| Article: 861
From: [email protected] (Wales Larrison)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.space
Subject: Shuttle Development History (1 of 6)
Date: 18 Jan 92 23:07:30 GMT
Organization: Universal Electronics Inc. (Public access BBS)
The following set of messages is a consise history of the shuttle
development I posted on sci.space in 1990. This might reduce some of
the fog of rhetoric I'm seeing here. A couple of years ago I was
digging into the history of the design of the space shuttle system,
put together a history of the shuttle development.
Simplest, most accessible references, which cover a good range of
the overall technical and political decisions that went into the
Space Shuttle design decisions:
"Enterprise" by J. Grey (avail in most large public libraries)
"The Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle", by J.M. Logsdon,
Space Policy, May 1986
" The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?", Science, 30 May
1986
"Engineering Design and Political Choice: the Space Shuttle
1969-1972", by S.N. Pace published as an AIAA historical paper 1984,
and as a MIT master's thesis, 1982
2 articles by C. Barfied in "National Journal", 12 and 19 Aug 72
Other good articles:
"Evolution of the Space Shuttle Design", by J.P. Loftus, S.M.
Andrich, M.G. Goodhard, and R.C. Kennedy
"The Space Shuttle - Some Key Program Decisions", by R.F.
Thompson (1984 Von Karman Lecture)
"Progress of manned space flight from Apollo to Space Shuttle",
by A. Cohen (1984 Von Karman lecture)
"The Space Shuttle Focused Technology Program: Lessons Learned"
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Feb 1983
If the forum will indulge me, I'd like to also add a few more
comments on the design process that was followed. This is
synopsized from the above articles, plus some more digging I've done
on my own into the data available (including requesting and reading
a fair number of the supporting contract reports, study assessments,
economic analyses, and industry proposals - plus talking to some of
the key participants).
NASA typically follows what is known as a "Phased Development"
program. The rules for this are outlined in OMB circular A-109.
Typically, there are initial small technology studies and small
design studies. To begin the process, a Phase-A study is let for
"Concept Exploration", which tries to establish if a concept is
feasible, and what its primary design constraints and requirements
might be. A Phase-B Study is next, which focuses on a "Preliminary
Design" for a selected concept to meet the design requirements
established in Phase A. Critical technologies should be identified
and demonstrated. Finally a Phase C/D "Design, Development, Test,
and Engineering" contract is awarded, which leads to a flight
article.
To scope this effort, there are about 100 Phase A studies awarded
for every Phase C/D, since not every conceptual idea is ever
pursued to production. Typical Phase A studies range from $100K to
$5M or so, and take up to a couple of years to complete. Phase B
studies have at least 2 competitors, usually take 1-2 years to
complete, and range in the $5-$50 million range. There is usually
only 1 winner of Phase C/D contracts, but the loser may be brought
in later as a "second source" or as a contractor for some parts of
the overall system, if their design is superior in those areas (as
was done with the F-16 and F-18)
From the documentation I have, Space Shuttle design studies began
in about 1968, with studies by MDAC of a Gemini-derived 9-12 man
spacecraft ("Big-G") for resupplying a space Station. In the heady
days after the first Moon landing, NASA and the administration had
mapped out an overall plan for future space activities which
included Space Station, a Lunar Base, Manned Mission to Mars,
continued use of the Saturn-series of Rockets, and a Space Shuttle.
Ref: "America's Next Decade in Space: A Report for the Space Task
Group", NASA, Sep. 1969
(Cont)
--
Wales Larrison
Internet: [email protected]
Compuserve: >internet:[email protected]
Article: 863
From: [email protected] (Wales Larrison)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.space
Subject: Shuttle Development History (2 of 6)
Date: 18 Jan 92 23:08:50 GMT
Organization: Universal Electronics Inc. (Public access BBS)
To gather more insight into what it would take to accomplish this
ambitious plan for space activities, NASA began a series of Phase A
and technology studies. (It should be noted this included Phase A
studies of Lunar Bases, Saturn-derived launch vehicles, Manned Mars
Missions, and Space Stations, among others). They let four Phase A
contracts for "Integrated Launch and Reentry Vehicle" studies,
totaling $1.8 M, in 1969. These included:
o McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC), contract NAS 9-
9204 (with LaRC) of a HL-10 body shape with a straight wing and
25,000 lb payload.
o North American Rockwell (NAR), contract NAS 9-9205, (with JSC)
of a straight wing vehicle with a 50,000 lb payload.
o Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation (LMSC), contract NAS 9-
9206, (with MSFC) for a 1 1/2 stage vehicle with a double delta
wing, launched in a triamese configuration. (This is later
redirected to 2 stage fully reusable configuration, as the triamese
proved unstable.)
o General Dynamics (GD), contract NAS 9-9207, (with MSFC), of a
triamese vehicle configuration with a two-element swing wing and
50,000 pound payload.
