Conference 7.286::space

949.0. "NASA re-structuring & impact on space exploration" by NETCAD::BATTERSBY () Thu Aug 31 1995 16:15

    I pulled this off the sci.space.shuttle newsgroup. I could have 
    posted this in the Nasa News topic, but I thought I'd put this
    in a new topic to discuss the impact on the down-sizing that NASA
    is being forced to got through. I haven't come to full grips yet
    myself on what the re-structuring of NASA is going to do to the
    shuttle program, the Alpha space station, unmanned space exploration,
    or other numerous programs underway at NASA & NASA supporting sites.
    It might be worthwhile having a discussion on just this aspect, and
    work through how this should/shouldn't affect various programs related
    to space exploration. The attached message has one very strong message
    on the impact that NASA management has/can have on the future of the
    agency and space exploration.
    Have at it.
    
    Bob
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article: 35739
From: Ken Hale <[email protected]>
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
Subject: Letter to the President
Date: 29 Aug 1995 17:28:37 GMT
Organization: TV-GDS-1
 
The following is a letter to the President from a long time NASA manager. 
I am posting it because I think it contains some interesting information 
that people may not be aware of.  It does not necessarily reflect the 
official views of NASA, although it does reflect the views of some of the 
workers.
 
 
 
 
 
The Honorable Bill Clinton
President
of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 
 
 
Dear Mr. President:
 
The biggest threat to the safety of the Shuttle and its crew since the 
Challenger disaster is presently under way at NASA.  My concerns, as well 
as those of my colleagues, are falling on deaf ears.  In their misguided 
attempt to economize, they have lost sight of what keeps the Shuttle 
safe.  There are ways to economize and still keep the Shuttle safe, 
without dismantling the best launch team in the world.
 
I am a NASA manager with over 30 years at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
working on Manned Spacecraft.  Prior to Mr. Goldin's tenure at NASA, I 
always felt that any concerns I might have had on any subject could be 
addressed to management and a sincere effort would be made to resolve my 
concerns.  Now I feel I can't even voice my concern.  Talented and 
capable high level managers who I know share these concerns, as a result, 
are leaving the program.  It is very disappointing that for whatever 
reason these individuals, who would have a much greater impact than my 
speaking out, haven't had the intestinal fortitude to speak their mind 
for the good of the program.  It is very difficult to have a free 
exchange of ideas in our present environment.  Recently, at a meeting 
with KSC middle management, Mr. Goldin said, "I have all my people in all 
the right places and anyone who doesn't line up is gone."  An environment 
for a free exchange of ideas?  I don't think so!
 
As a result of the re-inventing government and budget cutting efforts 
underway in Washington, all federal agencies (including and especially 
NASA) are going through reorganization and down-sizing.  Mr. Dan Goldin 
has the difficult task of developing a way to accomplish these goals 
within NASA.  I am writing this letter to elaborate and emphasize my 
concern about Mr. Goldin's efforts to delete the 'checks and balances' 
 
system of processing shuttles as a method toward saving money.  
Historically NASA has employed two engineering teams at KSC, one 
contractor and one government, to cross check each other and prevent 
catastrophic errors.  Although this technique is expensive, it is 
effective, and it is the single most important factor that sets the 
Shuttle's success above that of any other launch vehicle.
 
Operational efficiencies within NASA should be accomplished with minimal, 
if any, effect on the safety of the shuttle and its crew.  Anyone who 
doesn't have a hidden agenda or fear of losing his job would admit that 
you can't delete NASA's checks and balances system of Shuttle processing 
without affecting the safety of the Shuttle and its crew.
 
I  know that NASA, like all other federal agencies, needs to become more 
efficient and   economize, but the last place that any sudden or drastic 
changes within NASA should occur is in the hands-on shuttle processing 
operations.  In our business there is little margin for error and there 
are no second chances; therefore, any changes should be made judiciously. 
 The very last place that cuts should be made are in hands-on 
NASA/contractor shuttle processing efforts from launch preparation 
through landing.  Unfortunately, it has been the first place cuts have 
been made during the past year, and is now the object of an 
unconscionable attempt to drastically change the 'checks and balances' 
system which has been the backbone of safe manned space flight.
 
Mr. Goldin is trying to be more efficient and do things more economically 
within NASA; however, because his background lies in unmanned space 
vehicle operations, he does not understand the additional requirements of 
manned space vehicle processing.  He speaks of safety, but his actions 
and direction on shuttle processing are anything but safe.  I know that 
there is no one in Congress or the country that wants us to do anything 
to jeopardize the safety of the shuttle or its crew.  
 
Privatize a national resource??  No, I don't believe it wise nor that it 
is what the American public wants.  The Shuttle is a national resource 
that belongs to the American public - not a contractor.  The Shuttle is 
also a complex R&D vehicle - you can't privatize its processing like you 
would the running of a cafeteria.  Drastically changing the 'checks and 
balances' method of processing by taking NASA out of the process and 
leaving it to a contractor is unwise.  It would be better to cancel the 
manned space flight program than to recklessly endanger a future shuttle 
and its crew.  
 
All NASA managers, whether located at KSC, JSC, MSFC, or NASA 
Headquarters would like to think that they are the main reason for the 
success and safety of the Shuttle.   However, the policies and procedures 
established at KSC and the checks and balances performed by the KSC 
NASA/contractor team of systems engineers working around the clock are 
the real reasons for the success and safety of  the Shuttle.  The flight 
controllers at JSC and the supporting design centers do a great job, but 
their performances depend solely on the hardware that KSC delivers.  
 
