| I think I share your feelings, although I'm only halfway through the
document right now. I'm currently most of the way through "An Accident
Rooted in History".
{Some flaming to follow}
A few things really make my blood boil:
Telling Lund to "Take off your engineering hat, and put on your management
hat" has to top the list. This is as if the laws of physics change once
management takes over. This is a typical practice, but happening on such a
critical project turns my stomach. Where do those guys get off thinking
that a management decision can make a problem go away? I'm almost equally
pissed at Lund for going along with them once he removed his engineering
hat, as if half his brains stayed with the hat. To be fair, I've been in
precisely this sort of meeting, and even with all the facts on my side, my
own thoughts have become completely muddled when management procedure
is put ahead of reality.
Of course, all of this shows how the "prove it's safe to launch" policy
changed to a "prove it's not safe to launch" policy. Who the heck changed
this policy, or for that matter, let such a change occur?
The next thing heating my blood is that "The Source Evaluation Board on the
proposals rated Thiokol fourth under the design, development and verification
factor, second under the manufacturing, refurbishment and product support
factor and first under the management factor." It would seem to me that
while the design can be fudged to improve the other factors, it should still
be the promary concern. It's hard to believe that anything else could make
up for coming in fourth out of four in design, which is the case here. All
the product support and management in the world can't make up for a bad
design.
Next on the list is Rockwell not quite wanting to come right out and say
in so many words that they really shouldn't be launching with all that ice
all over the launchpad, and NASA never quite wanting to hear what they said
unless stated explicitly.
Of course, in the larger timeframe, the obvious "ship it" mentality that
prevailed over the design of the design of the SRM joint should be a lesson
to all of us the next time we're preparing to ship a product.
And the whole double talk about how on one had the secondary O-ring was
never intended to be a backup to the primary (it's just there for testing),
but on the other hand, if the primary fails, the secondary offers redundant
protection, is nothing but a knee-slapper.
That the level III review committee didn't see fit to elevate any of the
SRB joint concerns to the higher levels seems somehow consistent with
everything else that happened, in a warped sort of way.
But the nerve shattering conclusion that I draw from this whole thing is
that everyone thought they were doing everything within the rules, and given
the rules that seem to be implied by this report, that's pretty much the case.
All of this speaks very poorly for currently accepted practices for
management, product support and communicating breakdowns in a product. Not
only is everything documented common practice, but I can see parallels in
every other industry I've come in contact with. Only this time, it killed
seven people, and may mean a virtual death for our space program.
I would ask then, are we as a country smart enough to figure out what
really went wrong, and quit doing those things at a national level, or are
we going to leave ourselves open for yet another disaster of this sort?
Something to think about the next time you're trying to get your car
fixed, I suppose.
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In all the current hoo-ha about the seals/boosters, I just hope
that someone's remembering to make darn sure that the other critical
items that have been flagged are being worked. It seems typical
of American mentality, expecially in the media, to focus on just
one aspect of problems. We fix intersections after someone gets
killed there, but don't do anything about the more dangerous curve
down the road. I know that the wheels/brakes item is being worked
so that Kennedy landing will be safe, but how about all the others?
- Chris
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| NASA is supposed to be performing an examination of EVERY item which
is rated criticality 1, 1R, 2, or 2R (1's are failures which would
lead to loss of vehicle/loss of life, 2's are failures which would
lead to loss of mission, "R" indicates there is supposed to be some
kind of redundancy, no "R" indicates if it goes kiss it goodbye).
Now of course, this doesn't imply that anything will happen as a
result of the review, but we can hope that the folk in NASA are
scared enough that they'll pay proper attention to stuff.
Another flame which might be enlightening is that once the fact
that the secondary O-ring seal in the SRB joint was "proved" not
to always seal the joints were re-classified as criticality 1
(they originally were 1R). Yet, most of the people still thought
of the joints/seals as 1R, which probably lead to some of the
complacence in fixing the problem.
Speaking of fixing the problem, have you seen the bullshit which
Bojoisly (spelling?) at MTI went through trying to get resources
to research the problem after the primary seal failure happened
in one of the 1985(?) launches? The management crap that hindered
his efforts makes me wonder if good management equates to the
ability to blind oneself to reality.
Not to be vindictive (not that it would help, but it sure makes
me feel better) ... I'd really like to stick a MTI and Marshall
veep sort on every shuttle launch as a general insurance policy.
Maybe if the nurds knew their asses were in the sling they might
quit playing management games and make the system work.
Anyone heard any details on the joint/seal redesign? Right near
the end of the Commission Rogers blasted the dolts for already
having completed their redesign. Has it gone any further or are
they going to whip something up which will probably fail after
the 3rd launch, putting us back to square zero?
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| I am in flul agreement with every criticism leveled in each one
of the note/replys given here!
But what I cannot understand is WHY IS ANYONE SURPRISED?????
It seems to me that Challenger is just another manifestation of
the "SICK" attitude that management in this country has as a standard
practice!! There is no study that I've ever seen relative to our
loss of industrial prestige that does not point directly toward
arrogant, inept, self-centered and incompetence on the part of
management!!
We've made it a rule that we're not responsible for our actions
if we have "THE POWER" of management behind us. This is a standard
that seems to have originated with our public officials and those
who are supposed to be examples to our youth in the world of sports
and other so-called "leadership" roles.
It's just too damned bad that seven dedicated individuals had
to die unnecessarily due to the self interests of a few incompetent
and unpunishable individuals. Until this country returns to a concept
whereby you ARE responsible for what you do...whether you are a
"power figure" or a lowly worker, we should expect a lot more of
this type of fiasco!!
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| Re .-1, I have to agree too, but, American friends, you are not
alone. British mANAGEMENT (intentional that) sucks too, especially
in high technology areas. I don't think our management has yet
managed to kill anyone as publicly as Challenger, in fact, and
particularly when the Ministry of Defence is involved, such murders
are hushed up.
All my applause to those Engineers by whose technical efforts have
enabled the US space program to get so far with so few incidents.
Is it not symptomatic of the root problem that this latest incident
is being addressed by a committee?
_terry_
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