Conference 7.286::space

Didn't Korolyev die from a botched operation? I recall something about a
senior medical official insisting on personally operating on someone of that 
political standing and then screwing up because he was out of practice.

The two Zond flights in 1968 had the various signs of final tests prior to a
manned launch. The Soviets typically run two all-up systems tests of new manned
systems prior to risking cosmonauts. The Zonds also appeared to be tests for
tracking and other ground support of a circumlunar mission.

NASA evidently thought so. Apollo 8 was originally to have been an earth orbital
test flight. I am inclined to think that if Apollo 8 had not flown to the moon,
there would have been a manned Zond in Jan or Feb 69, followed by a claim that
getting to the moon was more important than landing on it (i.e. I do not think
the Soviets could have pulled off a manned lunar landing in 69 or 70).

gary

>Didn't Korolyev die from a botched operation? I recall something about a
>senior medical official insisting on personally operating on someone of that 
>political standing and then screwing up because he was out of practice.
    
    The only source I have mentioning Korolyev's death says that it was
    from a 'failed heart' in 1966.
    
John

    James Oberg in either "Red Star in Orbit" or "Uncovering Soviet
    Disasters" supports the botched operation theory.  If memory serves it
    was a relatively trivial operation, too - something like an
    appendectomy or surgery for an ulcer.
    

    There is no good place for this but I could not resist after
    the talk about botched operation theory.  The lead pilot of the two
    MIG-29's that came to Canada  a few days ago for the show was none
    other then Anatoly "broken_ass" Kvotchur of Parisian Fame....
    
    But re. 3  I will check James Oberg book as I think you are 
    right it was a complication from a simple operation...
    

From: [email protected] (Jonathan McDowell)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: News of the Week, Oct 6, 1989
Date: 5 Oct 89 17:50:20 GMT
Organization: Harvard/Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics
 
    Jonathan's Space Report
 
    October 6, 1989 (No. 27)
 
    In historical news (if you'll excuse the oxymoron), the race to
the Moon was finally acknowledged in August by the Soviet government
newspaper Izvestiya.  An article describes Korolev's N-I lunar launch
vehicle, which was designed to send two cosmonauts to the Moon.  One
was to orbit and another to land on the surface alone.  Four flight
tests of the booster, in 1969-1972, all ended in failure.  Development
of the lunar spacecraft, based on Soyuz-Zond, also suffered repeated
setbacks.  The program was finally abandoned in 1975.  So after 20
years we finally know for sure:  There really was a race, right up to
the finishing line. 
  
    Jonathan McDowell

From: [email protected] (Glenn Chapman)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: More details on the '60's Soviet Lunar program
Date: 26 Oct 89 15:04:16 GMT
 
     In the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya and recently published book
"Cosmonaut Number 5" by Valeri Bykovsky the Soviets have been
revealing a great deal about their lunar program during the 1960s. 
Bykovsky's June 1963 five day flight in Vostok 5 was a training for a
circumlunar mission.  A design of the Zond capsule to carry one man
around the moon began shortly after sputnik was launched.  A TASS
report on the same topic stated that a Proton booster was expected to
put the Zond into lunar orbit.  The key to a moon landing was the
giant booster they called the N-1 (known in the west as the G
booster).  Unfortunately for them while the design started in 1960 a
battle developed between the chief space program designer Sergei
Korolev, and the head engine designer Valentin Glushko over the fuel
(Korolev for Oxygen\Hydrogen, the other for more exotic materials like
fluorine/hydrogen or Nitric acid/dimethylhrdrzaine both rather toxic).
Lift capacity of the booster rose from an initial 50 tonnes with a
1964 flight date to the Nov. 1966 design with a 95 Tonne cargo (about
the same mass as the US's Saturn V).  The parallel Proton booster
program resulted in its first successful flight in 1965 orbiting 12
Tonnes (this was raised to 20 Tonnes by 1968). In the mean time
Korolev died in Jan. 1966 and the Soyuz-1 flight failed killing the
pilot Vladimir Komarov on Apr. 23 1967 all having very negative
impacts on the Soviet space program. 

    In spite of this there were four launches of the N-1 rather than
the 3 discussed in the West.  These were: Feb. 21, 1969: failed after
70 sec. when the first stage caught fire. July 3, 1969: a Lox pump
failure generated a launch pad explosion creating great damage.  This
was the widely reported event picked up on US spy satellites.  Note
the Izvestiya article incorrectly put this in 1970. July 21 1971: The
N-1 fell back to the launch pad creating another explosion (note, this
is another date error - probably June '71). Nov. 23, 1972: after 107
sec. the first stage again burst into flames. Interestingly the
articles state that the Soviets were also using the lunar rendezvous
plans that the US Apollo employed. Plans called for a two man mission,
with one cosmonaut orbit the moon, while the other landed.  Even when
the moon flight was dropped booster development continued until the
late seventies, when the new chief designer, Glushko, suggest the
development which lead the Energiya booster.  (see Spaceflight, Sept.,
Oct. for more details) 

     Gorbachev's Glasnost has finally begun to open the past of the
USSR's space program, as well as the present activies.  Now we may
learn the answer to the questions that have been puzzeling us for the
past 30 years. 
 
                                                      Glenn Chapman
                                                      MIT Lincoln Lab

        I was told by a friend who was watching CNN this weekend that the
    Soviets are going to display in the Moscow Space Museum an actual
    manned lunar module (or parts at least) from their manned lunar
    program of the 1960s and early 1970s.  He said the Soviets revealed
    their biggest problem in the program was getting a powerful enough
    booster, as the one they had exploded three times.  I presume they 
    were referring to the G booster?  This is all he could tell me.  
    Does anyone have more information on this?  Thanks.

        Larry

The Boston Globe had a rather long article about it this morning, including
a picture.  The picture looks to be a snapshot taken of the craft with the
two MIT professors who were the first Westerners to see it.  Apparently, if
the Soviets had not had repeated failures of their N-1 launcher (a Saturn
equivalent), they would have landed on the moon in 1968.  The professors
were convinced that the spacecraft was indeed capable of a landing and that
Soviets had the navigational technology required.  (They did land an unmanned
rover after all.)  The article also stated that the Soviet lunar landing
program was not cancelled until the early 70s.

						Mike

    The NY Times had a simular article today also,
    jb
    

    Re:.8
    	According to some recent information I have received, the N-1
    rocket project (the launcher that was to be used for the Soviet lunar
    program) continued development into the mid-1970's. After the fourth
    unsuccessful launch attempt in November 1972 further modifications were
    made to the first stage (mainly in the first stage start up and shut
    down procedures). Two additional N-1 launchers were assembled at the
    Baikonur Cosmodrome after the modifications were made with the first
    launch scheduled for August 1974 and the second launch scheduled for
    later that same year. Most of the engineers in the project (even the
    pessimists) were confident that most of the problems were solved and
    that the N-1 could be operational in 1976.
    	In May 1974, however, Valentin Glushko (the N-1 Cheif Designer
    after the death of Korolev in 1966) canceled the project. N.D.
    Kuznetsov (who headed the design bureau for the engines) continued work
    on the first stage engines until 1976. The N-1's engines accumulated
    almost four hours of perfect operation in static firings while only
    about two minutes was actually required in the actual N-1 first stage.
    	Despite this, the N-1 program was scrapped and a new booster was
    designed from scratch. That launcher is now known as Energia.
    
    				Drew
                                                                         

    
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Note 691.0               The Soviet Manned Lunar Program               2 replies
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    	I haven't seen a topic dedicated to this subject so I'll start one
    (Mr. Moderator, if in your infinite wisdom you feel that there is a
    better place for this material, please feel free to move it). I
    recently had published a two part article in the "Electronic Journal of
    the Astronomical Society of the Atlantic" (December 1990 and January
    1991 issues) on the Soviet manned lunar program. Much has been written
    on the existance (or nonexistance) of this program over the past 25
    years but only in the past year or so have the Soviets admitted to and
    relaeased information on their efforts to send men to the Moon. This
    article summarizes the currently known history of the Soviet's manned
    lunar program. Enjoy...
    
    				Drew
    

    
    Moved by moderator -
    
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Note 691.1               The Soviet Manned Lunar Program                  1 of 2
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                                  -< Part I >-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                            THE GREAT MOON RACE: 
                         THE SOVIET STORY, PART ONE
 
	           Copyright (c) 1990 by Andrew J. LePage
 
        The author gives permission to any group or individual wishing 
        to distribute this article, so long as proper credit is given 
        and the article is reproduced in its entirety.
 
        It has been almost thirty years since United States President John
    F. Kennedy gave his famous speech which committed the United States,
    then far behind in the Space Race with the Soviet Union, to landing a
    man on Earth's Moon by the end of the 1960s with the APOLLO lunar
    program.  Both during and after the APOLLO missions there were those
    who wondered if a bona fide race to the Moon between the Americans 
    and Soviets actually existed.  Many Western politicians, engineers,
    historians, analysts, and space enthusiasts have examined official and
    unofficial statements made by Soviet figures, their space hardware,
    space launches, and declassified American intelligence and other
    government documents over the past decades.  Their goal was to deter-
    mine what the Soviets' intentions were during those years when the 
    American space program was committed to placing astronauts first on 
    the Moon. 
 
        Despite all these efforts, no Westerner could confidently resolve
    the issue one way or the other.  The often conflicting evidence could
    be used to make a case for both sides of the issue.  The problem was
    that the Soviet government never made a definitive public statement as
    to what their goals in space were during those early years.  As a
    result of glastnost, however, many important pieces of the puzzle have
    been supplied.  Scores of magazine and newspaper articles with inter-
    views of various key Soviet space figures, recent Soviet books and U.S./
    Soviet exchanges let us confidently say that the Soviet Union did in-
    deed have a serious intensive program to be the first to send a man to 
    the Moon.  In fact, the race to the Moon was "neck and neck" right up 
    to the 'end' in 1968-1969.  If the American program had just one mishap 
    during a key mission, or if the Soviets had handled their program better, 
    or just had a bit more luck, a Soviet cosmonaut and not an American 
    astronaut would have been the first to set foot on the surface of the 
    Moon.  If that had happened, there might have followed a new race to 
    the planet Mars. 
 
        History does not generally recognize "what ifs"; but what was the
    history of the Soviet Moon program?  In the beginning, the Soviet
    manned Moon program - indeed, it can be argued the whole Soviet space
    program - was dominated by one brilliant individual:  Sergei P. Korolev.  
    Under his direction and with the political support of Premier Nikita 
    Krushchev, Korolev developed civilization's first InterContinental 
    Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the R-7.  This rocket made a poor ICBM but 
    a superlative space launch vehicle. It was used to launch the Soviet 
    Union's first satellites.  With the addition of an upper stage, it was 
    used to launch the first LUNA probes to the Moon in 1959 and the manned 
    VOSTOK craft into Earth orbit from 1961 to 1963.  With an improved upper 
    stage, the R-7 launched more advanced probes to the Moon and the first 
    generation of unmanned Soviet vehicles to Venus and Mars.  In fact, 
    this family of rockets after over one thousand launches is still in use 
    today, delivering everything from military reconnaissance satellites to 
    manned ferries for the Soviet MIR space station.  This rocket was to 
    play a central role in the Soviet Union's original manned Moon program, 
    known as SOYUZ. 
 
        The original SOYUZ concept was for a simple circumlunar mission
    that would make use of what is still the most powerful of the R-7
    launch vehicle family, now also called SOYUZ.  The plan required an
    unfueled escape stage with a maneuvering module called SOYUZ B to be
    launched into Earth orbit first.  Over the next few days, three tankers 
    called SOYUZ V would be launched.  These tankers would rendezvous and 
    dock with the SOYUZ B and transfer their load of fuel to it before 
    undocking.  Finally, the manned SOYUZ A would be launched and would 
    dock with the SOYUZ B escape stage. 
 
        The SOYUZ A, like the SOYUZ B and V, was to weigh almost seven
    metric tons and consist of three modules.  In the rear was a cylin-
    drical service module 2.3 meters (7.5 feet) long and 2.3 meters in 
    diameter.  It would have solar panels to supply electrical power as
    well as maneuvering engines, their fuel, and consumables such as air
    and water.  Next was a bell-shaped re-entry module also 2.3 meters 
    in diameter and 2.2 meters long.  It would carry from one to three
    cosmonauts during launch and would later be used to bring the crew
    safely back to Earth at mission's end.  Forward of the re-entry module
    was the roughly spherical orbital module, which was 2.3 meters in
    diameter and about 3.1 meters (10.2 feet) long, including the docking
    mechanism at the front.  It would serve as the cosmonauts' living
    quarters, laboratory, air lock, and cargo hold during the mission and
    was connected to the re-entry module through a hatch. 
 
        Once SOYUZ A and the now fully fueled SOYUZ B were docked, the
    escape stage would ignite and send the manned SOYUZ A on a one-week
    mission, where it would make a simple loop around the Moon and return
    to Earth for a low gravity controlled landing in Soviet territory. 
    There appears to have been two test flights of the SOYUZ B.  The first, 
    named POLYOT 1, was launched on November 1, 1963, and the second, POL-
    YOT 2, was launched on April 12, 1964.  Both spacecraft made extensive 
    maneuvers in Earth orbit testing the SOYUZ B maneuvering system.  By 
    the time these test flights were made, however, Korolev's original SOYUZ 
    circumlunar flight plan appears to have been already scrapped in favor 
    of a much more ambitious plan to meet America's challenge.  The race 
    to the Moon had begun. 
 
        In 1961, the Kremlin had broken up the Moon program into two
    sections.  One part, a simple circumlunar flight, was headed by
    Vladimir N. Chelomei.  The other more difficult part was an actual
    lunar landing.  This program was headed by Korolev himself.  This
    arrangement obviously did not sit well with Korolev.  He felt the two
    programs should be combined into one.  Two parallel projects with
    independently developed spacecraft and launch vehicles would take up
    valuable resources.  For the time being, however, the government
    insisted on two independent manned Moon programs. 
 
        Unlike Korolev's SOYUZ circumlunar concept, Chelomei wanted a
    single powerful rocket to launch a spacecraft towards the Moon.  He
    felt that Korolev's concept, which required five launches of the SOYUZ
    launch vehicle and involved the then-unproven concept of in-orbit
    rendezvous and docking, was far too complicated and risky.  As a
    result, Chelomei had to design a new and much more powerful launch
    vehicle.  Under one of his concepts a single rocket called the UR-900
    would launch a modified VOSTOK manned spacecraft to the Moon.  The
    spacecraft would require relatively little development; there were
    several plans to modify the VOSTOK for future flights on the drawing
    boards already.  The UR-900, which would have been over twice as
    powerful as Korolev's SOYUZ launch vehicle, would require several
    years of development. 
 
        Little is known of Korolev's earliest thinking or plans for his
    manned lunar landing program.  He definitely wanted to make use of the
    SOYUZ concept.  Its modularity made for very flexible development and
    planning.  Early on, it was obvious that a lunar landing would require
    a launch vehicle much larger than anything developed to that date.  On
    the drawing boards of Korolev's design bureau was a launch vehicle
    called N-1.  Already approved by the Soviet government in 1960, the
    N-1 was originally designed to be a modular, multipurpose launch
    vehicle capable of lifting as much as forty to fifty metric tons into
    Earth orbit.  Korolev, who was heavily influenced by the writings of
    the father of Soviet cosmonautics, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935),
    appears to have always favored assembling his Moon craft in Earth
    orbit.  It is likely that, as in his early SOYUZ concept, several N-1
    rockets would place the components for the Moon landing mission into
    Earth orbit, where they would then be assembled for the journey. 
 
        Orbital rendezvous and docking techniques would have to be
    developed to assemble Korolev's Moonship.  Early test flights of the
    SOYUZ could be used to practice these techniques, but certain aspects
    of the mission could also be rehearsed using the existing manned VOSTOK
    spacecraft.  While the relatively primitive VOSTOK required more equip-
    ment and maneuvering rockets to perform an actual rendezvous and 
    docking, the initial step of placing two ships in close orbits could
    be accomplished.  In August of 1962, VOSTOK 3 and 4 were launched just
    one day apart into orbits that let them pass within 6.5 kilometers
    (4.0 miles) of each other.  The feat was repeated in June of 1963
    with VOSTOK 5 and 6, which came within five kilometers (three miles)
    of each other while in space. The orbits were close enough that if
    these spacecraft had the proper equipment, the cosmonauts could have
    easily rendezvoused and docked with each other.
 
        In October of 1964, Kremlin politics shifted:  Krushchev was ousted 
    from power after the three-man flight of VOSKHOD 1.  Korolev seized 
    this opportunity and took over the manned circumlunar project from
    Chelomei.  Over the next several years, Korolev gradually consolidated
    his power base and in the process finally defined the design and plans
    of the Soviet response to the American challenge for a manned lunar
    landing.  This period of uncertainty and debate, however, cost the
    Soviet efforts valuable time.  Important hardware, especially the
    all-important Moon rocket, the N-1, was constantly redesigned and
    upgraded.  In addition, there was a deep disagreement between Korolev
    and his engine designer, Valentin P. Glushko, over fundamental N-1
    design issues.  Korolev wanted to make use of kerosene and liquid oxy-
    gen as propellants, perhaps even liquid hydrogen.  Glushko wanted to
    use fluorine, nitric acid, dimethylhydrazine, and other exotic and
    toxic fuels.  Glushko thought that there was no practical application
    for liquid hydrogen as a fuel; it was very light and would require
    prohibitively large tanks to hold it.  In addition, Korolev wanted to
    make use of a large sychronized cluster of medium thrust engines.
    Glushko wanted a smaller number of high-thrust engines. 
 
        In the end, Korolev and Glushko could not reach an agreement.
    Glushko and his design bureau boycotted the N-1 project.  Needing
    engines for his N-1, Korolev turned to N. D. Kuznetsov and his design
    bureau.  Kuznetsov had developed and built only aircraft engines in
    the past, such as those used in the Tu-144 SuperSonic Transport (SST)
    and other TUPOLEV aircraft, but in the early 1960s the Soviets started 
    to back off their aircraft production.  Kuznetsov and his factories in 
    Kuibyshev needed work and this would be the perfect opportunity to 
    diversify. 
 
        In its final configuration, the N-1 was the largest rocket of its
    day, much larger than its American counterpart, the SATURN 5.  The N-1
    consisted of four stages and was about one hundred meters (330 feet)
    long and fifteen meters (49 feet) across at its base.  Its thirty
    first-stage engines would produce about five thousand metric tons
    (eleven million pounds) of thrust at lift off and it could place 95
    metric tons (210,000 pounds) of payload into Earth orbit.  Its two
    upper stages were developed by Chelomei.  A specially designed booster
    stage producing one thousand metric tons (2.2 million pounds) of
    thrust could be used with these stages to produce an interim launch
    vehicle.  Called the PROTON, this 44.3-meter (145-foot) long launch
    vehicle could be used to place twenty metric ton (44,000-pound)
    payloads into Earth orbit or, with the addition of a special escape
    stage developed by Korolev, 5.5 metric tons (12,000 pounds) of payload
    could be launched towards the Moon.  In addition to being able to test
    the upper stages of the N-1, the PROTON would be valuable in the Moon
    program on its own merits.
 
        With the launch vehicles he needed, Korolev finalized the plans
    for the hardware that would carry cosmonauts to the Moon.  He designed
    three spacecraft based on his original SOYUZ concept.  The L-1 was to
    be used for the circumlunar mission.  It was essentially a SOYUZ
    without an orbital module.  Without this module, the L-1 would weigh
    about 5,500 kilograms (12,000 pounds), just enough for the four-stage
    PROTON to launch the craft on its mission to make a simple loop around
    the Moon and head back to Earth with a single cosmonaut on board. 
 
        The actual Moon landing mission would make use of two spacecraft.
    The L-2 was virtually identical to Korolev's original SOYUZ concept. 
    The only significant difference was the addition of a torroidal fuel
    tank that could hold the large amounts of additional fuel needed for
    the Moon mission.  With this tank empty, the L-2 would weigh about
    6,600 kilograms (14,500 pounds) and could be launched for test flights
    in Earth orbit using the SOYUZ launch vehicle.  Fully fueled for its
    trip to the Moon, the L-2 would weigh about 8,400 kilograms (18,500
    pounds). 
 
        The L-3 lunar cabin was the Soviet equivalent of America's APOLLO
    Lunar Module (LM).  Like its American counterpart, the L-3 consisted
    of two stages:  A descent stage and an ascent stage.  During the
    descent to the lunar surface, the twenty metric ton (44,000 pound) L-3
    made use of three engines, two mounted on the descent stage and one
    mounted on the ascent stage, all drawing fuel from the fuel tanks on
    the descent stage.  If any problems occurred during the descent, the
    ascent stage with its single engine still firing could switch to its
    own fuel tanks, cut loose from the descent stage, and head back to
    lunar orbit.  Otherwise, the craft could safely land a single cosmonaut
    on the lunar surface.  The 7,500 kilogram (16,500 pound) ascent stage
    was essentially a modified SOYUZ orbital module with a propulsion
    system attached.  Its primary purpose was to serve as a cockpit for
    the cosmonaut and to boost him from the lunar surface into orbit. 
 
