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Title: | Space Exploration |
Notice: | Shuttle launch schedules, see Note 6 |
Moderator: | PRAGMA::GRIFFIN |
|
Created: | Mon Feb 17 1986 |
Last Modified: | Thu Jun 05 1997 |
Last Successful Update: | Fri Jun 06 1997 |
Number of topics: | 974 |
Total number of notes: | 18843 |
147.0. "CHALLENGER 51-L Chronology" by CASTOR::MCCARTHY () Thu Feb 13 1986 01:24
Note 145 mentioned the Aviation week and Space Technology article on the
loss of flight 51-L. For those of you who haven't seen it, here's the
chronology of the flight as presented:
Digital engineering data transmitted by Challenger and new
photography of the accident are building a detailed chronology
of what occurred Jan. 28 following liftoff from pad 39B.
At liftoff, the two solid rocket boosters were functioning
normally, each generating about 3.3 million pounds of thrust.
[period above is accidental]
in addition to the oxygen/hydrogen main engines, each operating
at 104% thrust.
Twenty seconds into the flight the solid rockets each began to
reduce their power toward 2.4 million pounds of thrust. This power
reduction was to slow the rate of Challengers acceleration as it
apporached the region of maximum aerodynamic pressure. The three
liquid engines also began to throttle down at about this point.
At 40 sec. into the flight, Challenger flew through a wind
shear, and data show that the solid motors and main engines
pivoted to maintain the proper vehicle flight path. At about
45 sec., the thrust on both solid rockets leveled off as planned
at about 2.4 million pounds. At about 50 sec. into the flight,
the propellant in both solid motors was to start burning in a
way that would gradually start to build thrust back toward about
2.7 million pounds.
There are three chamber pressure sensors on the motors, and
the sensors on the left motor showed that it was beginning to
increase thrust as planned. Sensors on the right motor, however,
showed that it was not increasint thrust properly-indicating that
a rupture of the case had occurred and hot, high velocity gas
was beginning to escape from the 149 foot long stage.
At about 59 sec. into the flight, Kennedy tracking camera
photography of the right booster detected the leak as a 4x8 foot
brigth plume emerging from the attach joint between the two
aft segments of the right motor. The photography shows this plume
growing for about 15 seconds until it became severa feet wide anf
[and] at least 40 feet long. Chamber pressure from the motor
continued to lag until at about 70 seconds it was 4% below the
desired level, indicating that a massive leak was underway on
the stage.
At about 71 seconds - 2 seconds before the explosion, several
events began to take place as noted in the digital data. The right
motor at this time was providing over 100,000 pounds less thrust
than the left motor - a difference that was starting to affect the
flight path of the vehicle.
The flight control system noted this difference and began moving
both the main engine rocket nozzles and solid motor nozzles to
steer the vehicle and compensate for the lagging booster, whcih
[which] by then had a massive plume spraying from the ruptured
joint. This motor nozzle gimbaling was not dramatic, and the
vehicle was starting to compensate properly. The solid rocket
boosters are attached to the shuttle external tank by struts on
the boosters at both their foreward and aft ends.
The 5600[degree]F plume from the booster's leak was directed
toward the booster's lower attach points with the tank. In the
last second before all data were lost, the aft attach points for
the right booster were either severed by the fire or broken
structurally by the abnormal stresses created by the high velocity
leak.
At the time this occurred the booster's plume or structural
loads also severed the 17 inch diameter liquid oxygen line that
runs down the outside of the external tank. This line carries
liquid oxygen from the upper oxygen section of the external tank
down to the orbiter's main engines.
A split second after the aft attach points for the booster
failed, data from the rate gyro systems in that booster show that
the bottom of the solid rocket began to flip outward, pivotting
around its upper attach point but still secured to the portion of
the external tank that separates the oxygen and hydrogen sections.
This had the effedt of driving the upper portion of the booster
into the side of the external tank, rupturing the oxygen and hydrogen
section and resulting in a powerful explosion that destroyed Challenger.
Recently updated information indicates the explosion occured at 73
seconds.
The two solid motors then flew off in opposite directions still
generating over two million pounds of thrust. The right booster's
nose was badly damaged from its collision with the tank, and recovery
parachutes in its nose began to trail out of the motor as it flew
off prior to thrust termination by range safety explosives detonated
on command from Cape Cannaveral Air Force Station.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Brian
T.R | Title | User | Personal Name | Date | Lines |
---|
147.1 | | VAXWRK::HELSEL | | Thu Feb 13 1986 09:28 | 5 |
| Brian,
I believe you spelled that wrong. Isn't it Aviation Leak?
Brett.
|
147.2 | | VAXWRK::HELSEL | | Thu Feb 13 1986 09:42 | 16 |
| This is an afterthought, and it may be overkill, but I thought I'd include
it anyway. I got a letter from one of the Engineers at the Cape with her
description of what happened. It's very brief, but it captures the mood
better than Brokaw and the sensationalists. It follows:
Things aren't quite as depressing around here as they were. I still do not
think I could describe it to you though. The pictures on T.V. made it pretty
clear, but watching it out here, you could not see quite as well. There
was so much smoke, everybody just stood there watching the sky, praying that
they had separated and the bird would miraculously appear out of the clouds.
Everytime I picture it I get cold shivers. I did not watch the news much
that week. Seeing it over and over was a bit much. That afternoon we had
to gather up all the code we changed in the 53 release and it was locked
up in the boxcars with the disks until someone from the investigation team
said they didn't need it. We still can't use FR2 to test code and rumor
has it we won't be able to use FR2 anymore.
|
147.3 | | SAUTER::SAUTER | | Fri Feb 14 1986 07:44 | 2 |
| What is FR2?
John Sauter
|
147.4 | | VAXWRK::HELSEL | | Fri Feb 14 1986 10:52 | 8 |
| Sorry....
53 (1985, 3rd quarter software release)
FR2 (Firing Room 2) There are 4. 1 and 2 are primaries and 3 and 4 are
backups. FR4 is the secure Firing Room.
Brett.
|