T.R | Title | User | Personal Name | Date | Lines |
---|
117.1 | | SAUTER::SAUTER | | Tue Jan 28 1986 12:02 | 3 |
| I just got a call from my wife, who is in tears, relating .0.
She says that there were no survivors.
John Sauter
|
117.2 | | GUIDUK::STEBBINS | | Tue Jan 28 1986 12:12 | 6 |
| It appears that the accident happened as they were throttling
back the main rockets to go through the sound barrier. It
appears that they had an early solid rocket separation. It
is unknown if that is a cause or effect.
-gary-
|
117.3 | | KIRIN::OREILLY | | Tue Jan 28 1986 12:20 | 8 |
| Re: .2
That's the point of highest aerodynamic stresses on the vehicle. From the
reports that I've heard, I would guess some sort of structural failure, since
the one SRB did separate early, with no prior reports of problems from any
of the telemetry from the shuttle or SRB's.
Dan
|
117.4 | | RANGLY::BOTTOM_DAVID | | Tue Jan 28 1986 12:59 | 5 |
| I just would hope that instead of this being turned into a circus of
finger pointing that we are able to make this sad occasion an
opportunity to improve the entire space program.
dave
|
117.5 | | MANANA::BENNETT | | Tue Jan 28 1986 13:34 | 8 |
| It's my feeling that NASA is going to have a hard road to tread for
awhile. I'm already in fear of the lunatics who'll come creeping out
of the closet saying "if God wanted us to fly, he would have given us
wings." I think we should mourn for the brave astronauts (and I include
Christa as one ... not just as a teacher) and their families whilst still
giving full support to the space program.
Lydia
|
117.6 | | POTTER::MPASCARELLI | | Tue Jan 28 1986 12:36 | 26 |
| I went home and caught this on the news. Here are my impressions :
1. Slo mo shows a small explosion under the shuttle inself. It looks
like maybe a small explosion on the right booster. Then a
large fireball as the main fuel tank explodes. Hundreds of
small pieces fall with contrails ( on fire ?) into the Atlantic
2. The only guess by the TV news "experts" is "Ice crystals".
3. One parachute was shown. Then it was reported as belonging to some
type of rescue personel that had bailed out to help any
impossible survivors in the sea.
4. NASA's only semi-official comment so far is that it was a
un-survivable accident.
5. Channel 5's local news team was showing the Mcalluf (sp.) family
watching the lift-off from the VIP box at the cape. People
in the stands were still cheering the lift-off as the family
started crying and were led away by NASA. The ghouls were
showing the family again when I left to come to work.
Pardon my typing I'm too upset to do better.
PASCO
|
117.7 | | UCOUNT::SYSTEM | | Tue Jan 28 1986 13:40 | 20 |
| Needless to say, this is a tragedy.
I, too, hope that the "budget-cutters" don't use this as an excuse to hack
NASA to death. If there is one thing I don't mind my tax dollars going to,
it's space exploration.
I guess what makes this tragedy really hit close to home is that Christa was
just like you and me, a "regular" American chosen to take part in this great
adventure.
I really feel for the kids from her school who were cheering the launch only
to have this happen.
As with the Apollo astronauts who died (19 years ago yesterday ironically),
their deaths are the price that man has always been willing to pay to push
back the frontiers and extend our knowledge.
God bless them all.
-- Bill
|
117.8 | | PYRITE::WEAVER | | Tue Jan 28 1986 13:41 | 22 |
| From the report I saw, the explosion occurred 1 minute 12 seconds into
the flight. It appeared that the solid rocket booster away from the
camera had started burning up the side, then there was an explosion
which separated the booster with the best camera view that appeared to
me to be caused by the other booster burning out of control, or maybe it
was a last ditch effort by the astronauts to separate from the boosters.
Shortly after that explosion (which was up near the cabin area where the
astronauts would be), the main tank exploded and the whole shuttle was
engulfed in a big explosion. The separated booster was then flying
around aimlessly while it expended the rest of its fuel. The time
between the first smaller explosion and the main tank exploding was only
two or three video frames (2 or 3 thirtieths of a second?).
Small pieces of the shuttle were seen scattered all over the Atlantic
within a few minutes. Search crews were delayed from entering the
area until all of the debris had fallen. A parachute of one of the
paramedics sent in could be seen descending in one of the shots that
were shown.
Still in shock,
-Dave
|
117.9 | | TINCUP::DCHAVEZ | | Tue Jan 28 1986 13:57 | 3 |
| The space program needs our support now more than ever...
Dale
|
117.10 | | EXODUS::HARROW | | Tue Jan 28 1986 14:09 | 14 |
| I'm still in shock from this, having, like I suspect many of you, vicariously
accompanied Christa on her (now) ill fated journey.
The one tremendous fear which has come to mind is that some radical group,
whether correctly or incorrectly, will attempt to claim terroist responsibility
for this event. Given some of the highly inappropriate comments which have
come from Libia of late, I fear that such claims could begin a disasterous
chain of events.
Let us hope that clear evidence of a mechanical failure appears, and my heart
reachs out to the pioneers who perished today.
Jeff
|
117.11 | | NCVAX1::ANDERSOND | | Tue Jan 28 1986 14:54 | 9 |
| This is a very sad day for all of us that support the space program and it
will take a long time to get over what we have seen unfold. There will be
numerous critics of the program that will call for cutbacks in NASA funding.
I beleive we should take this tragedy as an oportunity to let our
representatives in congress and the officials at NASA know how we as individuals
support the space program. Anyone who has specific NASA names and addresses
could place them in this file for all to use in making their feelings known.
Dave.
|
117.12 | | ALIEN::RABAHY | | Tue Jan 28 1986 15:22 | 3 |
| I believe it was one of the solid boosters which was parachuting.
David.
|
117.13 | | GRDIAN::CLARK | | Tue Jan 28 1986 16:16 | 7 |
| No ... the solid rocket boosters are expendable, and are not equipped with
parachutes.
From what I heard, it was some member of the rescue personnel ... some claim
that it was a paramedic.
