| Article: 68431
From: [email protected] (Brian Yamauchi)
Newsgroups: sci.space,talk.politics.space
Subject: Book Recommendation: Inside NASA by McCurdy
Date: 31 Jul 93 04:07:24
Organization: Case Western Reserve University
During the 12 years from 1957 to 1969, the U.S. space program went
from the failed launch of Vanguard to a successful manned landing on
the Moon. During the 12 years from 1981 to 1993, the U.S. manned
space program went from launching the space shuttle to . . . launching
the space shuttle. I've always wondered how NASA could perform so
well in the 60s and early 70s, and then hit a brick wall in the late
70s and 80s.
Inside NASA (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, ISBN 0-8018-4452-5)
by Howard McCurdy goes a long way toward explaining why. I picked up
a copy of this book a few weeks ago at the National Air and Space
Museum bookstore. McCurdy is a professor of public affairs at
American University, and this is a "scholarly" book rather than a
"popular" book, meaning that it's chock full of references to source
material and relatively expensive ($32.95 for 215 pages, hardcover).
This was part of a history study commissioned by NASA, but the author
was given full control of the content of the book. His tone is
generally objective and academic, neither NASA-cheerleading nor
NASA-bashing. The book gives at least a partial explanation of why
the early NASA culture worked so well, and why the current NASA
culture works so poorly -- and equally important, how it went from
there to here.
A summary, from the concluding chapter:
"During its first decade, NASA exhibited many of the
characteristics scholars associate with organizations that perform very
well. It balanced technical discretion with central control. It
developed a tradition of open communication and flexibility when faced
with new challenges. It had a clear sense of mission and a strong
organizational culture."
"In government, it appears, characteristics such as these are
hard to sustain. They do not persist for extended periods of time.
The NASA experience suggests that three forces work against the
maintenance of a high-performance culture in government: a volatile
political environment, the long-term trend toward an increasing
administrative burden in government as a whole, and the natural
process of aging, fed by the inevitable expansion and contraction
cycle that government bureaus go through. None of these turn out to
be forces over which the managers of affected agencies can exercise
much control."
McCurdy goes into much more detail, about the early culture, the
current culture, and the reasons for change -- including a detailed
survey of NASA scientists, engineers, and administrators on their
attitudes towards the agency's culture. He compares the attitudes of
the "first generation" of NASA employees (who joined between 1951 and
1969) and the "second generation" (who joined between 1969 and 1988),
including their perceptions of how the agency has changed over the
years.
It's an analysis, not a prescription. McCurdy offers no solutions,
and questions whether such solutions are even possible "within the
governmental mainstream".
On the other hand, the early NASA culture reminds me a great deal of
the current culture in SDIO and surrounding the DC-X project. McCurdy
doesn't mention SDIO, but many of the characteristics seem similar:
-- the reliance on flight test as opposed to ground test and computer
simulation
-- an incremental approach to building spacecraft
-- a willingness to innovate, take risks, and accept the possibility of
failure
-- and above all, the sense of mission -- being willing to undertake a
task that many consider impossible (whether landing a man on the Moon,
defending against nuclear attack, or drastically reducing cost to orbit)
People can probably read their own conclusions into this study.
Supporters of the Delta Clipper can read similarities like those
above. Those who believe that NASA can be reformed can notice the
degree to which in-house capability and technical discretion allowed
NASA to perform well in the Apollo days, and can argue for less
contracting out and less Congressional micromanagement. And those who
believe that the government will never be able to explore space
effectively can look to McCurdy's conclusions about the inevitable
decay of high-performance cultures in large government bureaucracies.
Still, it seems as good a source as any to explain the "how and why?"
of the current situation, if not the "what next?"
--
_______________________________________________________________________________
Brian Yamauchi Naval Research Laboratory
[email protected] Navy Center for Applied Research in AI
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
| Article: 14631
From: [email protected]
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
Subject: Space pioneers
Date: 11 Aug 93 13:37:41 EST
Organization: NASA, Kennedy Space Center
Greetings and Salutations:
I saw this on another group, and since it was posted in public, I
thought it was something interesting that those here might comment on...