Martin Marrieta performed a parallel study effort under company
money (they had lost the Phase A competition), which followed the
same schedule, of a launcher with a 36,500 pound payload called the
"Spacemaster".
In parallel, and based upon the results of these Phase A study
contracts, NASA (at JSC, MSFC, and LaRC) studied a series of
alternative conceptual designs and performed system sizing studies
(contractually supported by MDAC), including a "DC-3 Shuttle" design
supported by Vought aviation.
Each of the major aerospace contractors also funded and ran their
own conceptual design and costing exercises, in parallel with their
contractual efforts. The estimates of these company investments
come to about $120 million over the 1968-1970 time period.
Unfortunately, much of the data supporting these industry studies is
lost, excepting conclusions and summaries of the results.
In 1970, NASA let 4 basic Phase B Contracts for a total of $30M,
over a 1 year period. Each contractor submitted about 500 pages of
technical and cost analyses supporting their proposal. Proposals
were submitted from:
o Lockheed/Boeing (teamed with TWA, AC Electronics Division, Bell
Aerosciences, Bendix Navigation, and Messerschmitt-Boeklow-Bolm)
o Grumman (teamed with General Electric, Northrup, Aerojet
General, and Eastern Airlines)
o MDAC (teamed with Martin Marietta, TRW, PanAm, Raytheon, and
United Aircraft Norden Division)
o North American Rockwell/General Dynamics (teamed with American
Airlines, Honeywell, and IBM)
Two proposals were selected (MDAC and NAR), each company team to
study a fully reusable system, with both a high (1100 nmi) and a low
(600 nmi) cross-range orbiter, carrying a 40,000 pound payload.
Each was funded at $20 M.
MDAC, contract number NAS 8-26016 (with MSFC), 1970
North American Rockwell, contract NAS 9-10960 (with JSC), 1970
However, budgetary impacts and external politics began to affect
the system. As studies of the Space Station and fully reusable
shuttle continued, it became clear to pursuing the Space Station and
Space Shuttle as a first step towards longer term objectives (such
as the lunar base and Mars mission) would require more than a
doubling of NASA's annual budget for some years. This was felt to
be unrealistic due to the current budget crunch needed to support
increased military expenditures in Southeast Asia and the continuing
expansions of programs from "the Great Society" begun in the mid-
1960's. (Note: NASA's space budget had peaked at $5.9 billion in
1966, and by 1970 had declined to $3.5 billion.)
(Cont)
--
Wales Larrison
Internet: [email protected]
Compuserve: >internet:[email protected]
Article: 862
From: [email protected] (Wales Larrison)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.space
Subject: Shuttle Development History (3 of 6)
Date: 18 Jan 92 23:10:00 GMT
Organization: Universal Electronics Inc. (Public access BBS)
During Congressional Review of the NASA 1971 budget, it was stated
NASA should first build the Space Shuttle over the Space Station
because if they could not be developed simultaneously, the Shuttle
could act as a surrogate station in extended orbital missions, and
the establishment of the space shuttle was necessary for cost-
effective logistics support of a space station. This decision was
bumped to the highest level in the administration to President Nixon,
by his top domestic policy advisor John Erlichman and approved.
A detailed independent economic analysis of the Shuttle program
was prepared, at the request of Congress. This was made by an
outside, non-aerospace consulting firm. This was a pivotal step
since it forced NASA to identify the Shuttle as the primary means of
performing a variety of roles for NASA, DoD, and other users -- and
forced NASA into a public justification of the Shuttle on near-term
financial grounds, when other reasons for such a system were more
fundamental (as part of a long term American space strategy). NASA
now had to get DoD assurances it would use the shuttle for all its
launches and began designing to meet all DoD launch requirements.
NASA was forced to show Congress and the Administration how any
system selected would be cheaper than any alternative launch system.