-dave
|
117.14 | | MRMFG3::B_BURNETT | | Tue Jan 28 1986 16:48 | 5 |
| re .13
SRB's are not expendable they are recovered after separation and reused.
][ Greg
|
117.15 | | GRDIAN::CLARK | | Tue Jan 28 1986 17:13 | 4 |
| Oh yeah, you're right ... it's the ET that's expendible ... my brain hasn't
been working too well since this morning ....
dave
|
117.16 | | GUIDUK::STEBBINS | | Tue Jan 28 1986 21:47 | 7 |
| I am on the West coast (Seattle), and would like to know what
television networks are providing the best coverage of the
shuttle accident. I know that CBS is having 1 one-hour special
at 10:00 PM. How about the other networks. Has anyone already
seen any specials and have any comments?
-gary- (three hours behind ...)
|
117.17 | | PEACHS::MITCHAM | | Tue Jan 28 1986 22:41 | 27 |
| At this time, all 3 major networks are showing specials on the tragedy.
Having been watching both local and national news programs covering this, I
have heard different speculation on the cause:
1) A leak in the solid booster
2) A structural problem with the frame holding the boosters
3) An imbalance in the way the solid fuel was burning in one (both)
boosters.
4) Ice crystals (?)
Item #3 was taken from an interview with a GA Tech professor with a local news
station. According to him, there are known problems with the way the solid
fuel burns...if it doesn't burn evenly, it presents an imbalance that can
actually cause the rocket to begin tumbling end_over_end. An example of this
occurred recently with a (not absolutely if this is the correct one) 'Minute
Man' missle.
My own speculation: Could be #3, causing a chain reaction which could include
#2 and/or #1.
BTW, the media say the Main Rocket Booster is VERY thin, and hince the reason
for the immediate blast.
God bless them all...
-Andy
|
117.18 | | BOEHM::GRIFFIN | | Tue Jan 28 1986 23:35 | 28 |
| Here come the theories - interesting considering all they have for data
is a few camera pictures.
Please note that BOTH(!) SRB's survived the explosion and continued to burn
for several seconds. I'll assume that the SRB's will be recoverable
in some form (depends if the chutes deployed). If so, they will help
pinpoint if they were the source of the explosion or if the main propulsion
system was at fault.
In the only publicly available view of the explosion the starboard SRB is
occluded, so it is difficult to see it's role. A small jet of fire
shot up from the bottom of the ET for maybe 1.5-2 seconds before the ET
exploaded (a 40-80 millisecond event). There was also a visible flame
near the front of the craft [I've speculated that the computers
may have attempted an ET separation when they discovered a problem - the
crew could not possibly react quick enough. On the other hand it
could have been the ET rupturing at another high stress point.]
Until they can get the flight telemetry analyzed, and get pieces of
the craft it is nearly pointless to speculate - except to help relieve
the anxieties of the general public who cannot wait for "the engineering
response". Quick answers are needed in this day of instant news, but
patience is something we should have instead.
I think I'm going to have trouble sleeping tonight.
- dave
|
117.19 | | TWEED::DEREZINSKI | | Wed Jan 29 1986 07:45 | 3 |
| It is very ironic that the Apollo 1 fire which claimed the lives of
three astronauts 19 years ago Monday, occurred on pad 39B..... the same pad
that Challenger was launched from yesterday.........
|
117.20 | | LYMPH::LAMBERT | | Wed Jan 29 1986 09:30 | 11 |
| Another theory (yet another) is that the wall between compartments in the
liquid fuel tank ruptured, allowing the oxygen and hydrogen to mix. The
smaller flare under the ET may have been either an attempt at separation
or the start of the catastophic explosion of the tank - which in turn
engulfed the ET.
(That theory comes from a Rockwell (?) engineer that ABC interviewed last
evening.)
-- Sam
|
117.21 | | MANANA::DICKSON | | Wed Jan 29 1986 10:23 | 16 |
| I saw a small flame at the rear between the shuttle and the main
tank. As the hydrogen is in the rear 2 thirds of the tank, this
could be hydrogen escaping from a hole in the tank and burning in
the (thin) air. Hole caused by something - one possibility is
a turbo-pump coming apart as it revved up to maximum boost.
The fire proceeded slowly forward and finally broke into the oxygen
feed line running down the side of the tank, or ruptured the bulkhead
between the H and O compartments. The major explosion thus occured
in the area of the bulkhead, 1/3 of the way back from the front
of the tank.
The force of the blast, coming from below, would have shattered the
shuttle instantly. From what I have seen of spacecraft at the
Smithsonian (Skylab, for example), they are constructed of very
thin aluminum, much like commercial aircraft.
|
117.22 | | PAUPER::AUGERI | | Wed Jan 29 1986 10:48 | 36 |
| I hope that they find out exactly what happened in order to quiet the
voices that are whispering sabotage or laxity on the part of NASA. The
latter is particularly important to me in view of a report that I heard on
ABC news last night: Someone made the comment that the external tank of
the shuttle had been hit by a crane sometime last week. No further
information was provided so you don't know whether it was a slight hit
(meaning that there was no possibility of damage) or whether it may have
been more serious. I do not think that the cold weather or ice had
anything to do with the problem. The external tank of the shuttle and
other liquid fueled rockets are typically covered with ice due to the fact
that liquid oxygen and hydrogen have temperatures of about 200 degrees
below zero.
I taped several hours of broadcast time last night and watched the
explosion frame-by-frame. From the time that they switched to the
close-up view of the shuttle until the explosion was only about 2 seconds.
In the space of about four frames you could see a flame erupt on the upper
cylindrical surface of the external tank toward the engine-end of the
tank, then a bright flash about mid-tank between the tank and the orbiter,
and then the explosion. However, even before the original flame on the
upper surface, there were some flames between the external tank and the
orbiter in the engine area. Also, there was a noticeable plume of gas in
the area where the flame originally erupted on the upper surface. I am
not familiar enough with shuttle launches to know whether this is typical
(the existence of the flames or the gas plume) or whether this is related
to the eventual destruction of the shuttle.