        The Soviet lunar landing mission would take place as follows:  
    A PROTON launch vehicle would place a fully fueled L-2 carrying two
    cosmonauts into Earth orbit.  Within a day, an N-1 would follow
    carrying the L-3, a braking stage, and an escape stage into Earth
    orbit.  The L-2 would rendezvous and dock with this complex launched
    by the N-1, after which the escape stage would ignite and head towards
    the Moon.  After it exhausted its fuel, the escape stage would be
    jettisoned.  Upon reaching the Moon, the braking stage would ignite
    and place the L-2 and L-3 into lunar orbit.  After casting off the
    braking stage, one of the cosmonauts would enter the L-3 lunar cabin
    and separate from the orbiting L-2.  It would then fire its engines,
    leave orbit, and land on the lunar surface.  After he collected samples
    and performed his experiments, the cosmonaut would re-enter the L-3 and
    lift off towards lunar orbit.  The L-3 ascent stage and the L-2 would
    rendezvous and dock.  After the cosmonaut transferred to the L-2 along
    with his samples, the L-3 would be jettisoned.  Making use of the fuel
    in its torroidal fuel tank, the L-2 would leave lunar orbit and head
    back to Earth for a landing in Soviet territory.  If all went well,
    the landing could take place by 1968. 
 
        Meanwhile, the L-1, L-2, and L-3 designs were eventually finalized
    and prototype hardware could now be built.  Other items were tested
    also:  On the VOSKHOD 2 mission, launched on March 18, 1965, cosmonaut
    Alexei Leonov made the first "space walk" (EVA, or ExtraVehicular
    Activity) using a prototype of the pressure suit that would be used
    for the excursions on the lunar surface.  No longer under political
    pressure from the Kremlin for space firsts after the ouster of Krush-
    chev, Korolev canceled the remaining manned VOSKHOD missions and
    put all his resources into the Moon project.  Much valuable time had
    been lost developing these essentially dead-end missions. 
 
        On July 16, 1965, the first piece of N-1 hardware was flight 
    tested.  The third stage of the N-1 was used in a two-stage version 
    of the PROTON to launch a test satellite, named PROTON 1, into Earth
    orbit.  Weighing 12.2 metric tons (26,800 pounds), it was the heaviest
    payload ever placed into orbit.  A second test on November 2, 1965, 
    which orbited PROTON 2, was equally successful.  The third test flight,
    launched on March 24, 1966, was a failure.  It would prove to be an 
    ominous sign of things to come.
 
        Flight testing of the L-1 and L-2 hardware finally began in
    December of 1965.  These sub-orbital flights, which continued until
    June of 1966, were to test the performance the spacecraft's recovery
    systems; an important prelude to in-orbit tests.  Unfortunately, Kor-
    olev would not live to see it.  He died on January 14, 1966, apparently 
    from a botched operation to remove intestinal tumors.  The Soviet space 
    program in general and their lunar program in particular would never 
    be the same after Korolev's passing. 
 
        Shortly after Korolev's death, Premier Leonid Brezhnev put Korolev's 
    assistant, Vasily P. Mishin, in charge of the Man-to-the-Moon program.  
    Mishin quickly finished the consolidation process that Korolev began.  
    No time could be lost now:  The Americans had begun inflight testing 
    of their Moonship, APOLLO. 
 
        The first APOLLO flight, designated SA-201, was the first test of
    a fully functional APOLLO spacecraft launched on the new SATURN IB
    booster.  The successful suborbital flight of February 26, 1966, went
    off without a hitch.  An orbital test of the SATURN IB, SA-203, was
    launched on July 5 with a dummy payload.  SA-202, launched on August
    25, repeated SA-201's successful flight.  Plans called for the first
    manned test of APOLLO in Earth orbit in the first quarter of 1967. 
 
        From a hardware standpoint, the Soviets and Americans were neck
    and neck in the race to the Moon.  Both nations had successfully
    tested their Moonships in suborbital tests.  Both had tested the third
    stage of their Moon rockets as the second stage of smaller launch
    vehicles:  The Soviets on their PROTON and the Americans with the
    SATURN IB.  The Americans, however, had more in-flight experience.  As
    their GEMINI program was drawing to a close in 1966, the Americans had
    accumulated much more flight time with longer missions, more EVA time,
    and - most importantly - they had more practical experience with the
    techniques of in-orbit rendezvous and docking. 
 
        Despite continuing management problems, the Soviets pushed ahead
    with the first orbital tests of the L-1 spacecraft.  On November 28,
    1966, they finally launched the first L-1 into orbit aboard a SOYUZ
    launch vehicle.  KOSMOS 133, as it was called, remained in Earth orbit
    for almost two days before it was brought down.  During re-entry
    something went wrong:  As a result of a manufacturing defect, the
    heatshield failed.  While the capsule was successfully recovered,
    there was still significant damage to the module's interior.  Further
    work on the L-1 was needed. 
 
        Meanwhile in The United States, preparations for the first manned
    APOLLO flight, known as both APOLLO 1 and SA-204, were in full swing.
    The SATURN IB rocket was assembled and the APOLLO spacecraft was mated
    to its launch vehicle in January of 1967.  During an on-pad countdown
    rehearsal on January 27, tragedy struck.  While the three astronauts,
    Virgil I. Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee, were proceeding
    with the countdown rehearsal inside their spacecraft, an electrical
    fire started.  Because of the pure oxygen atmosphere in the Command
    Module (CM) and an unforeseen availability of combustible materials,
    the flames quickly spread and in seconds the three astronauts, unable
    to escape quickly enough, died of suffocation.  The tragedy stopped 
    the APOLLO program in its tracks.  A board of inquiry was formed and 
    the whole APOLLO spacecraft design re-evaluated. 
 
        The Soviets saw their chance to pull ahead.  A second L-1 flight,
    KOSMOS 140, was launched on February 7, 1967, in a repeat of the
    failed KOSMOS 133 mission.  Again the spacecraft left orbit after
    almost two days in space; and again, there was some sort of failure. 
    The exact nature of the failure is not known, but it involved either
    the temperature control system, attitude control system, or the
    parachutes.  While this time the heatshield worked well, there were
    still problems to be worked out on the L-1 and its sister, the L-2. 
 
        Pressure from the Kremlin was beginning to build on those in the
    Soviet space program.  The Soviet government gave formal approval to
    the plan to land a man on the Moon by the end of 1968.  Failing this,
    the L-1 would be used to make a manned circumlunar flight using the
    PROTON.  At the same time the N-1 Moon rocket project was put into
    high gear, with the third quarter of 1967 being the goal for the start
    of flight hardware construction. 
 
        Despite two less than successful orbital test flights of the L-1,
    the next phase of flight testing was begun.  The ultimate goal of the
    L-1 was to make a circumlunar flight; a flight to the Moon at his
    point would have been too big a leap because of the complexities of
    navigation and spacecraft control.  As an interim step, it was decided
    to use the PROTON vehicle to launch an L-1 into an extended Earth
    orbit away from the influences of the Moon.  This would allow the
    problems of long-range communications and spacecraft control to be
    worked out.  It would also give the L-1 a realistic test of the re-
    entry conditions it would experience returning from an actual mission
    to the Moon. 
 
        On March 10, 1967, the first four-stage version of the PROTON
    booster lifted the 5,017-kilogram (11,037-pound) L-1 test vehicle,
    KOSMOS 146, into a 177 by 296-kilometer (110 by 184-mile) parking
    orbit.  After a short time, the PROTON's Block D escape stage would
    ignite and send KOSMOS 146 into its elongated orbit.  Come time for
    ignition, though, nothing happened.  The escape stage failed to ignite
    and KOSMOS 146 was stranded in space.  Hoping to salvage at least some
    information from the mission, the spacecraft was separated from its
    useless booster, whose Earth orbit was rapidly decaying.  KOSMOS 146
    then used its own engines to lift itself into a higher 185 by 350-
    kilometer (115 by 218-mile) orbit.  By the next day, the Block D
    escape stage fell out of orbit.  KOSMOS 146 continued on in low Earth
    orbit for over eight days before it was commanded back.  Again, the
    L-1, either during its flight or recovery, experienced some sort of
    system failure in its onboard control systems or its parachute. 
 
        The problems were quickly corrected and another test flight,
    KOSMOS 154, was launched on April 8, 1967.  As before, the PROTON's
    Block D escape stage failed to push the L-1 into the intended elon-
    gated Earth orbit.  Again the spacecraft separated from its useless
    escape stage in hope of salvaging part of the mission.  This time,
    however, there was yet another onboard system failure that prevented
    KOSMOS 154 from moving into a higher orbit.  After eleven days in
    space, the lifeless spacecraft's orbit decayed and KOSMOS 154 burned
    up in Earth's atmosphere. 
 
        After four unmanned orbital test flights of the L-1, the
    spacecraft had failed to perform as intended.  Under normal
    circumstances there would have been more design evaluations and
    testing, but pressure on Mishin and the other space program managers
    was mounting.  The government insisted that they catch up to and pass
    the United States during their reevaluation of the APOLLO program. 
    Despite the problems of the L-1, its sister, the L-2, was to be
    pressed into service for the first Soviet manned spaceflight in two 
    years. 
 
        In the first L-2 flight, the Soviets wanted to catch up to and
    even surpass America's achievements of the GEMINI program.  The plan
    called for an L-2 to be launched on a SOYUZ booster with one man on
    board.  The large torroidal fuel tank would be empty on this flight to
    lighten the L-2 enough so that the SOYUZ launch vehicle could place it
    into orbit.  The L-2's internal fuel reserves would be sufficient to
    carry out this and any future Earth orbital mission.  The day after
    launch, a second L-2 would be launched into orbit, this time with a
    crew of three cosmonauts.  The two spacecraft would rendezvous and
    dock.  After docking, two of the crew members of the second L-2 would
    don spacesuits, depressurize the orbital module, and perform an EVA 
    to transfer to the first L-2.  After the crew transfer, the two space-
    craft would undock and perform independent missions.  Each would
    return after spending about three days in Earth orbit. 
 
        If this mission was successful, the Soviets would have performed
    the first docking of two manned spacecraft and the first crew
    transfer.  In addition, they would gain the flight experience they
    needed to assemble their Moon craft in Earth orbit and later redock
    the L-2 and L-3 in lunar orbit.  The mission had to succeed, but Mishin
    refused to approve the launch.  He felt that it was too dangerous to
    commit the L-2 to a manned mission until the problems with the similar
    L-1 were solved.  Moscow overruled him and the mission proceeded. 
 
        The first L-2 would be manned by space veteran Vladimir Komarov,
    who flew on VOSKHOD 1 in 1964.  The second L-2 was to be manned by
    cosmonauts Valeriy Bykovsky, Yevgeniy Khrunov, and Aleksey Yeliseyev. 
    Khrunov and Yeliseyev would perform the EVA transfer.  On the morning
    of April 23, 1967, the 6,450-kilogram (14,190-pound) L-2 named SOYUZ 1 
    was launched into orbit with Komarov aboard.  With its unique design 
    and extensive automated systems, it was the most complex and advanced
    manned spacecraft to fly and almost immediately problems started.  One
    of the spacecraft's two solar panels would not deploy, depriving the
    SOYUZ of half its electrical power.  Still later problems developed
    with the attitude control system.  The launch of SOYUZ 2 was called
    off.  There was no way the mission could be accomplished.  All efforts
    were then poured into getting Komarov back. 
 
        Ground control sent commands up to Komarov to help bring the
    malfunctioning spacecraft under control.  A retrorocket burn on the
    fifteenth orbit would bring SOYUZ 1 back home.  The attempt failed. 
    As fuel ran low, Komarov got permission to try again on the seven-
    teenth orbit, but again he could not control the spacecraft.  Komarov 
    finally put the spacecraft into a spin to help stabilize it.  On the 
    eighteenth orbit, the cosmonaut finally succeeded and was on his way 
    home.  Because of the on board malfunctions, Komarov kept the re-entry 
    module spinning, resulting in a high-gravity ballistic re-entry.  The 
    spinning spacecraft survived the re-entry, but when the landing para-
    chute was deployed the lines snarled, preventing it from opening fully.  
    SOYUZ 1 with Komarov on board crashed into the ground at a speed of 
    about 500 kilometers per hour (about 300 miles per hour) near the 
    town of Orenburg in the Urals, one thousand kilometers (600 miles) 
    off course.  The pilot of the first manned SOYUZ flight was killed 
    on impact.
 
        Komarov's body was cremated and his ashes were placed in the wall
    of the Kremlin.  Like the Americans with APOLLO 1 only three months 
    earlier, the haste to reach the Moon resulted in the death of one of 
    the Soviet Union's best cosmonauts and a reevaluation of the design 
    of the L-1 and L-2 Moon craft. 
 
        End of Part One.
 

    
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                            THE GREAT MOON RACE: 
                         THE SOVIET STORY, PART TWO
 
	           Copyright (c) 1991 by Andrew J. LePage
 
        The author gives permission to any group or individual wishing 
        to distribute this article, so long as proper credit is given 
        and the article is reproduced in its entirety.
 
        During the re-evaluation that followed the tragic failure of the
    first manned L-2 flight, SOYUZ 1, the lunar test program took a slight-
    ly different track:  Flight testing of other components would begin.  
    On May 17, 1967, KOSMOS 159 was launched into orbit aboard a MOLNIYA
    booster.  The MOLNIYA was essentially a SOYUZ launch vehicle with an
    extra stage attached, usually used to launch communication satellites
    or lunar and planetary probes.  The spacecraft sent into a 203 by
    431-kilometer (126 by 268-mile) orbit was the first test of a fully
    fueled L-2 service module.  No other modules were carried.  Soon after
    reaching orbit, the craft made a single burn that placed it into a 350
    by 60,637-kilometer (218 by 37,686-mile) orbit.  This simulated the
    burn the L-2 would have to make to leave lunar orbit and return to
    Earth.  The test appeared to have been a success. 
         
        Later that year, testing of the L-2 resumed, but this time in a
    much more conservative manner.  On October 27, an L-2 test vehicle
    named KOSMOS 186 was launched unmanned into orbit.  Three days later,
    a second L-2 named KOSMOS 188 was also launched unmanned to within 24
    kilometers (fifteen miles) of KOSMOS 186.  The first vehicle acted
    quickly and in less than one orbit the two spacecraft automatically
    docked for three hours, thirty minutes.  The two craft then separated
    to follow independent missions.  KOSMOS 186 returned to Earth the next
    day, followed by KOSMOS 188 two days later.  The original SOYUZ 1/2
    mission had finally been accomplished (except for the two-day launch
    delay of KOSMOS 188) the way Mishin and the other program managers
    originally intended it:  Without a human crew. 

        As a further test, KOSMOS 212 was launched on April 14, 1968.
    KOSMOS 213 followed it the next day.  The two machines repeated the
    previous test mission faultlessly, clearing the way for manned L-2
    flights to begin - this time, hopefully, at a more careful pace. 

        In the meantime, unmanned test flights of the L-1 resumed.  On
    November 21, 1967, a PROTON booster lifted off to attempt yet another
    deep space test of the L-1.  Unfortunately, bad luck struck even
    earlier than before:  The first stage of the PROTON malfunctioned and
    exploded in mid-flight.

        By comparison, the United States was having much better luck with
    their lunar program.  On November 9, 1967, APOLLO 4 lifted off the
    launch pad with the first of the redesigned APOLLO spacecraft.  That
    in itself was an accomplishment, but what set this flight apart was
    that it was the first test of the SATURN 5 rocket.  The SATURN 5
    worked well, but did experience some minor problems.  It lofted the
    unmanned APOLLO 4 into space, where its own propulsion systems were
    tested.  The final burn sent the spacecraft back towards Earth at the
    speeds it would encounter during a return from the Moon.  All went well
    and the APOLLO Command Module was recovered in the Pacific Ocean. 

        On January 22, 1968, APOLLO 5 was lofted into space.  This time a
    SATURN IB was used to orbit a prototype of the Lunar Module.  All the
    tests went well.  The United States' luck had turned and they were well
    on their way towards a manned landing on the Moon sometime in 1969. 

        All was not well in the Soviet Union.  The Soviet's N-1 Moon
    rocket, originally scheduled for a test flight in March of 1968, was
    slipping further behind schedule.  May was the earliest first flight
    date.  One of the major problems was with the first and second stage
    engines.  Kuznetsov and his Kuibyshev factory were in over their heads.
    It would be difficult enough to assemble and synchronize thirty engines 
    for experts in the rocket field, but for builders of aircraft engines 
    it was proving to be virtually impossible.  Chief Designer Mishin had 
    no choice:  Glushko continued to refuse any participation of his bureau 
    in the N-1 project and instead concentrated on the development efforts 
    of the PROTON, which was having problems of its own. 

        Similarly, the Soviet's L-3 lunar cabin was far behind schedule. 
    The earliest first test flight of the L-3 in Earth orbit was at least
    mid-1969.  The Soviets were falling behind.  Still, they were moving
    along with other aspects of their project:  Eighteen cosmonauts had
    begun lunar landing training in January of 1968.  Plans and tests of
    drills to obtain sample cores, equipment carts, and other lunar tools 
    were proceeding.  Their unmanned lunar exploration program had so far
    succeeded in placing two unmanned landers on the lunar surface and
    four spacecraft in orbit to photograph landing sites, observe the near
    lunar environment, and map the Moon's slightly irregular gravitational
    field.  Despite all this progress, the earliest a lunar landing attempt
    could be made was perhaps 1970 or 1971.  If the Soviets wanted to be
    first on the Moon, all they could do was work harder and hope that the
    United States' schedule would also begin to slip.  In the meantime,
    there was still the alternate plan:  The L-1 circumlunar mission to
    beat the United States to the vicinity of the Moon. 

        On March 2, 1968, another attempt to place an L-1 spacecraft into
    deep space using the PROTON lifted off the pad.  This time the rocket
    succeeded in placing the L-1 named ZOND 4 (Zond is the Russian word
    for probe) into a 200 by 400,000-kilometer (124 by 250,000-mile)
    orbit.  But as before, there was a failure in an onboard system which
    made controlling the unmanned ZOND 4 difficult or impossible.  After
    one week in space, the craft re-entered Earth's atmosphere and made an
    uncontrolled landing.  The ultimate outcome of the mission is yet un-
    known in the West, but it was undoubtedly less than successful.  

        Yet another L-1 deep space test flight was launched on April 22,
    1968.  This time the PROTON booster's second stage failed at an
    altitude of about forty kilometers (about 130,000 feet), effectively
    ending the mission.  Over the course of thirteen months, the four-
    stage version of the PROTON failed four times and succeeded only once.  
    If a human was going to fly on this rocket, it had to be made much 
    more reliable. 

        At the same time, manned missions using the L-2 were about to
    begin.  As a prelude to the twin L-2 flights with a crew exchange, it
    was decided to try a simple manned docking first.  An unmanned L-2
    would be launched into orbit, followed the next day by an L-2 carrying
    a single cosmonaut.  The two spacecraft would first rendezvous and then 
    dock.  After a couple of orbits the two would separate and continue on
    separate missions, returning to Earth after about three days in orbit.
    On August 28, what would have been SOYUZ 2 was launched into Earth orbit.  
    Days passed and the manned L-2 was never launched.  The unmanned L-2, 
    now named KOSMOS 238, returned from orbit after almost four days in 
    space.

        On October 25, the Soviets tried again with the launch of another
    L-2 into orbit.  The next day, SOYUZ 2 was joined in orbit by SOYUZ 3,
    piloted by cosmonaut Georgi Beregovoi.  During the first orbit, SOYUZ
    3 came to within 180 meters (590 feet) of SOYUZ 2 using automatic sys-
    tems.  Beregovoi then manually took the two spacecraft to within a
    few meters but never actually docked.  The two spacecraft drifted 565
    kilometers (351 miles) apart by the next day before SOYUZ 3 closed 
    in on SOYUZ 2 again:  And again they did not dock.  Afterwards, the
    spacecraft entered separate orbits.  After four days in space both
    vehicles successfully landed.  The L-2 design had proved to be human-
    worthy, but it appeared that there was still more to be learned
    about docking. 

        As the L-1 circumlunar program was gearing up for its final push,
    U.S. intelligence learned about the Soviet mission to send a manned
    spacecraft around the Moon.  As a result of this information, American
    officials changed their plans:  Originally, the first flight to the
    Moon was not planned until early to mid-1969, when the Lunar Module
    would be tested in lunar orbit.  It was now clear that the Soviets
    planned to send a man on a circumlunar mission as soon as they had at
    least two successful tests of the L-1.  This could happen any time
    during the last quarter of 1968.  During this time a manned test of 
    the Lunar Module would be out of the question; it simply was not yet
    ready.  Sending just the APOLLO Command/Service Modules on a circum-
    lunar or better yet a true lunar orbit mission was possible.  APOLLO 6, 
    which used a SATURN 5 in a test flight on April 6, 1968, had experi-
    enced some technical problems, but they seemed to be under control.  
    If those problems could be solved and the upcoming APOLLO 7 manned 
    Earth orbit test was successful, it would be decided that NASA (Nat-
    ional Aeronautics and Space Administration) could send APOLLO 8 to 
    the Moon in late December.  The race was on! 

        On September 15, 1968, the Soviets launched ZOND 5 on the first
    unmanned circumlunar flight of a spacecraft.  The PROTON launch vehicle
    worked flawlessly.  The ZOND 5 capsule carried a biological payload of
    plants, turtles, flies, and meal worms, as well as a camera to take
    high-resolution photographs of the Moon's "farside" for later develo-
    ping on Earth.  On its outward journey, ZOND 5 made a course correc-
    tion at a distance of 325,000 kilometers (202,000 miles).  On September 
    18, it passed within 1,950 kilometers (1,210 miles) of the Moon and 
    headed back to Earth.  ZOND 5 made one more course refinement at a 
    distance of 143,000 kilometers (89,000 miles) on its long fall home.  
    Once the spacecraft reached Earth, it would fly over the continent of 
    Antarctica and skip off the atmosphere over the Indian Ocean, losing 
    just enough speed to enter a suborbital trajectory that would result in 
    a final re-entry and landing over Soviet territory.  Sometime before 
    this maneuver, failure struck again:  The astro-orientation system, 
    which was essential to steer the re-entry module during this skip-glide 
    re-entry, malfunctioned. 