FROM: PA PSE/Chief, Protocol and Special Events Branch
SUBJECT: Speech by Jim Slade, ABC News
Jim Slade, ABC News, gave the keynote address on Civil Space Day to the
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, May 5, 1993, Arlington,
Virginia.
Thought you would find the enclosed speech good reading.
Darleen Hunt
Enclosure
I saw Cocoa Beach, Florida, for the first time in 1962. Many of you
here will remember that there were about 400 residents, six motels and
five telephone trunk lines. Most of the beach front was jungle and to
get there from McCoy Air Force Base, Orlando, you had to drive for
scrub and tree lined miles on State Road 520, a two lane highway with
no road signs.
Out at Cape Canaveral, we broadcast from house trailers, when we could
get a phone line, on a little mound of dirt set out in a swamp
populated by man eating mosquitoes and a few alligators.
And the Atlas rocket, all 95 feet of it, was the most awesome thing we
had ever seen.
There was no question in our minds that the astronauts and the people
who worked with them were pioneers and that we were in a pioneer setting.
Most of us showed up totally unprepared. We thought we had a fair grasp
of the subject going in. I was sent by Westinghouse Broadcasting
Company because I had been around airplanes most of my life and had
been writing about them for some time before the space program began.
It's none of your business how long. I was not the one who looked
inside the Mercury capsule and asked where the rudder pedals were, but
I wasn't far from it.
However, reality sank in quickly, and we all began to listen very
carefully. We had to because getting a NASA press kit to read was a
very big deal in those days. I don't know if it was a budget problem or
if NASA was just playing up to the heavy hitters, but not everybody got
a press kit every time and those who did, carried it around under his
or her arm so everybody could see that he or she had one. We felt like
pioneers.
Astronauts were not isolated, then. In the spirit of "We Who Are About
To Die," they went to parties, out to get haircuts, drove fast cars up
and down the beach and cut a helluva figure. We loved it. We chased
after them and wrote down everything they said and in general. made
damfools of ourselves.
Then followed Gemini with a little more management and a somewhat
bigger rocket and finally, Apollo. We were so involved that. before any
of us knew it or fully realized how it all fit together. there was the
moon and we were learning rudimentary geology and how to pronounce
"Mare Tranquilitatus'.
It was wonderful. We had fun. We knew we were writing history.
There's this thing about writing history; the first time only comes
once. After that, one or two things has to happen. The event concludes
or moves to a higher plane. I wonder how future historians will read
what we've done.
Will Apollo be the pyramids of our time? Will it be the marker that
says This is what they did, and this is who they were?"
Will historians see it as the birth of an expanding era or will they
wonder why we dashed out for one blazing moment and then pulled back?
Did something frighten us? Did we lose vision? Or was it just a stunt?
At the NASA centers I visit today, I see them building monuments to
those days. People drive past Saturn V rockets displayed like beached
whales and wish they had them now. The astronauts have built their own
hall of fame in Florida; one of the few in the world where most of
those memorialized are still living. But, why wouldn't they be
nostalgic? The space program then was exciting, focused on patriotic
purpose. It had firm goals and direction.
Today, we have a diminished NASA, in grave danger of shrinking into the
background of other alphabet agencies. It is in an uncomfortable middle
age, now, wondering where it will be this time next year. With new
leadership that may change. But for now, NASA virtually sags under
layers of management bureaucracy that wants to do things the way
they've always been done. It has a history of "good old boy"
relationships with its contractors that has made change difficult and
made it almost impossible for new ideas...particularly new ideas from
the "outside"...to get a fair hearing.
Some of this stagnation was NASA's own fault. but a lot of it wasn't.
NASA does NOT make policy. It cannot freely determine its course of
action...or promise someone what it will do 5 years down the road...or
whether it will be able to keep a commitment. Just ask the
international space station partners about commitments. No, Congress
and the White House make policy. Congress can't AGREE on what space
policy ought to be...even though it has 535 of the finest aerospace
engineers that American law schools can provide.