One comment on the news coverage: I thought that NASA's statements
regarding the possibility of anyone surviving were ridiculous. The actual
altitude of the shuttle at the time of the explosion seems to be somewhat
in doubt from the reports that I heard, but regardless of how high it was,
none of the occupants could possibly have survived simply because none of
them had parachutes. Does anyone have an idea why this question was
handled this way?
Mike
|
117.23 | | VIKING::FLEISCHER | | Wed Jan 29 1986 11:07 | 26 |
| The strength of the blast must have been awesome to so shatter the orbiter
(although, as a previous note mentioned, the orbiter like all airframes
is actually quite light). I would guess that there would be no way that
any amount of redesign could make such an explosion survivable. And I would
suspect that no amount of redesign could make an explosion impossible.
So I was impressed that the solid boosters appeared to keep on going --
as if they were (relatively) undamaged after emerging from the fireball
that shattered the orbiter.
Are there any range safety explosives on the Shuttle? Those unrestrained
yet burning SRB's could have been quite damaging if something caused
them to veer towards land.
I was reminded of both the Apollo fire and the Hindenberg fire. The Apollo
fire resulted in a better spacecraft. The Hindenberg fire ended the era
of the Zeppelins. Which will it be?
re .20 (I think):
I saw that quote from the Rockwell engineer. Note that the tank is made
by Martin Marietta, not Rockwell. I thought "easy for him to say".
Bob Fleischer
(former Martin Marietta employee)
|
117.24 | | TWEED::DEREZINSKI | | Wed Jan 29 1986 10:20 | 10 |
| RE: .22 NPR had a report in which NASA said that a derrick had bumped some
part of the Challenger (I believe they said is was one of the SRBs), but the
damage was checked out and the only repairs necessary were to some scraped
insulation....... They (NASA) seemed to indicate that this incident was minor
and was not related to yesterdays tragedy.
Dave...
|
117.25 | | KIRIN::OREILLY | | Wed Jan 29 1986 11:31 | 6 |
| I wondered about the NASA statement about 'possible survivors' myself. I
had an occasion last year to spend some time down at the Marshall Space Flight
Center, the NASA facility in Huntsville, AL, courtesy of DEC. They did a
lot of the stuff on the shuttle there, and after standing inside of a full-
size ET, and realizing the capacity that represented, FORGET IT!!! That
sucker had to be still at least 70% full when it blew...
|
117.26 | | OBLIO::SHUSTER | | Wed Jan 29 1986 11:49 | 21 |
| RE. 19
The irony is strange. A couple of points that may have nothing to do with
accident seem to have been glossed over: This was the first time a Shuttle
was launched from pad 39B. Before the launch, the commander, in fact,
expressed concern over this and predicted delays.
Also, I have read something about a mechanical arm scraping the side of one
of the fuel tanks; NASA claims this was insignificant and had nothing to
do with the accident.
I have been wondering if NASA rushed this launch just a little. In addition
to having a tight timetable for launches, they might have been anxious to
get Christa up in space close to the original launch date the sake of widening
publicity; more people seemed to watch and were interested in this launch
than any other. And certainly, with the millions of dollars needed for
the space program, support from the public is absolutely necessary. I don't
know, though. The thought that NASA might have rushed things was the first
thing that occurred to me.
-Rob
|
117.27 | | BOEHM::GRIFFIN | | Wed Jan 29 1986 12:10 | 15 |
| Re: .26
The points were glossed over because they most likely have nothing to do
with the accident. What would you expect?
Regarding rushing:
NASA has very strict launch/flight rules. About the only rules they bend
are weather related. Mechanical/avionic flight rules are (for the most part)
imbedded in the launch software and cannot be "stretched" or overridden.
They delayed the flight one day because a bolt was stripped - this is not
a characteristic of an organization that "pushes" launches.
- dave
|
117.28 | | BOEHM::GRIFFIN | | Wed Jan 29 1986 12:17 | 17 |
| Re: my response .18
I estimated the explosion time at 40-80ms. I wasn't thinking clearly.
400-800ms is what I meant.
This is significant in that there was almost assuredly enough time for
some usable telemetry to have been transmitted (probably 20-100 passes of
critical sensors). It also was enough time for the onboard software to
attempt a separation/abort (if that is even a planned manuever - something
that might be there).
ET separation can be done manually by the flight crew - I don't know if
the flight computers can do it whenever they want to.
If somebody learns of the fate of the SRB casings, please let us know!
- dave
|
117.29 | | NUTMEG::BALS | | Wed Jan 29 1986 12:45 | 8 |
| RE: .28
[From USA TODAY, January 29th edition, Page 3A]
"Pieces of the booster rockets have been found. The largest piece found so
far is 5 to 10 feet long and about 2 feet wide."
Fred
|
117.30 | | POTTER::MPASCARELLI | | Wed Jan 29 1986 12:12 | 6 |
| From the NASA press conference at noon :
"The SRB's were detonated by the Range Master at about 30 seconds
after the initial explosion. "
|
117.31 | | ENGGSG::FLIS | | Wed Jan 29 1986 13:18 | 28 |
| Excuse me if I may, I am not normally involved in this note, however I have
some information that may be desired.
NASA director MOORE indicated in a press conferance this afternoon that the
SRB's were self destructed shortly after the explosion due to the risk of
them becomming inbound under power. This has not been confermed, I will keep
you posted.
Due to the ammount of telemetry available, the Space Shuttle does not make
use of a "Black Box" flight recorder as is found on commercial aircraft.
An active effort is being made to try to locate bodies.
If the television vidio is watched closely, the cockpit of the orbiter can
be seen exiting the fireball, only to be engulfed again.
The large cloud of smoke resulting from the fireball is believed to be a
ball of snow caused by the super cold propelents. (This belief is strong)
The parachute that was seen belongs to one of the SRB's.
In order for any of the pioneers to have survived they would have had to
survive the explosion, exposure to 50,000 foot altitued in shirt sleeves,
a 50,000 foot drop and water & air temps approching the freezing mark.
God care for the souls of the departed and bless the surviving mourners...
jim
|
117.32 | | OBLIO::SHUSTER | | Wed Jan 29 1986 13:17 | 12 |
| Dave,
I wasn't criticizing NASA, just trying to make a little sense of the disaster,
without much knowledge of the technical aspects of a launch.