        As a result of this error, ZOND 5 made an unplanned ballistic
    re-entry, which resulted in ten to sixteen G-loads, much higher than
    the four to seven G-loads in the skip-glide re-entry.  The result was
    that ZOND 5 landed on September 21 in the southern Indian Ocean far
    off course.  Despite the rough re-entry, ZOND 5 survived intact and
    was soon picked up by the tracking ship BOROVICHIY.  The craft was
    then transferred to the Soviet oceanography ship VASILIY GOLOVIN, which
    had it in Bombay Harbor by October 4.  ZOND 5 was then transferred to
    an An-12.  The aircraft then finished the trip to the Soviet Union. 

        On October 11, 1968, APOLLO 7 was successfully launched into Earth
    orbit.  After a virtually flawless eleven-day flight, the way was
    clear for the launch of APOLLO 8 on December 21 for a lunar orbit
    mission. 

        After examining the results of the ZOND 5 mission, the Soviets
    launched one last unmanned test.  ZOND 6 was successfully placed into
    a lunar trajectory on November 10.  Its mission and payload were
    virtually identical to that of ZOND 5.  On November 12, ZOND 6 came
    within 2,420 kilometers (1,500 miles) of the Moon and successfully
    executed a skip-glide re-entry, resulting in a landing in the Soviet
    Union on November 17.  Finally, the way was clear for a manned L-1
    circumlunar flight. 

        The race would be close:  The launch window for the American
    mission opened on December 21.  For the Soviets, celestial mechanics
    dictated an earlier launch window between December 7 and 9 for the L-1
    mission.  The spacecraft and its PROTON booster were rolled out of the
    assembly building on December 1.  Cosmonaut Valeriy Bykovsky was chosen
    to pilot what was planned to be humanity's first flight to the Moon. 
    Out on the launch pad, problems developed with the L-1.  The launch was
    scrubbed twice before time ran out.  The problem with the L-1 could not 
    be fixed before the window closed.  

        On December 21, APOLLO 8 lifted off to a flawless mission into 
    lunar orbit, carrying astronauts Frank Borman, James Lovell, and 
    William Anders.  The Soviets lost the first goal in the race to 
    the Moon. 

        Since a simple manned circumlunar mission would look second-rate
    compared to APOLLO 8's ten orbits of the Moon, future manned L-1
    flights were dropped.  The program would instead be used as develop-
    ment flights for future L-2 lunar missions.  In late December of 1968, 
    the now repaired L-1 was rolled back out onto the launch pad, this 
    time for an unmanned mission.  On January 5, 1969, the L-1 lifted off 
    on top of its PROTON booster.  Upon the ignition of the second stage, 
    the PROTON unexpectedly exploded.  The L-1's launch escape system 
    failed to function and the rocket and spacecraft were destroyed.  If 
    there had been a pilot on board, he would have undoubtedly been killed. 

        Progress on L-2 flights was stepped up.  The Soviets needed more
    experience in space with the L-2 and quickly.  For the first time the
    Soviets launched a manned mission in the midst of the Central Asian
    winter.  On January 14, 1969, SOYUZ 4 was launched with cosmonaut
    Vladimir Shatalov on board.  The next day, SOYUZ 5, with Boris
    Volynov, Yevgeniy Khrunov, and Aleksey Yeliseyev, joined Shatalov in
    orbit.  Moving slowly, the two spacecraft came closer.  The next day,
    on live Soviet television, the two spacecraft docked.  After waiting
    almost two years since the original SOYUZ 1/2 mission, Khrunov and
    Yeliseyev doned their space suits, depressurized SOYUZ 5's orbital
    module, and made an EVA to transfer to SOYUZ 4.  In thirty-seven min-
    utes, they had safely transferred.  After spending four and one-half
    hours docked, the two SOYUZ spacecraft separated.  SOYUZ 4 landed the
    next day, followed by SOYUZ 5 the day after. 

        After almost a year and one-half delay, the N-1 Moon rocket was
    ready for its first test flight.  A successful test flight would put
    the Soviets in the running again for a Moon landing.  The most power-
    ful rocket ever built smoothly lifted off from its pad at the Baika-
    nour Cosmodrome (Tyuratam Space Center) on February 3, 1969.  One
    minute into the flight all looked well, but trouble soon developed.
    Ten seconds later, a fire broke out in the first stage's tail compart-
    ment, resulting in the engines shutting down.  The now powerless rocket 
    was destroyed by range safety officers.  Along with the first N-1, the 
    chances of beating the Americans to a manned Moon landing were all but 
    destroyed. 

        After the successful flight of APOLLO 8, the United States set up
    a rapid fire series of test flights to reach the Moon.  No doubt they
    knew how close the Soviets really were in the race.  In the first
    quarter of 1969, the U.S. would test the Lunar Module in Earth orbit.
    In the second quarter, they would test the Lunar Module in lunar
    orbit.  Finally, in the third quarter, they would land on the Moon. 
    The Soviets knew that the earliest they could land on the Moon while
    still adequately testing their hardware was 1971.  If any one of the
    American test flights failed, they might still be in the running. 
    Just in case they did succeed, a new plan was devised.

        It was decided that for the time being all manned activities using
    the SOYUZ would be geared towards the development of an Earth-orbiting
    space station.  This experience, when needed, would still be useful
    for a lunar mission.  Development and unmanned testing of lunar hard-
    ware would continue in the hope that the American effort would fail
    or at least falter.  Finally, there was the Soviets' ace in the hole: 
    An unmanned lunar sample return mission.  The Babakin Design Bureau,
    which designed and built the previous generation of Soviet lunar
    spacecraft, had been developing a series of new unmanned lunar
    spacecraft to be used in conjunction with a manned lunar exploration
    effort, or as its replacement if schedules slipped by many years.  

        The hardware for an unmanned sample return mission was ready by 
    the beginning of 1969.  If the Soviets could not be the ones to place 
    the first man on the Moon, perhaps they could return the first soil
    samples from the Moon, robbing the Americans of one of their lunar
    mission justifications.  This would be an important propaganda vic-
    tory for the Soviets and could also help slow down the American Moon 
    landing program. 

        On January 19, 1969, the first of the new LUNA spacecraft was
    launched by the same four stage version of the PROTON as was used by
    the L-1.  Unfortunately, LUNA had the same results that the L-1 often
    had:  The PROTON failed to reach even an Earth parking orbit. 

        In March, regional politics began to take its toll on the Soviet
    Moon program.  On March 3, Soviet and Chinese troops clashed on the
    Ussuri River.  By March 9, Soviet forces in the Far East were put on
    full alert; on March 14, the Chinese assumed a similar posture.  Five
    days later, the two sides clashed again along the Ussuri River.  As a
    result of this emergency, the Soviet military took control of many
    civilian space facilities and personnel, including those involved with
    the now faltering Moon program.  Over the course of four months, over
    one dozen photoreconnaissance satellites were launched to observe
    Chinese troop and equipment movements.  By early May, both the Soviets
    and Chinese were moving in their nuclear weapons.  All this had a
    severe impact on the Soviets' efforts to send a spacecraft of any sort
    to the Moon. 

        Meanwhile, on March 3, NASA successfully launched APOLLO 9 into
    Earth orbit to test the Lunar Module.  On April 15, a second attempt
    by the Soviets to launch an unmanned lunar sample return mission
    failed as a result of a PROTON vehicle failure.  On May 18, APOLLO 10
    was launched and successfully tested the Lunar Module in lunar orbit. 
    On June 12, yet another Soviet sample return mission was launched and
    failed.  The Soviet effort was weakening miserably.  The United States
    set a mid-July launch date for their first manned lunar landing 
    attempt.  The Soviets had just one more chance to upstage it. 

        The second N-1 Moon rocket was brought out to the launch pad 
    in June of 1969.  It may have been yet another simple test of the
    booster, but for years rumors circulated about an impending Soviet
    space spectacular that would have upstaged the Americans.  According
    to the rumors, this N-1 would carry the first L-3 lunar cabin into
    Earth orbit, where it would be joined by a fully manned L-2.  The
    launch window would allow for a course to the Moon two weeks before
    the American mission.  The L-2/L-3 combination would then leave for
    the Moon, where the L-3 would be tested in a similar fashion as the
    American Lunar Module was tested in lunar orbit during the APOLLO 10
    mission.  The L-3 test, like APOLLO 10, would bring the lunar cabin
    close to the surface but no landing would be made. 

        Meanwhile, just a few days before the launch of APOLLO 11 on July
    16, an unmanned lunar sample return mission window would open and
    another unmanned spacecraft would be launched as the L-2 was return-
    ing home.  This mission would pick up a lunar sample and return it 
    to Earth just before APOLLO 11 arrived home with its precious cargo.  
    If the APOLLO mission was successful, the full details of the two
    missions could be kept ambiguous and humanity could be led to think
    that the Soviets had landed men on the Moon first and had the genuine 
    lunar samples to prove it.  If the APOLLO 11 mission failed, they 
    could be more candid:  Their manned lunar mission put them at par with 
    the Americans and their unmanned program was able to obtain lunar sam-
    ples until the Soviets were ready for a manned landing.  Either way,
    the Soviets would end up with the first lunar soil samples and upstage
    the Americans.  At least that was the rumor. 

        On July 3, the thirty engines of the giant N-1 were started. 
    Before it could lift itself off the pad, a liquid oxygen pump on one
    of the engines broke.  The N-1 exploded with the force of a small
    nuclear bomb, destroying the rocket, whatever payload it carried, and
    its launch pad.  In addition, the powerful explosion heavily cratered
    a second N-1 pad some distance away.  It was a devastating loss.  It
    would take at least eighteen months to two years to rebuild the N-1 
    launch facilities.  Barring a catastrophe of similar proportions in 
    the American program, the U.S. would almost surely be the first to 
    place a human on the Moon. 

        Meanwhile, several kilometers away from the N-1 disaster, another
    unmanned sample return spacecraft was being prepared.  On July 13,
    just three days before the launch of APOLLO 11, LUNA 15 was success-
    fully placed on course to the Moon.  It entered a 55 by 203-kilometer 
    (34 by 126-mile) orbit around the Moon on July 17, just as APOLLO 11 
    was nearing its halfway point to Earth's natural satellite.  Over the 
    next four days, LUNA 15 was carefully maneuvered into a lower and lower 
    orbit in preparation for its landing.  Finally, just after APOLLO 11 
    landed on the Moon on July 20, LUNA 15's engines ignited and the probe 
    began its long descent to the lunar surface.  Four minutes later, LUNA 
    15 crashed into Mare Crisium (Sea of Crises) at a speed of 480 kilo-
    meters per hour (300 miles per hour).  The final Soviet attempt to 
    literally "scoop" the United States had failed. 

        That night in 1969 almost every country on Earth televised
    astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin's first steps on the
    Moon, the exceptions being China and the Soviet Union.  By July 24,
    the crew of APOLLO 11 had safely returned to Earth.  The Americans had
    won the race to the Moon. 

        Having lost the race to the Moon, the Soviets shifted the emphasis
    of their space program.  All future manned flights of the L-2 would 
    be in support of the space station program, known as SALYUT.  Future
    flights of the L-1 and L-3 were to be used solely as technology
    demonstration flights.  There could still be an opportunity to use
    this hardware for a manned lunar landing, if the Kremlin saw some sort
    of political advantage in such a mission.  All future flights to the
    Moon by the Soviets would otherwise be unmanned.  Efforts would con-
    tinue to get the unmanned lunar sample return hardware to work.  In
    addition, this same hardware would be modified for future flights so
    that not only could sample return missions be flown, but also missions
    to land an unmanned, long-duration rover on the lunar surface, and for
    placing payloads in lunar orbit.  Development of the N-1 would continue.  
    Such a heavy lift capability could be used not only for a possible Moon 
    mission, but also to orbit a one hundred-ton space station that could 
    compete with the U.S. space station, SKYLAB. 

        Two additional flights of the L-1 were flown after the successful
    APOLLO 11 mission.  ZOND 7 was launched on August 8, 1969, where it
    flew by the Moon and landed on Soviet soil after a skip-glide re-entry
    one week later.  ZOND 8 was launched over one year later on October 27, 
    1970.  It followed a mission profile similar that of its predecessors, 
    but made its re-entry over the Arctic, so that it could be monitored 
    from the Soviet Union.  As a result, ZOND 8 made a landing in the In-
    dian Ocean.  Unlike ZOND 5, this landing was planned.  Unknown to the 
    West at the time (and possibly many of the Soviet scientists and engi-
    neers as well), this was to be the last flight of the L-1. 

        The L-3 lunar cabin was finally ready for flight testing in late
    1969.  The first L-3 was to be delivered on a PROTON launch vehicle
    and tested in Earth orbit.  The first attempt, on November 16, 1969,
    failed due to yet another PROTON malfunction.  A second attempt on
    February 6, 1970, failed for the same reason.  Hoping to get at least
    some flight testing done, Soviet engineers switched to the more re-
    liable SOYUZ launch vehicle.  Because of its lower lift capability,
    only the L-3 ascent stage could be carried into Earth orbit.  On
    November 24, 1970, an L-3 ascent stage, named KOSMOS 379, was suc-
    cessfully placed into space.  Over the next six days, the craft made 
    a number of maneuvers to simulate a launch from the lunar surface 
    and a series of communications tests using tape recorded voices. 

        Eight days after the launch of KOSMOS 379, a complete L-3 was
    finally sent on a PROTON into Earth orbit.  KOSMOS 382, as it was
    called, also made extensive maneuvers in Earth orbit, simulating a
    descent and ascent from the Moon.  Two additional tests of the L-3
    ascent stage were made:  KOSMOS 398, launched on February 26, 1971, 
    and KOSMOS 434, launched on August 12, 1971.  Both test flights were
    successful, but like the L-1, the L-3 would never fly again. 

        Efforts with the unmanned lunar soil sample return mission
    continued, at first with little success.  KOSMOS 300 was launched on
    September 23, 1969, but the PROTON's escape stage failed to boost the
    probe to the Moon.  KOSMOS 305, launched on October 22, suffered a
    similar fate.  A third attempt, launched on February 19, 1970, never
    made it to Earth orbit.  Finally, on September 12, 1970, LUNA 16 was
    placed on a trajectory to the Moon.  It safely landed on the Moon in
    the Sea of Fertility eight days later, where it recovered a small
    sample of soil.  After a smooth liftoff from the lunar surface, the
    return capsule of LUNA 16 landed in Soviet territory on September 20. 
    The probe had made the first automated soil return from another world
    in history.  The Soviet unmanned lunar exploration effort was finally
    under way again.

        During this same time, rebuilding of the N-1 launch facilities 
    and modifications to the N-1 itself continued.  On June 24, 1971, the
    booster was ready for another test flight.  All thirty first-stage
    engines ignited and the rocket slowly lifted off the pad.  Unexpectedly, 
    the giant rocket began to roll.  The radio guidance link with the still 
    climbing N-1 was severed.  Its guidance input now gone, the N-1 toppled 
    over after only seven seconds of flight.  The N-1 pad and facilities 
    were once again damaged but not destroyed, as in the last flight. 

        As before, the Soviet launch facilities were repaired and the 
    new problems with the N-1 were corrected.  On November 23, 1972, the
    fourth N-1 lifted off from its pad at Baikonur.  This time the rocket
    passed the seventy second mark when the first N-1 was destroyed.  All
    finally seemed to be going well.  About one hundred seconds into the
    150-second first-stage burn, the engines began to throttle back as
    programmed to keep the rocket from shaking itself apart.  Then, just
    seven seconds later, a malfunction occurred in the rocket's tail
    section and the N-1 was destroyed.  While the N-1 failures were dis-
    heartening, the engineers were not surprised by them.  It was all too 
    common for the first few flights of a new rocket to fail.  All one
    could do was learn from these failures, correct the problems, and try
    again.  Everyone involved was confident that the N-1 would finally
    operate as desired.  Two more N-1 rockets were prepared, one to be
    tested in August of 1974, the other by the end of the same year.  Even
    the most pessimistic engineers and managers felt certain that the N-1
    would be operational by 1976. 

        Politics were to interfere again.  The Kremlin slowly began to
    squeeze the funding for the N-1 program.  At first, Mishin was forced
    to slow down, then freeze work on the giant rocket.  Finally, in May
    of 1974, Brezhnev removed Mishin from his post with no explanation. 
    The new head of the Korolev Design Bureau was the nemesis of the N-1
    project, Glushko.  One of his first actions was to cancel the entire
    N-1 project.  The two assembled N-1 rockets were dismantled and sold
    for scrap.  By this time, as a result of the American success with
    high-energy cryogenic propellants, Glushko changed his mind about the 
    usefulness of liquid hydrogen as a fuel.  He set about a new develop-
    ment program to build a heavy lift rocket, not only to replace the N-1, 
    but also launch the Soviet's version of a space shuttle.  This new 
    launch vehicle ultimately was called ENERGIA, but it was not to make 
    its first flight until 1987. 

        This marked change in policy left Kuznetsov in a bad position.  
    He desperately wanted to prove that his engines could do the job. 
    Anxious to regain prestige for himself and his design bureau,
    Kuznetsov continued static testing of the N-1 engines through 1976. 
    By the end of the test program, the engines had accumulated almost
    four hours of successful operation, one hundred times more than they
    needed to operate in a typical N-1 flight.  While Kuznetsov may have
    proved that he could develop the engines, the N-1 project was
    nevertheless dead. 

        Today, very little of the Soviet lunar landing program remains. 
    The L-1 and L-2 hardware has been significantly modified and upgraded
    over the passing years.  It is still used today as the SOYUZ TM manned
    ferry and unmanned PROGRESS cargo ship for supporting the Soviets'
    manned space station program, now entering its third decade.  The L-3
    hardware, or what is left of it, sits in university labs for study by
    engineering students.  The PROTON is still in use today and is even
    being offered for international commercial launchings.  The N-1 launch
    facilities were extensively modified and are now being used to launch
    the ENERGIA - much as the old APOLLO launch facilities at Cape
    Canaveral in Florida were rebuilt to support the American Space
    Shuttle program. 

        In a small town outside of the Baikonur Cosmodrome, there sits
    perhaps the saddest reminder of the Soviets' manned Moon program:  A
    strange awning protects a dance floor in the middle of a park.  It is
    part of a fuel tank from one of the two N-1 rockets scrapped in 1974.

        The unmanned LUNA program was scaled back in 1973, after support
    for all lunar missions evaporated.  The last Soviet lunar flight to 
    date, LUNA 24, was made in 1976.  After one and one half decades of 
    work and 4.5 billion rubles spent, this is all that remains of the 
    Soviets' contribution to the race to the Moon. 

        Soviet missions to Earth's satellite do not appear to be entire-
    ly at an end, however.  There are currently plans to send a PHOBOS
    class probe to orbit the Moon in 1992, where it will map the lunar
    surface in detail and collect selenophysical information.  Missions
    to return soil samples from the lunar farside, perhaps in tandem with 
    advanced automated rovers - once discussed in the early 1970s - may 
    be reactivated again.  
 
        There has also been talk of the Soviets eventually sending cosmo-
    nauts to the Moon, perhaps with other nations to start the construction 
    of permanent lunar bases.  Should this come to pass, then the work done 
    by those Soviet engineers in the race to place humans on the Moon will 
    finally be completed, though more properly as a beneficial tie between 
    the former contenders. 

        Bibliography -
 
	Baker, David, THE HISTORY OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1981
 
	Clark, Phillip S., THE SOVIET MANNED SPACE PROGRAM, 1988
 
	Clark, Phillip S., "Correspondence: The PROTON Block D Stage and
         the N-1 Booster", SPACEFLIGHT (BIS), June 1990
 
	Clark, Phillip S., "Soviet Rocket Engine Review", SPACEFLIGHT, 
         July 1990
 
	Gatland, Kenneth, THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
	 1981 and 1988
  
	Harvey, Brian, "Promise Unfulfilled: The Soviet Unmanned Moon
	 Programme, 1969-1988", JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INTERPLANETARY
         SOCIETY (JBIS), Volume 43, Number 9, 1990

	Harvey, Brian, RACE INTO SPACE: THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM, 1988
 
	Hendricks, Bart, "Correspondence: Soviet Moon Rocket's Sad Fate",
	 SPACEFLIGHT, December 1989
 
	Johnson, Nicholas L., HANDBOOK OF SOVIET LUNAR AND PLANETARY 
	 EXPLORATION, 1979
 
	Johnson, Nicholas L., HANDBOOK OF SOVIET MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1980
 
	Johnson, Nicholas L., SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS 1980-85, 1987
 
	Johnson, Nicholas L., THE SOVIET YEAR IN SPACE 1989, 1990
 
	Kidger, Neville, "Glasnost and the Moon", SPACEFLIGHT, October 1989
 
	Newkirk, Dennis, ALMANAC OF SOVIET MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1990
 
	Oberg, James E., RED STAR IN ORBIT, 1981
 
	Pesavento, Peter, "Soviets to the Moon: The Untold Story",
         ASTRONOMY, December 1984
 
        Pesavento, Peter, "A Review of Rumored Launch Failures in the 
         Soviet Manned Program, Part 2: The Lunar Project/1968-1969", JBIS,
	 Volume 43, Number 9, 1990
 
	Young, Steven, "Soviet Union Was Far Behind in 1960s Moon Race",
	 SPACEFLIGHT, January 1990
 
	"Designer Mishin Speaks on Early Soviet Space Programmes and
	 the Manned Lunar Project", SPACEFLIGHT, March 1990
 
	"Soviet Lunar Lander Revealed", SPACEFLIGHT, July 1990
 
        "Soviet Manned Lunar Mission Used Modified SOYUZ Spacecraft"
	 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, January 8, 1990
 
        "Soviet Moon Flight Admission", SPACEFLIGHT, September 1989
 
	"VOSKHOD 2 Flight Recalled", SPACEFLIGHT, June 1990

        About the Author -

        Andrew J. LePage is a member of the Boston Group for the Study 
    of the Soviet Space Program, Krasnaya Orbita.  In addition to his 
    interests in astronomical and space related topics, Andrew has been 
    a serious observer of the Soviet space program for over one decade. 

