| Article: 13489
From: [email protected] (Dan Corbett)
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
Subject: Brief History of the Vandenberg Shuttle Pad (kinda long)
Date: 5 Apr 1993 13:49:19 +1000
Organization: School of Computer Science, UTS
There has lately been a lot of discussion about the Space Shuttle
launch site at Vandenberg AFB (SLC-6), and the reasons why it was
scrapped. I worked on the Shuttle launch system at Vandenberg (along
with about 300 other programmers), so I thought I would throw in my
$0.02. I worked on the Electrical Power Distribution and Control
(EPDC) console software and part-time on the Integration console
software. Everything here is my perspective on what was going on, and
may not concur with "official" opinions. That doesn't mean I got it
right, though (or them either!) :^)
When I started in early 1983, the launch pad was still under
construction (or should I say, still being modified from the MOL
project - the impression was of a huge construction site). To give
you some time perspective, I remember one day when I had only been
there a few weeks or months, someone brought in a television and a
bunch of us gathered around to watch the launch of the maiden voyage
of the Challenger, which I believe was STS-6 (can anyone give me a
date?). Everywhere, there were signs which said, "Launch Day: October
15, 1985." They were supposed to get us fired up about our work. I
was already pretty fired up.
I worked for Martin Marietta, which had been given the Vandenberg
Shuttle contract by the Air Force. This caused some problems, since
Rockwell had been given the KSC contract by NASA. The two companies
were forced to work together, which caused lots of competition and
some heated debates, including debates about the suitability of the
launch site at Vandenberg.
At VAFB, the launch control room was located 1200 feet (yes, I said
*feet*) from the launch pad. At KSC, the launch pad perimeter fence
is around 1200 feet from the pad. The KSC control room is three miles
away. The AF engineers assured us that the walls of the VAFB control
building were quite thick and could easily withstand the blast. They
were somewhat less reassuring about the roof, which was everyone's
main concern anyway. The running joke was that the emergency cutoff
switches should be located on the floor under the consoles, since
that's where everyone would be anyway.
Then there came some problems with the tunnels which connect the
control building, the service building and the pad, and carried all
the data and control cables. These tunnels were RF shielded, and
sometimes acted like wave guides when signals were passed through
them, causing a lot of noise in the data. Then came concerns about
the length of the exhaust tubes, and accumulation of H2. Then the
concern about sound waves and exhaust bouncing or resonating from the
concrete tunnels and base. All of these problems were solved using
standard engineering techniques. Most of these problems were
discovered at KSC, during the early Shuttle launches, with both VAFB
and KSC being retrofitted with the solutions.
In 1984, I was in charge of the Electrical Power console when the
software was first tested against the hardware. Since the Integration
software hadn't yet been completed, this meant that the Test Director
and I were the two top dogs on the pad, for about an hour (what fun!).
Although the TD was nominally in charge of the test, I was calling the
shots over my headsets, and people were running around reporting back
to me. I was verifying that the software was causing the pad hardware
to do what was expected, and then the software was reporting the
changes back to me correctly. We powered up the pad and tested the
equipment, with engineers and AF inspectors watching what was going on
out there and reporting back. Everything worked great, except for a
few minor glitches which were easily fixed. No problems with noisy
tunnels.
The AF and NASA then got together and decided that it was silly to
have two contracts for the two sites. They took bids from two teams,
and announced that the Martin-Rockwell team had lost their bid, and
the Shuttle contract was awarded to the Lockheed-Grumman team.
Although many of the people at KSC would simply switch from Rockwell
to Lockheed and keep working on the Shuttle, the Lockheed plan called
for only a skeleton crew to remain at VAFB, so many of us would be
losing our jobs. So you see that morale around Vandenberg was rather
low at this point, when . . .
Around mid 1984, NBC television news in Los Angeles came out to VAFB
to produce a piece about the Shuttle project. To say the least, NBC
put quite a negative slant on it. They interviewed an AF colonel
(sorry, I don't remember his name) who had overall day-to-day
responsibility for the project. He told some of us that he had said
to an NBC camera something about "Yes, I've heard some people say that
the launch pad has so many problems, it ought to be bulldozed into the
sea." NBC edited his statement so that it sounded like *he* was
advocating that it be bulldozed into the sea. All hell broke loose.