Actually, at this point, NASA is considering every possible shred of data,
including, most likely, those points I mentioned as being glossed over.
The "rushing" of the launch has been mentioned in the media, but, as you
said, there are strict rules for launching, not easily broken. In both my
case and the media's, this may just be an uninformed thought.
-Rob
|
117.33 | | POTTER::MPASCARELLI | | Wed Jan 29 1986 12:21 | 5 |
| It looks like the official memorial service will be Friday at 12:00 EST.
The President and his wife will attend. Can anyone confirm this time ?
Pasco
|
117.34 | | GODZLA::HUGHES | | Thu Jan 30 1986 09:08 | 31 |
| Someone asked about destruct mechanisms.
The SRBs and ET have destruct mechanisms in the form of explosives that
can be activated by ground control. They are primarily intended in the event
of a return to launch site abort and would be used to destroy the SRBs and
ET after speration (which occurs after SRB burnout).
The range safety destruct mechanism was used to destroy the SRBs sometime
after the explosion. The fact that the SRBs appeared to follow identical
trajectories would suggest that SRB failure is unlikely unless both failed
in the same manner.
There was some speculation on one of the networks (probably CNN) that the
ET destruct mechanism may have played some part in the events (the main
explosive charge is in the area where flames erupted first).
As for telemetry. The Challenger was considered an operational vehicle and did
not have the same amount of telemtry as the early Columbia flights. It carried
instrumentation to monitor operational systems and little else. The SSMEs and
SRBs are closely monitored so anything anomolous in the propulsion would be
expected to show up. Ground controllers noticed nothing amiss up to the point
of explosion and coninued to call out position data until several seconds after
the explosion. NASA said that they had not seen anything anomolous in the
telemetry in their press conference later in the day.
As an aside, part of the refit of Columbia was to include a lot more sensors
that NASA was unable to include of the early flights (budget pressures,
probably). They are intended to measure flight stresses on various parts
of the vehicle.
gary
|
117.35 | | BOEHM::GRIFFIN | | Thu Jan 30 1986 12:36 | 8 |
| Assuming that whatever caused the explosion was detectable by sensors, the
ground controllers probably would not have seen it. Sensor data arrives
very quickly and is summarized at human-readable intervals for the
controllers. It is possible that the raw data during the last second
or two of the downlink contains the clues that they need. I sure hope it
does.
- dave
|
117.36 | | CASTOR::MCCARTHY | | Sat Feb 01 1986 01:22 | 12 |
| re: .35 I think you can assume there is some raw data. The last bit of
the NASA narrative is that the Flight Dynamics Officer (who presumably
wasn't watching TV) suggested an explosion after the downlink
disappeared. It was 10-15 seconds (by my recollection) after the
explosion, so one would assume he put the no downlink and his own
telemetry together and got 4.
re: .19,.26 - I seem to recall that the Apollo I accident was on pad 34
not 39B. Disbelievers should look up a copy of "Murder on Pad 34"
by Erik Bergaust, an analysis of the fire.
-Brian
|
117.37 | | ATO01::VICKERS | | Sat Feb 01 1986 23:30 | 11 |
| Brian is, as usual, correct. Complex 39B was completed just a couple of months
ago and, I believe, that this was its first use.
There are, indeed, 'black boxes' on board the shuttle. These include voice
recordings of everything said by the crew.
One of the reasons for the voice recordings is, ironically, the value of the
voice recorders was proven by Chaffee's narrative during the Apollo diaster 19
years ago.
Don
|
117.38 | | CASTOR::MCCARTHY | | Sun Feb 02 1986 23:44 | 7 |
| Re: .35 That telemetry seems to be paying off. When NASA released the tape
Saturday which shows the apparent failure of the right hand SRB, a
report which someone on the team allegedly leaked to Jules Bergman
said that the SRB showed "reduced pressure" (I assume that means
exhaust pressure at the nozzle), which led NASA to believe the SRB
sprung a leak.
-Brian
|
117.39 | | MOTHRA::HUGHES | | Mon Feb 03 1986 09:20 | 9 |
| Pressure in this case is combustion pressure which is reasonably constant
throughout the SRB.
LC39B was originall built for Apollo. It has recently finished being
refurbished for shuttle use. If nothing else it was certainly used for Skylab
when they had a Saturn V and a Saturn IB both being readied for launch
(remember the 'milkstool'?).
gary
|
117.40 | | TROLL::RUDMAN | | Mon Feb 03 1986 16:52 | 7 |
| Last thing I heard was a theory on a cracked SRB. I think it will be some
time before a valid explanation is formulated and modifications are made
for the next flight.
"Keep pushin' the envelope."
Don
|
117.41 | | APOLLO::RUDMAN | | Mon Feb 03 1986 18:29 | 88 |
| (Moderate !Flame-on!)
This is going to be my last comment in this file with regards to the
myriad of theories running rampant. I read one today on the USENET that chills
me to the bone. The problem here is that there are bits and pieces of info from
the explosion that are a tiny piece of the puzzle and everyone believes that
they know from this tiny piece what the rest of the puzzle looks like. What
bothers me is that the info I read was claimed to be inside information obtained
from someone intimately involved with the control/monitoring of the mission.
According to this "informed source" the crew was aware of a problem shortly
after 1 minute into the flight and tried to abort and detach the shuttle prior
to the explosion and indeed, with the nature of the explosive bolts holding the
shuttle to the ET may actually have set off the ET. If one looks at the first
set of slow motions the networks had (with the overlays of the shuttle config.
it appears that the first bright flash came from the point where the forward
mount was.
First of all, I don't believe a word of this for several reasons.
1. If indeed the explosive bolts blew the ET, NASA had to know the
effect. To big a loophole to overlook. They procedure would
have either worked or wouldn't have been attempted.
2. If they knew that a/the SRB's were malfuntioning, they should have
been able to seperate the SRB's and tried an abort at a safer
altitude once the ET had burned out.
3. NASA has told us in the past that we hear from the shuttle what
they hear. The impression the aforementioned article left
me with was that there was communication with the shuttle
about the problem. Personal preference here, I believe NASA.
