| T.R | Title | User | Personal
Name | Date | Lines |
|---|
| 644.1 | Bush considers independent panel to look at NASA | 4347::GRIFFIN | Dave Griffin | Mon Jul 16 1990 19:29 | 96 |
| From: [email protected] (ROB STEIN, UPI Science Editor)
Newsgroups: clari.tw.space,clari.news.aviation,clari.news.gov.usa,clari.news.top
Date: 15 Jul 90 19:41:29 GMT
WASHINGTON (UPI) -- President Bush is considering the appointment of
an independent commission to review NASA operations in the wake of
problems that have shaken confidence in the nation's space program,
administration officials said Sunday.
Officials said Bush may decide this week to name a panel of experts
to conduct a broad assessment of NASA programs, one of several options
pursued in recent days by Vice President Dan Quayle, chairman of the
National Space Council.
Among the spate of embarrassing revelations from the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration in the past month: The Hubble Space
Telescope, touted as a revolutionary new eye on the universe, turns out
to be near-sighted. Days later, the space shuttle fleet, the centerpiece
of the U.S. space program, is grounded by an elusive fuel leak.
At the same time, reports indicate the space station Freedom,
envisioned as leading space exploration into the next century, may be
too heavy and need too many repairs to be feasible.
Regarding the appointment of a review panel, one administration
official said, ``To the degree that a shuttle screw-up or the Hubble
failure undermines public confidence in the program doesn't help, but
it's not the main focus.''
The White House could provide no timetable for a final decision by
Bush on steps to address the concerns.
Officials acknowledged the proposal for an independent review was
prompted in part by worries about funding prospects on Capitol Hill at a
time when Bush is urging Congress to back projects estimated to cost
upward of $300 billion over the next 30 years.
``Money is the underlying problem,'' said one official.
Instead of a master of technology on the high frontier, the agency
has become a target for comedians and cartoonists.
The foul-ups have eroded public and congressional support for the
agency to the lowest point since the space shuttle Challenger exploded
in 1986, some say.
``We're concerned about the public perceptions of NASA and the
space program,'' said Lori Garver, executive director of the National
Space Society in Washington, a NASA booster.
``NASA is really in a crisis of confidence,'' agreed John Logsdon,
director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University.
The blunders come as Congress considers whether to boost NASA's
budget above $15 billion, a 24 percent hike representing the largest
proposed increase of any government agency and includes programs key to
the agency's future.
``I think they're in trouble,'' said John Pike of the American
Federation of Scientists. ``Two weeks ago the problem was, `How big of
an increase are they going to get?' These problems have couched it more
in terms of hanging on to what they got.''
At the beleaguered agency, morale has reportedly plummeted and
something of a siege mentality has set in. Officials vow to uncover what
caused the foul-ups, stress the problems can be fixed and argue the
setbacks do not represent any fundamental problems.
Many outside experts agree, saying the glitches occurred at
different times, for different reasons and that such snags are
inevitable in the complicated world of space flight.
``It's fun to NASA-bash these days,'' said Jerry Grey of the
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. ``But this kind of
thing is fairly common in advanced technology programs. In this case
it's just really bad luck that they all happened at once.''
Americans remember Neil Armstrong stepping onto the moon and John
Glenn orbiting Earth but tend to forget disasters such as three Apollo
astronauts perishing in a launch pad fire, Pike said.
``On some level it is, `Situation Normal: All Fouled Up. The
technical problems they are having are no different than the problems
they've always had,'' Pike said.
``The reality is that Murphy is and has been alive and well in the
space program,'' said Pike, referring to Murphy's Law that ``Everything
that can go wrong, will go wrong.''
But others say the problems are indicative of a fundamental flaw in
the way NASA works: the tendency to pursue large, crowd-pleasing
projects instead of more modest, practical goals.
``NASA has laid out its long-range program in space, which is to
pursue what it calls a procession of manned space spectaculars,'' said
Alex Roland, a former NASA historian now teaching at Duke University.
``They are just determined to do that and they are going to see that
through in spite of the fact that it's an unrealistic agenda.
``Instead of adjusting their goals and schedules to suit what they
are learning technologically, they try to make technology fit their
preconceived notions of where they are going,'' he said. ``They insist
on these quantum leaps in technology that invite the setbacks that we
have seen repeatedly.''
Others say the problems stem from NASA trying to deliver more than
is realistic based on its budget.
``It's an organization that in its present form and style of
management is unlikely to be able to achieve the level of excellence we
expect of it. It's the product of 20 years of essentially dishonesty to
itself -- that it could in fact carry out programs on its own
successfully,'' Logsdon said.
At the least, the fierce negative reaction to the latest problems
raises questions about how much the public will support the space
program the next time something goes wrong.
``I'm disturbed by the level of public criticism and anxiety that
has been occasioned by these problems,'' Pike said. ``The problems they
are having right now is nothing compared to when the next shuttle blows
up. I think support for NASA is very broad but not very deep.''
|
| 644.2 | NASA asked to study future of space program | 4347::GRIFFIN | Dave Griffin | Mon Jul 16 1990 19:31 | 58 |
| From: [email protected] (HELEN THOMAS, UPI White House Reporter)
Date: 16 Jul 90 19:30:33 GMT
WASHINGTON (UPI) -- Vice President Dan Quayle Monday asked NASA
Administrator Richard Truly to form an independent task force to
consider ``the future long-term direction'' of the embattled space
program.
``Space continues to be a top priority for this administration. We
all want the best ideas on how we can move into the next century
maintaining our leadership in space,'' according to a statement from
Quayle's office.
While there is no specific deadline, the administration hoped Truly
and the task force would report back by early fall to Quayle, who heads
the National Space Council, said David Beckwith, Quayle's spokesman.
``This is not a backward-looking proposal,'' Beckwith said. ``We've
got to press ahead with the space program. This is not a, `Who shot
John?' investigation.''
NASA had no immediate comment.
Quayle's statement dismissed reports that the White House planned
to conduct its own investigation into the beleaguered space agency.
``The vice president is looking forward to the resumption of
shuttle flights and to NASA's conclusion of (its own) ... inquiry,'' the
statement said.
The move was prompted by the erosion of public and congressional
support for the space program, administration officials said.
The space agency is under fire from a series of embarrassing
revelations in the past month, including the grounding of the space
shuttle fleet, a defect in the Hubble Space Telescope and potential
problems with the proposed space station Freedom.
The problems triggered a storm of criticism in Congress, which is
considering a request to boost NASA's budget above $15 billion for
fiscal year 1991, the largest proposed increase of any government
agency.
Public and congressional support for NASA is widely believed to
have dropped to the lowest point since the 1986 Challenger disaster,
which claimed the life of New Hampshire schoolteacher Christa McAuliffe
and six other shuttle crew members. The $1.5 billion Hubble telescope,
placed into orbit April 25, was expected to revolutionize astronomy by
peering more deeply and with greater clarity into the universe than ever
before.
But engineers discovered a flaw in the telescope's highly touted
optical system -- one of the instrument's critical mirrors is apparently
curved slightly incorrectly, blurring the telescope's view of the
heavens.
Officials at NASA, which is investigating the foul-up, have said
the telescope can still do valuable research and its capabilities can be
completely restored by 1993 by replacing one of the instruments.
Meanwhile, NASA's three space shuttles have been grounded by
hydrogen fuel leaks, further detracting from the agency's image.
In that case, NASA officials have defended the agency, saying the
leak was detected by safety procedures instituted in the wake of the
Challenger disaster, demonstrating the effectiveness of those changes.
Engineers last week reported they believed they had pinpointed the
source of the leak in two shuttles and hoped to resume flights soon.