Until recently. the White House thought it could just make a speech
about the space program and that would take care of everything.
Private industry waits to see what the government wants to do.
Pure science doesn't sell it. We do not place high premium on learning
for learning's sake in this country. We're geared to t he fast payback.
Besides, science is repetitious and shuttles fly in circles. Media
geared to sensation are bored with space because they have "seen it all
before." As a consequence, it is ignored at the public's expense.
The fact is that, with exception of some visionary leaders like George
Brown, space has not been taken very seriously in this country since it
lost political appeal when the United States "beat the Russians to the
moon." That, in spite of the growth, knowledge and technology it has
always provided. The question seems to be is this program real...or is
it Star Trek?
Well, this is a critical year, and somebody had better get a grip.
Businesswise, things are looking good for the future. With new interest
in what satellites can do for personal affairs as well as
communications, for navigation, for environmental monitoring and other
kinds of observation, things are in fat city. Pretty soon, you'll be
able to carry your computer in your pocket, fax messages from it, take
notes on it and beam them back to the mainframe. Why go to the office
at all? Satellites will steer your airplane, your boat or your car and
will find you when you get more lost than you can handle.
The space agency is turning toward smaller, quicker, cheaper deep space
probes, a trend that could ensure doing more of them...and it should be
encouraged.
The disturbing thing, though, is the state of the American expendable
fleet that is supposed to launch all those things. Although the United
States is building most of the world's satellites, a majority are being
launched by somebody else. That fleet needs to be modernized. Soon.
But my chief interest has always been human flight, and there's the
real struggle for the future.
Logic tells us that if things had been done in proper sequence. a space
station would have been constructed between Gemini and Apollo to study
the effects of long term human night. Since I am the person who
invented the phrase, "the next logical step" in relation to the space
station, I hereby apologize for irrational thought.
But now, some say it's time to build it. And as usual, some don't.
Congress' annual lack of concurrence on station has already cost the
taxpayers a ton of money and may yet lose everything spent so far in a
political donneybrook like the one that junked the SST.
It's still not clear what...if any...space station will emerge from
this latest in a long series of "redesigns." At best, you may have an
accelerated Skylab. Or, you may already have all the space station you
are ever going to get in the extended duration shuttles. Couple a
shuttle carrying a spacelab to an orbiting solar power pack and you're
good for 30 days. Tether a small robotic storage shed like Max Faget's
and Joe Allen's "Industrial Space Facility" to the solar frame for long
term microgravity work and you've got a base that can be visited
repeatedly. If you must keep humans there longer, rent a room from the
Russians. They're available.
Parenthetically, no matter what happens to the space station, the
shuttles get new life unless there is a decision to abandon human
spaceflight altogether. If there is a station, shuttles will be
required to service it...up and down. If there is NO station, the
shuttles will continue to do space station work as they already have
been doing with spacelab since 1985.
Everybody talks about the complicated, expensive. unreliable shuttle
system they designed in the 60s and 70s...and hollers about the huge
numbers of people it takes to service them. And there is the classic
discussion of the way the shuttle was oversold at the expense of
alternate launch capability. All true. But that was then and this is
now and the shuttles are what you've got. and I do not hear anybody
talking seriously about a replacement. Nobody wants to discuss it.
You don't even HAVE a man rated rocket today and as you know and as
NASA Administrator Dan Goldin pointed out to a committee the other day,
it would take 10 years to build something new even if someone gave him
the money this minute. Frankly, the record for safety and utility since
the post Challenger return to flight has been remarkable and the
shuttle constantly takes a bum rap.
The real reason the public has a perception problem with the shuttle is
nobody ever really explained what it is and what its limitations are,
admit that it is still a dangerous vehicle and always will be, and then
tell why it is absolutely necessary to fly it as much as possible, when
it can be wisely done.