4. My first impression upon seeing the films was that the bolts did
indeed blow, but I believe that there was a tongue of flame
in that area before it blew.
(Turning the burner down a little...)
I want answers just like everybody else does, but I want the right
answers. I the crew knew nothing about the problem or everything about the
problem I think NASA will come out with the entire story once they have
completed their investigation.
With the debates rising over the wisdom of manned vs unmanned flight
and the press doing a moderate amount of sensationalizing and the dispersions
cast on NASA over the wisdom of going ahead with the launch due to the weather
conditions and the derrick arm incident, the last thing we need is what in my
opinion is an unfounded theory like the aforemention article put forth.
I am sick over the loss of the Challenger and the 7 crew. I'm tired,
shocked, dismayed, depressed, saddened, and feel the same sense of loss as
the rest of the country and reading that article added anger to the list.
I don't want to be angry. It was a terrible accident in a program that has
a million variables that could spell disaster every second of a mission and
a number finally got picked.
For whatever reason it happened, it happened. The clock can't be
turned back and we, NASA and the Shuttle flights have to go on.
(Flame almost out)
Lest anyone feels that I dispute the use of this notesfile for
the discussions that have taken place, rest assured that I don't. This isn't
my first entry and I'm sure it won't be my last.
When you lose someone close to you, you share grief with those that
are left. You need to cry, and talk about them, and cry a little more. As
with the assination of President Kennedy, we experinced a loss of someone that
we all felt close to without being close at all. For me anyway, it's almost
harder to deal with because there isn't a clear way to share those feelings
and really experience the grief and begin to get over it. I think that this
notefile has been the means for a lot of us to try to express our feelings as
part of the "healing" process and for that, I'm grateful that it exists.
(I think the flame's out now)
For those of you that made it this far, thanks for listening.
Here's hoping for a speedy investigation, rapid correction, swift
(but careful) implementation, and a return to the business a hand.
To the Challenger crew, wherever you are:
We'll never forget you. . .
Rick
|
117.42 | | PAUPER::GETTYS | | Tue Feb 04 1986 08:41 | 16 |
| Re. the crew knowing what was happening and trying to abort (especially
by "releasing" the SRB's).
It has been reported by NASA that the pieces of the SRB's thus
far recovered show positively that NO ABORT WAS TRIED! There are
evidently some very positive things that happen in the nose cone
of the SRB's (of which at least one has been recovered) which
definitily did NOT happen.
I would like to believe that they never knew, or that if they
did, it was mercifuly short (less than seconds).
/s/ Bob
|
117.43 | | BOEHM::GRIFFIN | | Tue Feb 04 1986 12:16 | 17 |
| Re: .41
I have been reading the USENET stuff (2 inches of paper over the
weekend) hoping that it would reveal good information on the
accident. I actually got angry reading the article you mentioned
(heck, my wife burst out in disbelief when I explained the
premise - and she's noway as "involved" with the shuttle as I
am)...
I could not believe the number of people who were proposing "what
went wrong" on the basis of 90 seconds of videotape. I've often
wondered where rags like the National Enquirer get people to
write their articles.... I know now.
Digusted with USENET,
- dave
|
117.44 | | MANANA::DICKSON | | Tue Feb 04 1986 12:34 | 11 |
| I really believe that they did NOT know. That makes it easier, knowing
that they did not see their end coming, but it makes me angry that
they COULDN'T know. There was PLENTY of time for them to break away
from the ET and glide back, had they (and NASA) known about that
flame shooting out of the starboard SRB. 10 to 15 seconds. If
they had broken off at the first sign of the leak, which was even
visible from the ground (if NASA had had live TV from the north
instead of just the south).
The faulty seam, or whatever it was, lead to the explosion of the
shuttle. But what killed the astronauts was lack of information.
|
117.45 | | SKYLAB::FISHER | | Tue Feb 04 1986 12:56 | 9 |
| re 37 et al:
Pad 39B was used for only one Saturn V launch: I believe it was Apollo
10. All the other moon flights were launched from 39A. 39B was used for
the Saturn 1B launches for Skylab, and (I believe) for ASTP (Apollo-Soyuz
test project). I don't know about Apollo VII (which was also a Saturn 1B
launch).
Burns
|
117.46 | | RANGLY::GILLEY_PAUL | | Tue Feb 04 1986 16:37 | 5 |
| If it makes any difference, Apollo VII was launched from a pad at
Cape Canaveral on the Air Force side of the river.
I would like to compliment Rick Rudman on one of the best stated
(FLAMES) I have seen so far.
|
117.47 | | MOTHRA::HUGHES | | Wed Feb 05 1986 09:37 | 49 |
| re orbiter serperation during SRB burn
Several notes have commented on the possibility of seperating the orbiter
from the rest of the cluster if there were time to react. I do not beleive
it is possible to do this with any amount of warning.
Why?...
- the dynamics of seperating two still thrusting SRBs without damaging the
rest of the cluster would be extremely difficult at best, if not impossible.
When the scenario was studied, the opinion was there was no procedure that
improve the chances of the orbiter surviving SRB failure. At one stage in
the program the SRBs were to have a thrust cutoff mechanism where large
vents at the from of the casing would be opened explosively, reducing thrust
to 0 and probably extinguishing the propellant (propellants of the type
used in the SRB will not continue to burn after a sudden drop in pressure)
- since the orbiter carries no fuel for the SSMEs, they would not be usable
if the ET was seperated (assuming that is doable in the atmosphere) so it
would have to rely upon the OMS to fly away from the rest of the cluster,
fast. The OMS was not built to do this and does not provide adequate thrust
for this kind of manouver. Again, early designs included abort escape rockets
on the orbiter to be used in an abort in the first two minutes of flight.
It was my opinion while closely following shuttle development in the seventies
that the orbiter could not survive a major failure if it occured in the
first two minutes of flight (i.e. before SRB seperation), with the exception
of non destructive failure of one of the SSMEs.
From Jane's Spacefilght Directory (reprinted without permission)...