Concerns have also arisen over the proposed $30 billion space
station Freedom, which reports have indicated may be too heavy and
require too much routine maintenance under current designs to be
practical.
|
| 644.3 | Another article on NASA (LA Times) | 4347::GRIFFIN | Dave Griffin | Sun Jul 22 1990 19:32 | 259 |
| [There are a few factual errors in the article, but it makes its point
nonetheless..... -dg]
From: [email protected] (Gerald J. Walsh)
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
Subject: NASA: A Can-Do Agency Becomes A Can't Do Bureaucracy
Date: 22 Jul 90 19:23:40 GMT
Organization: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA
"NASA: What Goes Up -- A Can-Do Agency Becomes A Can't Do Bureaucracy"
(from the Los Angeles Times Opinion Section - Sunday July 22, 1990)
(by Gregg Easterbrook - contributing editor to Newsweek and the Atlantic)
Think the United States should go to Mars? Or back to the moon? Build a space
station? Or even just launch satellites and probes on a timely basis? The
National Aeronautics and Space Administration used to be the answer to such
questions; today it's the obstacle. NASA now stands between the United States
and success in space.
Recent problems such as the defective Hubble telescope and the grounded shuttle
fleet are inklings of much deeper flaws rippling through the agency. NASA has
been transformed from a can-do agency that represented the best in government
to a can't-do bureaucracy embodying the worst aspect of British Admiralty
stagnation, ass-protection and the military-industrial mind-set. At NASA, it
no longer matters how many months or millions anything takes, as long as all
personnel keep their jobs and all contractors continue receiving business.
"We absolutely cannot get anything done any more," said a recently retired NASA
official. "We've stopped thinking and stopped innovating. All NASA energy now
goes to endlessly rejustifying the budgets for bad ideas from the past. We
haven't had a winner new idea since Skylab." Skylab was launched in 1973.
Consider these current NASA failings:
-The Hubble telescope's most basic quality - whether its two primary lenses
worked - was never tested before launch. This happened despite the fact that
NASA had an unexpected three extra years - caused by flight suspension after
Challenger - to work on the instrument. After the flaw was revealed, NASA
complained it was because there was not enough money. The project came in
about $400 million over budget as it was.
-Two shuttle mission commanders were recently suspended from flight duty.
-The space station, with construction costs up from $8 million to $37 billion
even as the design has shrunk, will require more maintenance than previously
acknowledged, NASA now admits. And there's still barely any explanation of
what astronauts will [do] once aboard.
-Though environmental science is a pressing political issue, NASA's $17 billion
"crash" initiative won't put the first environmental research satellite into
orbit until the next century.
-A Mars mission, whose potential price tag NASA will not discuss publicly, may
cost $500 billion, according to internal agency estimates.
-The White House just announced permission for U.S.-built satellites to be
launched aboard Soviet rockets from a for-profit spaceport to be built in Cape
York, Australia. The U.S. commercial satellite industry had been pressuring
for this, because the Cape York consortium promises lower prices than NASA or
any U.S. company can provide. That they can do something in space we can't is
perhaps the most frightening indictment of the U.S. space effort.
-The space shuttle fleet is indefinitely grounded because of hydrogen-fuel
leaks, but that's the least of its problems. Launching cargo on the shuttle
can cost 10 times as much as using expendable rockets. The shuttle continues
to be unreliable, with a peak launch rate of nine flights per year instead of
the 50 NASA promised.
Statistical studies by NASA continue to suggest another shuttle flight
catastrophe is probable. The shuttle still relies on the no-turning-back-
solid-rocket boosters that destroyed Challenger.
"The way you get ahead inside NASA," said the former NASA official, "is by
denying there are problems and being the loudest one to attach the blame for
anything that goes wrong to critics."
In the wake of the Challenger disaster, no NASA official was fired - not even
those involved in trying to hush up the warnings from Morton Thiokol engineers.
The career of NASA Deputy Administrator James R. Thompson is a case in point.
Thompson was director of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center. Marshall was
responsible for designing and supervising the solid rocket boosters that
destroyed Challenger. Marshall also supervised testing of the Hubble. Yet
Thompson is now No. 2 for the U.S. space program.
Today, the White House is upset about NASA performance, but continues to allow
Vice President Dan Quayle to run space policy. Nothing could please NASA
deadwood more. Quayle does not challenge NASA's basic assumptions. With much
fanfare last week, he announced a high-level task force to assess NASA
priorities and performance. Who will sit on it? Quayle said NASA would pick
the members. It's hard to believe these words came form an adult. Look for a
hard-hitting report.
Actually, although significant segments of the engineering and space-science
communities are dismayed about NASA, it might be difficult to find experts who
would say this publicly. This is partly due to disgust with the fact that the
thorough report of the Rogers Commision - after the Challenger disaster - went
straight to the discard pile.
But it is largely because, if your career involves space science or
engineering, you cannot be on record criticizing NASA. It is a monopoly, the
only game in town.
What is the most basic problem with NASA that many people know but refuse to
say in public? That the agency must move on from the space shuttle.
Technologically, the shuttle is a remarkable achievement. But operationally,
the system is a white elephant. The shuttle is far too expensive to launch
more than a few times a year;far too complex to be reliable, and its premise is
elementally flawed because it risks precious human lives on prosaic cargo-
delivery missions.
How can the Soviets stage some 90 space launches per year and the United States
only about 15? Because, for the majority of missions, Soviets use relatively
low-tech, low-cost "dumb" boosters.
The Soviet Union has a space shuttle. It's been launched once - because the
Soviets cannot afford to operate it. Under perestroika, Soviet scientists have
been more open about criticizing its impracticality than U.S. scientists have
been about our shuttles.
NASA refuses to make the slightest concession about shuttle use because any
alternative would diminish the role of astronauts. Full employment for
astronauts is NASA's non-negotiable demand: the reason for NASA's insistence in
the early 1970's both on building a space shuttle and halting all research into
throwaway rockets;the reason for insistence on a space station that is
[continuously habited].
Astronaut employment is a NASA fixation not so much because of the relative
handful of astronaut jobs, but because of the thousands of astronaut-related
jobs in the NASA hierarchy and at NASA contractors. Shuttle fixation lies at
the heart of NASA's bureaucratic miasma.
How can the NASA logjam be broken? The nature of the U.S. space fleet must be
changed. Here's the program:
1) [Park the shuttle]. The shuttle fleet should be converted from a payload-
delivery system into scientific research vehicles able to stay in space for a
few weeks at a time. For pure research purposes, the shuttle would fly three
or four times per year. Astronauts and scientists working in the shuttle bay
could perform all the basic research and commercial manufacturing experiments
proposed for the space station.
2) [Cancel the space station]. It won't be necessary if step 1 is taken, and
money saved could be used to fund steps 3 and 4.
3) [Build new boosters]. It's absurd for the United States to debate a Mars
mission when we can't even get routine payloads into low-Earth orbit. This is
like arguing over the rules for a road race when you don't even own a car.
NASA's first priority should be developing affordable launch systems that work.
Because NASA stopped all rocket research to prevent shuttle competitors from
developing, the United States has not designed a new expandable space booster
in almost 25 years. Using current advances in computer science, materials
technology and aerodynamics, it should be possible to design new throwaway
boosters that would have at least as much power as those in use - yet be far
cheaper.
Four years ago, when the Air Force thought the Strategic Defense Initiative
would happen, generals realized SDI could never be practically launched from
the shuttle - putting the system into orbit would cost more than SDI itself.
So the Air Force initiated a cheap booster project, Advanced Launch System.
NASA jumped into hyperspace over this program, lobbying frantically for its
cancellation. Now, with the military budget shrinking, Advanced Launch System
research has all but stopped. It should be revised.