Results from this economic analysis would be used as the rationale
to "phase out" other launch systems.
"Economic Analyses of New Space Transportation Systems",
Mathematica, Inc., 2 volumes, May 1971
At this point, NASA stopped providing strategy for future space
programs, and began a long series of tactical battles focusing on
narrower and narrower budgetary battles. It had to meet strict
economic criteria imposed by OMB (who maintained an independent
shuttle system design group), and was encouraged to design a shuttle
that could "do all things and be all things" to all users to get the
maximum cost effectiveness. This made it very difficult to accept
suggestions for smaller, less capable, and less risky shuttle
systems, or to accept the added costs of parallel development
programs which could reduce technical risks.
While the two stage fully reusable configuration was the option
offered the lowest potential cost per flight (as shown by all of the
Phase A studies), the overall cost to develop the system was
attacked by Congress and OMB. Other options for the Space Shuttle
configuration had to be examined.
To look at lower development cost, but higher operational cost
options, Grumman and Lockheed were given supporting contracts in
parallel to the existing Phase B contract studies to look at
"Alternative Space Shuttle Concepts" which included a 1 1/2 stage
thrust-augmented system, a solid booster/reusable orbiter system, a
reusable booster and orbiter system, and a minimum risk fully
reusable system. This was done as extensions to their Phase A
studies, and were essentially parallel Phase B studies to the fully
reusable system previously selected to provide the lowest
operational cost. Each study was funded at $14 M.
Lockheed, contract NAS 8-26362 (with MSFC), 1970
Grumman, contract NAS 9-11160 (with MSFC), 1970
It should be noted that numerous parallel technology studies were
also being performed. Results from these studies would be used to
flesh out the Phase B study efforts in key technical areas. These
included a foamed silica coated borosilicate glass studied for a
reusable heat shield (which offered a 10:1 weight reduction and
greatly decreased costs over metallic thermal protection systems),
reusable cryo tankage, advanced materials, and cryo engines.
At the end of the formal Phase B studies in 1971, several
conclusions were reached. Primary among them was the preferred 2
stage, fully reusable system had a high development cost, required
multiple concurrent technology developments, and had a relatively
high technology risk. Development costs could exceed $2 billion in
the peak year. The political feasibility of the preferred 2 stage
fully reusable design ended when, in 1971, the OMB capped the NASA
budget for all programs not to exceed $3.2 billion, and specifically
stated they would not increase this level in the foreseeable future.
An alternative configuration studied in the Phase A extension
studies using an expendable external fuel tank was felt to have
lower development costs and lower technology risks. However, this
(Cont)
--
Wales Larrison
Internet: [email protected]
Compuserve: >internet:[email protected]
Article: 864
From: [email protected] (Wales Larrison)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.space
Subject: Shuttle Development History (4 of 6)
Date: 18 Jan 92 23:12:18 GMT
Organization: Universal Electronics Inc. (Public access BBS)
decision bumped the Phase B studies back to the starting point. All
of the Phase B studies were extended for another year. NASA
baselined the external tank approach in August 1971 to reduce peak
development cost and began to look at variations on the differing
booster and shuttle designs with reduced system development costs,
while still getting as much utility out of the vehicle as possible.
An external fuel tank, by putting more than 80% of the mass to be
accelerated into a flexible design envelope, reduced the system
sensitivity to the critical uncertainties of orbiter inert weight
growth, and main engine performance shortfall. While these design
factors had been massively analyzed, the system design was very
sensitive to these. Since all uncertainties could not be eliminated
without actually building and testing a system (and there was no
money for doing this), NASA chose to pick a system that was the
least sensitive to these uncertainties. This approach however,
complicated the operations, and greatly increased recurring costs.
(Note: using 20:20 hindsight, the engine performance has
technically been right on. Engine recurring cost has exceeded its
expected levels, since the approach taken was to not risk
performance in favor of lower costs. Similarly, the orbiter inert
weight has grown approximately 2 % over the expected weight set in
1971 - primarily due to uncertainties in the aerodynamics and
aerothermal environments. Prior to the shuttle, the X-15 had
provided data up to about Mach 7, but the entry environment from
Mach 7-25 was pretty much unknown, and almost impossible to simulate
on the ground. Again, the decision was made to design heavier
structures and less maintainable systems to encompass the range of
these uncertainties - reducing the development risk and cost, while
increasing the recurring costs from continuing operations. NASA's
priority had been changed from the recurring operational
characteristics of the vehicles - and this would come back to haunt
them in complex and high cost operations for the system.)