Launch Aborts
There are 3 possible abort alternatives during the launch period. Return
to Launch Site (RTLS) would be used in the event of a main engine failure
in the first two minutes. The remaining engines, plus RCS thrusters, would
be used to acheive a pitch around manoeuvre enabling the orbiter to jettison
the ET 45km from the coastline and glide back to the KSC runway. Abort Once
Around (AOA) would be used from two min after SRB Sep, agian in the event
of a main engine faliure. The procedure relies on 2 OMS burns after ET jettison
to place the orbiter in a suborbital coast and "free return" orbit for re-entry
and glide back to the runway. Abort to Orbit (ATO) is available in the event
of a main engine failure after passing the AOA point. Again the procedure
relies upon 2 OMS firings, one to insert the orbiter into orbit, the other
circularise the path. An alternative mission might then be possible. When
asked about procedures for other possible failures, the favourite astronaut
response is : "Start worrying". No mission would survive an SRB failure.
End of quote
gary
|
117.48 | | MOTHRA::HUGHES | | Wed Feb 05 1986 09:39 | 5 |
| re .46
Apollo 7 was launched from LC34, the orginal Saturn I launch pad.
gary
|
117.49 | | SKYLAB::FISHER | | Wed Feb 05 1986 15:18 | 23 |
| From Aviation Week, October 15, 1979: (Obviously there may have been changes
since then!)
"Some exotic survival paths have been studies such as "fast separation" of
the orbiter from the still-thrusting solid rocket boosters. This might be
necessary if a serious loss of control occurred in first-stage flight.
"The fast separation maneuver is considered viable, but only marginally so,
during the last 30 sec. of first-stage flight. Use of ejection seats may
be the best survival choice during first-stage flight up to 100,000 feet
altitude <but only for the first 4 flights when they were installed, and
then only for 2 crew members..bf>. Ejection at low-altitude, first-stage
flight, however, could place the crewmen in the flame plume of the two large
solid-rocket boosters. In both the fast-separation and basic-contingency
options, there are areas where orbiter breakup would be likely before the
vehicle reached a low enough altitude and velocity for a survivable ejection."
P.S. Basic contingency aborts means "such dire emergencies as two- and
three-engine-out cases where loss of the spacecraft would be likely, but
a chance for crew survival would remain by ejection or ditching."
Burns
|
117.50 | | TROLL::RUDMAN | | Wed Feb 05 1986 16:54 | 22 |
| RE .42:
Interesting comment on getting angry. That was my first reaction when I
got home that night and started watching the news. No chance, that was first;
they were doomed after liftoff. Sure things go wrong (that's what most
of us get paid for), in this case the decision to abort wasn't possible;
one likes to think one has control over one's destiny, short- or longterm.
The justification: "They all knew the danger."
The anger was compounded by nationally broadcasting the instant grief of their
relatives and friends. Stick a mike in your face and ask how you feel.
Sure. Its news.
I watched it all until the anger subsided. 12:45 in the AM.
Anyway, as I touched on before, I'll wait 'til the official findings are
out; then I'll see how my gut feels.
Don
P.S. And yes, Richard, your entry was quite eloquent.
|
117.51 | | CASTOR::MCCARTHY | | Wed Feb 12 1986 23:59 | 9 |
| re: .42 There are smaller thrusters on the SRBs (small SRBs) which are used
to perform the SRB separation and in an abort, although survivability
is unlikely due to exhaust temperature. The separators weren't fired
on 51-L according to telemetry.
re: .47 In between the RTLS abort and the AOA is the emergency landing at Rota,
Spain. The AOA abort lands at White Sands.
-Brian
|
117.52 | Tomorrow is Discovery | DACT6::CHASE | Everybody is somebody else's weirdo | Wed Sep 28 1988 23:20 | 7 |
|
Tomorrow, Discovery will lift off.
It's been a long time. Assuming the success of Discovery, perhaps
we can put #117 to bed.
S. Chase
|
117.53 | "Challenger"-now a major motion picture????? | LUDWIG::PHILLIPS | Music of the spheres. | Mon Feb 26 1990 08:25 | 13 |
| Apparently, the TV networks seem to be unwilling to let the issue
go. Last night was the broadcast of a 3-hr. made for TV movie about
the Challenger (which was also featured on the cover of TV Guide).
It was frankly stated that the movie would open many old wounds.
The idea of such a project as this - to capitalize (let me put it
another way: to MAKE MONEY) on such a tragedy as this - lowers my
estimation of Hollywood to new depths. I refuse to dignify this
film by my watching it.
Does anyone have any comments re. the Challenger movie?
--Eric--
|
117.54 | Perhaps good idea, poor implementation | BEATLE::STRANGE | Steve Strange | Mon Feb 26 1990 10:28 | 20 |
| re: .53
Well, I saw parts of the film last night. I think it's important for
people to understand what exactly led up to the event, i.e., the
irresponsibility of the Thiokol and NASA management in ignoring the
recommendations of their engineers, and some of the engineers'
unwillingness to state their position for fear of losing their jobs.
Look at Roger Boisjoly (sp?), he voiced his opinion that they shouldn't
launch, and he ended up losing his job (or got demoted, and decided to
leave, same thing). While the engineers at Thiokol who didn't speak up
still remain at the company, and were the ones who designed the new SRB
ring seals!! (Boisjoly says the new design is even worse than the old
one!) I'm not necessarily blaming the engineers from not speaking up
as much as I'm blaming the engineer/management relationship that caused
the engineers to feel that they were unable to voice their opinions.
My problem with the film was that it didn't stress what I've stated
above.
Steve
|
117.55 | My $.02 worth | KAOA04::KLEIN | Nulli Secundus | Mon Feb 26 1990 11:24 | 17 |
|
I too watch the film, but from a different perspective. I was hoping
that they would show alot of the training for a space flight and
actual launch events. I was interested in the end of the film showing
the scene of the crew getting in the orbiter. I have never seen that
done for real and I assume that it was accurate. I also like the
training scenes from the STA flight and in the sim for an ascent with
aborts. These parts made the movie interesting. However, from the
point of view of the families involved I don't think that some of the
scenes were particularly flattering. The Morton Thiokol engineers were
protrayed as pressured to make management decision. The NASA official
(I don't remember who) who did the pressuring was particularly nasty.