4) [Build a spaceplane]. More than 30 years ago, the Air Force was routinely
dropping the X-15 spaceplane from a B-52 bomber, flying it to the lower reaches
of orbit and bringing it back for standard landings on runways. The X-15
program was put together quickly, didn't cost much and never had an accident.
Forward into the past!
For those missions when people are required, a new spaceplane may be the
answer. Several proposals are circulating for a spaceplane that would be
carried aloft on the back of a 747, then released to ignite rocket engines and
transport six to 10 people into orbit.
The spaceplane does have one technical drawback that drives NASA crazy: It
would be impossible to build a huge spaceplane. The vehicle would be for crew
and small payloads only, which means spaceplanes could not take large
satellites into orbit, resulting in a lower percentage of manned space
launches. It is for this reason that NASA hates, hates hates any mention of
the word spaceplane.
A new U.S. space fleet based on science-only shuttles, cheap new "dumb"
boosters for most cargo launches and a spaceplane would make NASA programs
affordable, flexible and reliable. The agency would be shaken up from top to
bottom during the conversion, breaking bad habits and instilling new vision.
NASA would have an exciting short-term goal - building and testing the new
fleet - and far greater prospects for exciting long-term goals, once affordable
and practical means of access to space comes into existence.
These are the kinds of issues - not whether to send men to Mars - that ought to
be attracting White House attention.
Leadership starts at the top. It is no coincidence that NASA was most
effective during a period when two Presidents, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
Johnson, showed they were personally concerned with outcome of missions.
Since then the United States has not had a President who exerted constructive
pressure on NASA, one reason for its institutional decline. Richard M. Nixon
hated space, which he considered a Democratic program; he pushed the agency
toward issuing lies about shuttle cheapness, creating the self-deception that
still haunts NASA. Ronald Reagan had a negative impact, imposing no cost
controls during the heady first-term; then, after Challenger, firing no one and
granting an immediate budget increase - the worst message to send a bureaucracy
that has screwed up.
Now comes George Bush. He's already hiked the NASA budget 36% in the last two
years. And he is talking about vast new NASA budget increases for the space
station, a moon base and perhaps Mars.
Dangling the carrot of big budget increases, Bush ought to win significant
concessions from NASA. Presidential leadership is the key to reform. The
agency will not reform itself; and too many congressman will fight to the death
to preserve existing spending in their districts to make Congress a likely
source of NASA change.
But Bush has yet to send the get-tough signal. Letting NASA appoint its own
self-study commision is hardly going to get the agency's attention. Putting
Quayle in charge of space policy will not make any entrenched bureaucrat lose a
moment's sleep. In fact, Quayle's presence sends the signal that NASA can get
away with murder. If Bush were serious about NASA reform, Washington insiders
know, he would have assigned somebody else. It's time to chart NASA a new
course to the stars.
=============================================================================
Now its time for my comments I suppose...
I've been defending NASA everytime they're attacked regarding the latest
problems with the shuttle and the Hubble. I've always said, "those people just
don't understand the complexities of these things. They never praise the good,
only condemn the bad." Well, after reading this article I've realized that
people always have, and always will, condemn the bad. People will always
expect 100% no matter how complex the technology is. I'm still a student and
I've always been awed by space. NASA and its achievements have always
impressed me and I'm proud to have the opportunity to work with some of the
finest scientist and engineers in the entire World. I think the future is in
space. Humans are known for their curiosity and drive for exploration. Where
in history would we be now if Columbus had not been curious about what was over
the horizon? We've reached the point where its time to start looking beyond
the horizon and outward into space and beyond. The author of this article has
shown the flaws in NASA and has suggested some good reforms. Unfortunately,
when Congress becomes confused or dismayed about something they take the most
logical approach they can think of... cut the funding off. What can this
possibly solve?? As the author has suggested, we need to come up with new
visions and a new direction. We are relying too much on one launch vehicle.
The scariest part for the U.S. is that commercial satellites are going to be
launched by the Soviet Union! We've got to use expendable launch vehicles, cut
the cost and increase the number of launches per year. We will still need the
shuttle to grapple disabled satellites, but it just costs too much to have it
carry up new satellites that could easily be lifted by cheap rockets. I still
believe a moon base and a manned landing on Mars are great long-term goals.
I'm all for it! But if the shuttle can't even get off the ground, how can we
even think about achieving these goals.
Our future [is] in space. But to make that future a reality, we've got to
change our direction in the present.
|
| 644.4 | X-15 accidents | 15372::LEPAGE | Constitutional Anarchy | Wed Jul 25 1990 11:47 | 38 |
| Re:.3
As mentioned previously, there were some factual errors in the
previous posting. One in particular was made in point 4 of the author's
plan. In it he states that the X-15 never had an accident. Well it did
and one of them was fatal. Here is a list of the major flight
accidents:
- November 5, 1959 Aircraft number two on the fourth X-15 flight
piloted by North American test pilot A. Scott Crossfield suffered from
an engine fire which forced the aircraft into an emergency landing. On
landing (with its fuel tanks nearly full), X-15 #2 came down hard and
the fuselage snapped in two just behind the cockpit.
- January 10, 1962 Aircraft number one on X-15 flight 47 piloted by
Navy test pilot Cmdr. Forrest S. Peterson suffered an engine ignition
failure and had to make an emergency landing.
- November 9, 1962 Aircraft number two on X-15 flight 74 piloted by
NASA test pilot John B. McKay had to make an emergency landing. Upon
landing, the aircraft tipped over and tumbled to a stop resulting in
serious injuries to McKay and the virtual destruction of aircraft
number two. It was later rebuilt and modified into the X-15A-2.
- June 29, 1967 Aircraft number one on X-15 flight 184 piloted by
Air Force test pilot Capt. William J. Knight experienced an electrical
failure as the aircraft climbed through 107,000 feet forcing an
emergency landing.
- November 15, 1967 Aircraft number three on X-15 flight 191 piloted by
Air Force test pilot Maj. Michael J. Adams apparently suffered an
instrument failure prior to reentry which resulted in an improper
reentry attitude. The aircraft went into a spin then a steep dive which
resulted in a breakup of the aircraft at an altitude of over 100,000
feet. Maj. Adams was killed in the mishap.
Drew
|
| 644.5 | | 7908::REDFORD | All isms are wasms | Wed Jul 25 1990 17:59 | 16 |
| re: .-1
Fortunately for the X-15, none of those accidents were broadcast
on nationwide TV to millions of schoolchildren. Unfortunately
for the Shuttle, those sort of accidents would probably have
destroyed it. No emergency landings for it.
re: Easterbrook's article:
This sounds essentially like imitating the Soviet program. The
Soviets have big, dumb boosters and have a spaceplane. If we
want to inspire people, shouldn't we be trying to leapfrog them instead?
Solar sails to Mars! Railgun launches from Hawaiian volcanos! That
would make people sit up and take notice.
/jlr
|
| 644.6 | stars and shields | 60608::MANSFIELD | | Thu Jul 26 1990 02:05 | 16 |
| Question:
Being from the new era - I am not that farmilar with the x-15.
In the previous note Drew makes mention of reentry in regards to the
x-15. I take it that this means the x-15 could operate outside the
earths main atmosphere and therefore required shielding when decending.
I remember a scene from the right stuff - when Chuck steals a plane and
goes striaght up before engine cut out and we see stars - to infer that
he was above the atmosphere so to speak. Was that scene an accurate
representation.