News crews from all over (even other countries) came to find out about
the "bad roof on the launch room," the "exhaust tubes that would
explode," and the "communication tunnels that didn't work." NBC later
apologized for the story, but the apology never got the same attention
as the original story. I left the program late in 1984 when Martin
Marietta closed up shop, and I accepted a transfer to Martin's Denver
division.
Later, the Air Force decided that it couldn't really justify having
a Shuttle pad at VAFB. They could launch all their polar-orbit
satellites with Titans. Manned vehicles were complicated anyway. The
occasional polar launch that NASA had promised in order to get the
cooperation of the AF was really unnecessary. It came down to this:
NASA needed the support of the AF to get sufficient funding from a
reluctant Congress. The AF was just about as reluctant, but put up
some initial funding anyway, just in case the Shuttle turned out to be
a good thing. In return, the AF got ownership of one Shuttle orbiter
(the Discovery) and control over the VAFB schedule and pad.
After all the orbiters and facilities had been built, NASA didn't need
the AF anymore to keep the funding coming. They had committed the
government to a fifteen year contract with Lockheed-Grumman. The AF
found it more and more difficult to fend off the rumors of a defective
launch site, and to justify the use of the Shuttle. After a change of
command at several levels in the VAFB hierarchy, the order was given
to close SLC-6. Our software wasn't wasted, since much of it had been
written in cooperation with KSC, in order to have "compatible"
software. The software was just shipped off to KSC and added to what
they had developed. It could still be in use (but I don't really know).
So, the bottom line was: the VAFB Shuttle program was canceled due to
economics and politics, just like everything else in life. I don't
know many people in "high places," but I do know quite a few in "low
places" (ie clerks, secretaries, engineers) who happen to get a look
at a memo before it gets shredded, or hear a conversation as they walk
past an open door. This story is put together from what I saw, and
what these friends of mine saw. This in no way represents any
official opinion. Allow me to reiterate that this anecdotal account
is my perspective only.
Sorry if this got too long. I left out many details about the
software, construction and other aspects of Shuttle life at
Vandenberg. If there seems to be any interest or specific questions,
I would be glad to elaborate these details to this newsgroup.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dan Corbett
Current whereabouts unknown . . .
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| Article: 4483
From: [email protected] (UPI)
Newsgroups: clari.local.los_angeles,clari.tw.science,clari.local.california
Subject: Laser lights startle sky watchers
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 23:48:34 PDT
POINT MUGU, Calif. (UPI) -- A laser test and some missile
vapor trails put on a light show Tuesday night that startled many
Southern California residents.
The lights in the sky were caused by a Vandenberg Air Force
Base Peacekeeper Missile launch at 8:19 p.m. and the atmospheric
testing of laser device at Point Mugu Naval Air Weapons Station,
military officials said.
The light show shortly before sundown prompted dozens of
residents to call the news media and police and fire departments from
Santa Barbara to San Diego.
To some skywatchers, the lights resembled the aurora borealis,
rainbow-like luminous bands or streamers that usually are seen farther
north.
One television station received 40 telephone calls while the
Los Angeles Fire Department received so many calls, it issued a news
release on the lights, blaming the phenomenon on the laser testing.
Military officials said the combination of the missile vapor
trails and laser lights in the sky was a coincidence. But at first,
Air Force officials, unaware of the laser tests, thought residents
were just over-reacting to a routine missile launch.
The missile was the 12th Peacekeeper launched from Vandenberg
AFB in Santa Barbara County. The missile flew 4,800 miles to the
Kwajalein area in the Marshall Island in the Pacific Ocean.
But the Point Mugu laser test was a first. Base spokesman Bill
Green said the testing of the device with an orbiting weather satellite
will produce some more strange lights in the sky until October.
Officials at Point Mugu, located on the southern coast of
Ventura County, had planned to announce the laser testing Wednesday at
a news conference at the base. But apparently the testing began one
day early.
|
| Article: 21951
From: [email protected]
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
Subject: RE: Shuttle at Vandenberg??