        Andrew is the author of the following EJASA articles:

        "Mars 1994", March 1990 
        "The Great Moon Race: The Soviet Story, Part One", December 1990
 

    
    	I just knew that there was already a topic on this :-). Thanks, Mr.
    Moderator.
    
    				Drew
    

	Among observers of the Soviet space program, there is the constant
threat that new information released by the Soviets will radically change
our interpretation of the previously available evidence. When I was writing
my article on the Soviet manned lunar program I was in constant fear that
some new revealation from the Soviets might render part of my story incorrect.
Well, it happened.

	The January, 1991 issue of "Spaceflight" has an interview with Vasili
Mishin who headed the Soviets manned lunar program after the death of Korolev
in 1966. In this article he revealed key details of the N-1 rocket, the lunar
spacecraft, and most importantly the mission profile. Previously, I (as well
as other Soviet space observers) believed that the Soviets made use of a
combination of an Earth-Orbit-Rendezvous (EOR)/Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR)
mission profile to get to the Moon. According to Mishin, the Soviets were to 
make use of the LOR method just as the American Apollo project did. This was
the plan:

	The first three stages of the N-1 (Blocks A, B and V) would place the 
upper two stages of the N-1 (Blocks G and D) into Earth orbit along with
the Lunar Cabin (Soviet acronym LK) *AND* the Lunar Orbital Cabin (LOK) which
was a modified Soyuz. Previously it was believed that the N-1 would only launch
the LK into orbit where it would be joined by the LOK launched on a seperate
rocket, most likely the Proton. The remaider of the mission is similar to what
I described in my article. The N-1 Block G would act as the escape stage and
Block D would act as the Lunar Orbit Insertion stage.
	Unlike in the Apollo mission where after the spacecraft was on it way
to the Moon the CSM would turn around and dock with the LM, the LK remaind in
its launch shroud underneath the LOK until they reached lunar orbit. Once in
lunar orbit, one of the cosmonauts would leave the LOK on an EVA, climb across
the spacecraft and enter the LK via a hatch in the launch shroud. Once all
the systems were checked, the shroud would be jettisoned and the lander would
make its way down to the surface.
	The lander is also slightly different than described. It had but a 
single engine that it used for descent and ascent. The fuel for descent came 
from the descent stage tanks while the fuel for ascent came from the ascent
stage but both phases of the mission used the same engine (I suppose it was
lighter and was safer in the event of an abort during landing). 
	After the LK ascent stage docked with the LOK in lunar orbit, the
cosmonaut would leave the LOK on another spacewalk to return to the LOK.
This being the case, the spacewalk and crew transfer during the Soyuz 4/5
mission was a rehersal for this procedure. It also explains why the early
Soyuz docking system had no provisions for internal transfer (like in the
Apollo or later Soyuz flights to the Salyut space stations).

	There was some other interesting information about the N-1 included:

- The N-1 first stage had 30 non-gimbaled engines arranged in two concentric
  circles of 24 and 6 engines. The N-1 first stage was steered by selectively
  throttling the engines. This being the case, the N-1 had no way to roll
  or correct for it which would help explain the June 24, 1971 launch failure.

- The N-1 second stage had had eight engines similar to the first stage engines
  except that the nozzles were lengthened to gain additional performance at
  high altitudes. Like the first stage, the engines were not gimbaled and was
  steered by selective throttling.

- The third stage had four gimballed engines of a different design. The fourth
  stage had one engine of a similar design. Although Mishin did not make any 
  statement on the subject, this is still consistent with the belief that the 
  third and fourth stages of the N-1 are modified versions of the second and
  third stages of the Proton.

	I still have to wade through the article and do some calculations
to gain some additional insights into the Soviet's manned lunar program. At
least now we have the basics outlined for us so that the job of filling in
the details will be a little easier.

				Drew

Article        26727
From: [email protected] (Bruce Dunn)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Spaceflight: Soviet Moon Program
Date: 22 Jan 91 11:56:58 GMT
Organization: MIND LINK! - British Columbia, Canada
 
    From "Spaceflight", January 1991
 
    The Moon Programme That Faltered
 
     This is a two page article with diagrams on the Soviet Moon
program in the 1960s.  Information is from a Spaceflight interview
with Vasili Mishin, who was the Soviet space program chief designer
after the death of Korolyov in 1966, until he was dismissed in 1974
after repeated failures to successfully launch even the booster stages
of the Moon vehicle. 

     The Moon vehicle was a five stage vehicle, with the lower three
stages termed the N-1, and the upper two stages the L-3.  The first to
fourth stages used LOX and kerosene - propellants for the fifth stage
are not given; stage 1 had 30 motors, stage two 8 motors, and stage
three 4 motors, while stages four and five had one motor each.  The
first two stages were steered by differential throttling of the
engines, while the rest had conventional gimballed thrust.  The fifth
stage was topped by a lunar lander (termed "lunar cabin") and by a
"lunar orbital cabin" (a modified Soyuz).  The lunar lander had one
engine for both descent and ascent, burning UDMH and nitrogen tetroxide. 

     In operation, the first three stages were to place the upper
stages in Earth orbit.  The fourth stage would be fired to give a lunar
trajectory followed by the fifth stage to give lunar orbit insertion. 

     The article implies a crew of two, of whom one would remain in
lunar orbit in the Soyuz and the other who would land.  Transfers
between the Soyuz and lander were to be by spacewalk, as there was no
docking arrangement for the two vehicles.  Return to Earth was to have
been by the Soyuz, using a 1-skip atmosphere reentry (a dip into the
atmosphere to lose velocity, followed by an upward skip to allow
radiative cooling of the reentry vehicle, followed by final reentry). 

     "According to Mishin the main reason for the failure of the lunar
programme was a lack of funds."  Mishin stated:  "The Americans spent
$25 billion but we spent only three billion or even less.  The United
States spent up to six billion per year...[Our budget] was only half a
billion a year at the peak of the programme in 1967/68." 

     The article goes on to detail failed test flights of the N-1/L-3
in 1969 (explosion after 70 seconds), two subsequent launch pad
explosions, and a final inflight explosion in 1972.  "Two more rockets
had been fully assembled and readied for flight but in 1974 the
programme was cancelled and Mishin dismissed as Chief Designer".
"According to Mishin, the N1/L3 would have had to have successfully
flown four or five times before a manned launch was attempted." 
 
    The monthly magazine "Spaceflight" may be received worldwide by
mail through membership in the British Interplanetary Society (BIS). 
Details may be obtained from: 
 
    British Interplanetary Society
    27/29 South Lambeth Road
    London  SW8 1SZ
    England 
--
Bruce Dunn   Vancouver, Canada    [email protected]

Article          913
From: [email protected]
Newsgroups: clari.tw.space,clari.news.aviation,clari.news.military
Subject: Old Soviet moon booster unveiled
Date: 15 Feb 91 19:52:39 GMT
  
	WASHINGTON (UPI) -- Lifting a 20-year veil of secrecy, the
Soviet Union has released drawings and details of its now-discarded N1
booster, a giant four-stage rocket equipped with 43 engines and a
one-man lunar lander, a magazine reported Friday. 

	The massive rocket proved to be unreliable, however, and the
United States ultimately won the race to the moon with its towering
Apollo-Saturn 5 moonships.  But the nature of the Soviet booster has
long intrigued observers in the West. 

	Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine reports in its Feb.
18 edition that the Russian N1 rocket stood some 370 feet tall and was
made up of four stages powered by 43 rocket engines -- 30 engines in
the first stage alone. 

	In contrast, the American Saturn 5 was a three-stage vehicle
equipped with 11 engines: five first-stage powerplants, five in the
second stage and one restartable engine mounted at the base of the
third stage. 

	``During the early 1970s, four N1 launch attempts failed
before the Soviet lunar landing program was scrapped,'' Aviation Week
reported. ``One N1 flew as high as about 70,000 feet before failing.''

	The American Saturn 5 never suffered a single failure,
successfully completing several Earth-orbit missions and ultimately
carrying nine Apollo crews to the moon, including 12 men who walked on
the lunar surface. 

	Aviation Week said new data on the N1 rocket appeared in a
recent issue of Znanye Cosmonavtika Astronomiya, a Soviet aerospace
technical journal. 

	Vladimir A. Pivnyuk, an official on the Soviet Council of
Ministers, told Aviation Week the N1 proved unsuccessful primarily
because of an inability to achieve reliability and ``thrust
stability'' across the 30 first-stage engines. 

	The Saturn 5 first stage was equipped with five Rocketdyne F-1
engines, each one generating a titanic 1.5 million pounds of push
burning liquid oxygen and kerosene. 

	In contrast, the N1 used 30 engines in its first stage, each
one producing about 338,800 pounds of thrust. Twenty four of the
powerplants were arranged around the circumference of the rocket's
base while six were clustered at its center. 

	The U.S. Saturn 5 had a total liftoff thrust of 7.5 million
pounds while the N1 generated a whopping 10 million pounds of push. 

	The N1 second stage featured eight engines mounted around the
base. Each engine generated about 393,800 pounds of thrust giving the
stage a total power level of about 3 million pounds. The same engines
apparently were used by both stages, but the second-stage powerplants
were modified to develop more power. 

	The Saturn 5 used five Rocketdyne J-2 engines, which burned
liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen rocket fuel, a more potent
propellant than the oxygen-kerosene combination used by the N1,
generating about 1 million pounds of thrust. 

	The Soviet booster's third stage was equipped with four
engines rated at 90,200 pounds of thrust while the Saturn 5 third
stage used a single restartable J-2 engine. 

	The American moon rocket used its third stage engine to
complete the initial trip into orbit and later, to boost the three-man
Apollo command and lunar modules on toward the moon. 

	The Soviet N1, however, was to use a fourth stage engine to
send a two-man Soyuz capsule and an attached lunar lander to the moon.

	In the American system, the Apollo command module was equipped
with a restartable engine designed to put the crew in lunar orbit. The
lunar lander was equipped with separate descent and ascent engines
designed to carry two astronauts to and from the moon's surface. 

	Aviation Week said the Soviet design called for using a
19,200-pound thrust engine attached to the lunar lander to put the
Soyuz-lander combination into orbit. After one cosmonaut made a
spacewalk to enter the lander module, the braking rocket was to fire
again to begin the lander's descent to the moon. 

	The fifth-stage engine then was to be jettisoned, allowing the
lander to continue the descent on the power of yet another engine. The
cosmonaut then would use a single ascent engine to return to lunar
orbit.  After another spacewalk, the two cosmonauts would be fired back
toward Earth by yet another engine attached to the back of the Soyuz. 

	As has been reported earlier, the Soviets have recently released 
a significant amount of information on their N-1 moon rocket. I've recently
seen the drawings and have made some measurements to determine just how
big it is. All together, the N-1 stands 370 feet tall (including the payload)
compared to the 365 feet for the American Saturn V (again, including the
payload). The first three stages of the N-1 are in the shape of a gently
tapered cone. The fourth and fifth stages along with the LOK and LK (the
Soviet versions of the American LM and CSM) are inside a launch shroud with
a maximum diameter of 20 feet and 151.5 feet long including the launch escape
rocket. 
	This is how the N-1 compares to the American Saturn V:

			        N-1		     Saturn V

	First Stage
Number of engines		30			5
Propellants		 Kerosene/LOX		Kerosene/LOX
Thrust (lbs)		 10.1 million		7.5 million
Length (ft)		 	105			138
Diameter (ft)			59 to 34		33

	Second Stage
Number of engines		8			5
Propellants		Kerosene/LOX		      LH/LOX
Thrust (lbs)		3.1 million		1.1 million
Length (ft)			70			81.5
Diameter (ft)			34 to 24		33

	Third Stage
Number of engines		4			1
Propellants		Kerosene/LOX (?)	      LH/LOX
Thrust (lbs)		     360,800		     229,500
Length (ft)			50			58.1
Diameter (ft)			24 to 14.5		21.7

	Fourth Stage
Number of engines		1			-
Propellants		Kerosene/LOX (?)		-
Thrust (lbs)		       90,200			-
Length (ft)			29			-
Diameter (ft)			14.5			-

	Fifth Stage
Number of engines		1			-
Propellants		Kerosene/LOX (?)		-
Thrust (lbs)		       19,200			-
Length (ft)			18			-
Diameter (ft)			12.2			-

	This new information destroys the suspicion that the third and
fourth stages of the N-1 are also used as the second and third stages of
the Proton launch vehicle. The size, shape, and construction of the stages
are totally different and the engines also different (and it is likely the
fuels are different also). Interestingly enough, though, it now appears
the the fifth stage of the N-1 is identical to the escape stage used on
the four stage version of the Proton. The size, shape, the apparent 
construction, and the thrust of the engine are virtually identical to each
other. Although to my knowledge the Soviets have not stated it, it appears
likely that in addition to the Soyuz, the Proton Block D escape stage is
the only piece of hardware still in use by the Soviets.

				Drew

    It would explain why the Block D and the Proton main stages burn
    different propellants with similar Isp's.
    
    Which drawings did you see? Gauthier's interpretation that AvLeak
    published or the originals from the Soviet publication?
    
    gary

    Re:.19
    
    Gary,
    	My measurements of the N-1's dimensions are based on Gauthier's
    drawing that appeared AW&ST. I'm in the process now of asking my
    contact in the Soviet Union for copies of the original (assuming he
    didn't die in an uprising or the KGB has him, no :-) intended).
    
    				Drew
    

From: [email protected] (Jonathan McDowell)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: NOVA and Horizon; Soviet Lunar stuff.
Date: 8 Mar 91 15:02:09 GMT
Sender: [email protected] (Super-User)
Organization: NASA/MSFC
 
    [email protected] (Adam R. Brody) writes:

>[email protected] (Kish Shen) writes:
 >>>Russian Right Stuff
 >>I think this is the "Horizon" (a BBC TV science program) shown here in the UK
 >>a few months back. 
>The program was definitely Nova put out by WGBH Boston (PBS).
 
    Not quite: actually Nova is often a joint production between WGBH
and the BBC in England; the same programs are broadcast in the UK
under the Horizon name. So WGBH gets the credit in the US but if you
look at the fine print a lot of it is actually made by the Beeb in
England. The Russian Right Stuff had two technical advisers - Jim
Oberg from Houston and Phil Clark from London. Phillip never wears
stetsons and so is probably not considered photogenic enough to appear
on camera. 
 
    I wish they had spent a little longer showing us round Vasiliy
Mishin's attic with all the left over hardware in!                  
 
    On a related note, a recent article in the Soviet magazine
Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika with Aleksey Leonov, who will be familiar to
viewers of the Horizon/Nova, he states that the first unpiloted launch
of the L-1/Zond spaceship failed when the escape stage burn went in
the wrong direction and the craft zoomed back in to the atmosphere. I
suspect this refers to the Kosmos-146 mission, which has long
attracted interest as an Earth orbital mission included on Soviet
lists of flights that attained escape velocity. It had been speculated
that this was a deliberate reentry test of the L-1. Guess not! (Although 
there is some evidence K146 stayed in orbit for 3 days, which would 
contradict this; in which case he may be referring to Zond 4.) 
  
 .-----------------------------------------------------------------------------.
 |  Jonathan McDowell                 |  phone : (205)544-7724                 |
 |  Space Science Lab ES65            | uucp:                                  |
 |  NASA Marshall Space Flight Center | bitnet :                               |
 |  Huntsville AL 35812               |  inter : [email protected]  |
 |  USA                               |   span : ssl::mcdowell                 |
 '-----------------------------------------------------------------------------'

From: [email protected] (Henry Spencer)
Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.space.shuttle
Subject: Space news from February 18 AW&ST
Date: 5 Apr 91 08:07:09 GMT
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology
 
    Soviets reveal details of their N1 booster, meant as their Saturn
V equivalent for manned lunar missions.  The N1 used massive
clustering of engines, and reliability problems in the 30 (!)
first-stage engines were its Achilles' Heel.  Early reports suggesting
that the N1 would carry up the lunar spacecraft and rocket stages
while a Soyuz launch carried the crew up appear to have been
incorrect; it now appears that a single N1 launch would do the whole
job.  The first three stages would put a Soyuz, a lander, and three
more rocket stages into Earth orbit.  The fourth stage would boost the
rest toward the Moon.  The fifth would brake the rest into lunar
orbit, and then do most of the deceleration of the lander, being
jettisoned shortly before landing to crash on the Moon.  [This "lunar
crasher" approach was seriously considered for Apollo for a while.] 
The lander engine would then complete the landing, and later be used
to boost back to lunar orbit. Finally, the sixth stage would boost the
Soyuz back toward Earth. The total crew would be two, with only one
descending to the lunar surface, and crew transfer between Soyuz and
lander would be by EVA. [Actually, various elements of this resemble
rejected alternatives in the US program; similar problems, similar
solutions.] 
-- 
    Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
    [email protected]  utzoo!henry

    
    	For those of you who can get a copy of it, the June 1991 issue of
    "Spaceflight" has two pictures (that's real pictures, not drawings or
    artist impressions) of the N-1. They were taken from a Soviet
    television show commemerating the 30th anniversary of the first manned
    spaceflight. One shows an N-1 on it rail mounted erector while the
    other shows an N-1 launch (since it successfully cleared the pad it
    must have been either the first or fourth launch). The pictures are
    rather poor due to a lot of electronic noise (the imaging scientist in
    me would love to get a hold of an original videotape to do some image
    restoration :-) ) but to my knowledge these are the first pictures
    publicly released of the recently declassified N-1 moon rocket.
    
    				Drew
    

Article: 51370
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Bill Higgins-- Beam Jockey)
Subject: N-1 giant Moon rocket photo in *AvLeak*
Sender: [email protected] (The Background Man)
Organization: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1992 19:57:03 GMT
 
I think this one can't wait for Henry's summaries...
 
The new 9 November issue of *Aviation Week* just hit my mailbox.  On
page 65 is a nice photograph of the Soviet N-1 rocket on its pad with
service tower.   The N-1 was the "Soviet Saturn V," the BIG rocket
whose failure doomed their manned lunar landing program. 
 
The photo, taken in 1968 or 1969, was given to American educator Edwin
N. Cameraon by an official of NPO Energiya.  Other photos Cameron took
at Baikonur-- I mean Tyuratam-- show the N-1 service tower as it appeared 
today, and an old N-1 shroud that's been converted into a toolshed. 
 
The N-1 has always been cloaked in secrecy, and this is only the
second photo of it that's been published in the West.

 
     O~~*           /_) ' / /   /_/ '  ,   ,  ' ,_  _           \|/
   - ~ -~~~~~~~~~~~/_) / / /   / / / (_) (_) / / / _\~~~~~~~~~~~zap!
 /       \                          (_) (_)                    / | \
 |       |     Bill Higgins   Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
 \       /     Bitnet:     [email protected]
   -   -       Internet:  [email protected]
     ~         SPAN/Hepnet:      43011::HIGGINS 

Article: 51492
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Dennis Newkirk)
Subject: Re: N-1 giant Moon rocket photo in *AvLeak*
Organization: Motorola 
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 17:39:56 GMT
Sender: [email protected] (Net News)
 
In article <[email protected]> [email protected]
(Bill Higgins-- Beam Jockey) writes: 

>The new 9 November issue of *Aviation Week* just hit my mailbox.  On
>page 65 is a nice photograph of the Soviet N-1 rocket on its pad with
>service tower.   The N-1 was the "Soviet Saturn V," the BIG rocket
>whose failure doomed their manned lunar landing program.
>
>The N-1 has always been cloaked in secrecy, and this is only the
>second photo of it that's been published in the West.
> |       |     Bill Higgins   Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
 
That's not true. At the least, photos of the N-1 published in the west
probably number in the dozen.  Spaceflight magazine had several
detailed photos of the N-1 Block A (first stage) and excerpts of film
of one launch in an issue a few months ago. 
 
Aerospace Ambassadors group has published a few photos in their Russian 
made books, but these have mostly been seen in other sources first. 
 
Also, a book published a few months ago in France contains some photos
of the N-1 different from any I have seen in this country, including
an aerial photo of 2 N-1's on both launch pads.  This book also
contains information on other once secret projects similar to the
Russian "Unknown Spacecraft" booklet privately published earlier this
year or last year and translated by the good folks at FBIS-JPRS. 
 
Dennis Newkirk ([email protected])
Motorola, Land Mobile Products Sector
Schaumburg, IL

Article: 52943
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Dennis Newkirk)
Subject: Russian lunar program (was Re: US/Sov space comparisons)
Organization: secure_comm
Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1992 18:14:01 GMT
Sender: [email protected] (Net News)
 
First, about the race between Apollo and Zond:

When the Russians flew Zond 5 and 6 around the moon, NASA accelerated
Apollo lunar orbit missions.  This had the side effect of accelerating
the US lunar landing project while the prospects of a Russian
circum-lunar orbit flight did very little to advance their N1/L3
landing project since they used almost totally different hardware (the
Block-D, LOK-Soyuz capsule and cosmonauts being the only common parts). 
 
In article <[email protected]> [email protected] ("Phil G.
Fraering") writes: 

>The N-1 wasn't the only rocket they had capable of lunar flight.
>Proton is capable of sending a small manned capsule to lunar orbit
>and back. (Or at least on some sort of lunar flyby; I guess it depends
>on whether you have one or two people in the capsule etc...)
 