Simon
n
|
| 644.7 | Walk before we can run | 42070::HAZEL | A town called ... er ... thingy | Thu Jul 26 1990 09:38 | 33 |
| Re. .5:
The impression that I get about NASA's recent spate of problems is that
they are caused to some extent by trying to "leap-frog" the Soviet
space program. The result is that the Soviet space program continues
relatively unimpeded by technical problems (despite some notable
failures), while NASA's program appears to be getting into
difficulties.
I have no doubt that US technology is superior in terms of quality and
reliability to that of the USSR. If the US were to adopt a program with
less "gee-whizz" and more steady progress, it would "leap-frog" the
Soviet program by virtue of the quality and reliability of its
hardware.
I find it disappointing that the US makes its superiority in technology
less visible by constantly trying to leap light-years ahead instead of
consolidating what it has. The inevitable failures which arise from
this policy tend to give the impression that the USA (not just NASA)
can't do what it says it will. Use of slightly improved "old"
technology would be a way of proving this impression wrong. The
improvements could be sufficient to make the new equipment visibly
better than the old, but not so much that the newness compromises
reliability.
I bet a US-built version of the MIR space station and its support
hardware would have vastly improved capabilities, and would have a much
higher profile in the eyes of the world. In contrast, the proposed US
space station is already begining to look as though it won't be
launched until a lot later than originally proposed.
Dave Hazel
|
| 644.8 | | 2631::DAHL | Tom Dahl, CDMS | Thu Jul 26 1990 10:51 | 25 |
| RE: <<< Note 644.6 by 60608::MANSFIELD >>>
> I take it that this means the x-15 could operate outside the
> earths main atmosphere and therefore required shielding when decending.
The X-15 did operate outside the main atmosphere. Altitude record was just
over 300,000 feet (where the air density is of the order of 0.001% of sea
level). However, extensive shielding to protect the aircraft from re-entry
heating was not required, because the speeds were relatively low -- Mach 4-ish
rather than Mach 20-ish.
> I remember a scene from the right stuff - when Chuck steals a plane and
> goes striaght up before engine cut out and we see stars - to infer that
> he was above the atmosphere so to speak. Was that scene an accurate
> representation.
Certainly stars can be seen in the daytime (i.e., when on the side of the Earth
illuminated by the Sun) above 90,000 or 100,000 feet, so that is accurate.
Yeager was flying the F-104N which was a modified F-104 with a small rocket
motor mounted in the tail. I don't remember the altitude he reached on that
flight, but it was of the order of 100,000 feet. I haven't heard any other
descriptions of the flight which included the clandestine manner in which he
took off, as described in The Right Stuff, so I don't know if that's accurate.
If it is accurate, I would be surprised.
-- Tom
|
| 644.9 | Who'll buy it? | 4347::GRIFFIN | Dave Griffin | Thu Jul 26 1990 11:32 | 46 |
| Re: .7
While I think I agree that slow and steady is the best way to run a
big program like NASA, I wonder if they can do that in this country.
I think that NASA believes that have to fight for every penny they get and
therefore must show significant "bang for the buck". Since appropriations
are made by congresspeople who typically aren't interested in NASA's science
or other programs -- and they represent, on a whole, a public which
generally holds science at a distance -- could NASA survive by going slowly?
I've recently started to read up rather heavily on NASA's history, so I'm
still trying to get my facts straight -- but here's a "for instance":
I recall that after the heyday of Apollo 11, which had almost no science on
it at all, NASA slowly started to integrate a lunar exploration plan into
the Apollo program. This called for a couple of Apollo launches a year, with
quite a few of them lunar missions (others were long-term space missions).
Just when Apollo started to return interesting science data, it's funding
was cut -- Congress, Nixon, and the public just didn't seem to care all that
much.
The Space Shuttle, oversold and underpriced, managed to get presidential
support because someone gave Nixon a nice model of one (or so I've heard).
It's difficult to place blame here, because we're talking about some interesting
organizational dynamics. Did NASA screw up because they thought they
were invincible after Apollo, or did Congress only accept the programs that
NASA could pitch to get their interest (even if they were not in the best
interest of the organization)?
Whether we go slow and steadily, or try to leapfrog, space exploration will
cost big BIG bucks. Whether that expenditure is worth it depends on the
ideals and desires of those paying for it -- the taxpayers. JFK turned
patriotism into multiple billions of dollars to put a man on the moon --
nobody got there because of scientific curiosity. The Soviets are rightly
proud of their space program -- but they are recently questioning the costs
as well. Buran, I believe, is a recent example of how the Soviet space
ministry may have reacted to budget pressures in a manner that the U.S. did
20 years ago.
I'm still learning about this, and still forming opinions. The more I learn,
the less "cut and dried" it all seems.
- dave
|
| 644.10 | | 5874::SCOLARO | Loren Marie - born 2/2/90 | Thu Jul 26 1990 12:27 | 29 |
| Well, I frankly don't think the problem is that NASA is to technically
agressive, far from it. The shuttle is a CONSERVATIVE compromise. If
the shuttle had been designed AGGRESSIVELY, with a ramjet manned
booster, and some jet engines on the return body, we wouldn't be in
anywhere near the shape we are now in.
Without the solids, we never would have had a challanger. With a
manned ramjet booster, we could launch from anywhere, not just
huricane/thunderstorm prone Florida. With some small jet engines, the
orbiter could land anywhere (thrust reversers go a long way to removing
braking problems and the jets cure cross wind problems).
I don't believe NASA was technically aggressive with the shuttle. It
woudl have been FAR, FAR better for the country if they had been more
aggressive.
As to who would buy it, I think that Boeing would LOVE the opportunity
to build a ramjet booster. They would probably pay half of the
development costs, for the right to use that technology on a ramjet
commercial jet.
Small, powerful jet engines are the watchword of the day. The USAF is
supporting several projects to improve the thrust to weight ratio of
jet by many fold (important for fighters).
I think NOW is the time to think about shuttle mark II. We know the
problems with mark I, lets fix them.
Tony
|
| 644.11 | | 19548::YANKES | | Thu Jul 26 1990 13:58 | 36 |
|
Re: .10
>Well, I frankly don't think the problem is that NASA is to technically
>agressive, far from it. The shuttle is a CONSERVATIVE compromise. If
"Conservative" management plays a lot of "what if" games to cover the
vast majority (can't cover them all) of bad situations. NASA didn't do that
at all with the position that the Shuttle is to carry up everything and that
expendable boosters are a waste. That puts NASA as being highly agressive
in terms of its hopes, believes and crossed fingers for the shuttle program.
Yes, you can argue that the shuttle hardware itself is not exceedingly
agressive (which I'd agree with), but it is the management problems that are
giving NASA the black eye right now, not the lack of technical agressiveness.
>the shuttle had been designed AGGRESSIVELY, with a ramjet manned
>booster, and some jet engines on the return body, we wouldn't be in
>anywhere near the shape we are now in.
Purely speculative statement that can't, by nature of not being able
to prove something that hasn't occured, be backed up. But, anyways, adding
all of those other technologies to design the shuttle more aggressively would
most likely create other technical problems.
>Without the solids, we never would have had a challanger. With a
True, but would we today be discussing what went wrong and gave us
"an Atlantis"? Trying to replay history with one changed parameter to see what
the outcome would be (ie. no shuttles being lost in your example) is a very
thin style of logic. If it had ramjets, how can you guarantee that we wouldn't
have lost one by now? The shuttle is too complex to infer that if one thing
had been changed, that none would have, or will be, lost. Who knows, if the
past ~30 flights could be replayed, one of the shuttles might have been stranded
in orbit.
-craig
|
| 644.12 | | 5874::SCOLARO | Loren Marie - born 2/2/90 | Thu Jul 26 1990 16:11 | 38 |
| re .11
Craig,
I must say I agree with your interpretation of the management problem
at NASA.