The cold war rivalry that started the space program was too expensive
to endure. We may switch, now, to cooperation for the very survival of
that program, and that could be a very good thing. This is an expensive
business. It is a great burden for any one country...perhaps an
indecent luxury. But a human rather than a nationalistic effort is
probably the best track that any future enterprise may have, and it
seems to be coming together slowly...by default.
And human effort is the key. I do not agree with those who think that
all the good things that need to be done can be done robotically. The
experiences provided by humans on Apollo, the shuttles and on space
station Mir proved that isn't true. But that argument doesn't matter,
either. The bottom line is that if you ever take humans and the realism
of human exploration out of the spaceflight equation, you will lose the
remaining interest and support of the ordinary per$on because, deep
down inside, that's what they see in it. Take humans out and you will
be out of business. People do not go to the world's most popular museum
to look at satellites. They go to see what humans did and where they
went. They want to touch the remnants of those great adventures, smell
the fear, feel the pride and imagine where it may take their children.
Humans WILL go to Mars someday, you know. It's inevitable...part of
human nature. What is NOT certain is which humans we're talking about
and which humans of what era.
With Mars as a given, I wish we'd forget about it and plan for what we
are really capable of doing. If we ever get serious, the most perfect
laboratory you could ask for is only 3 days away. The moon is a rock
solid base, has a wonderful vacuum and unspeakable living conditions.
If you could learn to survive and prosper there, you could make it on
Mars when the time comes.
And in terms of firing the imagination, it beats flying in circles by a
long shot.
Firing the imagination is what it's all about, too, if the dream is to
survive. Children understand more about space than you think. Why
wouldn't they? They were born with it as a matter of fact. We have to
give them every opportunity to learn more and embrace it...if they
choose to do so. Maybe they won't.
But we have no right to deny the next generation its own decision.
In the broad sense...Apollo may ALREADY be our marker...our pyramid.
Because from here on out, this era will be remembered as the time it
all began. The history is there to read and to see, warts and all. And
if you're content with that...if nothing more happens in our generation
and the technology is put on the shelf for someone else to take down
some other time, well...there it is, and we should be proud.
No matter what, it WAS the beginning.
But only the beginning.
--
-----------------------------------------------
Ken Hollis INTERNET: [email protected]
SPAN/HEPnet: KSCP00::HOLLIS
Dizzyclaimer:
If you believe this is in any way, shape, or form actual official
information or opinion,then you are probably as confused if not more
so than I am...I think...
|
| Article: 77520
Newsgroups: sci.space
From: [email protected] (Stephen Lamkin)
Subject: NASA Mission Statement
Sender: [email protected] (USENET News Client)
Organization: NASA Johnson Space Center
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 1993 15:12:26 GMT
A year ago NASA went through a lengthy process to come up with a
collective statement of what NASA's vision of its' purpose is. As far
as mission's and goals, these have been dictated by Congress for
several years. In addition, there have been several Presidential
Commissions that have developed missions and goals for NASA: The Sally
Ride Commission, The Thomas Paine Commission, the Synnergy Group, etc.
For what it's worth, NASA hasn't done a very good job of telling the
American public what its vision is, and where it has been successful,
other than Shuttle flights.
Here is the Vision Statement, for your comments:
The NASA Vision 11/3/92
1. NASA is committed to the future. As explorers, pioneers and
innovators, we boldly expand frontiers in air and space to inspire
and serve America and to benefit humanity.
We:
Explore space toward expanding human presence beyond our planet;
Advance scientific knowledge of the Earth, the solar system, and the
universe;
Research, develop and transfer advanced aeronautics, space and related
technologies.
2. NASA dedicates its unique talents toward national objectives in:
Economic growth and competitiveness. We conduct research and develop
technology in partnership with industry and academia to keep America at
the cutting edge.
Preserving the environment. We study Earth as a planet and a system to
understand global change, enabling the world to address environmental
issues.
Educational excellence. We involve the educational community in our
endeavors to inspire America's students, create learning opportunities,
and open new fields of discovery for inquisitive minds.