NASA was in the process of declaring the shuttle operational and turning 
the pre-launch processing over to a contractor just prior to the 
Challenger disaster.  It was a mistake then and it is a mistake now.  Let 
me re-emphasize what was pointed out by independent post Challenger 
investigation committees and stated to me personally by Dr. Feynman, a 
Nobel Prize winning physicist.  Dr. Feynman indicated the following to 
me:  "The shuttle is an R&D vehicle and needs to be dealt with as such.  
The Orbiter is not growing more reliable with time - just the opposite. 
We are charting new water every day.  The environment that the shuttle is 
exposed to is taking its toll, we don't know the effect it is having on 
the shuttle.  We should be doing more pre-launch checks - not less."  
 
As a current KSC Shuttle Operations Manager, I can attest that over 50% 
of the turnaround processing work at KSC is unplanned.  Our engineers and 
contractors continually find new areas of concern and develop innovative 
solutions to keep the Shuttle flying safely.  Our current system of  
'checks and balances' is an integral part of safely doing this job.  It 
is not an overlap or duplication of effort as suggested by some.
 
Removing NASA from everyday hands-on Shuttle processing efforts, and 
instead authorizing NASA to perform only audit functions, would result in 
NASA processing the Shuttle in the same manner that unmanned launch 
vehicles are presently processed.
 
My concerns for this type of Shuttle processing are reflected in the 
following statistics:  Since 1985, the Shuttle success rate has been 
97.56% as compared to 95% for U. S. Department of Defense, 87% for U. S. 
Civil/Commercial and 92% for European Commercial.  The Shuttle program 
has a 98.59% success rate for the life of the program.  Please note that 
if the Shuttle had the same success rate as it competitors, NASA would no 
longer even have a Shuttle fleet, not to mention the loss of astronaut 
lives.  
 
Since Shuttle hardware is not only older than that of unmanned launch 
vehicle hardware, it is also reusable, then why is the success rate of 
the Shuttle better?  Could it be that the processes and procedures and 
checks and balances used in its pre-launch checkout produce this success?
 
KSC has made numerous changes to streamline pre-launch processing.  Both 
the contractor and NASA have down-sized (approximately 30%) without 
significantly jeopardizing Shuttle safety.  Until recently, we were 
continuing our downsizing efforts, but we were doing it prudently.  
Today, it appears that KSC's management is climbing on Goldin's "BUS TO 
ABILENE."
 
The KSC NASA/contractor launch team is in the risk management business.  
Drastically changing the KSC launch team will unequivocally increase risk 
to the Shuttle and its crew.  If these drastic changes are implemented, 
the perpetrators should not only be held accountable for their action, 
they should be held "criminally liable" for the consequences.
 
The KSC Shuttle launch team (NASA/contractor) is the best in the world.  
We shouldn't let Mr. Goldin dismantle it.  Let's keep KSC a Center of 
Excellence.  We are running out of time.  We really need your help.  
Possibly an independent group, as was formed post-Challenger, is needed 
to make an independent assessment of the consequence of deleting the 
'check and balances' system of shuttle processing.  This is the biggest 
shuttle safety concern since the Challenger accident.
 
The safety of the shuttle needs your help.
 
Sincerely yours,
 
 
 
 
Jose' Garcia
 
 
 
cc:
Honorable Congressman Dave Weldon, House, 15th District
Mr. Dan Goldin, NASA Administrator
Mr. Jay Honeycutt, KSC/NASA Director
Mr. George W. S. Abbey, JSC/NASA Acting Director
Mr. John W. Young, Special Assistant for Engineering, Operations, and 
Safety
Mr. John Manning, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Mr. Michael J. Coleman, President and Publisher, Florida Today
Mr. Thomas Curley, President and Publisher, USA Today
 
 

    re .0
    
    If savings have to be made, perhaps they can fly less often. At some
    point this isn't going to save more money unless they can use the people
    elsewhere within NASA between flights.
    
    I wouldn't welcome a reduction in the flight rate but that's preferable
    to a catastrophic cessation of flights such as occurred in '86.

  It's not clear flying less often will save all that much money. Much of the
cost seems to be labor and the upkeep of the facilities. Same with the company
that builds and overhauls the shuttles. Employing people who can overhaul one
shuttle per year probably doesn't cost that more than having those people sit
around doing nothing half the time. You still have to pay their salary or they
would go find other jobs. 

  They are already operating pretty much as cheap as they can while maintaining
the safety margins. They've been forced to make cuts in the man program and
operate it on a shoe string since the end of the Apollo program. As the author
implies the only result from further cuts will be higher risk and more
accidents. 

  One way or the other the Shuttle's days are numbered. Either they shut it
down now or they shut it down after the accidents that are bound to result from
these cuts. I hope the SSTO really works as advertised because once the Shuttle
is gone that's the only way we'll see a continued manned space program during
our life time. 

  George (the glum) 

re .2

I agree that it's a debatable point as to whether savings can be made by
lowering the flight rate. The sort of scenario that I had in mind was that
perhaps the current flow allows the processing of two shuttles simultaneously.
If the two shuttles can be and are at the same stage of the flow then one
stream could simply be scrapped and the staff transitioned. Savings would
be made but the flight rate would be halved. A more complex scenario could
be that the two shuttles must be at different stages of the flow (i.e.
there is a pipeline). To apply the same cost saving measures to this
scenario would require multi-skilling the retained workers.