether there is such a thing as
    a just wear or whether war can, in fact, be evaluated morally.

    	Ambrose and Augustine began reasoning in the just-war mode, though
    quite unsystematically.  Early medieval canon law codified it by determine
    under what conditions participation in war needed absolution.  Thomas
    Aquinas (d. 1274) gave it a dozen pages in his "Summa Theologica." 
    Francisco de Vitoria (d. 1546) first wrote about it at book length, in the
    interest of protecting the peoples of South America against the
    depredations of the Iberian (Spain and Portugal) empires.  Hugo Grotius
    moved it into the language of internationl(sic) law.  And a system of
    treaties (Paris 1856, Geneva 1864, going on until the United Nations
    conventions since 1948) spelled it out in procedural rules about blockades,
    prisoners and the wounded, prohibited weapons, etc.

    	The "just war tradition," as its roots attest, is not one single
    argument, but rather a multidimensional mode of evaluation that uses a
    checklist of criteria to determine when the "lesser evil" claim can be
    sustained and a particular war can be justified.

    	The value of this approach, in the mind of the moral theologian, is to
    provide political and military officials with a framework for making
    decisions about war.  This is particularly useful if it helps call for
    restraint, in the face of the many pressures that militate against
    sobriety; or helps caution against "realism" or "cynicism" that denies the
    possibility of moral reasoning in matters of war; or against the "crusading"
    mood that claims a transcendent mandate or the "Rambo" mood, devoted to
    proving the combatant's virility.  Wherever in the public debate such
    restraint is effective, the just war tradition is working.

    	The superficial impression, according to which the "just war" and
    pacifism are the major opposing positions, is wrong.  These two views agree
    in their rejection of the crusade, of "realism" and of "Rambo," which are
    the really threatening alternatives.  They differ on specific cases, but
    they agree with the initial presumption against war.  War has the burden of
    proof.

    D o e s   s y s t e m   f o s t e r   r e s t r a i n t?
    	Critics of the tradition sometimes ask: "Was there ever a just war?" 
    The question is helpful, as a way to learn from history, but as a way to
    evaluate contested moral postures, it is not quite fair; no moral system is
    validated by someone's living it out perfectly.  The more helpful question
    to ask is: "Does the system foster restraint?  Can it say 'no' to a
    particular war?"

    	What does it take to prove that the initial presumption against war is
    overridden in a particular case?  One set of criteria must apply before the
    fact; jurists call them 'jus as bellum' - the right to go to war:
    	o The cause must be just
    	o The authority waging war must be a legitimate government.
    	o The ultimate objective ("intention") must be a secure, just future
    peace.
    	o The motivation (also called "intention") must not be hatred or
    desire for glory but selfless commitment to justice.
    	
    	Another set of criteria ('jus in bello' - "fighting rightly") must govern
    the prosecution of a war once undertaken:
    	o The means used must be necessary; no wanton destruction.
    	o Noncombatants must not be attacked directly and intentionally.
    	o Damage done must not be disproportionate. 
    	o The means must be discriminating in order to meet the three above
    criteria.
    	o The provisions on international law, customs, and treaties (e.g. the
    Hague and Geneva conventions) must be respected.

    	A third set of criteria is more procedural, overlapping the two above
    categories:
    	o Resort to war must be a last resort.
    	o Success must be probable
    	o The enemy must always be able to sue for peace.
    The list could be extended, but this suffices to characterize the logic of
    the system.  All of these criteria are commonsensical, reasonable.  Their
    vocabulary is familiar.  They depend on no religious warrant.  Each of them
    demands further definition, without which it is not in fact usable as
    criterion, i.e., to measure with.  That further definition (What cause is
    "just"? What authority is "legitimate"?) will be supplied from the rest of
    the value system of the respective person or group.

    T r a d i t i o n ' s   r e c e n t   a p p l i c a t i o n
    	The tradition has been applied effectively twice in our recent history;
    during the Vietnam War, when it provided the criteria whereby US citizens,
    including a few thousand "selective conscientious objectors," without being
    pacifist, rejected that war; and in 1980-1983, when Roman Catholic bishops
    of the United States formally rejected nuclear war.

    	The Persian Gulf crisis is now showing us how familiar categories can
    be appealed to on both sides of the domestic debate.  In the last three
    months, the leadership of most of the "mainstream" churches, including the
    Roman Catholic bishops, has indicated that the war being projected in the
    Persian Gulf would not meet the "just war" requirements.  Others who claim
    no less religious authority, claiming to apply the same tradition, take
    the other side.  Any reader can run down the above list of criteria and
    fill in the blanks on either side.

    	Is the criterion of "legitimate authority" met internationally when the
    United States outruns the original United Nations authorization?  Can we
    with integrity claim a UN mandate when we don't pay our own dues and when
    we deny the right of the world community to judge our mining the harbors of
    Nicaragua?  When we refuse to negotiate in good faith on the laws of the
    sea or on a test ban?

    	Is the criterion of "legitimate authority" met domestically when
    despite powerful pressures, 46 senators vote against authorizing war?  Was
    the criterion of "last resort" met by making Jan. 15 an absolute deadline
    and by President Bush's intransigence about not negotiating?  Is the
    criterion of serving a "future just and secure peace" met by destroying
    the Iraqi infrastructure and by further arming both Israel and Syria?  Is
    the criterion of "proportionality" met when we measure all the likely
    categories?  Can the criterion of "civilian immunity" be met with the scale
    of air war now being carried on?

    	These questions demonstrate four things:

    	o That since the just-war system is subject to such diverse
    interpretations, as a whole it is not capable of yielding a clear, univocal
    reading about a particular case.

    	o That the tradition does provide a set of concepts whereby public
    debate about any particular war can proceed.  It enables people with
    conflicting values to talk past each other while using the same words,
    contesting the meaning of the same facts.

    	o That when religious authorities base their pastoral guidance upon
    commonsensical resources of this kind, their "faithful" are not very
    faithful.  The authority of ecclesiastical leaders is at risk when the
    moral judgment they try to provide is based upon debatable readings as to
    the facts.

    	o One of the tests of the tradition'/s working is its capacity to move
    individuals to disobey unjust orders or laws.  After "selective objection"
    had been happening for several years in the Vietnam years, America's
    traditional church hierarchies, Roman Catholic and Lutheran, recognized
    that it was a bona fide implementation of the just-war tradition.  Thus
    far, no such advice has been given by bishops or synods to men and women
    being sent to Saudi Arabia.  Scant pastoral assistance has been available
    to servicemen and women seeking help to determine whether they should
    accept being sent to battle in the desert.

    	When once asked: "What do you think of Western civilization?" Gandhi
    said, "I think it would be a good thing."  The analogy is authentic.  The
    just-war tradition would be worthy of respect, in the eyes of the pacifist
    on one side who wants more restraint, as in the eyes of the "realist" on
    the other who wants less, if it were to keep its promise produce effective
    discernment.

    	It would need to be implemented with some degree of clarity, to draw a
    more-than-subjective line between the licit use of military force and the
    forbidden.  It would need to move citizens to opposition and persons in the
    military to refusal to serve.

    	Failing to do that, it has the ambivalent value of a common language
    system within which to formulate our disagreements.