For Booster design, the reusable booster design had been ruled out
as too expensive to develop (although everyone involved agreed it
would be cheaper to operate flight-to-flight). After several design
iterations, a design emerged based upon Grumman and MDAC analyses
which used an expendable booster burning in parallel to the orbiter
during first stage flight. It seemed to provide the most capability,
with the minimum development cost, although every assessment showed
it had a higher recurring cost.
Cost awareness was very high at NASA. NASA's guidelines to the
contractors in August 1971 included:
"o Don't exceed much over $1 B in any year
o Keep total costs below $12 B for 445 flights
o Keep Risks Low - don't do a great deal more than we have
demonstrated before
o Keep flexible to vary costs with traffic demands"
By this time, NASA's cost data base was extensive, based upon up
to 6 independent cost analyses designs for similar systems, and it
very specifically showed the differences in vehicle configuration
and recurring cost from limiting development costs.
The following is example data from summary data from my files...
[Summary Data from 3 August 1971 JSC internal report]
Grumman Concepts - all 1 1/2 stage, thrust augmented systems.
Expendable Expendable Expendable Reuse
Liq Booster Liq Booster Solid Bstr Orb &
(Reuse Cryo Reuse Orb Reuse Orb Booster
Tanks)
Reuse Orb
DDT&E ($M)
Orbiter 2,600 2,615 2,615 2,586
Booster/SRM 153 537 338 2,724
Reuse Cryo Tanks 301
Main Engine 657 769 657 655
Flt test 651 693 664 936
Total 4,362 4,614 4,274 7,079
(Cont)
--
Wales Larrison
Internet: [email protected]
Compuserve: >internet:[email protected]
Article: 865
From: [email protected] (Wales Larrison)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.space
Subject: Shuttle Development History (5 of 6)
Date: 18 Jan 92 23:13:38 GMT
Organization: Universal Electronics Inc. (Public access BBS)
Production ($M)
Orbiter 482 544 544 491
Booster/SRM 1,369 2,612 5,644 1,121
Tanks 2,259
Total 4,110 3,156 6,188 1,612
Operations 998 2,131 1,105 1,475
Total Program 9,470 9,901 11,567 9,988
Peak Annual 1,100 ????? 1,100 1,640
Funding
Direct Cost 9.82 10.26 14.66 3.23
per Flight
Note:(translating from 1971 dollars to 1990 dollars, yields a cost per
flight of $35.84M $37.45M $53.51M $11.79M
these were for a 40,000 pound payload system, and yielded a cost per
pound (1990$) of $896 $936 $1338 $295 ).
[Note: A system similar to option 3 was chosen since it had the
lowest technical risk, most flexibility, and low development costs.]
NASA still had not been given the official go-ahead for shuttle
development, although the primary decision had apparently already
been made in the White House. In a calculated measure, NASA was
forced by OMB to go through repeated attempts to reduce the Shuttle
development costs. (Ref: Pace, Logsdon) Casper Weinberger, Deputy
Director of the OMB, told his staff that they had a free hand to
work on NASA to reduce program costs. Through November and December
of 1971 OMB and NASA fought over the shuttle design and
configuration (despite all of the previous contracted studies and
study results). To force NASA to consider smaller, lower-cost
shuttles, OMB kept specifying specific designs to be evaluated by
NASA, and NASA kept arguing against the technical ability of OMB to
cost-design a shuttle system.
It was not until 3 January 1972 that the final approval for the
Space Shuttle was communicated to NASA. Appropriately enough, NASA
had spent the holidays struggling to answer another set of detailed
OMB questions, and had set a 14x45 foot payload bay as the minimum
size for the shuttle. To NASA's surprise, they were told the 15x60
foot payload bay had been approved.
The decision to use solid rocket motors for the booster stage was
made soon afterwards. As part of the extensions of the Phase B
contracts, numerous booster propulsion schemes had been examined.
The major reason for the choice of solid rocket boosters was the
development cost of the liquid boosters. NASA specifically chose to
accept a higher recurring cost and a complex operations flow, to
reduce the projected development cost. Reusable cryo tanks were
also rejected on the basis of a higher development cost and
increased technical risk, although they had a lower recurring cost.