I was happy at the end that they did not show Challenger blowing up,
since this is still distressing to alot of us even 4 years later.
|
117.56 | We shouldn't just let it go... | CEOWS::BALSAMO | Save the Wails | Mon Feb 26 1990 12:35 | 18 |
|
RE: 117.53 <LUDWIG::PHILLIPS>
>Apparently, the TV networks seem to be unwilling to let the issue go...
>It was frankly stated that the movie would open many old wounds.
It's been several years since the Challenger disaster. I saw the movie
last night and it made me appreciate the shuttle astronauts and Crista M.
more than ever. I don't know how accurate the movie was, but assuming that
it was pretty close, I think that the movie served as a reminder of what
can happen when priorities get mixed up...and the tremendous cost that
these mistakes have.
Family members who saw this movie should be proud of their own. For
though the lost of their lives was devastating, perhaps if we continue to
remember it, it will save the lives of others.
Tony
|
117.57 | It wasn't for me to watch | CLOSUS::J_BUTLER | Leave it better than you found it... | Tue Feb 27 1990 15:29 | 17 |
| I did not watch the movie, as the pain of the loss is still very
much a part of me. Several friends in the company I used to work
for (that did much shuttle-related simulation) knew some of the
astronauts.
I also regret the headlong flight from space that followed the tragedy.
It was almost as if we became afraid to try. Great explorations
require great risks. We cannot afford to make spaceflight risk-free,
but the efforts to minimize risk have dramatically slowed our progress
and left us with a failure-oriented manned program that our Congress
seems reluctant to fund. Yes, we must learn from the mistakes of
the past and apply the lessons learned. We must take all reasonable
precautions and use the best equipment we have. But we must not
stop.
We lost much that day...
|
117.58 | Don't make them likable or evil. Plain facts might be boring, but.... | AV8OR::KANDAPPAN | parthi@shyam | Wed Feb 28 1990 13:06 | 18 |
| Please consider whether the issue of negligence, pressure to go along with
corporate rules, stiffling of dissenting voices, etc wouldn't have been
brought out better by a very probing matter of fact documentary by NBC News
division; rather than a very dramatic portrayal of convenient facts that
clearly demarcates the Good and the Bad?
Ponder for a moment on whether Christa M and Judy R and the other brave souls
would have preferred a very superficial analysis of their lives and achievements
to a very thoughtful analysis of who they were, why they chose this job, what
made them gifted and how they went about their jobs. Particularly fascinating
to me - in a perverse way - was the almost simplistic capsulisation of the
achievements and efforts of each of the astronauts in a few minutes in a very
farcical [they would call it lively and humorous] setting; perhaps such
scenes did take place. But I'd trade a Frontline or a NOVA or even a NBC News
special documentary to a glitzy drama.
Just my opinion
-parthi
|
117.59 | I'll watch news, but I won't lower myself to a docudrama | PRAGMA::GRIFFIN | Dave Griffin | Wed Feb 28 1990 13:42 | 10 |
| According to Air&Space, the families did not wish this film to be made - this
was the primary reason for me not watching the film (although I knew I'd
miss some great "hardware" shots).
Perhaps for the millions of people who don't follow space travel as intently
as those in this conference, it was a way of conveying the story of what
happened. I, personally, find enough drama in the real event - I don't
require some writer to color it (and make money for it).
- dave
|
117.60 | For those who want real drama... | PRAGMA::GRIFFIN | Dave Griffin | Wed Feb 28 1990 13:47 | 15 |
| I think I mentioned this in a previous posting... if you get the chance,
see the Frontline report that came out about a year after 51-L. There
is a scene in the control room where, during a shuttle launch, an engine
shuts down and the launch controller has to make the decision to override
the computer and do an ATO, or let the system shut down the engines and
do a "real" abort. If he goes with the engineer who says its a sensor, then
the mission either ends up in orbit or it blows up. If he goes with the
computer, the mission ends up aborting - something that is a mighty dangerous
maneuver.
I suppose some people need manipulative music to get a response.
My stomach ends up in my throat just thinking about it.
- dave
|
117.61 | | BILBO::PIPER | Derrell Piper - VMS Security | Thu Mar 01 1990 10:03 | 16 |
| I too have read several reports which stated that several families of
the Challenger astronauts objected to the film but had no recourse
since astronauts are clearly public figures and therefore not subject
to the privacy the rest of us enjoy. For this reason, I also did not
watch the "docudrama." (Er, that term bugs me too.)
I did catch a Larry King Live the night afterwards when he had on a
representative from ABC (co-writer, producer maybe?) who was defending
the film. He very nicely reinforced all of my reasons for not watching
the film and, of the networks in general. My favorite line was where
he said that ABC had not produced the film to make any money. I was
unimpressed. He also repeatedly said that the show's ratings were
poor. I guess he wanted us to feel sorry for him.
I would not have objected to a real documentary from any decent news
organization, and I'll even include the networks here.
|
117.62 | Why the world needs writers | WRKSYS::KLAES | N = R*fgfpneflfifaL | Fri Mar 02 1990 12:56 | 30 |
| From: hairston%utdssa.dnet%[email protected]
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: Space Poem
Date: 2 Mar 90 16:06:23 GMT
Sender: [email protected]
Organization: The Internet
One of the Dallas papers ran an article last Sunday about the new
book "Eyewitness at the Revolution" (I may have garbled the title
slightly) by Peggy Noonan. Ms. Noonan worked in the Reagan White
House and was one of their best scriptwriters (oops...speechwriters.
Well, there I go again...). This is the person you can credit (or
blame) for Bush's "thousand points of light", but she is best known
for writing the speech Reagan gave after the CHALLENGER disaster.
In the article she told the story about finding the poem "High
Flight" and including part of it in the speech. When the rough draft
was circulated among the White House staff, someone opposed her using
the phrase "...they reached out and touched the face of God" and
suggested it be replaced with "...they reached out and touched
someone". According to Noonan "he had heard that phrase in a
commercial and thought it sounded good". Noonan threatened to kill
and the phrase was left intact.