No, it was a 2 person craft. Russian articles sometimes talk of 'lunar orbit'
missions for the Zond but it was capable of only circum-lunar fly-by.
 
(Phil Fraering) writes:

>Now get this: some of these Zond missions were Soyuz capsules without
>the orbital module and a little more propulsion
 
No. The Zond (L-1) spacecraft carried less: a KTDU-53 main engine
(same as the Soyuz engine but without the backup) and no torus tank.
It could NEVER have entered and left lunar orbit. Only needed mid
course corrections. 
 
[email protected] (Henry Spencer) writes:

#They flew unmanned precursor tests:  the Zond lunar
#flights were stripped-down unmanned Soyuzes.  If a man had been aboard
#the last one of those, he'd have survived in comfort.  (On the previous
#one, he'd have had a rough flight but not a fatal one.)  There was time
#to launch another before Apollo 8.  Nobody knows why it wasn't done;
#the best guess is that they were trying but ran into minor problems of
#some kind and missed the window.

-AND-

(Phil Fraering) writes:

>At the end of the mission the Zond performed a lifting re-entry maneuver 
>similar to the Apollo missions' and landed. 
 
True, but unfortunately, many Zonds experienced guidance failure
during reentry. For instance, no flights were scheduled to land in the
Indian Ocean but Zond 5 and 8 did just that. Zond 4 may have landed in
China, I still haven't heard if that's verified. Leonov (lead
cosmonaut for the Zond mission) says the first 2 tests failed. 3 more
failed during launch, and Leonov says one cabin depressurized in
flight. They only launched 10 and at least 9 failed although some of
those fell back to Earth somewhere.
 
(Phil Fraering) writes:

>In short, they could have done it. They did send a manned capusle on
>a lunar flyby and back; they simply neglected to put a cosmonaut in.
>In retrospect, they should have.
 
I think you may want to reconsider based on the statistics above.
 
(Phil Fraering) writes:

>I also wonder what would have happened if they had put all the effort
>they put into the N-1 into a good upper stage for the Proton and 
>in beefing up their docking technology. They could have gotten to
>the moon shortly after we did...
 
There were many different ideas.  In fact, these different ideas and
political games are what lead to the N-1 being delayed for many years.
Regardless of boosters, the spacecraft weren't ready until well after
1970. The lander may have been ready around 1972 but the lunar version
Soyuz was apparently never space tested and it had a totally new
engine module. 
 
1960 - Korolev KB begins plans for N-1 and N-2 boosters, government delayed
       project until 1965.

April 1961 - Chelomey KB circum-lunar project approved

July 1962 - Keldysh report supports N-1, Glushko and Chelomey oppose it

1963 - Due to Glushko's opposition, Korolev picks Kuznetsov KB to develop 
       N-1 engines, but it isn't part of rocket industry and its managment

April 1963 - Korolev KB starts conceptual development of N-1 and L-3 
             Chelomey and Glushko counter with proposal for UR-700 booster
             Yangel counters with proposal for R56 booster

Oct 1964 - Chelomey proposes Proton for lunar orbit mission
           Korolev counters it can only do so using EOR scheme
           Chelomey counters with proposal for UR-900 booster to eliminate EOR

mid-1965 - Korolev continuing conceptual development of N-1 and L-3 
           Chelomey circum-lunar mission behind schedule
           Korolev takes over circum-lunar mission mating the Proton to
           a modified LOK (Soyuz) (Yuri Semenov in charge) and N-1 Block-D 

August 1965 - Chelomey continues work on lunar mission spacecraft

Jan 1966 - Korolev dies in surgery

mid-1966 - Mishin completes N-1 project draft with 95,000 kg payload to LEO
           L-3 spacecraft complex design draft also completed

1967 - engine tests uncover unstable combustion problems and corrections made

1967 - first N-1 test article completed

1967 - Chelomey begins mockup fabrication for UR-700/LK-700 direct ascent 
       lunar landing project without funding - Glushko supports it

Dec 1968 - manned Zond cancelled, Chelomey awarded Almaz project

Feb. 21 1969 - 4L N1/L3S first launch failure

1969 - Mishin plans for N1/L3M LOR lunar landing mission with 5-30 day stay

.....more removed....

Nov. 24 1971 - first LK (lunar module) test - Kosmos 379

1971 - N1/L3M proposal complete, 1972 - N1/L3M plan approved

.....more removed....

1974 - Glushko appointed to replace Mishin, all N1 work stopped.
       Chelomey proposes UR700M for (240,000 kg LEO) Mars mission, rejected.
       Glushko later proposes Zenith booster and lunar colony plan which is 
       rejected except for Energia which is tied to military need for Buran 
       project.
 
I hope this info clears up some misconceptions.
 
Dennis Newkirk ([email protected])
Motorola, Land Mobile Products Sector
Schaumburg, IL

Article: 31441
From: [email protected] (Bruce Watson)
Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.astro
Subject: Satellite of the Month
Date: 2 Feb 93 19:28:46 GMT
Organization: Alpha Science Computer Network, Denver, Co.
 
Artificial Earth satellite Cosmos 398 (NORAD #04966, COSPAR 1971-016A)
was launched on a Proton (SL-13) launcher from the Baikonur (Tyuratam)
Cosmodrome on 1971 February 26. This satellite is in an orbit inclined
to the Earth's equator by 51.5 degrees. In 1993, it makes one
revolution of the Earth every 112.4 minutes in an elliptical orbit
with a low point (perigee) of 190 km and a high point (apogee) of 2486
km above the surface of the Earth. Its visual characteristics indicate
that it may be approximated as a sphere of 6.2 meters diameter. 
 
When launched it was put into a parking orbit of 196 x 275 km and soon
afterwards boosted to an orbit of 200 x 11000 km. Since then, the
apogee has steadily decreased. TRW Space Log asks if this Cosmos was
manned lunar related. Was this a test of a command or lunar module in
Earth orbit or was it supposed to go to the moon but the burn didn't
last long enough? 
 
I have been trying to observe Cosmos 398 while its perigee was over my
latitude since January of 1986 when its apogee was 5800 km. Finally on
the evenings of Jan 26-27 and Jan 27-28 I succeeded. On Jan 27, at
1:00 UTC, it appeared just north of Orion's belt moving very swiftly
to the northeast at +2 magnitude. It was 198 km above the Earth and
492 km distant from me. On the following evening, Jan 28 at 1:21 UTC,
it passed through Cepheus and under the pole star moving to the
northeast at +4 magnitude. It was 199 km above the Earth and 308 km
distant. Both evenings it was about 45 seconds late relative to the
elements given below. The next time the perigee is above northern
latitudes will be late June. 
 
Cosmos 398       6.2  0.0  0.0  4.4
1 04966U 71016  A 93 22.19651361  .00101327  26323-4  31262-3 0  9786
2 04966  51.4625  16.6086 1487809  50.8249 321.5614 12.80975878704617
 
-- 
Bruce Watson ([email protected]) Bulletin 629-49 Item 6700 Extract 75,131

Article: 56795
From: [email protected] (Henry Spencer)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Vulkan -- what it is/was
Date: 11 Feb 93 17:34:47 GMT
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology
 
The following is from [email protected], who would have posted it
himself but has problems with his software:
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
       Three years ago, FBIS/JPRS published a longish history of the
Soviet Moon landing program (JPRS-USP-90-002) which originally
appeared in the Soviet Ministry of Defense newspaper Krasnaya zvezda
(Red Star) of 12 January 1990. Buried in the article was the following
sentence passage, attributed to Professor Yu.A. Mozzhorin, Director of
the Central Scientific Research of Machine Building: 
 
     "space technology is creating a solid foundation for the 
     realization of a whole family of standardized promising 
     launchers like the Tsiklon and the more powerful Vulkan 
     boosters." 
 
     The Tsiklon is, of course, the SL-14, derived from the SS-9, but
Vulkan was new; at the time, there was some speculation that it might
be a booster version of the SS-18, but no further evidence appeared
until last year. As it turns out, the Vulkan is considerably more
interesting than it first seemed. 
 
     In a monograph called "Unknown Spacecraft (from the History 
of the Soviet Space Program)" by I. B. Afanasyev, translated as
JPRS-USP-92-003 of 27 May 1992, there is discussion of the program
which led to Energiya and Buran. In the 1974-1976 period, it was
intended that the orbiter not be a clone of the U.S. Shuttle, but a
rather different design mounted coaxially on an Energiya stack. This
coaxial payload arrangement left open the possibility for other
configurations and missions: 
 
     "With eight [Zenit] boosters and an enlarged second stage, the
     launch vehicle, which was given the name Vulkan, would be able 
     to lift a 200-ton payload into orbit,  which would make it 
     possible to realize the idea that [Academician V. P.] Glushko 
     [,Director of NPO Energiya,] had been thinking about for so 
     long--creating a spacecraft for a direct landing of a man on 
     the Moon... 
 
     "The principal transport system proposed by Glushko for 
     delivering cosmonauts and cargo [to the lunar surface] was the 
     direct-landing lunar mission module (LMM), which was to be 
     placed in translunar trajectory by a Vulkan booster with an 
     oxygen-hydrogen upper stage... 
 
     "At launch, with the LMM in the upper part of the Vulkan 
     booster, the spacecraft crew would be in the reentry vehicle, 
     which would be secured inside the living quarters...
 
     "Glushko, to the very last days of his life, tried to rouse 
     interest in the plans for exploring the Moon, but he never 
     succeeded in convincing the 'higher-ups' of the need to fund 
     the program."
 
     So it appears that Vulkan is a super-Energiya, and that, as late
as the end of 1989, senior Soviet space folks were considering it to
be at least semireal. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
C++ is the best example of second-system| Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
effect since OS/360.                    |  [email protected]  utzoo!henry

                                                       

Article: 62702
From: [email protected]
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Manned Zonds, etc.
Date: 14 May 93 08:27:11 PST
Organization: Science Applications Int'l Corp./San Diego
 
     Speaking of manned Zonds, there is a pretty good overview of several
  previously un- or little-known Soviet manned programs:
 
  Translated Title: Development of soviet spacecraft for manned missions
  Author: AFANASEV I B
  Translation Year: 1992, 28 p.
  Translating Organization (Availability):  UMI -- UMI Research Information
Services   300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346, USA.  (UMI
JPRS-USP-92-003, only complete report supplied)
  Translation Language: English
  Document Type: TV (Translation) ; Level: LM (Monographic)
  Series: JPRS Report: Science & Technology-Central Eurasia: Space
(JPRS-USP-92-003)
  Translation Country: USA
Translated from:
  Original Title: UNKNOWN SPACECRAFT (FROM THE HISTORY OF THE SOVIET SPACE
PROGRAM)
  Publisher: s.l. Znanie  no. 12
  Original Publication Year: 1991, p. 1-64
  Original Language: Russian
  Document Type: XL (Book) ; ZM (Monographic)
  Country of Publication: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Descriptors: Aerospace technology; Engineering
Subject Classification: V02   Spacecraft
 
Allen Thomson                  SAIC                      McLean, VA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yes, there is an opinion in the first sentence; but it's mine, not SAIC's.
 

Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1993 14:54:21 GMT
From: Dennis Newkirk <[email protected]>
Subject: QUESTIONS: Soviet manned lunar lander/orbiter
Newsgroups: sci.space

In article <[email protected]> [email protected] (Dave
Michelson) writes: 

>In article <[email protected]> [email protected] (Wan Ngai
>Wayne Lee) writes: 
>>Would the Soviet approach have left a cosmonaut in lunar orbit?  

YES, until redocking of the lander.

>>Would two spacewalks have been required? 

YES, but three if they wanted to get out on the moon.

>>Has glasnost ever uncovered a specific target date? 

There was never a scheduled manned lunar landing mission. They never
got to the stage where a schedule could be set, they were just
trying to get the hardware developed as soon as possible.

>>Was there anything particularly risky about the approach?

Cosmonaut Grechko was one of many cosmonauts training for the mission.
Whan I asked him recently why the project was stopped this was his response:

"The lunar program was ended because the lander was technologically inferior 
to the Apollo and the risk [and expected/probable loss of life] was too high to
continue the project in the light of the highly successful Apollo landings.
The N-1 was capable of being made reliable but without a reliable lander there
could be no mission. This is why it was cancelled."

In addition to that risk, it is not clear if the orbiter was ever
tested. While it was similar to the Soyuz, it used fuel cells and a 
totally new engine and tankage section. When I asked Grechko if it
was ever tested he could not recall. Someday we'll find out.

>One spacewalk would have been required for the cosmonaut to enter
>the landing module because the docking tunnel was blocked by an
>RCS thruster assembly.  However, the thruster assembly would have been
>jettisoned on the way back from the surface so the cosmonaut would
>have been able to use the docking tunnel to return to the Soyuz-derived
>mothership.

NO. There was NO docking tunnel. Recent information also indicates there
was NO 'thruster assembly'. It does not appear on any Russian diagrams
of the N1/L3 and has been reliably reported to be a student project
which unfortunately happens to sit next to the lander at the MAI museum
as seen on NOVA's Russian Right Stuff. Other photos also show thrusters
mounted on the top of the lander making a 'thruster assembly' unnecessary. 

EVA would have been needed to reach the lander while it was still 
in its shroud behind the orbiter. EVA would also be needed to 
transfer from the lander to orbiter after redocking. The docking device
was a simple claw probe and the drouge on the lander was a simple
light honeycomb type material which the probe would plunge into. 

There is no good documentation for this yet. Probably the best and
easiest to get would be the last issue of Quest magazine (PO Box 9331
Grand Rapids, MI, 49509-0331), they'll probably send you a sample
copy, just ask for the N1 issue.

Dennis Newkirk ([email protected])
Motorola, Land Mobile Products Sector
Schaumburg, IL


Date: Fri, 18 Jun 1993 00:22:05 GMT
From: Dave Michelson <[email protected]>
Subject: QUESTIONS: Soviet manned lunar lander/orbiter
Newsgroups: sci.space

In article <[email protected]>
[email protected] (Dennis Newkirk) writes: 

>There is no good documentation for this yet. Probably the best and
>easiest to get would be the last issue of Quest magazine (PO Box 9331
>Grand Rapids, MI, 49509-0331), they'll probably send you a sample
>copy, just ask for the N1 issue.

<sigh>  It is *so* hard to keep up with the "most recent" information
concerning the Soviet lunar program.  Well, at least the drawings in
Aviation Week (10Feb92) were kinda neat to look at... 
--
Dave Michelson  --  [email protected]  --  University of British Columbia

Article: 69434
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Tim Harincar)
Subject: N-1(was Re: Saturn V Question)
Sender: soc1070                         
Organization: University of Minnesota CIS
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 1993 13:51:00 GMT
 
In article <[email protected]>, [email protected]
(George William Herbert) writes... 

>In article <[email protected]>,
>Phil G. Fraering <[email protected]> wrote:
>>I was sorta fishing in that post for someone who knew something
>>more definite about the N-1's problems.
 
The N-1's first stage (Block A) was powered by 30 NK-33 engines. Pitch and
yaw were maintained by throtteling individual engines in the cluster. Roll
was controlled by venting turbine exhaust through four movable nozzles.
 
A computer would automatically shut down a pair of motors on opposite
sides if one developed problems, and then (hopefully) the rest would
make up for the loss by burning longer.
 
The first one crashed when a LOX line ruptured some 65 seconds after
lift off. Kind of like the shuttle, the N-1 throttles back during Max-Q,
and then back up again. When the N-1 throttled back up, it was too 
fast causing vibration which broke the LOX line. All the engines shut 
down, and triggered the escape sequence.
 
The second one exploded when on oxydizer pump failed shortly after
liftoff, causing all 30 motors to shut down and causing the rocket to
fall back onto the pad. 
 
The third N-1 went into an uncontrollable roll which caused the rocket
to basically twist itself apart between the second and third stages. 
 
The fourth and last N-1 was launched in 1972. 107 seconds after lift off,
the rocket broke apart and crashed. This one may heve experienced the
same 'pogo' problems that the first Saturn V's had.
 
This is from information that will be appearing in Peter Alway's
new book, _Rockets of the World_. Also, some of this was in Part 2 of
_The Great Moon Race: The Soviet Story_ by Andrew J. LePage published in
the Jan. 1991 edition of The Electronic Journal of The Astronomical
Society of the Atlantic (EJASA).
--
tim harincar
[email protected]
 

Article: 69492
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected]
Subject: Saturn V Question
Sender: [email protected]
Organization: [via International Space University]
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 1993 02:46:44 GMT
 
> Date: 16 Aug 1993 04:13:25 GMT
> George William Herbert <[email protected]>
 
Writes
 
> In article <[email protected]>,
> Phil G. Fraering <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>Try asking Art Bozlee;
>>>(206) 933-0944 ?
>>>[or I here he's on GENIE]
>
>>Just one comment: doesn't he live in the 20_5_ area code?
>>(You know, like the rest of Huntspatch?) (Great term, Dennis!)
 
(I don't know how long the "Huntspatch" thing has been going on, but
40 years that I know about., for sure. Before Huntsville became noted
as a space center, cotton was about all there was, and there are still
more than a few cotton patches in the area. Actually, things got so
bad, that at one time the local image makers tried to promote it as
being the "Watercress Capital of Somewhere" -  "North East Alabama?"
In the mid 1800's Huntsville was a respectable metropolis, for the
area, still has a bank that was bigger than any in Atlanta until the
1870's probably, and which was robbed by the James Brothers, what more
could one ask for in public acceptance? 1854 was the 'high water mark'
of Huntsville, the year the railroad arrived, and Atlanta was founded.
Huntsville went down, and has never recovered. The view of an native
of Atlanta.) 
 
> Seattle, not Huntsville... or so he told me.  Though he seems to
> get around a lot, that's where he lives.
 
> If that number is wrong, and it could be because I think that's one
> of the numbers I had to rebuild when my address book was partially
> damaged a year ago, just call Seattle information.  Tell him the
> loudmouth from Baycon '92 with the clear business cards sent you 8-).
 
Bozlee is a SYSOP on GEnie, which is where I usually hang-out, myself.
I have a number and address for him, which is neither in Seattle nor
Huntsville, both of which were previously correct, (and, the area
codes do sometimes cause confusion, for those of us who commute a lot
between them) but he didn't say if I was suppose to let it or not, so
I won't. 
 
He did send me the following message, which I am passing along.
 
 ------------
Category 3,  Topic 3
Message 427       Mon Aug 16, 1993
BOZLEE [Bozlee]              at 15:36 EDT
 
Henry, to answer the second question first, you have mail.
 
Now on to N-1, I do not have a lot of data but here is what I do have
that seems to be fairly solid.
 
ENGINES
 
FIRST STAGE
 
30 NK-33 engines
 
ENGINE SPECS
   LOX/kerosene fuel
   Flow rate 500 kg/sec
   LOX/kerosene ratio 2.8 to 1
   Sea level thrust 339,400 pounds
   Vacuum ISP 331
   Specific mass 8.1 kg per metric ton of thrust
   Combustion chamber diameter 430 mm
   Throat diameter 281 mm
   Chamber pressure 2109 PSI
   Turbopump speed 20,000 RPM
   Nominal burn time 110 seconds
 
SECOND STAGE
 
8 NK-43 ENGINES
 
ENGINE SPECS
   Vacuum thrust 394,158 pounds
   Vacuum ISP 346
   Specific mass 7.8 kg per metric ton of thrust
   Exit diameter 2.5 meters
   Turbopump RPM 32,000
   Exit diameter 1.35 meters
 
THIRD STAGE
   FOUR NK-39 ENGINES
 
ENGINE SPECS
 
   Vacuum thrust 90,364 pounds
   Vacuum ISP 352
   Chamber pressure 100 atmospheres
   Turbopump RPM 32,000
   Exit diameter 1.35 meters
 
The first booster was launched in 1969 and failed when a 2mm pipe used
to measure pressure upstream of the turbopump assembly failed and
sprayed 350 degree C gas on a cable bundle which resulted in the
shutdown of all 30 first stage engines 
 
The second failure was also in 1969 and was caused by debris from a
ruptured sensor entered the LOX pump and caused a massive explosion on
the launch pad 
 
The third failure was caused by a faulty control system
 
The fourth failure was caused by the rupture of a 10 inch LOX line.
 
Hope this helps a bit.
 
 ------------
 ************
 
Art's four failure discriptions sound unrelated, but then, one could
say that POGO could be involved in almost any sort of failure at all.
And, almost every large liquid, pump fed, rocket has had POGO except
for the Shuttle, which actively suppresses it, so we do not know if it
would have it or not. 
 
As to the original question, I only check in here occasionally, and my
connection is quite primitive, and convoluted, (easier to get me on
GEnie) so the whole discussion was over before I ever saw any of it. I
was, however, networking even before "Lake Woebegone" (which someone
here noted was before some of the people here can recall) and I have
been asked a lot dumber questions than the Saturn V fuels. 
 
If I don't like the questions, I know how to handle that.
 
A couple of random notes. "Fuel," like most words, has a very
particular meaning to engineers, and it makes some of us nervous.
Hydrogen is "fuel," LOX is not. Sometimes you have to get a chemist to
tell you which is the fuel and which is the oxidizer, sometimes they
get confused. 64 Trivia Point question. Name a substance that is a
fuel in one (fairly well) known propellant combination, and an
oxidizer in another (not as well known). What blew me away was to find
out that in solids, the rules are different, and that "fuel" is only
the rubber binder, whereas the aluminum is the "real fuel" in most
common current propellants. And, RDX is an "oxidizer" no matter what
the stoichiometry says. 
 