I disagree with your negative assesment of a shuttle with a ramjet
booster and deployable jets on the lander. Ramjets are SIMPLE. There
is virtually nothing that can go wrong. A ramjet is little more than a
pipe with a fuel inlet. Of course a ramjet is not self starting so the
booster would also need turbojets, to get it up to ram speed. But
these are well proven technologies. Turbojets reliably power hundreds,
maybe thousands of aircraft every day. Ramjets have powered USN
surface to air missles for 30 years.
Deployable jets on the lander is also probably not a technical
challange. The only reason it was not done on the shuttle is to save
the weight of the engines and the fuel that would have to be carried.
The extra savings from a ramjet powered booster should more than offset
the extra weight of fuel and engines.
Did you know that about 60% of the gross weight of the shuttle on the
launch pad is fuel oxygen? Ramjets get their fuel from the air. The
amount of fuel required to orbit after a manned booster gets the
orbiter to mach 6 at 150k feet is a tiny fraction of that required for
surface launch. There are tremendous efficiencies there ......
I don't know that we wouldn't have lost a shuttle with a ramjet booster
and deployable jets on the orbiter by now. But I can make a good case
that it is an inherently less risky and more flexible system. More
likely to fly on time and get back safely.
Also with more commercial spin-off. The ramjet booster could be the
base for a hypersonic transport. A necessity, if you have ever taken a
16 hour flight to Tokyo. :-) :-) :-) :-)
Tony
|
| 644.13 | | PAXVAX::MAIEWSKI | | Thu Jul 26 1990 16:13 | 20 |
| Actually, things are not nearly as bad as people make them out to be.
The Shuttle is operating with a 95% success standard which no other system
being used today can beat. The fact that they grounded the fleet is an example
of being on the safe side, it could probably fly with 95% success with the
leak, which is very small.
The mirror problem shoudn't have happened, but by the end of the 15 year
mission the HST will have done all it went up there to do with little added
cost to fix the problem.
Galiliao and Megellian are both working fine.
The in flight redesign of the Voyager software went well and the mission
exceeded expectations.
The only real problem is the space station design which would be easy to fix
from an engineering point of view.
Bumb wrap if you ask me,
George
|
| 644.14 | | 5874::SCOLARO | Loren Marie - born 2/2/90 | Thu Jul 26 1990 17:30 | 10 |
| not so bum a wrap, George. It costs them 1/4 billion to launch each
shuttle. This is a outrage. It was supposed to be an order of
magnitude less in cost and at least that much efficiency (an order of
magnitude) is required to make space viable.
when they can launch for $25 mill per shot, then I'll say they are
successful. This is not an impossible goal, in fact, it is a goal that
must be achieved.
Tony
|
| 644.15 | | 19548::YANKES | | Thu Jul 26 1990 18:17 | 37 |
|
Re: .13
>The Shuttle is operating with a 95% success standard which no other system
>being used today can beat. The fact that they grounded the fleet is an example
>of being on the safe side, it could probably fly with 95% success with the
>leak, which is very small.
What is your criteria of success to come up with the absurd (my opinion)
figure of 95%? If success is "when it launches, it comes back down ok", then
yes, 95% sounds right. If success is "it met the original design goals (ie.
being a cheap space truck doing dozens of flights per year)", it has failed
miserably. If success is even remotely meeting schedules, it has failed
miserably. If success is that it can be relied upon for other activities (such
as building a space station), it is failing miserably.
> The mirror problem shouldn't have happened, but by the end of the 15 year
>mission the HST will have done all it went up there to do with little added
>cost to fix the problem.
I just love the "[it] shouldn't have happened" handwaving. It did
happen, so it can't be brushed aside so easily. And the statement "with little
added cost to fix the problem" -- is this a historical fact, a premonition of
the future or just a hope? No matter how cheap the fix is itself, once you add
in the cost of the shuttle mission to get the fix up there, the cost becomes
very high. A $.05 nut might be cheap, but the FedEx cost of shipping it
somewhere makes it a very expensive nut if you have to go that route.
> The only real problem is the space station design which would be easy to fix
>from an engineering point of view.
Oh, simple problems like "how can we afford it or reliably send supplies
to it and bring the people back home?" The space station's problems run much
deeper than just embedding key valves inside the manned compartments to cut
down on the number of space walks.
-craig
|
| 644.16 | Rockets are a hack | 2853::BUEHLER | Winning requires knowing the rules | Fri Jul 27 1990 12:46 | 22 |
| Other comments about X flights:
1. An X-15 engine test with Scott Crossfield in the vehicle in a static test
rig resulted in a destruction of the vehicle. Crossfield was unhurt (the
cockpit privdes excellent protection).
2. The movie "The Right Stuff" was full of inaccuracies with respect to the
mentality and procedures of how things were done. The F-104N flight was a
standard test flight, scheduled and sanctioned, etc. You don't just hop into
an F-104 that's parked in a hangar and fly. Also, the X-1 setup as described
by the movie presented another maverick scene. On the contrary, it was a
carefully run program, and Yeager didn't do it on his first attempt (as
portrayed by the movie). Lots of glitz and glamour that just wasn't (and isn't)
part of being a test pilot. I suggest reading the book "Yeager", by its
namesake to get a better feel for the air around test pilots back then.
Almost as a P.S., the comments by Tony Scolaro about ramjet use sounds awfully
appealing (without my knowing the details of ramjet technology beyond what has
been said). I've always disliked rockets and mourned the end of the X-15 and
follow-on programs for air-ascent spacecraft.
John
|
| 644.17 | A couple of points | 57897::LEE | Wook... Like 'Book' with a 'W' | Fri Jul 27 1990 19:09 | 11 |
| Re: Cost of the shuttle trip to fix Hubble
The Shuttle was going to visit Hubble anyway, so redesigning a couple of key
instruments that would ahve been installed anyway is a cheap fix.
Re: X15
Wasn't the X15 rocket-powered? I thought it was basically a rocket with some
stubby wings and and a skid attached to it. :-)
Wook
|
| 644.18 | | PAXVAX::MAIEWSKI | | Sat Jul 28 1990 01:12 | 14 |
| Sure, the cost of the shuttle is high, but the criticizm is that things don't
work and is simply wrong. The shuttle has been as reliable as any launch
system. As it was stated, the launch to replace the equipment on HST was going
to happen anyway, and all of the unmaned probes are working fine.
The TDRS system has been a huge success and has replaced many of the
expensive world wide tracking stations. A few years back a space craft studied
infered light for a year and made many scientific discoveries.
Considering how difficult the task, they are doing fine. Not great, but ok.
Now if they dump the current station plan and do something simpler, then they
will do great.
George
|
| 644.19 | | 19662::PIPER | Derrell Piper - VMS Security | Mon Jul 30 1990 07:34 | 3 |
| The shuttle is an impressive technical achievement. But it is not a
reliable or cost-effective booster. If you had to put a satellite in
orbit by 19xx, would you choose shuttle or ELV?
|
| 644.20 | big smiley on this, folks | 19548::YANKES | | Mon Jul 30 1990 12:55 | 16 |
|
Re: .18
I'll refrain from debating your assurtions since I'd just be repeating
myself. However, to add some lightheartedness to this discussion, I can't help
but point out one comment you made:
> A few years back a space craft studied
>infered light for a year and made many scientific discoveries.
Well, now, that *would* be an impressive triumph! Making scientific
discoveries from "infered" light speaks well for NASA's simulation capabilities.