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 94 11:27:06 GMT
Organization: IDS World Network Internet Access Service, (401)
884-9002 GUEST [telnet ids.net]
Technically the SLC-6 (Slick Six) complex is in mothballs and can
be made operational within a couple of years. But I wouldn't bet on
it, it's in the same likelyhood as Buran ever flying again or the DC-X
program actually leading to an 'airline-like' SSTO system.
SLC-6 was originally built in the mid 1960s to support the Air Force's
Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program. It was based on the
stretched version of the Titan-III launch vehicle. Crew quarters
were built and the program was fairly far along before it sucumbed
to the budget battle - and more importantly the fact that uncrewed
spy satellites could do its job better. The MOL astronauts who were
under 35 years old became NASA astronauts and several got to fly on
the shuttle (Crippen, Truly, Fullerton, Hartsfield, Overmeyer, Bobko,
and Peterson).
When the shuttle was designed it was decided to convert SLC-6 into
a shuttle-compatible launch pad. The magnitude of the task was
completely undetestimated. For the first time cryogenic (e.g. liquid
hydrogen) propellants would be used at Vandenberg. (Until shuttle
the only cryogenic fluids in use as Vandenberg were small quantities
of liquid helium aboard spacecraft with dewars like COBE and IRAS).
The water required for sound suppression alone each mission would tax
the areas's water supply network - to say nothing about processing
it after it was contaimnated with the SRB exhaust fumes. Many flight
paths would go close to Catalina Island - and its endangered bird habitat.
Well, most of these problems were worked out, and there were waivers
obtained for the rest. Because of the mission's high visibility the
Air Force agreed to permit limited press coverage of the launch
(although the mission would be secret - like other DoD flights). The
crew for the first mission was: commander Bob Crippen (making his
fifth shuttle flight), pilot Guy Gardner, MS2 Jerry Ross, MS Dale
Gardner, MS Mike Mike Mullane, PS Brett Watterson, and PS Pete
Aldridge. The last payload specialist Edward 'Pete' Aldridge was
also the Undersecretary of the Air Force and there were many complaints
about having to fly a VIP passenger on such a risky mission. I've
talked to Pete a couple of times and he claims that he wasn't just a
VIP passenger and had full PS duties, including memorizing a stack
of documents which would come up to his chest.
The mission also would feature the first flight of the Hercules
filament-wound solid rocket boosters, instead of the steel-cased
Thiokol boosters used for earlier missions. An additional SRB
recovery vessel, Independence, was outfitted for Vandenberg duty.
One of shuttle prototype Enterprise's final duties before retirement
was to do a fit-check of Vandenberg's facilities - just as it had done
at KSC before the first shuttle mission. That was performed in late
1985 and there are some interesting photos of Enterprise at SLC-6.
Discovery had already completed its final KSC mission (51-I) and was
in preparation for its trip to Vandenberg when the accident took place.
After the accident the Air Force looked at its requirements and
decided that the shuttle wasn't necessary for many of its payloads,
especially ones out of Vandenberg. When it's more expensive to build
a reusable satellite than it is to make throw-aways it's an easy
decision to make. More importantly, from a political point of view,
the shuttle was a NASA project. The Titan was a USAF project. Better
to use something you owe and need to justify to congress. (This was
also one of the key arguements to launch Galileo on the shuttle instead
of an Titan-Centaur for NASA). So with few payloads to justify the
high expense the Air Force decided to 'mothball' SLC-6 with the
understanding that it could be reactivated when necessary given a
couple of years notice. Much of the support equipment at Vandenberg
is now at KSC on 'loan' from the Air Force to NASA until the Air Force
needs it. Much of the hardware in OPF-3 was originally intended for
the hangar at Vandenberg, the Orbiter Transporter was designed to
handle the tricky roads from North Vandenberg to South Vandenberg, etc.