As to the Saturn I and IB, I said earlier that I think that the switch
from the I to the IB was an error, and that in a sense, the Saturn I
configuration is "coming back," at least in some circles. Around a
half dozen to a dozen engines per stage is not a bad number. If we
still knew how to build it, the Saturn I would not be a dumb vehicle
to have in the inventory, now, more robust than the T-IV, and more
reasonable in size than the Saturn V, of course, it did have its
problems. 


Article: 69498
From: [email protected] (Paul Dietz)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Propellant Trivia (was Re: Saturn V Question)
Date: 17 Aug 93 03:47:51 GMT
Organization: University of Rochester
 
In article <[email protected]> [email protected] writes:
 
 > they get confused. 64 Trivia Point question. Name a substance that is
 > a fuel in one (fairly well) known propellant combination, and an
 > oxidizer in another (not as well known).
 
Um, either hydrazine or diborane.  Both of these can be used as fuels
with conventional oxidizers, or used together, reacting to form boron
nitride and hydrogen. 
 
	Paul F. Dietz
	[email protected]

Article: 69512
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Albert Einstein)
Subject: Re: Saturn V Question
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 1993 10:13:39 GMT
 
[email protected] wrote:
: they get confused. 64 Trivia Point question. Name a substance that is
                     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
: a fuel in one (fairly well) known propellant combination, and an
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
: oxidizer in another (not as well known). What blew me away was to
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 
Hydrazine? (Oxidizer as a monopropellant)
 
-Al

    re .last few
    
    'Scuse ignorance but what is "pogo"?

I don't think POGO is an acronym, but I would put it past the NASA folks
to have figured out one.

Pogo, roughly speaking, is an oscillation that can build up in liquid fuel
rockets (the rocket starts bucking forward, much like a pogo stick - hence
the name).  If you don't know what a pogo stick is, then this is going nowhere
fast...

I think it is caused by either acceleration or pressure changes in the fuel
lines and as the engines compensate for it they might slow down a bit, the
fuel slow settles out and they speed up again, generating a feedback loop.

If nobody else chimes in with better information, I'll dig up a better
explanation from my library at home tomorrow.

- dave


p.s. I don't know if the pogo stick is an international phenomenon.  It was
popular in the '50s and '60s here in the U.S.    Roughly:

    ==== ====  - handle
        V
        |
        |
        |
        #
        #      - spring
        #
     ===#===   - foot pedals
        |
        "

You grab the handles, jump on the foot pedals, and starting bouncing...

Article: 69571
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected]
Subject: Saturn V Question
Sender: [email protected]
Organization: [via International Space University]
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 1993 01:29:43 GMT
 
> Date: Mon, 16 Aug 1993 13:51:00 GMT
> Tim Harincar <[email protected]>
 
Writes:
 
> The fourth and last N-1 was launched in 1972. 107 seconds after
lift off, the rocket broke apart and crashed. This one may heve
experienced the same 'pogo' problems that the first Saturn V's had.
 
"POGO" has been used to describe more than one more or less related
kind thing, mainly related in that there is a longitudinal oscillation.
 
The Titan and the Saturn V/S-1C stage had very similar
characteristics, "Classical POGO." On the S-1C, it occurred once, and
only once. On the second flight, AS-502, on April 4, 1968. 
 
A strange commentary on our philosophy at the time, an analysis had
already been done, and a POGO "fix" already designed, and was "in the
box," before the first flight, but, it was decided to wait and see if
it was needed. 501 was totally clean, not a trace of coupling, but 502
got pretty rough. If it had been manned, it would have probably been
necessary to terminate the flight. 
 
Well, of course, we forgot all about the fix that we had already
designed, started over from scratch, designed an even better fix,
tested it, analyzed it, designed an even better one, tested it, proved
it didn't work, then had a sort of a "bounce off" between the original
and the second fix, selected the   second one, modified and built
hardware, installed it on the third vehicle, and most of us on the
"POGO Tiger Team" were off the program by August, and the vehicle
didn't fly until Christmas, because of spacecraft problems. Some sort
of a record for NASA fixes, I suppose. 
 
The N-1 timing suggests that it could possibly have been classical
POGO, as that is about when it usually occurs (depends on the
specifics of the vehicle, of course.) 
 
The S-II stage had POGO problems, also, but that was a somewhat
different sort of a thing than the "classic" manifestation. . 
 
> Date: Tue, 17 Aug 1993 02:19:12 GMT
> Mike Van Pelt <[email protected]>
 
> [email protected] should do it, but I think I recall you have to
> "sign up" for Internet email, and he might not have done that.
> (They changed the rules at some point, and signing up may no longer
> be necessary, but I'm not sure.)
 
I should have thought to have said that in my last message, that is
the correct form for GEnie addresses, as one can see from mine, and
they did change the rules and everyone on GEnie can be reached that
way, all you have to know is the GEnie mail address, i. e. "BOZLEE." 
 
> Date: Tue, 17 Aug 1993 02:15:02 GMT
> Henry Spencer <[email protected]>
 
  Well, "ready in time" implies that it was considered at all...  The
original Saturn I design started at about the same time as the F-1
design, and was oriented to near-term results
 
The truth is that the Saturn I (and IB) never really had any very
clear cut objectives or requirements, and the missions were sort of
invented after the fact to fit the available hardware, and the whole
program nearly "missed its time slot."
 
> (which is one reason why it used a bundle of existing tankage
rather than full-diameter tanks).
 
The tank bundle was probably a good idea, multiple tanks do not
weigh as much more than a single one as most people suppose, and
have the advantage of having effectively a "flat" bulkhead. But, if
more time had been available, I suppose they would have tried to
make it a single one, anyway. (A very popular idea at the time was
for "orange section" tanks, which turn out to be sort of the   same
idea, but much more difficult, they might have tried that.) What
probably could have use a little optimization was the connecting
structure, which, to put it tactfully, looks a bit crude.
 
> There was talk about replacing the first-stage cluster with an F-1 in
> later versions, which never materialized in the end.
 
There was undoubtedly talk about most everything, but I don't think
single F-1s were ever discussed very seriously.
 
Henry S. Hillbrath
    ----------------------------------------------------------
NO ONE  believes an analysis...   |  EVERYONE believes a.test...
   - except the guy who did it.   |     - except the guy who did it.
 
                   T. M. ("Scotty") Davidson
 
(and the POGO exercise was one of the places Scotty got his data.)
 
    "Never fight a land war in Asia." - General Douglas MacArthur

Article: 74501                                   
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Dennis Newkirk)
Subject: Grechko interview Pt 1 - 1960's Space Admin
Organization: Motorola
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 1993 22:54:48 GMT
Sender: [email protected] (Net News)
 
Interviews with Dr. Georgi Grechko, 4/7/93, Part 1-1960's Space
Administration Copyright (C) 1993 by Dennis Newkirk and Jim Plaxco 
 
Premission to reprint and copy this in its complete form is granted and 
encouraged as long as the authors are credited.
 
DN denotes interviewer Dennis Newkirk all other text is Dr. Grechko's.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
DN - I want to ask you about the Academy of Sciences in the 1960's and
how much power it had to approve of projects like N1/L3, and about
Academy President Keldysh. 
 
He was the figure number one or two compared to Korolev. He was very
powerful man. He did very much for use. He had his own institute of
applied mathematics and we were very close with his institute. I
calculated trajectories in Korolev's bureau and in his institute they
calculated too and we compared and his influence was very good. It was
their idea to launch rockets to the moon not from the Earth but from
orbit. I had many colleges and friends in this institute. I was one of
the last to speak to Keldysh, he was very interested in this and I
spoke with him and he made many notes. I told him that the idea of
keeping all instruments on the same station platform was not good, but
he died. He had heart surgery by a famous American surgeon. 
 
DN - Was it his personal authority that had influence on projects, and
not Academy of Sciences authority? 
 
His institute checked our ideas, and made methods of how to calculate
our trajectories. They made mathematical investigations and I used
their methods to calculate trajectories. It was not like Einstine,
working all by himself, it was his institute and his people, now many
of them are famous, it is a very good institute. 
 
DN - When Korolev was trying to get funding for N1 or moon projects
who did he have to convince in the government? 
 
In cooperation with the Minister of General Machine Building and
Minister of Defense, they make proposals to Politbureau and Khruschev.
Sometimes to Prime Minister, but he was not very powerful, most
powerful was Politbureau and Central Committee of CPSU. They have
department for defense and in department they have small department
for space. 
 
DN - What about the Council of Chief Designers? 
 
The Politbureau and Central Committee, they never made any decision,
even for 1 ruble, they never make bad decision themselves. They ask
designers, academicians, and all. When maybe a hundred who can be
blamed if they are wrong, sign the document, will Politbureau and
Central Committee approve something. It was their politics and they
never voiced their opinions. It was very funny that a man from the
Central Committee, say a chief of a department or the Minister of
Defense (there were wise chiefs and small chiefs), nobody ever heard
one of them say, "I have my opinion on this question", they instead
say "There exists an opinion" but who's opinion you never know. It was
very good to be in the Central Committee because you could say do this
and that and never be blamed because nobody knew who's solution it was. 
 
DN - You have written that Korolev would sometimes at the Cosmodrome
pick up his engineers at the fence around the launch pad and take them
beyond the gates in his car to watch the launch? 
 
Korolev knew how to make a good team of right minded individuals and
how to keep them working together. He would instill in them a feeling
of romanticism about rocketry and a desire to work hard. Sometimes he
would have someone wake him up before dawn to go out at watch the
rocket being moved to the launch pad in the morning dawn, he was a
romantic and had strong feelings about rocketry. 
 
DN - What ended the N1/L3 project?
 
The lunar program was ended because the lander was technologically
inferior to the Apollo and the risk and expected/probable loss of life
was too high to continue the project in the light of the highly
successful Apollo landings. The N-1 was capable of being made reliable
but without a reliable lander there could be no mission. This is why
it was cancelled. 
 
DN - After Korolev's death was Mishin ordered to continue in his place?
 
In the first years we were moved by inertia, by Korolev's inertia, and
then we failed. 
 

Article: 74598
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Dennis Newkirk)
Subject: Grechko Interview Pt 2 - The Sputnik Years
Organization: Motorola
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 1993 22:10:28 GMT
Sender: [email protected] (Net News)
 
Interviews with Dr. Georgi Grechko, 4/7/93, Part 2 - The Sputnik Years
Copyright (C) 1993 by Dennis Newkirk and Jim Plaxco
 
Premission to reprint and copy this in its complete form is granted and 
encouraged as long as the authors are credited.
 
(JP denotes interviewer James Plaxco, all other text is Dr. Grechko's.) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
JP - What was the atmosphere like working in the bureau before Sputnik.
 
I was happy working in the bureau because I knew when I graduated
there was no satellite and I could not choose any bureau working on
satellites, so I choose the one working on the biggest rockets. 
Because in some years I knew that a space booster would be built. When
I entered the bureau, my first duty was the SS-6 ICBM, and thank God
it was never used for what it was designed. First of all, I calculated
trajectories from Tyuratam to Kamchatka and understand deviation from
target points. It was my duty to calculate the trajectory from the
Cosmodrome, but it was not Cosmodrome at that time, it was "paligon" -
the place to test rockets not to go to space. For me this was my
happiest time, when I was a young engineer and I worked at the polygon
to test the R-7 and test it for booster for the first satellites. My
most happy years were not my years in space but when I was in Korolev
KB and at the paligon. Why? Because Korolev extended the spirit of
pioneers. He supported all new ideas immediately, he didn't play dirty
political games with rockets and satellites. He was very honest and
direct. He did not try to hide or deceive, he was always straight
forward and open. It was after some years it was very hard to ask a
Cheif Designer for an audience, but to ask Korolev even as a young
engineer, I could ask Korolev and he invited me some days to see him.
His power was in his team. He could choose his team, sometimes crazy
and unpleasant people, but he did this with only one goal, to go ahead
and ahead with the design of satellites, spacecraft and rockets. The
spirit of pioneers and clean atmosphere of design bureau without
rumors and playing and hiding something behind his back. We could make
many things out of metal without many, many papers. Now if you make
devices you must make a vast quantity of papers before you can go
ahead Sputnik 2 was made in a month. I bet nobody now can make a new
satellite in one month. We had experienced design bureau, but I bet on
one bureau will make a satellite in one month, but we did it, because
after the launching of the first satellite, and I know about it from
his own mouth that he was invited to Khruschev at the Kremlin.
Khruschev said 'please do something launch some- thing new for the
anniversary of the revolution', but it was after Oct. 4 and the
anniversary was Nov. 7. Less than one month and we launched a new
satellite with a dog. This was for me the most important, very active,
not very much documentation or signatures, signatures, signatures,
signatures to avoid punishment if something went wrong. Nobody said
"there existed an opinion", we would say our own opinions and Korolev
would decide which was right and approve. I was happy in this clear
pioneering spirit of that time. 
                                                      
JP - After your time as an engineer you became a cosmonaut with the
lunar training group. What was it like, that seems like it would be
quite a different ife to make that change. 
 
I liked science fiction, and I had experience to be in the occupation
by German troops in the Ukraine for 2 years in Chernigov without my
parents, and my toys fire rifles, guns and grenades. It was the toys
of boys in war time. And many of my friends were dead by these toys,
or wounded, I had only one, once I had an explosion of one cartridge
in my a arm you can see this [displays slight scar on inside of thumb
into the palm]. But I was lucky, I was alive. And my character was I
liked to drive motorcycles, fly gliders, small one engine airplanes,
parachuting, down hill skiing, scuba diving, snorkeling, I was made
for space. I liked to be on first frontier. When we began design of
spacecraft for 3 cosmonauts, Korolev said that one of the 3 should be
flight engineers, and from whom would he choose flight engineers, of
course from us young engineers in space technology. He knew us, and he
invited us to be flight engineers because only we had experience in
space engineering. I gather 2-300 of use were invited by Korolev for
medical tests, but in those times medical tests were very hard,
sometimes cruel, and only 13 of use got okay from physicians for
flight engineer. 
 
JP - What were your responsibilities for the flight engineer?
 
I was to explore all devices in the spacecraft and station. It was my
primary task. Because when Gagarin flew, his spacecraft was fully
automatic, really he was the subject to test not the object. Gagarin
was chosen as a very healthy man and good looking man and good in
communication, but not like specialist, not like engineer, or doctor
or academician. The next move in space was for specialist, and Korolev
said one should be the same [as Gagarin] but the next should be
engineer and next should be a scientist. 
 
JP - What was pilot responsible for?
 
He was commander.
 
JP - He would be the one to control the spacecraft?
 
Really, all that he can do, the flight engineer can do, but a pilot
can't do everything a flight engineer can do. Its really two
departments, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of General Machine
Building and they share their duty and their cosmonauts and it was
fighting between them as to whose cosmonauts should fly. The Ministry
of Defense and their people would say 'you guys you are engineers, you
duty is to design spacecraft and we are pilots, we should fly not
you.' but Korolev was of course right because space is for specialist
and professionals. 
 

Article: 74742
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Dennis Newkirk)
Subject: Grechko interview Pt 3 - Space Stations
Organization: Motorola
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 1993 18:44:51 GMT
Sender: [email protected] (Net News)
 
Interviews with Dr. Georgi Grechko, 4/7/93, Part 3 - Space Stations
Copyright (C) 1993 by Dennis Newkirk and Jim Plaxco
 
Premission to reprint and copy this in its complete form is granted and 
encouraged as long as the authors are credited.
 
DN and JP denote interviewers Dennis Newkirk and James Plaxco all other 
text is Dr. Grechko's.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
JP - What was your position for your first flight?
 
Flight Engineer. I had scientific tests, I spend all my time, sometimes in the 
morning I knew I had a very interesting scientific program and decided not to 
eat all the day, and in the morning I would get a chocolate from the food 
stores so as to not spend time eating, but in the end of the day I would find 
the chocolate still in my pocket. Because there are to many new prospects in 
space, so much is interesting that I don't like eating or sleeping. I like 
experiments and my duty was engineering, exploring all devices of the station,
but my hobby was science, and I was most successful with scientific 
experiments on board Salyut 6 and the scientific program of our mission to 
Salyut 7 was made by me and my friends, I was one of the authors of the 
program. And it means I was engineer, became Flight Engineer and became 
scientist on board a space station, and them I founded my laboratory to study 
atmosphere from space, I was the head of this laboratory processing data we 
obtained from space.
 
DN - Before your Soyuz T-14 mission there was a spacecraft Kosmos 1669 docked 
to Salyut 7. Dzhanibekov has said it was a Star Module is this right?
 
I gather it was Almaz. Yes, it was like Almaz. It was used for reentry to send 
something interesting to Earth. Chelomei made Almaz with 1 or 2 capsules to 
return to Earth.
 
JP - Was the data you obtained on the atmosphere from space very valuable to 
your studies?
 
I made many experiments about the Earths surface, ocean surface, medical, 
biological, and I had many results, but the most successful were my studies of 
the atmosphere. Then after my first flight I understood and I thought about 
the efficiency of our space station and with Segdayev he understood that the 
efficiency of our station was very low and your NASA insists on the same low 
efficiency of your Freedom station and my thought was, what can I do to have 
designed to get more scientific results from a flight. First I tried to write 
that the idea of our station was wrong, the more modules our chiefs thought 
and they still think now, the more scientific modules the better but it's 
wrong the more scientific modules make the efficiency of the station lower. 
When I express it to Glushko and his deputy Semenov who is deputy, they 
punished me, they striped me in pieces, they ignored me for many years after 
this when I expressed this idea for the first time. I expressed this idea in 
1978 for the first time, that a manned space station is a bad idea. They are 
getting awards for this kind of space station and even the first cosmonaut on 
board said that its a bad idea. But all new ideas have three steps, first 
'its impossible', next step is 'maybe', and next is 'its obvious'. 
 
JP - How do you define space station efficiency?
 
When I understood my new idea had no support, just like new idea of 
Feoktistov for single stage vertical take-off and landing project he had no 
support also. I asked myself what else I could do and I understood that we 
had good enough cosmonauts to make experiments, I was maybe number 1, 2, or 
3, or maybe 3rd best or 5th best in scientific experiments but number 1 for
me was Dzhanibekov not only because he flew 5 times in space but because he
was very efficient and modest, very active in space. He was number one for 
me, maybe I was number 3 or 5, I don't know, but I understood that we had 
good enough cosmonauts but our data sometimes was not processed.  I 
understood that now the main task was not to have data from space but to 
process data from space and I understood that for me it was one way to make
our space station more efficient form a scientific point of view and 
founded a new laboratory to process all data that I had from space, but not
astrophysics, biological, medical, geophysics, I choose my atmosphere data.
 
JP - What would your advice be to NASA about the space station Freedom 
program.
 
I told them 2 or 3 years ago my opinion about free flyers they rejected and 
didn't appreciate my idea because it was too new for them, because they are 
bureaucrats, because they had their money for Freedom and nobody would speak 
up. It was my duty to say to America that you have the wrong idea. 2 or 3 
years ago when they discussed a redesign to make Freedom a little smaller or 
bigger and I told them it is not a thing for discussion, to make it bigger 
or smaller, you should think about new ideas and one example of a new idea is
a free flyer, but maybe you will have a new much better idea that my idea of 
a free flyer but stop this monkey business to repeat our mistake with many 
scientific modules on the same platform, but they were blind.
 
JP - One of the arguments for having people on space stations for a long 
period of time is that it helps us learn a lot about trips to Mars. How do you
react to that the assertion that Mir was a stepping stone to manned mission 
to Mars?
 
Mir was really a step to Mars because before flight a to Mars we should fly
for about one year about the Earth. Of course it is true. 
 
DN - Perhaps it is best to make a station with scientific modules that can 
dock periodically for servicing by a crew?
 
When they began to make plans for Mir station it was crazy that after docking 
they throw away the engine module and I told them its crazy, 'you should use 
this modules like free flyers with engines and shouldn't discard the engines
after docking' [talking about Kvant 1]. First of all you should use this 
module in fully automatic mode 24 hours a day for one or two months an only 
then you should dock the module and discard the engines. You know it is said 
in your country you can not be one who looks ahead in your own country. You 
have the same problem.
 
JP - How are things now in the Russian space program?
 
Space activity was the great advertisement of the USSR, but now the government 
is bankrupt. We have some money, but not enough. We will cancel the most 
expensive programs, we will use our unmanned satellites and Mir and we will 
lease the station to astronauts of other countries and we will use our 
boosters to launch foreign satellites and we will cooperate with other 
countries. You know you have a space shuttle, we have a shuttle and maybe soon
a smaller shuttle, Germany has Sanger, France Hermes, Britian Hotol, it is 
crazy to have 6 shuttles. We should cooperate and use your shuttle, our 
boosters, and so on. The best from all countries. But of course you will have
trouble from your space industry, they have a very good lobby in your 
congress, because when I was in the Headquarters of NASA in Washington [a few
years ago] and I said your station was too big and the idea was too old they 
didn't appreciate my speech. After all, they were big bosses and had their 
money, but now when I was in Ames [more recently] and I tell them the same 
thing they appreciate it.
   

Date: 8 Oct 93 09:13:19 PST
From: [email protected]
Subject: Former Soviet Vulkan Superbooster; USSR Lunar Program
Newsgroups: sci.space

     The Russian magazine Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika has been carrying a
number of articles on the Soviet lunar landing program, and also what
happened in the mid-1970s after the four unsuccessful launches of the N-1
Saturn-V-class superbooster.  Among the things cleared up is the
nature of the "Vulkan" booster, which started to be mentioned in the
press several years ago, but without any description.  Herewith is my
translation of some passages from "'The Lunar Theme' after the N1-L3" by
I. Afanas'yev, Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika No.2, 1993.

