| Some observations on differences between NASA and the Soviet space
program.
1) NASA and its Soviet equivalent have to operate within very different
systems.
NASA has to 'sell' its programs to the legislature who in turn have
to beleive it will help them get re-elected (well, at least 50%
of the time). Bottom line is that they have to sell the programs
to the public.
This means that the big, flashy programs get funded, at least
initially. The public's attention span is quite short (politicians even
more so) so once the 'big, flashy' programs become just 'big', they get
jerked around a lot.
The Soviet system does not have to sell the idea to the public,
although I get the impression that the level of public interest is
higher (could be completely wrong about the latter). They do presumably
have to sell their programs to their politicians. The main difference
here is that their politicians tend to stay in power longer, so the
space folks can spend less time selling and more time doing.
Remember that there have been long periods of routine
one-step-at-a-time missions in the Soviet program that got very
little coverage in the West. Lately, they seem to have become better
at publicising their programs (or perhaps now they are allowed to).
2) NASA needs leaders, but all they get is managers. From leadership
comes goals, which they don't really have. No idea about the Soviets
here, although Sagadev (sp?) might be such a leader. Interestingly, he
intends to resign his post, apparently voluntarily,
3) When given a choice, NASA likes to build new tools rather than
use existing ones. The incredible array of ELVs they have used over
the years, in some cases custom built for single missions, is a
good example.
The Soviets seem to prefer to use existing tools and technology
wherever possible. However, in the past they have tried to carry this
approach beyond its limits, e.g. the 'G' class booster they tried to
build in the 60s and 70s.
Given the current crop of politicians and the apparent public
attitudes, I can't see these conditions changing in the 1990s.
gary
|
| The bottom line is, just as in the topic header;
The United States accomplished what it wanted to do in the sixties
and landed man on the moon. It seems as though nobody knew where
to go from there. Mars? It would take a human being six years
to get there and return. So we sent Viking I and II.
In the early seventies, NASA built up the Skylab program and it
went well. It seems like the last major accomplishment of the U.S.
before the STS was the joint Soviet/U.S. linkup in '75. Ironic,
isn't it? Much like the passing of the torch to the Soviets, in
terms of leadership, anyway. There was the Galileo project that
fell through in the late seventies and early eighties as well.
The space program simply needs the leadership it had in the early
sixties, and an itinerary to follow.
|
| GALILEO is not dead yet (the Jupiter probe, not the astronomer).
It will be launched from the Space Shuttle in 1989, to encounter
and orbit Jupiter in 1995, as currently scheduled (See Topic 280).
Larry
|
| Newsgroups: sci.space
Path: decwrl!labrea!agate!eos!ames!yee
Subject: NASA's Office of Exploration releases annual report (Forwarded)
Posted: 19 Dec 88 17:13:27 GMT
Organization: NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA
Edward Campion December 19, 1988
Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 11:00 a.m. EST
RELEASE: 88-172
NASA'S OFFICE OF EXPLORATION RELEASES ANNUAL REPORT
NASA'S Office of Exploration (OEXP) today released the first in
what will be a series of annual reports on the agency's planning
efforts and the nation's current capabilities for future human
exploration of the solar system. The report, entitled "Beyond Earth's
Boundaries - Human Exploration of the Solar System in the 21st
Century," details OEXP's work over the past year to better understand
the efforts required to comply with the National Space Policy
directive to "expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit
into the solar system."
One of the major conclusions in the report is that independent of
what type of future exploration course is chosen, the United States
must now lay the foundation by beginning a modest but vital effort in
detailed research, technology development and concentrated studies in
addition to a sustained commitment to the current ongoing NASA
programs. By pursuing a modest near-term investment of resources in
the 1990s in long lead technologies and capabilities, the U.S. will
preserve the ability to pursue a wide range of opportunities at the
turn of the century.
Among the critical ongoing programs identified in the report are
1) the completion of Space Station Freedom which will serve as the key
to developing the long duration capability to live and work in space,
2) the continuation of Project Pathfinder which builds the technology
base of the U.S. civilian space exploration program, 3) the pursuit of
a critical life sciences research program which will be the foundation
for long duration human habitation of space for both Space Station
Freedom and solar system exploration and 4) the continued development
of more capable Earth-to-orbit transportation systems to increase the
capability to transport equipment, propellant and personnel to
low-Earth orbit.
The report also identifies additional programs which must be
initiated if the U.S. is to maintain its exploration options. These
programs are in the areas of artificial gravity research and focused
flight test and demonstration program. The artificial gravity
research must be started because if it is determined that an
artificial gravity environment is needed for exploration, that
requirement will have a significant impact on the space transfer
vehicle configuration. The focused test program is needed to
understand and demonstrate the performance and capability of new
technologies such as aerobraking, cryogenic propellant handling in
space and highly advanced closed-loop- life-support systems.
To better understand the way all of these factors influence one
another, OEXP examined four case studies that encompassed a broad
range of objectives, requirements and capabilities. All four addressed
the prime directive of expanding human presence and activity beyond Earth
orbit but, each emphasized a different pathway and destination.
One pathway examined is "Human Expeditions," which emphasizes a
significant, visible, successful effort by humans to accomplish the
first scientific exploration on another body in the solar system.
This type of approach is applied to two different case studies; one
involving an exploration mission to Mars and the other an exploration
mission to the Martian moon Phobos.
A second pathway is "Science Outpost." This approach also
emphasized the advancement of scientific knowledge while gaining
operational experience at an extraterrestrial outpost. The case study
chosen involves a human-tended lunar observatory on the far side of
the Moon.
The final pathway studied is an "Evolutionary Expansion" approach
that involves a methodical, step-by-step program to open the inner
solar system for exploration, resource development and permanent human
presence. This approach is applied to a case study using the
establishment of an outpost on the moon as a "stepping stone" to
similar outposts on Mars and its moons.
An in-depth discussion of this report is contained in a separate
three-volume series entitled "Exploration Studies Technical Report:
FY 1988 Status," which will be available in early January 1989.
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