I just wonder why they had to put the space craft in orbit to infer what was
out there... ;-)
-craig
|
| 644.21 | | PAXVAX::MAIEWSKI | | Mon Jul 30 1990 14:15 | 46 |
| No, if I wanted to launch a satellite I probably wouldn't pick the shuttle,
but if I wanted to fly a space lab mission, rescue a satellite, or maintain
something like the HST I would, it works well for those types of jobs. Show
me another system that would do those things as well. Also, it serves as a
stepping stone for developing technology for the Space Plane.
Another thing to point out is that NASA gave Congress proposals for better
shuttles back in the 70's, but Congress decided to cut the funds which left
NASA with the Shuttle as their only choice. It seems to me that they have
"made the best of a bad situation".
And what about all of the accomplishments over the past few years? The
infer-red satellite was a huge success (regardless of how it's spelled).
Just about every week it was up there and for many weeks afterward we heard
about all types of discoveries that it had made.
Why does the HST get so much flack when for very little cost it can be
repaired during a shuttle mission that is already planed and by the end of
it's 15 year mission will have completed all it went up there to accomplish?
What about Voyager being reprogrammed to complete the mission to the outer
planets?
What about the TDRS system that replaced all of those expensive ground
tracking stations. It's worked so well that most Americans don't even know
about it.
How about LANSAT and the navagation system that allows fishermen and other
boaters to find their location within a mile or so.
How about the Magellan and Galileo flights that are on target?
And what about all of the research that NASA has done on composits and
other aeronotic issues that has contributed to aircraft design for both
the military and civilian aircraft?
Considering how difficult the job, it seems to me that there are a lot
of positives that never get mentioned while the negatives get
hyped beyond belief.
Oh yeh, and finally, when is Al Gore going to remember that it was Congress
chopping every proposal back to the bone back in the 70s that was largly
responsible for driving all of the best engineers out of the agency? Bet
I'll have to wait a bit for that one.
George
|
| 644.22 | Planning for the post-shuttle era | 58205::ALLEGREZZA | George Allegrezza @VRO | Mon Jul 30 1990 14:52 | 113 |
| We seem to be discussing two different but related problems:
1) The reliability of the shuttle once it is launched.
2) NASA's ability to maintain the integrity of the entire
shuttle system (including the ability to support the nation's
space program with a predictable and dependable launch
schedule).
Problem (1) has been discussed extensively, and fixes (including the ASRM
program) have been and will continue to be implemented, yet NASA believes
that there is still a 1 in 26 chance of a major shuttle accident. As the
Phase I space station will require 28 (last number I saw quoted -- is this
correct?) flights to deliver and deploy it, its possible that the shuttle
system may have to endure a standdown of months or years before the station
is completed.
Problem (2) is less dramatic but perhaps more critical. Because the
shuttle has had so many delays and program standdowns over its operational
lifetime, NASA cannot plan a mission schedule that supports the current
space launch needs with any level of confidence, let alone the many
launches necessary to build and maintain the current design space station.
Plus, the costs associated with each shuttle launch are astronomical, and
are increased significantly by the sheer number of people needed to
prepare the system for flight.
This is my fear: after a multibillion dollar commitment to the station is
secured, a problem (an accident or a critical technical problem identified
before launch) occurs and shuttle flights are suspended. NASA, wedded to
the shuttle, has to abandon the station for some period of time because it
cannot be competed, manned, and/or resupplied. Needless to say the
recriminations arising from such an occurrence would make the Hubble
problem seem like a finger painting duel at Kinder Care, and might
permanently damage the space program.
The shuttle is simply not robust enough to support the current space
program and the space station, let alone a manned lunar or Mars effort.
The design changes forced on NASA from 1969-72, when the shuttle devolved
from an all-reusable, all-liquid-fueled launcher, oriented to support an
ambitious and active space flight program, down to a hybrid, design-to-cost
comsat delivery truck, embed flaws and errors into the system that cannot
be easily or cheaply corrected. It is time the Unites States recognized
this fact, and began planning for the post-shuttle period.
First, we have the current program ass-backwards. We are planning a space
station without an assured capability to get from Earth to LEO. This is
somewhat like planning an elaborate resort on a beautiful but remote
island without considering how one is going to get construction workers,
materials, and equipment out to the site. NASA should emphasize the
development of an assured launch capability *prior* to beginning
deployment of the space station or planning for lunar and Mars
initiatives.
This launch vehicle development should have two objectives:
1) A true heavy lift launch vehicle to lift large space station
segments, or space probes such as the Mars Rover or Cassini, and
ultimately equipment and vehicles for the lunar or Mars efforts.
Much of the technology developed for ALS could be used with this
system, with an eye to reducing launch costs and increasing
reliability. Although various shuttle derived vehicles have been
proposed for this role, any system based on the shuttle would
carry along some of the shuttle's inherent unreliability and
would be wedded to the current and very expensive ground
handling procedures now used for the shuttle.
Development costs for ALS were estimated to be $12 billion for
FY89-99. Deletion of some of the military requirements (such as
very rapid turnaround) and concentration on a single variant
instead of the family of vehicles envisioned under ALS should
reduce this cost considerably. I think a new start is
necessary to carry NASA into the 21st century.
2) Using the technology developed under (1) (and perhaps using
the actual vehicle, a la Energia/Buran), a second generation
space shuttle for station operations and support for lunar/Mars
operations. As much as I would like to see us develop a
single stage to orbit air-breathing system, with the first
flight of the X-30 delayed until 1997 at the earliest, it seems
unlikely that an operational aerospace plane could be ready
before 2005-7. Even a new-generation shuttle couldn't be
ready before the turn of the century, when Columbia will be
almost 20 years old (and ready for retirement). This is
something we must do anyway if we are to have a man-rated system
after about 2005; we should couple it to the unmanned launcher
program to save money wherever possible.
Next, we should scrap the current space station. Any design which
requires 3000+ man hours of EVA out of an eight person crew is fatally
flawed. Instead, we should concentrate on developing a simpler station
with larger segments (lifted by the new HLV), with emphasis on
maintainability and usability, and a decreased need for in-orbit assembly.
It should also be designed to support lunar/Mars missions in the future.
Much of the work on life support systems, electrical power generation,
communications, navigation, DP, scientific instruments, and attitude
control systems could be brought forward from the current station design to
the new one, which should offer much more habitable/usable volume and the
ability to support a larger crew (important for lunar/Mars missions).
The space station program would be delayed for a few years, possibly until
1998, while the redesign took place, but the result would be a more robust
and maintainable system with lower operating costs. Some of the funding
currently committed for the space station could be reprogramed for launch
vehicle development.
In the interim, NASA should continue the policy of transferring unmanned
payloads from the shuttle to ELVs. I would follow Gregg Easterbrook's
suggestion that the shuttle be husbanded for specific missions; for
example, using Spacelab, it should be modified to fly some extended
science missions to compensate for the delay in the space station. When
the space station is operational, the shuttle can close its career by
flying personnel and resupply missions to the station until the new
Shuttle II is ready, thus fulfilling its original (1969) mission.
|
| 644.23 | | STAR::HUGHES | You knew the job was dangerous when you took it Fred. | Mon Jul 30 1990 16:09 | 48 |
| re .22
I think your point (2) is the primary problem; the shuttle does not
provide reliable access to LEO (note: reliable .ne. safe). The obvious
conclusion is that another launch system is needed for any large
program or indeed any 'production' use of space. An example of the
latter category is the launching of the GPS satellites, now carried by
Delta vehicles. The logical thing (to me) is to let the shuttle do
things it is good at, work on extending shuttle mission duration and
work on a new generation of LVs to provide heavy lift capability and
possibly a follow on to the shuttle.
Unfortunately I don't see any evidence of work proceeding on new LVs.