     In one of the points of the complex plan for 1974 he [V.P.
     Glushko, director of NPO Energiya] envisioned the creation of a
     long-duration scientific research base on the Moon. The basic
     means of transportation for delivering cosmonauts and cargo was
     proposed by Glushko to be the lunar expeditionary ship (LEK). He
     presented the LEK together with the colossal Vulkan launcher. The
     new rocket, derived from Glushko's previous ideas, clearly lost
     out to the N1 on esthetics, but had astonishing specifications.
     Having a launch mass about 60 percent greater than the N1, it
     would have carried 200 tonnes to low earth orbit, 54 tonnes to
     Venus, and 52 tonnes to Mars. Delivery of the LEK to
     selenocentric orbit was proposed using the Vesuvius cryogenic
     unit -- an oxygen-hydrogen engine with low thrust but high
     specific impulse.

      Characteristics of the N-1F, Vulkan and Energiya Boosters

                          N-1F       Vulkan         Energiya

      Launch thrust       5070       7520           3600
      tonnes force

      Launch mass         3025       4700           2400
      tonnes

      Payload mass
      tonnes to:

      LEO                105         200           102

      Lunar xfer
      orbit               34          65            35

      Selenocentric
      orbit               22          43            23

Article: 74981
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Dennis Newkirk)
Subject: Re: Russian SSTO (was Re: Grechko - IMPORTANT CORRECTION 
Organization: Motorola
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 1993 18:29:45 GMT
Sender: [email protected] (Net News)
 
In article <[email protected]> [email protected] (Pat) writes:

>Dennis's interview with gretchko mentions  Russian SSTO VTOL's being
>not supported.
 
Grechko: "When I understood my new idea had no support, just like new idea of
Feoktistov for single stage vertical take-off and landing project he had no
support also."
 
I should have noted here that this is probably a mistake and
not correct. I don't remember if it was Grechko's less than perfect
english or my transcribing slip, but a review of the tape can tell...
 
A day after hearing this I dug up the closest thing I knew of this
concept, showed the drawings to Grechko and he confirmed that he was 
talking of the project below which is NOT SSTO! Grechko was aware of the
DC-X and in passing mentioned that he hoped the effort would be
successful. He is very supporting of new ideas, as he promotes in 
the interview.... 
 
>How far did they get, and what did their concepts look like?
 
From I.Afanasyev's monograph "Unknown Spacecraft", available from
NTIS as JPRS-USP-92-003, May 27, 1992.
 
....winged shuttles..."substantial drawbacks...large mass of the wing...
very long high quality expensive runways...meanwhile...soft landing
parachute-deceleration systems widely used by assault troops had 
demostrated ...high reliability at low cost..[and] acceptable accuracy 
of touchdown. For that reason in 1974 a wingless spacecraft was proposed.
it consisted of a crew cabin forward, conical part; a cylindrical
cargo section, mid part; and a conical aft section with a propulsion
system for in orbit maneuvering. After being launched by a heavy lift
booster...[it would] enter dense layers of the atmosphere and using the
small lift to drag ratio at hypersonic speeds of its lifting body,
which had a cylindrical-conical shape and was equipped with air vanes 
and gas-jet vanes-perform a controlled descent...and a parachute
assisted landing on skis...solid propellant soft landing engines
in the final stage."
 
Afanasyev goes on to report that the only real appeal of the idea
to Glushko was that it would be axially attached to the Energia
and would eliminate lateral cargo carrying from the Energia design
and thus allow Glushko to design in support for up to 8 strap-on's
and realize his proposal for the Vulcan booster to start a new manned
lunar landing program someday...but,
 
"The top priority was to create a system like the American Space Shutle." 
 
"In May 1976 a more detailed analysis ... indicated the
need to raise its hypersonic lift-drag ratio to increase its
lateral range. The spacecraft acquired special trianglar 'bulges'
that grew larger toward the tail...the concept of a reusable
vertical landing transport were abandoned in favor of Buran. ..ideas
underlying the design ...were used in the...system for recovering
the strap-on boosters of ... Energia." [a drawing is provided of the
final version of the design]
 
Dennis Newkirk ([email protected])
Motorola, Land Mobile Products Sector
Schaumburg, IL 

Article: 79884
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Marcus Lindroos INF)
Subject: NEWS on SOVIET MANNED LUNAR PROGRAM (1967-1972)
Sender: [email protected] (Usenet NEWS)
Organization: ABO AKADEMI UNIVERSITY, FINLAND
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 1993 11:10:12 GMT
 
SOVIET MANNED LUNAR PROGRAM:
 
     The December issue of SPACEFLIGHT (pp. 410-413, written by Theo
Pirard) sheds some light on the secret USSR manned lunar program. It
turns out that the Soviets designed an innovative lunar spacecraft,
but that technical problems with the giant N-1 (Nossitel) booster &
lack of funds prevented them from beating the Americans. Their failure
turned out to be fateful for space exploration in general: had the
Soviets won the race to the Moon, America might have been forced to
continue with the Apollo/NERVA project to Mars to salvage some pride. 

     The Soviet lunar program was centered around the N-1 Nossitel
booster. They didn't have the technology to build high-performance
LOX/LH2 engines and consequently had to settle for a cluster of 30 1st
stage liquid oxygen/kerosene rocket engines. Nossitel (photos of it
have been published in SPACEFLIGHT) was 105m high and capable of
putting 95 metric tons in low Earth orbit (65-70% of the Saturn V's
maximum capability). 

     Work on the lunar spacecraft, known as the "L3 Complex", began in
1968. Unlike Saturn V, Nossitel wasn't powerful enough to launch the
spacecraft toward the Moon. Instead, a suspended rocket stage (Block G) 
would deliver the necessary translunar injection burn. 

     The L3 Complex consisted of two spacecraft and two rocket stages.
The total mass was only 95 tons, considerably less than the
Apollo/S-IVB combination (135-140 tons in LEO). Components: 
 
     -The Block G stage. Using a highly powerful LOX/Kerosene engine
and firing for 8 minutes, it would launch the L3 Complex into
translunar trajectory. Depending on how efficient its NK-31 engine was
(isp=360sec?), the total mass was probably 60-65 tons, leaving only
about 32 tons for the rest of the craft compared with 45 tons for
Project Apollo. Block G would have been jettisoned after the TLI burn.

     -The Block D second stage. Apparently similar to the 4th stage
used by the Proton/Zond program, its LOX/Kerosene engine would have
performed all trajectory corrections and the transfer to circumlunar
orbit. In the first phase, the L3 Complex would be put in orbit orbit
at an altitude of 119km, then transferred to an altitude of only 16km.
It is difficult to estimate its mass, my guess would be 14 tons. Since
its specific impulse must have been higher than the UMDH/N2O4 engines
used by the Apollo CSM/LM craft, the Soviets would have been able to
accomplish a lunar landing despite being forced to use smaller, less
advanced spaceships. 

     -The lunar orbiter spacecraft or LOK (Lunova Orbitalny Korably).
This was referred to as "Heavy Soyuz" when the Soviet lunar program
was first  revealed in 1990. The accompanying photos of a partly
disassembled craft appear to show a Soyuz with some important
modifications. The spherical front section (=working/living module)
had been equipped with a larger exit hatch for EVAs/crew transfer, and
a docking/maneuvering unit. The 2-cosmonaut crew would spend most of
the flight in the LOK. The reentry module had been redesigned to
withstand higher velocities/temperatures during  atmospheric reentry.
The instrument module (the rear part of LOK) would contain the main
propulsion system using UMDH/nitrogen tetroxide just like Apollo.
Since it would be used only for a short burn to launch LOK toward
Earth, a delta-V capacity of only 0.9-1km/s would have been required.
Assuming a dry mass of 7 tons (Souyz), the loaded mass would have been
approx. 10 tons. LOK was designed for the same tasks as Project Apollo's 
CSM. 

     -"Lunova Korably" or LK, the Soviet equivalent of Project
Apollo's Lunar Module. Installed inside a cylindrical shell behind LOK
and attached on top of the Block D stage, this was a small one-man
lunar lander based on the Soyuz craft. Its mass probably was only half
of the Lunar Module's. There are no good photos of it, but what little
there is suggests a craft resembling the famous BIS Lunar Rocket study
from 1946, with a spherical, pressurized cabin on top. To save weight,
there was no docking tunnel between LK and LOK. The LK pilot had to
don a spacesuit and perform an EVA in lunar orbit to enter/leave the
craft! Like the LM, there was no seat to save mass - the pilot was
standing before an instrument panel/landing viewport. 
 
     The LK must have been a dangerous craft to fly. Too small to
peform a complete mission by itself, it depended on the Block D stage
for leaving its 16x119km parking orbit. After separating from LOK, the
LK/Block D combination descended to an altitude of 2km over the lunar
surface. At this point, the Block D unit would become empty and be
jettisoned. The LK pilot would now have a minute to find a spot to
land on before the lander's descent fuel was used up! 

     Safely on the surface, the cosmonaut would perform a brief EVA on
the lunar surface. The lander could remain on the Moon for 48 hours
only, so the cosmonaut would have been busy setting up scientific
equipment, erecting the Soviet flag, collecting samples, taking
photographs... 

     The departure from the Moon would represent the next crucial
step. The 1.8-2km/s delta-V of the lander would be just enough to
enter a 16km orbit and rendezvous with the LOK spacecraft. LOK, using
a powerful radar scanning system and piloted by its passenger, would
be the active spacecraft. Using its own engines for the first time, it
would dock with the small lander. The cosmonaut would (again) perform
an EVA and climb into the LOK spacecraft, carrying the lunar
soil-samples with him. The LK would then be jettisoned and the LOK
spacecraft (again inhabited by two cosmonauts) would enter a precise
Earth-return trajectory by firing its main engine. Before reentry in
the atmosphere, the LOK entry capsule would separate and land in the
USSR using the same controlled low-g trajectory tested previously by
the unmanned Zond craft in 1968. 
 
IMPORTANT MILESTONES:

-21/09/67: First unmanned Zond spacecraft fails to reach Earth orbit.
 
1968: 

-In March, a program of cosmonaut training in preparation for
the Moon landing starts at Star City. A moon-walk simulator is
installed and a program of simulated lunar landings takes place with a
modified version of the Mi-8 helicopter. Alexei Leonov and Oleg
Makarov are selected to form the prime crew for the first Soviet
expedition to the lunar surface. 
 
-A mock-up of the N1 booster was erected on its launch platform at
Baikonur cosmodrome, ground tests of its systems. 
 
-Modifications were made to the Soyuz craft which led to the death of
cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov in 1967. 
 
-Soviet laboratories started work on the design of the L3 system.
 
-Further problems with the Zond program for launching a Souyz/LOK
prototype on a lunar flyby mission. Still, the Soviets prepared two
teams (Valery Bykovsky & Nikolai Rukavishnikov, Pavel Popovich &
Vitali Sevastianov) for a manned launch ("Zond 7") on December 17. The
launch did not take place, however, and Apollo 8 became the first
manned lunar expedition a week later. 
 
1969:

21/02/1969: The first N-1 rocket explodes on the pad.
---
The decision is taken to proceed with development of a manned system
for Moon exploration. The first Moon landing is scheduled to take
place in 1970-71. Two weeks before the launch of Apollo 11, a second
N-1 explodes shortly after launch. The lunar program starts to fall
behind schedule. 
 
1970:

First tests of the lunar spacecraft. The LOK tests (to be launched on
the Proton booster) are cancelled to save money. Only the LK survives
the cuts. 
 
24/11/1970: Cosmos 379, an unmanned LK prototype, is launched on an
A-2-E  (Soyuz) booster. Two separate engine firings (simulating lunar
descent/ascent) raise its apogee to 14,035km from the initial
192x232km parking orbit. The spacecraft performs as planned. Two
further launches take place (Cosmos 398 on 26/02/1971 and Cosmos 434
on 12/02/1971), and the spacecraft is declared ready for manned
missions. However, additional launch failures with the troublesome N-1
booster (on 27/06/1971 and 23/11/1972) eventually lead to the
cancellation of the entire lunar program in 1973. 
 
MARCU$

Article: 80395
Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.space.policy
From: [email protected] (Dennis Newkirk)
Subject: Re: Soyuz on Proton (and lunar cosmonauts)
Organization: Motorola
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1993 23:35:11 GMT
Sender: [email protected] (Net News)
 
In article <[email protected]>
[email protected] (Charles Radley) writes: 

> -=> Quoting [email protected] to All <=-
> He> e> Message-ID: <[email protected]>
> He> Newsgroup: talk.politics.space,sci.space.policy,sci.space
> He> Organization: U of Toronto Zoology
>He> [email protected]  utzoo!henry
>
>Henry Spencer (I think) asked if the Soyuz-1 was launched on a Proton.   
 
Actually I think he asked if the rumor that Soyuz 1 was launched
on a Proton had been disproved yet...
 
Answer is: I don't think any serious researcher has believed that
rumor for a long, long time. So much so, that I can't even think
of an example to disprove it. I'm sure there are plenty of photos
of Soyuz 1 on the pad on its Soyuz booster in popular books, 
though I didn't put one in my book because they cost too much money to
use legitimately. 
 
>The Soviet manned moonlanding effort was all but cancelled before
>Apollo-8, after the well-known failures of the N-1.
 
I don't think that's what you intended to say since all N-1 failures
happened AFTER Apollo 8..., let's just say that after Apollo 11 the
Soviet N1/L3 project was on shaky ground... so supporters increasingly
promoted the N1/L3M long duration lander program. 
 
>In late 1968 a one-manned circumlunar flight was planned.
>    A Proton booster with a Zond / Soyuz capsule was made ready.
>One cosmonaut (perhaps with a back-up) was trained for this
>mission.  I think the cosmonaut selected to fly was  Pavel Belyayev.
>The mission reached a countdown, with Belyayev in the Zond / Soyuz
>sitting on the Proton, some time in late 1968, before Apollo-8.
>There was a technical problem, and the launch attempt was scrubbed.
>The Soviets were unable to make a second launch attempt before Apollo-8,
>and the manned circumlunar flight was then cancelled.
>I seem to remember the cosmonaut (Pavel Belyayev?) is still alive and
>was interviewed for the PBS NOVA TV show.
>If I have time I will re-run the tape tonight and see if my memory is
>playing tricks again.
 
That's probably close to what the show says, but it is an old rumor/
presumption. In fact, the Zond (L-1) was not ready for manned flights
yet. Only 1 of the unmanned tests actually worked well enough to be
called a success, although most returned to Earth one way or another.
One of those long considered successful by way of photos it returned
actually crash landed and the film was among the only items to be
retreived undamaged from the rubble of the crashed capsule... Belyayev
by the way died not long after the time in question. 
 
The lunar cosmonaut group was established in Jan. 1968 but the
crews did not begin training until March 1968. 4 crews were formed.
Cosmonaut assignments for circumlunar mission:

  Prime crew - Leonov & Makarov

 Other crews were were made up of the following:

  Artyukhin, Dobrovolski, Grechko, Klimuk, Popovich, Rukavishnikov,
  Voloshin, Voronov,
  Belyayev (subordinate to Gagarin and in charge of lunar flight training)
  Sevastyanov (later replaced Belyayev as head of lunar flight training)
 
Crew assignments changed frequently and members changed frequently.
Most of that group was absorbed into a group of about 21 cosmonauts
formed for the lunar landing missions. 
 
Most of this info is from published interviews with those involoved but
their memory is not perfect (nor mine) so treat it accordingly.
 
Dennis Newkirk ([email protected])
Motorola, Land Mobile Products Sector
Schaumburg, IL

Article: 80439
From: [email protected]
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: Soyuz on Proton (and lunar cosmonauts)
Date: Thu, 23 DEC 93 20:00:01 EST
Organization: Delphi Internet
 
The three crews in the latter part of 1968 (after many changes) who
were trained for a circumlunar mission were: 
 
	prime: 	Leonov/Makarov
	backup: Popovich/Sevastyanov
	third:	Bykovsky/Rukavishnikov
 
Sevastyanov was replaced by Grechko in December.
 
There were two other crews:
 
	Klimuk/Artyukhin
	Voloshin/Voronov
 
But they may have been training for L-3 landing missions.
 
Asif Siddiqi

Article: 80437
From: [email protected]
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: Soyuz on Proton
Date: Thu, 23 DEC 93 19:51:08 EST
Organization: Delphi Internet
 
Cosmonaut Belyayev died in 1970. The Zond flight that was planned in
1968 was to carry two cosmonauts (Leonov and Makarov). It seems from
the recently released Soviet information that a manned flight was
planned for December 1968 but was cancelled well before the scheduled
launch date (around December 8). In fact the two previous Zonds
(Zond-5 and Zond-6) were partial failures prompting the cancellation. 
 
Originally before these disclosures, Westerners had SPECULATED that a
manned Zond with ONE cosmonaut was ready to fly in December 1968. This
is now known to be untrue. Cosmonaut Belyayev in fact never trained
for the lunar program (although he headed the training program for a
short while). He, in fact trained briefly for the Almaz space station.
 
Hope that helps.
 
Asif Siddiqi

Article: 81351
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Dennis Newkirk)
Subject: Re: Vidoecosmos Offerings--Any N1 Launch footage?
Organization: Motorola
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 1994 22:37:03 GMT
Sender: [email protected] (Net News)
 
In article <[email protected]> [email protected]
(Tom Frieling) writes: 

>Dennis Newkirk writes that Videocosmos provided him with interesting 
>Russian photos of the N1 lunar booster.
 
That's photos of high quality artwork...
 
>Do they have video or motion picture footage for sale of the N1 launch 
>attempts?
 
My copy of the video catalog is a few years old. There were items on
the lunar program but nothing on N1 launches was specified.
 
I've seen some of the first launch and last launch video so it exists
and I'm sure its all making the rounds in the USA. C-Span Moscow news
rebroadcast had a second of N1-7L (last) in good quality color a 
few months ago in Barmin's obituary.
 
You can get video of the first N1 launch from the publisher of Quest
magazine. For info write to: Glen Swanson, CSPACE Press, PO Box 9331,
Grand Rapids, MI 49509-0331. Ask about the Secret Designer video. It
includes the Soyuz 1 recovery, Soyuz 11 recovery, Nedelin fire, etc..
for about $30 I think. 
 
Dennis Newkirk ([email protected])
Motorola, Land Mobile Products Sector
Schaumburg, IL

Article: 1127
From: [email protected] (Marcus Lindroos INF)
Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.space.tech
Subject: Soviet Lunar program specs.-NEED ASSISTANCE
Date: Wed, 16 Mar 1994 22:20:53 GMT
Organization: ABO AKADEMI UNIVERSITY, FINLAND
 
	SPACEFLIGHT recently published two very interesting articles on
the failed Soviet L3 Complex manned Lunar program. Check out (3/1994) and 
(12/1993) for pictures & details.

	I have been trying to estimate the masses of the spacecraft involved,
conclusions so far:
 
THE L3 COMPLEX:
 
Name     Description           Dry wt. Gross wt. Isp.  Delta-V

Block G  TLI Rocket Stage        6t?    71t?     345s? 3.35km/s (TLI burn)
Block D  LOI/LK Descent stage    2.65t  17.65t   345s  1km/s (LOI burn)
                                                       2km/s (LK descent)
                                                [8.65+6.35t fuel consumed]
LK       Lunar Lander            2.75t? 5.5t     290s? 2km/s (Lunar ascent)
LOK      "Heavy Soyuz" orbiter   8t??   11t??    290s? 0.9km/s (TEI burn)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        94+11t         9.25km/s

(TLI=TransLunar Injection, LOI=Lunar Orbit Insertion, TEI=Trans Earth
Injection)

	The maximum capability of the N-1 booster was only 95t.
Because of this and for safety reasons, the Soviets were contemplating
a different approach. They would have launched the manned LOK vehicle
on a Proton, then docked with the rest of the L3 complex (launched by
the N-1) in low Earth orbit. 
 
-The BLOCK-D (still being used today with the Proton booster as a 4th
stage) is well-known, Dennis Newkirk recently published the specs for
it. Powered by a single 83.4kN LOX/Kerosene engine, it would have
provided the Lunar orbit insertion burn for the LK/LOK combination,
all course corrections on the way as well as most of the delta-V
necessary to land the small 1-man LK lander on the Moon.
Interestingly, the Block-D is far more efficient than anything carried
by the Apollo spacecraft. The N-1's limited capability would have made
it impossible to land men on the Moon without using cryogenic
propellants on the spacecraft.

- something the Americans were able to avoid.
 
-The BLOCK-G would also have used a LOX/Kerosene engine. I have a
assumed a typical mass fraction of 0.08 here, and an Isp of 345s. It
seems as if the N-1 would not have been powerful enough to launch all
four components. 
 
-The LK would have landed one cosmonaut on the Moon. The pictures in
the March'94 issue of SPACEFLIGHT shows a midget-size vehicle smaller
than even the unmanned Luna sample return craft!! The weight figure of
5.5t was taken from SPACEFLIGHT. Using a standard 20kN UDMH/N2O4
engine, 50% of the wet mass must have been fuel. The landing profile
is quite exciting, the Block D would have powered it down to an
altitude of about 2km before being jettisoned. The LK then lands using
its own integral engine. As with Apollo, the LK docks with the LOK
"mother craft" in Lunar orbit and its pilot transfers to the orbiter.
The LK would then be jettisoned as the LOK returns to Earth. 
 
-The LOK is essentially a Soyuz without the docking tunnel but with an
RCS module in its place. The service module is much heavier (3.388t
according to Dennis Newkirk, vs. 2.1t for Soyuz) and lengthened by 1
meter because of the 32kN Block I engine necessary to return the crew
to Earth. Two cosmonauts would live and work in it for most of the
mission. To reach Earth from a Lunar parking orbit, a delta-V of
0.7-0.8km/s would be necessary. This suggests that the "Heavy Soyuz"
would need 2-3t of UDMH/N2O4 fuel to accomplish the task. The gross
weight is probably 10-11t. 
 