World peace. We explore the universe in a peaceful quest for knowledge,
and through international cooperation, unite nations of the world in a
common goal.
3. NASA's achievements reflect its devotion to individual and collective
excellence.
We recognize that our greatest strength is our workforce. We
aggressively recruit a team of highly qualified individuals from
America's diverse cultures.
We empower our employees. encouraging and rewarding creativity,
initiative and teamwork. We provide training and valuable hands-on
experience to develop our premier workforce. We enable the highest
employee productivity through innovative management practices which
respond to employees' differing personal needs. We high standards
for leadership. Each of us makes unique contributions to NASA's
success. and we constantly seek ways to improve.
We preserve America's confidence and trust by ensuring that our
missions are carefully conceived. consistent with national objectives.
and well executed. We deliver what we promise in terms of schedule,
cost, and content, and are accountable for our performance. We are
open and honest with each other and our customers, and cooperate within
and across organizations to deliver the highest quality results. We
are bold, but prudent, in confronting challenges and accepting risks.
We work with integrity and are dedicated to fulfilling our vision.
--
Steve Lamkin
|
| From: US1RMC::"[email protected]" "MAIL-11 Daemon" 24-NOV-1993 18:42:13.38
To: verga::klaes
CC:
Subj: fyi#155_distr
Senate Subcommittee Examines NASA's Identity Crisis
FYI No. 155, November 23, 1993
With the Cold War fading into history, economic competitiveness
becoming the watchword of the decade, and the space race against
the Russians turning into probable cooperation, NASA is struggling
to redefine its role. On November 16, the Senate Commerce
Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space invited NASA
Administrator Daniel Goldin, Martin Marietta CEO Norman Augustine,
and Robert Frosch of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government
to offer their thoughts on NASA's plans, priorities, and budgetary
difficulties.
Augustine, who in 1990 chaired the Committee on the Future of the
U.S. Space Program, posed two questions: What does American want
its space program to be, and can the country afford to pay for the
program it wants? He stated bluntly that if the answers were
incompatible, "we are unlikely to have a satisfactory program."
Frosch, the NASA administrator in the early 1970s and more recently
Vice President of General Motors for Research, warned that
restructuring the space agency will "not necessarily" improve its
performance. He advocated open, collegial discussions with
Congress and the White House on NASA's role, and argued that
overregulation of procurement, personnel, and auditing has led to
a "system of bureaucratic trivia."
Goldin vehemently blamed the lack of stable funding for many of
NASA's difficulties, including poor morale. Testifying that NASA's
budget was altered every few months, he called for multiyear
funding and complained, "when we can't plan, we can't perform."
Augustine added that year-by-year budgeting allows lawmakers to
avoid hard choices by stretching programs out, and he recommended
budgeting by program rather than by year.
Subcommittee chair Jay Rockefeller (D-West Virginia) asked how
Congress's recent emphasis on technology commercialization fit with
NASA's original missions. While Goldin agreed that technology
transfer "should be treated as importantly as the mission," he
worried that too much emphasis on "things that'll have an impact
over the next few years" might deter investment in the future. He
declared: "If NASA is going to be converted to justify itself just
on tech transfer-- cancel the agency."
Asked to name his priorities for the agency, Goldin responded with
Mission to Planet Earth, followed by research on humans in space,
aeronautics, and then space science, which he called "what NASA was
born to do." However, he warned that, while he favored a balanced
program, further budget cuts might force cancellation of the
planetary program and cut deeply into astrophysics.
Augustine, while admitting that his committee's recommendations
need to be revisited in light of current budget realities, said
that committee members continue to believe that space science
deserves the first priority. He placed Mission to Planet Earth
second, and Mission from Planet Earth third, done on a
"go-as-you-pay basis." Fourth on his list of high priorities was
NASA's contribution to the technology base.
###############
Public Information Division
American Institute of Physics
Contact: Audrey T. Leath
(301) 209-3094
##END##########
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|