The USAF scaled down its ALS program to the point where it is a
propulsion technology program with no commitment to go beyond
prototypes.
NASP is struggling for funding, and probably competing for resources
with DoD's Aurora program. This brings to mind another possibility.
The US supports two active space programs, and the NASA program gets
less funding than the DoD program. This duplicity results in an
enormous amount of wasted effort and money, all in the name of
'national security'. Most of the DoD effort could be combined with NASA
(e.g. LV development, spacecraft systems, testing facilities, etc)
without comprimising the few areas that are truly sensitive.
I can't see this happening however. In fact, my guess is that the
number of black DoD space (and other) programs will increase to avoid
congressional and public scrutiny.
re X-15
Yes it was rocket powered, and flew into space. At least far enough for
many of it's pilots to qualify for their astronaut wings. The F-104N
also 'flew above the sensible atmosphere' (whatever that means; its a
quote from Yeager in a recruiting film for test pilot school).
re ramjet booster
Designing and building ramjets to operate at hypersonic speeds and
above is still the subject of much research. While ramjets have been
used in a lot of missiles, they all tend to cruise at no more than mach
3, at which point fluid flow in the ramjet combustion chamber is
subsonic. These designs do not translate well to supersonic combustion.
There is a way to go before ramjets will be useful as booster
propulsion, but they do hold promise.
gary
|
| 644.24 | | 5874::SCOLARO | Loren Marie - born 2/2/90 | Mon Jul 30 1990 16:42 | 27 |
| re: <<< Note 644.23 by STAR::HUGHES "You knew the job was dangerous when you took it Fred." >>>
> re ramjet booster
>
> Designing and building ramjets to operate at hypersonic speeds and
> above is still the subject of much research. While ramjets have been
> used in a lot of missiles, they all tend to cruise at no more than mach
> 3, at which point fluid flow in the ramjet combustion chamber is
> subsonic. These designs do not translate well to supersonic combustion.
> There is a way to go before ramjets will be useful as booster
> propulsion, but they do hold promise.
I never said anything about a supersonic combustion ramjet, or
scramjet. Most models that I have heard of say that subsonic flow can
still be achieved in the engine with a speed of mach 6. This requires
fancy things like cryogenic fuel cooling the compressive surfaces in
the ramjet, or the heat of compression would cause all viable materials
of construction to melt. Mach 5 has always been presented as fairly
easy to achieve. While it is not mach 25 on air breathing, a booster
that takes the orbiter to 100k feet at mach 5 or 6 would save a LOT of
fuel.
Now, if you can get a scramjet, that is the single stage to orbit or
aerospace plane, in my opinion a good goal, this is just an
intermediate step, a "shuttle II", if you will.
Tony
|
| 644.25 | More votes for air-breathers | 2853::BUEHLER | Winning requires knowing the rules | Mon Jul 30 1990 17:10 | 20 |
| RE: the comment on X-15 being a stubby-winged rocket-powered vehicle.
Totally true about the experimental vehicle itself. However, it used a B-52
as part of the overall vehicle. The B-52 carried the thing up to 30K or so feet
and then the X-15, the high-altitude/high-speed component, took it from there.
It just proves how a multi-engine vehicle can work. I can easily imagine an
efficient air-breather that can get to 30K feet with a significant payload.
That payload could be a rocket-powered vehicle.
As proof, the 30K feet payload vehicle is a Boeing 747. The rocket-powered
vehicle would be a small shuttle, or a large X-15. I've gotta believe that
it's possible to start from there and work up to get a true LEO delivery system
working with hybrid vehicles.
For all I know, all we need is a monstrous balloon that can lift the entire
shuttle, SRBs and external tank combined to 30 or 40 thousand feet (only half-
jesting).
John
|
| 644.26 | Let's not be stingy... | LEVERS::HUGHES | TANSTAAFL | Tue Jul 31 1990 15:45 | 15 |
| re .22
I think this is the clearest statement of the consequences of NASA's
current directions and possible solutions I've ever seen. We shouldn't
horde such valuable insight for notes readers only. Perhaps you could
write a letter to AW&ST? Maybe we could all write our congress
critters outlining this proposal? If they hear the same message enough
times it might sink in. Might even try Dan Quayles call in line for
proposals.
On the far side, but I feel obligated to note that the Soviets have a
heavy lifter looking for work, The ESA is planning Hermes and the
Germans have their Sanger proposal.
Mike H
|
| 644.27 | | 58205::ALLEGREZZA | George Allegrezza @VRO | Tue Jul 31 1990 16:51 | 6 |
| re: last
Well, thanks. Needs a bit of editing, of course, but I might try
AW&ST. My congresshmuck? I think not. He just gave his first news
conference -- in 28 years! Old J. Danforth might be worth a try,
though.
|
| 644.28 | Outreach + VP + Congress | 4347::GRIFFIN | Dave Griffin | Tue Jul 31 1990 21:09 | 7 |
| We could (as a group of concerned space watchers) submit a proposal to
the NASA Outreach program, plus a few other key spots.
As I see all the excellent ideas floating by, this has crossed my mind more
than once. Getting a concensus might take a while.
- dave
|
| 644.29 | To Contribute | 52331::ANDRADE | The sentinel (.)(.) | Wed Aug 01 1990 07:49 | 10 |
| Good idea,
Getting our ideas heard outside of these notes file. Thinking
should be followed by action.
It would be nice to see our ideas more widely discussed, and
it would be great to see any of them actualy incorporated into
some space program.
Gil
|
| 644.30 | A Proposal | LEVERS::HUGHES | TANSTAAFL | Thu Aug 02 1990 13:42 | 67 |
| Ok lets take a cut at it -
1. We have serious concerns over NASA's conduct of the nations plan for
space exploration.
2. Principle among these are NASA's plan to build and support the Space
Station using the Shuttle exclusivly. We do not believe that the
Shuttle system has demonstrated sufficient reliability for this task
and that due to it's complex nature and the requirement to support
manned flight, the Shuttle cannot be made to achieve the required
reliability.
3. We assume that a failure resulting in damage or loss of an Orbiter
would result in an extended stand down while the failure is
investigated. Since NASA has not provided alternative access to the
space station in this event, they will not be able to support the
station which may be damaged or even lost as failures accumulate and
consumables run out. We believe this event is likely given the current
program and that it would represent a severe, possibly fatal blow to
the space program. Those who do not believe such an event is likely
are encouraged to read the history of the nation's first space station,
SkyLab.
4. We feel that the management of space station development lacks
direction. We believe that the business of the space station is to
support space exploration, in particular the establishment of a
permanent presence on the moon and exploration of the solar system.
Other applications should be considered, but must be secondary to the
station's primary mission of exploration.
Given these concerns, we believe that NASA should immediatly -
1. Develop or purchase an unmanned heavy lift vehicle to provide low
cost reliable access to low earth orbit. This booster should require a
minimum of new technology and must have the virtues of simplicity and
low cost foremost. (Note: This booster may or not be expendable, (ie
recoverable), depending on the economics.)
2. Develop or purchase Shuttle II who's principle mission is to take
men and women to and from low earth orbit. Safety and reliability are
the first concerns for this vehicle with low operating cost a
secondary, but important, objective.
3. Cancel the current space station. Begin again with the following
objectives:
1. Support of space exploration to the moon and beyond.
2. Resupply of the station should not be dependent on any single
space transportation system. Ordinarily the station should be
supplied by unmanned vehicles with perhaps an option to resupply
critical items at crew changes.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
That's all I've got time for now, I'd propose adding something about
clarifying Nasa's charter emphasizing exploration and de-emphasizing
commercialization. I also need help on defining what exactly we want
in the way of a space station.
Fire away!