MARCU$
 
                                   ////
                                  (o o)
------------------------------oOO--(_)--OOo-----------------------------------
 
                           Computer Science Department
                       University of Abo Akademi, Finland
 
Email: [email protected]
       [email protected]
MAIL:  Marcus Lindroos, PL 402 A, 07880 Liljendal, FINLAND

Article: 1135
From: [email protected] (Dennis Newkirk)
Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.space.tech
Subject: Re: Soviet Lunar program specs.-NEED ASSISTANCE
Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 15:42:24 GMT
Organization: Motorola
 
Remember each N-1 launched differed from each other one, sometimes in
small ways, but in the case of the 7L greatly. Engines changed, the
number of roll engines changed, structure of the first stage changed,
etc. Weight also changed and I'm sure the Soviets were fighting a
weight problem just as NASA had on the LM for Apollo. N-1's after the
7L were also being equipped with newer engines, other tweeks were
being considered to boost payload capability, a common figure
published so far puts payload at 95-100t. You are trying to assembly
figures for prototype equipment so don't be too concerned that the
figures don't perfectly add up. The spacecraft also were only in the
early development and their weight was probably planned to be reduced.
The Soviets never got to that point in the project. 
 
>and for safety reasons, the Soviets were contemplating a different approach.
>They would have launched the manned LOK vehicle on a Proton, then docked with
>the rest of the L3 complex (launched by the N-1) in low Earth orbit.
 
This is an old western idea from the 1970s, it is not supported by
ANY Russian publication about the N1/L3 mission. It also will not work
with the equipment described as the L3 complex, you are implying that
the Russians are still hiding secret equipment and plans that would
have differed from what has been released so far. There are no hints
from any Russian source that this is true. I helped spread this idea
in my book in 1990 but it is out of date and I reject it now. An Earth
orbit docking would only be possible in an Earth orbit test flight of
the lunar spacecraft which has never been mentioned by the Russians
since they never got that far in the program. 
 
>-The BLOCK-D (still being used today with the Proton booster as a 4th stage) 
>is well-known, Dennis Newkirk recently published the specs for it. Powered by 
 
Again you are comparing apples and oranges. The specs you cite are
for a ~1990 Block-DM and NOT for a ~1969 Block-D, if I have misled
you, I do not mean to, you must be more specific. 
 
You should not think that using a mixture of figures from 1960s
designs, designs that in some cases were not even built beyond
protoytypes, with 1990's versions of equipment. There's a lot of error
doing that. Also, maybe an Apollo expert can tell you if the first 4
Saturn 5's could have launched the Apollo complex to the Moon. I don't
think so, especially if you use mass figures from prototype Apollo's. 
 
There is not enough detailed information widely available to do what
you are trying to do now. 
 
Dennis Newkirk ([email protected])
Motorola, Land Mobile Products Sector
Schaumburg, IL

Article: 1143
From: [email protected] (Marcus Lindroos INF)
Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.space.tech
Subject: Re: Soviet Lunar program specs.-NEED ASSISTANCE
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 1994 09:37:56 GMT
Organization: ABO AKADEMI UNIVERSITY, FINLAND
 
In <[email protected]> [email protected] writes:
 
> >and for safety reasons, the Soviets were contemplating a different approach.
> >They would have launched the manned LOK vehicle on a Proton, then docked with
> >the rest of the L3 complex (launched by the N-1) in low Earth orbit.
> 
> This is an old western idea from the 1970's, it is not supported by ANY 
> Russian publication about the N1/L3 mission. It also will not work with the
> equipment described as the L3 complex, you are implying that the
> Russians are still hiding secret equipment and plans that would have
> differed from what has been released so far. There are no hints from
> any Russian source that this is true. I helped spread this idea
> in my book in 1990 but it is out of date and I reject it now. An Earth
> orbit docking would only be possible in an Earth orbit test flight
> of the lunar spacecraft which has never been mentioned by the Russians
> since they never got that far in the program.
 
Sorry, I should have known better than spread unfounded rumors... The
idea just seemed to make sense, with the
reliability/performance-related problems they were having with the
N-1. But why would EOR be so difficult? The LOK was designed to be the
active part in Lunar orbit -if it could have docked with LK there, why
not in LEO as well? Or would the presence of the Block D/G stages have
complicated things too much? 
 
> >-The BLOCK-D (still being used today with the Proton booster as a 4th stage) 
> >well-known, Dennis Newkirk recently published the specs for it. Powered by a
> 
> Again you are comparing apples and oranges. The spec's you cite are for
> a ~1990 Block-DM and NOT for a ~1969 Block-D, if I have misled you,
> I do not mean to, you must be more specific.
 
Well, I assumed the figures were for the Block-D, and that the 19.65t
gross wt. version was the DM!! Apparently the latter is the new
hydrocarbon-based model, right? Or have I got it all wrong? :-) 
 
> There is not enough detailed information widely available to do what you 
> are trying to do now.
 
Still, painted with a broad brush, my figures (give or take a few tons
here and there) make sense? Do you have any Isp figures for the LK/LOK
engines BTW? If they were highly efficient 316s engines like the
Proton's, even less fuel would be needed. 
 
> Dennis Newkirk ([email protected])
> Motorola, Land Mobile Products Sector
> Schaumburg, IL
 
MARCU$

Article: 1178
From: [email protected] (Dennis Newkirk)
Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.space.tech
Subject: Re: Soviet Lunar program specs.-NEED ASSISTANCE
Date: Mon, 21 Mar 1994 16:02:34 GMT
Organization: Motorola
 
In article <[email protected]> [email protected]
(Marcus Lindroos INF) writes: 

>were having with the N-1. But why would EOR be so difficult? The LOK was
>designed to be the active part in Lunar orbit -if it could have docked with LK
>there, why not in LEO as well? Or would the presence of the Block D/G stages
>have complicated things too much?
 
Design details are still not well known but the docking system as
shown in the latest Spaceflight was not intended to be reusable. It
was designed to be as light as possible and still allow stable docking
for the few minutes of EVA transfer. It does not appear to be very
useful in a EOR-LOR scheme. It does not allow for precision dockings
so the center of mass would be off, alignment would be off and someone
would have to trust their life to reusing a non-reusable docking
system. In addition, there may be no way to disengage the probe
without blowing it off. These details are yet to be confirmed, but it
has been stated that it was not reusable and the descriptions of it
match all photos yet released of the craft. 
 
>Well, I assumed the figures were for the Block-D, and that the 19.65t gross wt.
>version was the DM!! Apparently the latter is the new hydrocarbon-based model,
>right? Or have I got it all wrong?:-)
 
You should look it up in Interavia Space Directory, I hear there have
been a lot or revisions in the latest edition. As for 19.6t, the 'old'
version of the DM matches, but the 'new' version of the DM should be
around 17.6t. I have not followed this project so I don't know if its
in use yet, it was once scheduled for 1992 according to an old Interavia. 
 
>> There is not enough detailed information widely available to do what you 
>> are trying to do now.
>Still, painted with a broad brush, my figures (give or take a few tons here and
>there) make sense? Do you have any Isp figures for the LK/LOK engines BTW? If
>they were highly efficient 316s engines like the Proton's, even less fuel would
>be needed.
 
I can't find that at this time.  Keep looking, you should be able to
find the LK but the LOK may be harder. 
 
Dennis Newkirk ([email protected])
Motorola, Land Mobile Products Sector
Schaumburg, IL

Article: 1227
From: [email protected] (Dennis Newkirk)
Newsgroups: sci.space.tech
Subject: Re: Soviet Lunar program specs. - (was on A&E's Time Machine)
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 1994 15:34:19 GMT
Organization: Motorola
 
In article <[email protected]> [email protected]
(Marcus Lindroos INF) writes: 

>Damn, I completely forgot that the LOK/LK/Block-D stack would not separate
>until Lunar descent began! The lander would of course be stored inside the
>conical skirt behind the LOK - not docked to the front of the orbiter like
>Apollo. 
 
Actually the outer fairing is discarded during launch to expose the
LOK and Block-D, but the LK is inside a second cylindrical fairing
between the Block-D and LOK, supporting the bottom fairing of the LOK.
It has some hatch in it to allow EVA transfer in lunar orbit before
the LOK and inner fairing seperate to expose the LK. This probably
helps the thermal design of the LK a lot too since it only has to work
for a couple of hours after emerging. 
 
>BTW, have you seen any film footage of the two N-1 launches that did take
>place? 
 
2? There were 4. I've seen video of the first and last. Actually the
video of the first should have been on Arts and Entertainment network
on March 18's Time Machine show. They played an edited version of the
Soviet Secret Designer tape available from Quest magazine. Nice color
video of the N1-7L (last) ignition was shown on a Moscow News show
several months ago but only lasted a second. I'm sure the others are
available by now if you look hard enough. 
 
Dennis Newkirk ([email protected])
Motorola, Land Mobile Products Sector
Schaumburg, IL

Article: 1828
From: [email protected] (JamesOberg)
Newsgroups: sci.space.tech
Subject: Re: Soviet Lunar program specs.-NEED ASSISTANCE
Date: 15 May 1994 02:40:03 -0400
Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364)
 
It has been suggested: <<They would have launched the manned LOK
vehicle on a Proton, then docked with 

>the rest of the L3 complex (launched by the N-1) in low Earth orbit.>>
 
My friend Newkirk is exactly right, that is an early Western idea
(alas, enshrined in my 1981 book "Red Star in Orbit", which is
OTHERWISE still EXTREMELY reliable!!!)) based on the
"active-first-passive-second" launch sequence of 1967-1969 Soviet
rendezvous missions. Actually, that sequence (as we now know) was a
dress rehearsal for the lunar ascent of L3 followed by active
rendezvous of the 'command module' L1. Also, there WERE two-vehicle
countdowns monitored by US Intel. LATER, in early 1970s, Russians
considered TWO N-1 booster launches in near-simo flights. But not for
the INITIAL manned lunar landing profile. 

Article: 1829
From: [email protected] (JamesOberg)
Newsgroups: sci.space.tech
Subject: Re: Soviet Lunar program specs.-NEED ASSISTANCE
Date: 15 May 1994 02:45:03 -0400
Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364)
 
Nick Johnson has written a report on what we now know about the Soviet
man-to-the-moon program, it's been advertised by "Cosmos Books" in DC,
and although it's a bit pricey I strongly recommend it. HOIWEVER, the
cover photo is a forgery, as detailed below: 
 
     NOTE OF INTEREST: RUSSIAN MOON ROCKETS PHOTO IS A FORGERY
                        James Oberg      ///       May 12, 1994
 
A widely distributed and reprinted color photograph allegedly showing
two Russian N-1 moon rockets standing an adjacent pads at the Baikonur
Cosmodrome (circa 1969) is a forgery, my investigation claims. 
 
The high-quality prints of that photograph in "The Soviet Reach for
The Moon", Editor-in-Chief Dr. Wayne Matson, Cosmos Books, 1994, shows
the forgery activities clearly. They are on the front and back covers.
 
The original (and probably authentic) B&W print, on pages 2-3 of the
booklet, shows one booster on the left-hand pad and the right-hand pad
empty. A gibbous moon hangs in the sky between the two launch towers. 
 
The forgery adds in a second N1 rocket, with coloration and markings
EXACTLY the same as the original authentic view, on the second launch
pad. The inserted N1 image matches the positions of the access arms
and the bottom is cut off to reflect the lower portion being occulted
by the concrete structures around the pad.  This was nicely done. 
 
However, to clear the space for the insert of the N1 image, a
troublesome perimeter lamp with its upside-down "J" bracket had to be
removed from its position behind the thick post at far right. This was
because part of it occupied background space that the new N1 image
would have to overlay. This near-foreground structure was thus
airbrushed out, BUT you can still see its outline in the "double N1"
forgery, against the right pad's concrete base and first access arm,
if you look for it and compare it to the original. 
 
There was a second similar lamppost in the original photograph,
standing innocently in front of the concrete base of the left
(occupied) pad, just to the left of the true N1 image. Probably for
consistency, that lamppost was also airbrushed out of the "double N1"
photo. Faint traces of the removed post can still be seen there (e.g.,
in the cover photo of the "Cosmos Books" pamphlet), by means of
"slanted viewing" (holding the page so that it slopes away from your
eye) to enhance the remaining linear feature. 
 
Another act of retouching is the removal of the lightning rod atop the left 
tower, perhaps to make it more similar in appearance to the right tower. 
 
(more)

Article: 1830
From: [email protected] (JamesOberg)
Newsgroups: sci.space.tech
Subject: Re: Soviet Lunar program specs.-NEED ASSISTANCE
Date: 15 May 1994 02:46:02 -0400
Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364)
 
(continued)
 
The forged photograph alone, without comparison with the original, has
only one clue to its falsity. "Both" rockets are viewed in EXACTLY the
same face & profile. However, from geometric analysis of expected
perspective across the field of view (using the Moon for angular
scale), and assuming that both rockets had the same orientation with
respect to their gantries, the rocket to the right SHOULD have been
rotated about ten degrees counter clockwise (as viewed from above).
This effect IS visible on the gantry structures, especially when
viewing the aft diagonal support leg. Its  base is directly BEHIND the
left gantry tower, but this base is well clear of the right gantry
tower because the observer's line-of-sight has slewed with respect to
the structure. Since no such similar rotation perspective is visible
in the rocket, it is a FLAT image, not a cylinder with true depth. 
 
Both photographs' point-of-origin is precisely the same, as seen from
the alignment of the foreground posts. That never happens by
coincidence in reality. And at all four edges, the "double N1" forgery
image's boundary falls INSIDE the boundary of the original photograph.
This is supportive evidence of forgery. 
 
The false colorization of the original B&W view is also evident. At
the right base of the main lightning tower which completely traverses
the scene just right of center, a triangular blue patch extends to the
ground between two spars, even though a building lies behind that region 
and should have been colorized "gray" like the neighboring sections. 
 
My question is, when and where was this sophisticated photographic
forgery performed? Is it an old Soviet fraud (only recently come to
light) or is it a modern Russian (or even non-Russian) fraud? I recall
that I've seen the double-N1 view before the publication of the recent book, 
in Russian magazines, but I have not found the exact location or date. 
 
Even though it is a beautiful view and if labeled a collage might be
thought to be an acceptable "conceptualization", presenting it to the
public as an authentic image (with its implications of two N1's on
pads simultaneously) is false and misleading history. That was the
so-called "old thinking" of widespread space photo forgeries in the
late USSR. Detecting such forgeries and falsifications is clearly not
yet an obsolete art!! 
 
James Oberg
email <<[email protected]>>
voice/fax 713-337-2838
Rt 2 Box 350
Dickinson, TX 77539 , USA
 
May 12, 1994
 

Article: 2201
From: [email protected] (Chris Jones)
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
Subject: Scientific American article on moon race
Date: 20 May 1994 13:33:22 GMT
Organization: Kendall Square Research Corp
 
I just received the latest Scientific American (USA June issue, I
suppose) and quickly read the article on the moon race between the
Soviet Union and the United States.  Overall it was a pretty good
article (though they did label a photo of a Soyuz launch as a Proton
launch) with nothing really new for people who have followed the story
in the past.  There was one over-exposed over-magnified picture of an
N-1 liftoff. 
 
Two things that struck me as I read the article:  for a so-called
centrally planned economy, the SU did a terrible job of central
planning, and managed to fritter away the lead that they clearly had
in 1961 when Kennedy threw down the gauntlet.  The infighting and
indecision around the Soviet space program wasn't a very good
advertisement for the new socialist man.  Second, the US decision to
"raise the bar" to the moon was a master stroke.  By setting the goal
beyond the immediate or near term capabilities of the SU, the US had
time to overtake the SU.  The US program was also blessed with support
at the highest levels (President Johnson, even more than Kennedy, was
a supporter of the space program), a politically savvy leader in James
Webb, and Werner von Braun (who, in addition to his other assets, gets
credit in the article for realizing that going to the moon was the
proper goal if the US was to have a chance to beat the SU). 
 
I'm going to try to track down the French language articles mentioned
in the bibliography.  The bibliography alos mentions JBIS and Quest
magazine, both of which are fine sources for space history buffs. 
--
Chris Jones    [email protected]

Article: 4724
From: [email protected]
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
Subject: Re: Russian Historical Data Warning
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 94 18:38:56 -0500
Organization: Delphi ([email protected] email, 800-695-4005 voice)
 
Phillip Clark <[email protected]> writes:
 
>The second concerns the Moscow Aviation Institute (I believe) publication
>"Propeller" for either January 3rd or March 1st 1993 (I am not sure whether
>the date 1.3.1993 shown on my copy is US or UK date format).   This shows a
>drawing of a spacecraft referred to as a "Heavy Zond" and describes it as
>if it is a real spacecraft.   Such a spacecraft was originally proposed by
>David Woods in his article "A Review of the Soviet Lunar Exploration
>Programme" ("Spaceflight", July-August 1976) when we had little
>understanding of the *real* Soviet manned lunar programme.  Dave's "Heavy
>Zond" has no basis in reality, we now know, and the same can be said for
>the "Propeller" description, I am sure.   Once more, we seem to have
 
I would like to add some comments about the description of the
so-called "Tyazheliy Zond" in the pages of Apogey (the special
cosmonautics edition of the newspaper Propeller). When I saw the
article, I was quite surprised too and immediately thought back to
Woods' article in Spaceflight. While I do not argue with the
designation of the spacecraft shown in the diagram as being perhaps
appropriated from pre-1989 Western analysis, I believe that the
drawing of the L-1 type spacecraft shown in Apogey is correct. 
 
The point of contention appears to be the mysterious Engine
Orientation Complex (DOK) module that Westerners have observed lying
around in Russian museums. It is clear that at least *part* of the DOK
was used on the LOK (or 7K-LOK). The complete DOK (for reasons I'm not
clear about *was* used on the 7K-L1S spacecraft launched on the N-1s
in Feb and Jul 1969. This is clear from a several drawings from NPO
Energiya archives that were published in 1993-94, clearly showing the
entire or part of the N-1 with a 7K-L1S... which has the DOK attached
at the 'top' of the spacecraft. [See, Kryla Rodiny, No. 9, p. 16, and
Kryla Rodiny, No. 10, p. 4. Also, see Flug Revue, Jan 1994, where the
exact same drawings are reproduced clearly sayin that the diagrams are
from the NPO Enrgiya archives. 
 
It would be understandable if the Apogee editors made a 'mistake' in
appropriating the Woods model, but less clear why such a configurationw
would be in the NPO Energiya archives.
 
My belief is that the similarity in the Woods model and the 7K-L1S is
just a bizzare coincidence, and the DOK was actually used on the two
vehicles launched on the N-1 in July, 1969.
 
On the issue of the Zond-4 mission, I am in total agreement with you,
and it somewhat disheartening to see Western researchers repeat the
errors of the Soviet/Russian descriptions over and over (see New
Scientist, December 1993, article on the UR-500K/L-1 program). 
 
Asif A. Siddiqi
Northampton, MA
[email protected]
 
    "It was blasphemy that made us free." - Leon Wieseltler         

Article: 3080
From: [email protected] (Allen Thomson)
Newsgroups: sci.space.tech
Subject: Re: USSR lunar lander data
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 1994 02:38:54 GMT
Organization: Netcom Online Communications Services (408-241-9760 login: guest)
 
[all snipped -- I just wanted to keep the subject line]
 
If you want to see a Soviet lunar lander, one is still in orbit
and visible with binoculars: Cosmos 398.
 

Article: 3502
From: [email protected] (Marcus Lindroos INF)
Newsgroups: sci.space.tech
Subject: L-3M (Soviet manned lunar) info.?
Date: Thu, 15 Sep 1994 14:59:56 +0000 (GMT)
Organization: ABO AKADEMI UNIVERSITY, FINLAND
 
Could someone post an analysis of the cancelled L-3M flights
to the Moon...?  Following the cancellation of the L-3 project in the early 
1970s, the Soviets redesigned their manned lunar project and L-3M was born.
---
I already have some interesting tidbits. Each mission would have required two
N-1 launches, lifting two 104t payloads into low Earth orbit (L-3: 98t).
Sounds like two LOX/kerosene upper stages again were used, a large translunar
injection rocket and a smaller lunar orbit insertion stage. The latter 
probably would have been smaller than the Block-D used by the L-3 Complex.
The actual PAYLOADS would have weighted about 25-30t according to my source -
one Soyuz-based lander/return-to-Earth stage launched on one N-1 booster,
plus a slightly heavier lunar descent stage launched on the other booster.
The payloads would rendezvous in lunar orbit, *NOT* in LEO, and the descent 
stage would fire to de-orbit the Soyuz lander and be jettisoned a few 
kilometers above the surface. In other words, the same flight path as the 
L-3's LK/Block-D vehicle. The lander would have a mass of 23t on the surface, 
19t at liftoff and slightly more than 8t after trans-Earth orbit insertion.
Long-duration missions of 30 days+ would have been possible (sounds like
George's Lunar Millennium to me...).
---
Sadly, the N-1 and L-3M projects were cancelled in 1974, although the new
Energia HLLV probably would have been powerful enough to launch the entire
~55t spacecraft (no lunar orbit rendezvous necessary). The first mission was
scheduled to take place in 1979-80.
---
I know QUEST and Nicholas Johnson's book on the Soviet lunar program probably
have the information I seek but...
 
MARCU$
 
                                   ////
                                  (o o)
------------------------------oOO--(_)--OOo-----------------------------------
 
                           Computer Science Department
                       University of Abo Akademi, Finland
 
Email: [email protected]
       [email protected]
MAIL:  Marcus Lindroos, PL 402 A, 07880 Liljendal, FINLAND