Marc Hairston--Center for Space Sciences--Univ of Texas at Dallas
SPAN address UTSPAN::UTADNX::UTD750::HAIRSTON
Any resemblance between my opinions and the official positions of
the University of Texas system is purely coincidental.
|
117.63 | | USMRM3::SPOPKES | | Fri Mar 02 1990 17:03 | 8 |
| I'm interested in a comment made -.n earlier, abot how Boi(mumble,
mumble) thinks the new o-rings are worse than the ones previous.
Is this true? Do we have another enormous firecracker out there
*again*?
steve p
|
117.64 | "Oh! I have slipped the surly bonds of earth..." | LUDWIG::PHILLIPS | Music of the spheres. | Sat Mar 03 1990 08:44 | 9 |
| Re. .62
Glad to see somebody besides me likes "High Flight" - the White
House staffer who wanted John Gillespie Magee's poetry replaced
with a commercial for the phone company should be boiled in oil.
I am not an aviator, but every time I read "High Flight", I sure
feel like one. Way to go, Ms. Noonan!
--Eric--
|
117.65 | More info on the new design | BEATLE::STRANGE | Steve Strange | Sat Mar 03 1990 11:09 | 37 |
| re: .63 Steve P.
>I'm interested in a comment made -.n earlier, abot how Boi(mumble,
>mumble) thinks the new o-rings are worse than the ones previous.
>Is this true? Do we have another enormous firecracker out there
>*again*?
Well, I'll just be the messenger of this info, here's the scoop:
When I was at Cornell, Roger Biosjoly came to talk about the disaster,
and brought slides describing exactly what happened with the o-rings,
and even passed around a piece of the o-ring. These rings are about
4 mm thick, and about 12*pi feet in circumference! The tolerances on
the booster joints where the ring fits in are amazing! He also
described how the o-ring rubber doesn't reform to it's initial shape
(after being compressed) for a number of seconds at 32 degrees F., and
how he had made tests on this well before the disaster. This can all
be read in the Presidential commision's report, which is a rather hefty
document.
Anyway, in his talk, he described how the new joint design involved 100
bolts all around the circumference of the booster. He said there's no
way to torque all those bolts down properly, because they'd all need to
be tightened at once, which is pretty much impossible. And this would
cause stresses in certain areas, which he believed was not acceptable.
What he wanted was a design with steel rings, so they wouldn't burn
nearly as fast. The reason Thiokol didn't use this solution is because
it was considered too expensive, and would delay the return of shuttle
flights. His reccomendations again went unheeded. Instead, they went
ahead with the design put forward by the same team that designed the
first one, and Roger is out of a job. Obviously, at this point, Roger
probably does not know all the details of Thiokol's design efforts, so
his opinion can't really be accepted as fact w/o more info. But it
does make one think about how politics gets in the way of engineering
and safety -- of course this is nothing new to any practicing engineer.
Steve
|
117.66 | | USMRM3::SPOPKES | | Thu Mar 08 1990 13:24 | 7 |
| Re: -.1
Yuch. One would think the those that design the shuttle would have
the foresight of those who would design, say, toilet bowl cleaner.
steve p
|
117.67 | UPI: NASA's safety hotline prompts low response | PRAGMA::GRIFFIN | Dave Griffin | Wed Aug 19 1992 19:48 | 37 |
| From: [email protected] (UPI)
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 92 10:38:24 PDT
HOUSTON (UPI) -- NASA managers are overhauling a reporting system
designed to avoid a repeat of the 1986 Challenger disaster because they
are hearing fewer complaints than they anticipated, The Houston Post
reported in a copyright story Tuesday.
The NASA Safety Reporting System, or NSRS, which was designed to
handle 1,032 warning calls a year, has received only 254 calls since its
March 1987 creation.
The confidential system is one of two major programs that allow NASA
employees or contractors to express concerns about safety.
A Feb. 14 audit of the system, obtained by The Houston Post under the
Freedom of Information Act, said there are fewer calls because NASA has
not promoted the system.
``Whereas the program started with much emotion and enthusiasm,
promotional efforts have slackened considerably,'' auditors reported.
``Without NSRS as a backup safety reporting system, NASA runs an
increased risk that a safety incident might occur that could otherwise
have been prevented.''
The system, a preventive one in which employees can call about
suspected dangers before any occur, is one of two that NASA uses to
probe major safety problems. The other, NASA's Mishap Reporting and
Corrective Action System, is used to collect information after accidents
occur.
Almost 60 percent of calls to NSRS have come from two NASA
facilities: the Johnson Space Center in Houston and the Kennedy Space
Center in Cape Canaveral, Fla. While the system is designed to handle
safety concerns related to all NASA programs, two-thirds of the warnings
have dealt with the space shuttle.
``It's a good system,'' said Dwayne Brown, a spokesman for NASA
headquarters. ``It's now in all the centers.''
But NASA managers generally agreed the program has not been promoted
as well as it could have been and they have promised to correct the
problem.
Brown said employees and contractors will be provided written
materials, videotaped programs and briefings about the system.
|
117.68 | Pictures of crew cabin released | REAPER::FISHER | I *hate* questionnaires--Worf | Thu Feb 18 1993 12:33 | 12 |
| Someone apparently obtained 50-60 photos of the crew cabin
via the Freedom of Information act. This is not all the photos,
but the ones which s/he obtained are now unclassified.
Apparently there was a fairly thorough review to ensure that no
personal effects of the astronauts were showing, and the families
were consulted. The newspaper showed one of these photos;
it appeared to show the cabin in a hanger after it was recoverred,
not in situ, but you could not make out much from the paper
quality picture. It has not been in AW&ST (yet?).
Burns
|
117.69 | | WLDBIL::KILGORE | WLDBIL(tm) | Thu Dec 09 1993 09:03 | 6 |
|
Author Joesph Trento will be on whichever news-magazins show is in
this Friday night (20/20?). Trento wrote "Prescription for Disaster:
From the Gloyy of Apollo to the Betrayal of the Shuttle" (Crown
Publishers, Inc, New York, 1987).
|