Mike H
|
| 644.31 | proposal for replacement ot space station | 58205::ALLEGREZZA | George Allegrezza @VRO | Thu Aug 02 1990 14:17 | 43 |
| Re: last
Good job. For space station designs, I'd start with the 1970 MOSC
Phase B proposals, which I happened to be reviewing at the Clark U.
library last night. These 12-person crew designs were intended to be
launched as a more-or-less completed package by a two stage Saturn V.
They were very similar to Skylab in concept, with a multi-deck interior
and a cylindrical structure. One major difference with the Freedom
design is that the MOSC plans only required 25kw of power. I think the
75kw power capability of Freedom is worth retaining, but it should be
packaged in a module that could be attached to the station in one (1)
assembly trip. The MOSC stations also had ports to attach 15x60
shuttle-delivered experiment modules. For our scheme, these modules
could be used to attach the ESA and Japanese modules, thus maintaining
our treaty commitments to other countries.
Total lift off weight target was 110,000 lbs.
New station based on MOSC: assuming weight growth to 150,000, plus a
second launch for the power module, this should be well within the
capacity of a new heavy LV. Four shuttle flights (one to assemble the
power module to the station, two to deliver the international modules,
and one to bring along remaining crew and more supplies). Unmanned
Progress-like logistics modules to be boosted by Titan IV, Ariane 5,
Japan's H-2, or the HLV (multi-module missions). Periodic (3/yr)
shuttle flights to resupply and bring up new crew, scientific
equipment, and modules. Except for the power supply, most equipment in
accessible from inside the station.
Expandability: new main modules could be lifted and attached, with
power modules to follow. Hangars ("outsize", but of relatively light
weight) for transfer spacecraft (GEO, lunar, planets) lifted in a
single HLV flight.
Crew escape: low L/D 12-seat lifting body built with 1960s technology,
launched by HLV and attached to station. Such a vehicle could also be
used for crew transfer in lieu of shuttle/Shuttle II.
Ultimate objective: affordable, buildable, sustainable, useful space
operations center, not dependent on a single launch vehicle for support
or on the size of the shuttle cargo bay as the major design constraint.
Expandable to support increases in on-orbit operations as lunar and
planetary flights commence.
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| 644.32 | Let's not forget the Europeans | 2377::diewald | Means, Motive, and Opportunity | Fri Aug 03 1990 11:13 | 9 |
| The station should be of modular design, like the Mir, so that new modules
can be "snapped" into place at strategic locations, with a minimum of
maintenance.
If the modules are compatible with the current European space lab that
is carried in the shuttle cargo bay, then we don't have to do a redesign
from scratch. Order one a year from the Europeans for expansion.
Voila - space station using (some) already understood designs and parts.
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| 644.33 | Perhaps part 1 of Freedom is already in orbit? | 19548::YANKES | | Fri Aug 03 1990 11:57 | 11 |
|
Re: .32
Good idea, but lets take it one step further. Instead of making our
space station modular like Mir, why not make our space station to *be* modules
of Mir? If we're going to go to Mars jointly with the Soviet Union (as a side,
something I'm against due to the cost of it -- we just can't afford it right
now), why not start by making the space station that is supposed to support
this mission also be US/USSR?
-craig
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| 644.34 | | PAXVAX::MAIEWSKI | | Fri Aug 03 1990 12:11 | 5 |
| It looks clear that we are all agreed that the station should be a simpler
one that is launch and deployed like Mir or Skylab. If we all agree, why
doesn't everyone else, meaning NASA, Congress, the President, etc?
George
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| 644.35 | More but simpler | 52331::ANDRADE | The sentinel (.)(.) | Fri Aug 03 1990 12:55 | 64 |
| There is modular and there is MODULAR ...
I agree the station should be as modular as possible. But I don't
think that a MIR like station is the answer.
You can have a modular station (meaning the hole station is one
or two modules, Mir like) But this is essenialy the Skylab route.
You either have the hole thing or nothing, and it cannot be
expanded easily ( in essense every new module, is a new station
that just happens to be attached to the old one).
The thing to do is to build the station of more modules, that
are in themselves much easier to design then the hole station
together. That can be replaced at any time, and extras added
for extra capability or redunduncy at any time.
I get the impression that they are trying to design, the station
like the shuttle as an integrated non-devisible hole. And that is
a crazy thing to do if you don't have to. Specially as they are
counting in making it expandable, etc.
Here are the simpler Modules I propose:
A Electric Power Module(s)
A Life Support Module(s)
used by all the other maned modules
A Physical Interconnect Module(s)
for people, communications, and all consumables
A Propultion Module(s)
for station keeping and attitude control
A Gyro Attitude Keeping Module(s)
(alternative: have the Eletric Power Module(s), in
a bit higher orbit and tethered to the station.
This would keep the solar panels clear, and produce
a small force on the tether that would be used to
keep the station in a stable attitude)
A Control and Communications Module(s)
A Living Quarters Module(s)
B Lab Module(s)
B Industrial Production Module(s)
B Storage Module(s)
B Space Craft Assembly and Refurbishment Module(s)
C Astronomy Module(s)
these modules would have to be free flying as
the station would move/shake too much to be a good
observation platform.
* The A modules needed to just have a working and maned
station (minimum of one each, more added for redunduncy or
additional work loads). All the other ones added or deleted
as needed to fullfill station goals.
All these modules of course need not be launched separately,
and them assembled in orbit. But could be if needed. And of
course extras could be added at any time.
Gil
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| 644.36 | NASA review panel named | 4347::GRIFFIN | Dave Griffin | Mon Aug 06 1990 19:49 | 44 |
| From: [email protected]
Newsgroups: clari.tw.space,clari.news.gov.usa,clari.tw.aerospace,clari.tw.science
Date: 2 Aug 90 18:16:30 GMT
WASHINGTON (UPI) -- Vice President Dan Quayle announced the
selection Thursday of 11 members of a special panel that will study the
future of the trouble-plagued National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
The members of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S.
Space Program were selected ``on the joint recommendation'' of NASA
Administrator Richard Truly and Norman Augustine, who ealier was named
to head the panel.
The committee ``will advise the NASA administrator on overall
approaches NASA management can use to implement the U.S. space program
for the coming decades,'' according to a statement Quayle's office.
``The committee will have a broad charter and will report its
findings within approximately four months'' to Truly and Quayle, who
chairs the National Space Council.
Augustine's selection July 25 to lead the review generated
questions about the impartiality of the committee. Augustine is chairman
of the Martin Marrietta Corp., a major NASA contractor. Several members
named Thursday also are linked to corporations that do business with the
space agency.
The panel was named in response to a string of problems at NASA,
including the discovery of a defect in the Hubble Space Telescope and
the grounding of the space shuttle fleet due to fuel leaks.
Laurel Wilkening, provost of the University of Washington in
Seattle and former member of the National Commission on Space, was named
as vice chairman of the committee.
The other members tapped Thursday:
Edward Aldridge Jr., president of McDonnell Douglas Electronics
Systems Corp.; Joseph Allen, president of Space Industries International
Inc.; D. James Baker, president of Joint Oceanographic Institutions
Inc..
Edward Boland, a former Democratic congressman from Massachusetts;
Daniel Fink, retired senior vice president of General Electric Co.; Don
Fuqua, president and general manager of the Aerospace Industries
Association of America Inc.
Retired Air Force Gen. Robert Herres, former vice chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and former commander in chief of the U.S. Space
Command; David Kerns, chairman of Xerox Corp.; Louis Lanzerotti, of AT&T
Bell Laboratories, chairman of the Space Studies Board of the National
Research Council; Thomas Paine, former NASA administrator and chairman
of the National Commission on Space.
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