Oh yeah, the payload from the original Vandenberg mission ended up
flying on STS-39 as the partially declassified AFP-675 payload. It
didn't end up in a polar orbit, but 57.1 was quite adequate for its
research purposes. Three of the crew assigned to the Vandenberg flight,
Gardner, Mullane, and Ross, ended up flying on the STS-27 crew along
with Hoot Gibson and Bill Shepherd. Crippen went into management,
Gardner went back to the Navy, Pete Aldrige got a high paying
contractor job with mcDonnell Douglas and then the Aerospace Company,
and I never heard what happened to Watterson.
I found out recently that the Air Force wanted the capability to put
a small GAS size payload into the cargo bay very late in the count,
and the Vandenberg AIAA chapter had a series of experiments planned
for that mission. This was kept secred enough that the folks in the
Getaway Special program didn't find out about it for many years!
So what happened to SLC-6? There were brief talks about converting
it into a Titan IV-Centaur launch pad, but that never got anywhere.
The first launch from SLC-6 will take place this November - over
25 years after the MOL was supposed to take place. But it will be
an extremely small launch vehicle, the Lockheed LLV. It will use
an adapter plate to permit it to be mounted on the same launch hold-
down bolts which would have been used for the shuttle's SRBs. In
comparison it's a tiny booster.
As far as the payloads which would have been launched from Vandenberg
on the shuttle. Many of them simply disappeared, due to the end of
the Cold war, changing miliatry requriements, budget cuts, and existing
spacecraft in orbit lasting longer than anticipated.
At least three were launched into 'high' inclination orbits from the
Cape where compromises were made as far as mission performance. They
included the STS-27 payload (often called Lacrosse) the STS-36 payload
(often referred to as AFP-731) and the aformentioned AFP-675 on
STS-39. Contrary to popular opinion (and John Pike - see other threads)
no 'keyhole' series satellite has ever been launched from the shuttle.
They absolutely require sunsynchronous orbits (e.g. Vandenberg
launches) to accomplish their missions.
List of three letter acronyms so somebody doesn't ask and get ten
different replies with many mistakes:
STS - Space Transportation System
AFP - Air Force Project
GAS - Getaway Special
DoD - Department of Defenses
MS2 - Mission Specialist 2 - the flight engineer
and the heck with it - you can look up the other acronyms in the FAQ
Philip Chien
no sig yet
In Article <[email protected]>
[email protected] (David Spiceland) writes:
> I know they were going to use Vandenberg AFB in California to
>launch the shuttle for polar orbits. I saw a few stories about problems
>with workmanship on the pad and the decision was made to scrap the facility.
> Last week I picked up a book at a kids science museum and the
>book (fairly recent publication) said the facility would be utilized by
>1995.
> Is that true? Will it EVER be operational? If so, when?
> What was the original problem at Vandenberg?
>
>Thanks,
>
>Dave Spiceland [email protected]
>Appalachian State University
>Boone, NC
Article: 21955
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
From: [email protected] (thomas hancock)
Subject: Space Shuttle at VAFB (SLC6)
Organization: NASA/MSFC
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 1994 21:47:53 GMT
The old Enterprise was taken to VAFB/SLC 6 in 1985 as part of the
Facility Verif. & Val program (the orbiter was moved from north to
south VAFB and the vehicle stack (with the enetrprise) was errected on
the pad. Several functional test where conducted. All VAFB operations
where worked excluding those that the enterprise was unable to support.
The air force was big into shuttle launch and landing ops at VAFB and
plans where formulated to launch between 9-12 times a year. The
Discovery was to be based at VAFB and be the 'blue' orbiter. Early in
the development of SLC6 for the STS our major concern was ice forming
on the ET during vehicle stacking and fuelling. Later H build up in
the SSME flame trench was a concern but this was addressed byplanning
to ducting some of the hot jet exhust we would use to keep the ET warm
down into the SSME flame trench. ( a soluation to the ET ice problem
was setting two jet enginnes in a small block house near the launch
pad and ducting the exhust over the ET) There are other reasons SLC 6
was not used, but the air force gave it there best shot.
