| I received the last set of reports before I left on vacation For
those who may be interested in ordering part or all of the set of
5 documents, here's the master table of contents
VOL I - The actual report to the President by the Commission. The
best of the set for a condensed overview of what happened,
what is suggested as a cure, and some good photographs of
recovered debris. Includes appendices A) Commission
Activities, B) Documentation System, C) Observations on
the Processing and Assembly of Flight 51-L, D) Supporting
Charts and Documents.
VOL II - More appendices, E-M, including Feynman's report and a
section with comments by MTI on NASA's report. Some good
photography, all black and white, of recovered debris.
VOL III - Appendices N-O, NASA photo and TV support team report,
and NASA Search, Recovery, and Reconstruction team report.
VOL IV - Transcripts of hearings, Feb 6 to Feb 25. Some charts,
few photos.
VOL V - Transcripts of hearings, Feb 26 to May 2.
I'd recommend getting volumes 1, 2, and 3. I'll probably get around
to reading volumes 4 and 5 some day. If anyone would like a more
detailed description of any volume please let me know and I'll try
to type in a more detailed table of contents.
BTW, I was at the Air and Space Museum at the Smithsonian this week.
They had volume 1 for sale, along with the "Space Shuttle Operator's
Manual", several other shuttle-related books, and some "The Dream
is Alive" T-shirts (of course, they were out of stock). The reports
didn't seem to be moving very quickly.
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| Article: 18866
From: [email protected] (Ken Hayashida)
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
Subject: 51-L Recovery Report, Rogers' Appendix O
Date: 6 Apr 1994 00:16:46 -0700
Organization: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
Sender: [email protected]
As a result of the current thread related to the 51-L accident investi-
gation, I obtained a copy of Appendix O of the Rogers Commission report.
Appendix O is a detailed description of the recovery operations comple-
ted by a joint task force composed of US military and NASA personnel.
On Page O-17, the team writes:
"Contact classification was accomplished by documentation and small
debris provided by divers (many), remotely-operated submersibles (2),
and manned submersibles (2). This documentation consisted of still
photographs, video tapes, audio descriptions from manned submersibles,
and diver descriptions. Small pieces from debris fields were recovered
in a n effort to determine a possible general location fo adjacent
components. Each contact was classified as Shuttle-related, non
Shuttle-related, or unconfirmed. The Shuttle-related were put into
categories of each element: Orbiter, ET, Right SRB, and Left SRB.
The majority of the contacts were classified as non-Shuttle related.
These items were Geological, such as shells, coral ridge lines, fish,
debris of previous unsuccessful launches from CCAFS, and discarded
equipment from vessels using the shipping lane, such as (a)
refrigerator, 55-gallon drums, (and) coils of wire."
Part E continues:
"During the contact phase, photos, video tapes, and divers' logs were
examined to determine what techniques were to be used for recovery.
Special tools were designed and fabricated."
"Divers were used extensively for recovery operations in shallow water.
Only surface-supplied air and scuba diving techniques were utilized.
Surface-supplied mixed gas (helium/oxygen) and saturation mixed gas
(helium/oxygen) diving techniques were not used in the initial search
effort. However, this technique is planned to be used later in depths
of approximately 300 feet.
Submersibles were used in the deeper water areas.
Table 2 lists the major debris recovered. This operation utilized the
largest number of assets ever assembled for marine salvage."
The list in Table 2 of recovered orbiter debris includes the following
lines:
"System Contact # Remarks
Orbiter 520 Left Aft Fuselage
566 Right Wing
595 Large Left Wing Piece
*** Crew Compartment
*** Orbiter Cargo
*** Orbiter Cargo"
Recent posts imply that NASA should have included NTSB personnel in the
investigation. Part F of Appendix O states:
"The NTSB evaluated the recovered debris in an effort to determine the
probable failure mode of teh Orbiter including the Payload, the ET, and
each SRB."
It is clear that NTSB was a part of the investigation. The author
writes, "A more detailed explanation is found in Enclosure No. 8, Space
Transportation System, Mission 51-L Structural Evaluation Report."
*********
several interesting questions arise from this report...
1. Why was the contact report number "***" for the crew module and cargo?
2. Has NASA taken steps to preserve the photo, document, and audio tape
records related to recovery team operations?
3. What is the NTSB recovery team report?
4. Does the recent Air & Space magazine story concur with the findings
in the Rogers' Commission?
Article: 18865
From: [email protected] (Ken Hayashida)
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
Subject: 51-L Break up and Wing Loads was Re: Challenger minor Q
Date: 6 Apr 1994 00:10:36 -0700
Organization: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
Sender: [email protected]
[email protected] (Henry McDaniel III) writes:
(lots deleted)
>If Dick was serious (someone who can comment on the likelyhood of him
>actually not wearing his restraints could surely help me out here)
>then shortly after the orbiter broke up he would have been thrown
>upwards into some switches, and later knocked about the cabin.
I doubt that any STS CDR would ever launch without being adequately
restrained in the seat...At MECO, the CDR would come out the seat if
he wasn't properly restrained and Scobee had been in space before.
(lots deleted)
>I'm also curious if the wing connections to the main fuselage could
>have been made any less rigid. . . I mean to the point where they
>are safe for landing with, but would neatly seperate from the main
>body in the event of high areodynamic stresses (such as challenger
>encountered shortly before breakup.) Would this (and a much stronger
>main body) have kept the shuttle (besides the wings) intact even
>after the ET exploded? I suspect this is asking far too much,
>and any less strength in the wings would be unsafe for landing with. ..
>but.. anybody know?
Appendix O of the Rogers Commission comments on this issue.
>The way the solid boosters made it through without breaking up, suggest
>(to my laymen's mind) that the orbiter wings were the chief catalyst for
>the challenger break up. . .
This is not a good conclusion because the shape of the SRM is much
different than the shape of the orbiter...accordingly the forces on
the SRM which could lead it is destruction are much different than the
tolerances allowed on the orbiter. Interesting question though...so
here's a longer answer on the issue about the wings of the Challenger.
The Rogers report states:
"Insufficient structure was recovered to definitely establish the failure
mode of the Orbiter, Challenger."
"There is evidence that the right SRB contacted the bottom surface of
the outboard section of the right wing which may have contributed to
the separation fo the right wing from the Orbiter. The evidence
includes crush damage on the bottom surface of the right wing and
outboard elevon, positive (+z) bending and fractures in sections of
the right elevon and inboard structure of the right wing, and high
inertial loading on the right main landing gear and on the IUS's
right spreader beam."
"...indicates that as the SRB moved upward (+z) into contact with the
right wing, and as the wing separated from the Orbiter, the right side
of the Orbiter was sprayed by hot gases exhausting from the hole in
the inboard circumference of the SRB. It is possible that this
contact between the right SRB and the Orbiter assisted in separating
the Orbiter from the ET in a rapid counter-clockwise rolling movement
that exposed the Orbiter to destructive aerodynamic and inertial forces."
"The structural evaluation established clearly that the crew module,
including most of its outer shell, remained essentially intact until
impact with the water and that the module was fragmented extensively
from extreme overload and inertial forces associated with water impact.
The structural deformations and fragmentations indicate that the module
struck the water in a slight nose down and steep left bank attitude."
Hope that answers your question.
Ken in LA, CA, USA, Eh?
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