OMB director George Schultz said "NASA is to be congratulated for
its willingness to examine a wide range of alternatives to find a
configuration which retains system capability but which reduces the
amount of investment required." (Ref: Letter from George Schultz to
Jame Fletcher, 17 March 1972, NASA historical archives)
In March of 1972, a "request for proposals" was released to the
industry for the specified space shuttle system. It had all of the
elements of the current design - 15X60 payload bay volume, cross
range of 1100 nmi, 65,000 pound payload capability, large external
tank, and dual solid rocket boosters. 4 teams of companies replied
- each with a proposal of 2000+ pages. These were MDAC, Grumman,
North American Rockwell, and Lockheed. Of these, North American
Rockwell was chosen, and contract NAS 9-14000 to design, develop,
test, and construct the space shuttle was let in late 1972.
Between 1972 and 1980, the funding profile for the program
changed dramatically - annual budgets for the phase C/D contract
effort changed yearly. Each year the effort had to be replanned and
rephased by NASA and the contractors. The expected 5 year contract
(Cont)
--
Wales Larrison
Internet: [email protected]
Compuserve: >internet:[email protected]
Article: 866
From: [email protected] (Wales Larrison)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.space
Subject: Shuttle Development History (6 of 6)
Date: 18 Jan 92 23:14:58 GMT
Organization: Universal Electronics Inc. (Public access BBS)
was stretched by Congress to 7, then 9 years. The number of
vehicles to be built changed from 10 (1972) to 5 (1975) to 4 (1976)
to 1 (1977) to 4 (1978) again, and the fleet delivery schedule
stretched out from 1 every 6 months to 1 every 2 years. Each year
the contracts for delivery of parts and materials had to be
renegotiated with subcontractors and vendors. This doubled or
tripled the expected program costs. (Rockwell claimed after 51-L
that a block buy of 3 orbiters can be made for the price of 2 - if
the dollars were allocated up front so they could effectively
negotiate with their suppliers).
Meanwhile, the NASA budget continued to shrink. In constant 1972
dollars, the NASA budget shrank from $3.2 billion in 1971 to $2.4
billion in 1978. As the budgets decreased, new programs that had
been expected to provide the majority of the payloads to be carried
on the shuttle were eliminated or severely cut back. Since these
programs were not yet established, or not even in existence, they
could not defend themselves against budget cuts. This created the
vicious spiral of: few missions - high cost transportation - high
cost missions - more importance on fewer missions - fewer, more
costly missions - higher cost transportation - ...
And it is from this "death spiral" that we are trying to extract
our national space program. The Challenger accident, the failure of
the few alternative launch systems, and the increased attention given
to space by the public are all working to extract us from this.
Hope you folks find this interesting. I had fun putting it
together. (Finis)
Editorial commentary: I have to agree with some of the other
folks - much (I'd say about 60%) of the problems with the shuttle
came from the external constraints on the design of the system
imposed by Congress and OMB - which always focused on reducing the
annual budgetary cost at the expense of higher operating costs. In
my opinion, NASA did a pretty good job at doing the best design they
could get for the budget they were handed, and considering the
changes and micromanaging of the budget that were mandated on them.
(P.S. - it would be interesting to rewrite Allen's "Boat
construction" analogy to match historical actions. Any takers?)
The other 40% of blame I place on NASA who did not take the policy
of initially focusing on running the shuttle as a test and
developmental program, and who have not pursued an agressive shuttle
improvements and upgrades program to fix what has been identified as
wrong with the shuttle to decrease operating costs, improve
turnaround flow, and improve reliability. And another, different,
rassberry to NASA for not getting out of the operational
transportation business as soon as possible. I believe the shuttle
could be operated for about 50% of the current operating cost, if
done by a commercial firm on an incentive basis.
But the big question we have to ask, is if this type of OMB and
Congressionally micromanaged development project will be the norm
for future space developments? Look at SSF and the congressional
design and operational conditions and approaches laid upon the Space
Station program, and consider what has happened with the shuttle.
Will this change for the next launch system? What can we do to
avoid this problem for any future launch systems? (Like NLS, like
NASP, like PLS/AMLS, like the SSTO?) How can we do Lunar/Mars
exploration and settlement in this environment?
Discussion, anyone?
------------------------------------------------------------------
Wales Larrison Space Technology Investor
--
Wales Larrison
Internet: [email protected]
Compuserve: >internet:[email protected]
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