[email protected]
former project engineer/ air force systems command/ for sts at vafb
/ I speek for me and not NASA MSFC /
Article: 21954
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
From: [email protected] (Dennis R. Jenkins)
Subject: Re: Shuttle at Vandenberg??
Sender: [email protected] (USENET NEWS SYSTEM)
Organization: Florida Institute of Technology
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 1994 23:16:58 GMT
In article <[email protected]>, [email protected]
(maurice.r.baker) wrote:
> In article <[email protected]>
[email protected] (Dennis R. Jenkins) writes:
> >
> >We tried many possible fixes (giant water balloons in the bottom of the
> >trench to absorb the overpressure; fans to vent the hydrogen, etc. Nothing
> >worked. The last estimate I heard was close to $1 Billion (with a B) to
> >fix the problem by basically rebuilding the launch mount and flame
> >trenches.
>
> I'm curious what you mean by "tried" many possible fixes. I'm pretty sure
> that one of the shuttles was at Vandenberg for 'fit tests' to see how well
> it integrated with the launch complex. But I was under the impression
> that these were largely mechanical checks (maybe also electrical, etc.)
>
> But were the SSME's ever hot fired on the Vandenberg pad? How would
> these fixes be tested? Simulation?
'Tried' is probably not the correct term. No, we never had a vehicle that
had all the MPS/SSME on it (we stacked Enterprise as a mechanical
fit-check). But we did vaporize hydrogen into the flame trench and set it
off several times with various potential 'fixes' in place (the water
balloons, etc.) and did overpressure measurements. We knew what kind of
overpressures Shuttle could take since STS-1 did some marginal damage to
Columbia at KSC before the water deludge system was modified.
> I hope I've phrased my question correctly. For some reason, I'm
> fascinated with what went on out at SLC-6 and all the details --
> probably in the same way that many people are still hashing through
> the details of the Apollo lunar flights (which are very interesting too).
>
> Anyone out there with more stories about Vandenberg (SLC6, Shuttle,
> MOL, Blue Gemini, etc.) ?
For stories on MOL, try Quest magazine next month (they are doing a three
part article on it), the official USAF history (coming out next year
sometime), or my Space Station book (coming out if I ever stop playing in
the Net and finish it).
Dennis Jenkins
Article: 21968
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
From: [email protected] (Dennis R. Jenkins)
Subject: Re: Shuttle at Vandenberg??
Sender: [email protected] (USENET NEWS SYSTEM)
Organization: Florida Institute of Technology
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 1994 12:40:14 GMT
In article <[email protected]>, [email protected] (B.
E. Johnson) wrote:
> Can you shed some light on this for me? Wasn't it the Air Force that
influenced the
> design in the first place to have greater cross-range capability for
their needs and
> that is one of the reasons that we have the design that exists today?
Seems that I
> remember that a more 'pure' design of the system would have been
possible had the
> scientific aspects outweighed the military by a higher degree. Yes? No? ?
There is a fair discussion of the Air Force's influence on Shuttle's
design in my book ... it would take too long to restate it.
As for why they decided not to support it later, I personally believe it
was a territorial dispute. There was no way the Air Force was ever really
going to be able to operate shuttle. First, it was abvious that there
would never be more than four of them, and NASA would own them all.
Discovery was scheduled to become the 'dedicated' Air Force vehicle, but
what this meant was that all Vandenberg flights would use Discovery, but
Discovery might also fly from KSC under NASA sponsership. Also, NASA
controlled the configuration, safety, modifications, etc. for all the
orbiters. Basically the Air Force got the 'rent' a vehicle for one or two
flights a year. They also had to 'rent' the majority of the launch team.
By the time all of this became real clear, construction of SLC-6 was well
under way, and NASA and the AF decided to press on, as much for Congress'
sake as anything else. The STS-33 accident provided a good rationale for
the Air Force to press ahead with the Titan IV (which is a vehicle they
control).
Besides, Shuttle could *never* meet the launch-on-demand (the original
requirement was for 24-hour notice launches to replace spy-satellites). It
was also horribly expensive, somewhat inflexible, and had a very limited
payload from the west coast. Not that Titan IV really solved any of these
problems.
Dennis Jenkins
|