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Conference 7.286::fddi

Title:FDDI - The Next Generation
Moderator:NETCAD::STEFANI
Created:Thu Apr 27 1989
Last Modified:Thu Jun 05 1997
Last Successful Update:Fri Jun 06 1997
Number of topics:2259
Total number of notes:8590

270.0. "CRC Checksums and FDDI Bridges" by ARRODS::SWANSON () Wed Jun 05 1991 13:51

How do FDDI bridges handle CRC checksums when forwarding from the FDDI to 
Etherent.   I have just been explaining how our Ethernet bridges pass on 
CRCs transparently (providing there is no error in the incoming packet),
and bridges that re-generate them (Cisco, Wellfleet etc.) run the risk
of errors occuring inside the bridge causing erroneous data to be output
with a valid CRC.

Part of out proposal includes an FDDI hub, and the question was put back that
our FDDI bridges must regenerate CRC checksums because the frame formats are
different so aren't we running the same risk?

Could anybody explain whether the above scenario is possible with the FDDI
beidges, or has it been accounted for eg by memory parity checking or something.

Also on the new 600 bridges, are CRCs pass transparently between Ethernet ports?

Any help appreciated

Dave
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270.1good questionLEVERS::ANILWed Jun 05 1991 22:249
    Translating bridges, such as the ones we make, have to modify
    the packet and cannot maintain end-to-end CRC, as you say.
    However, without going into it in much detail, our hardware
    contains sufficient memory protection logic that packet
    corruption is not ever likely to happen.
    
    Yes, the 600 series will maintain end-to-end CRC's between Ethernets.
    
    Anil
270.2KONING::KONINGEesti vabaks!Thu Jun 06 1991 10:589
More specifically, the checking (or rather, re-checking) of the incoming 
CRC, and the generation of the outgoing CRC, are done at the same place
in the bridge (the same chip, if I remember correctly).

The result is that the probability of errors slipping by is about the same
as the inherent probability of errors slipping by CRC in the first place
(which is what the requirement is).

	paul
270.3think probability while thinking packet corruptionTALLIS::REGEThu Jun 06 1991 11:039
 Ref. 270.1

>   However, without going into it in much detail, our hardware
>   contains sufficient memory protection logic that packet
>   corruption is not ever likely to happen.
    
	"Packet corruption is not ever likely to happen" are very strong
	words. It is always prudent to think probabilistically
	when the issue is one of packet corruption.
270.4KONING::KONINGEesti vabaks!Thu Jun 06 1991 16:283
Re .3: correct -- my comment in .2 addresses this.

	paul
270.5Thanks for the explanationsARRODS::SWANSONFri Jun 07 1991 06:283
Thanks very much for the clear responses.

Dave
270.6Even better CRC protectionORACLE::WATERSI need an egg-laying woolmilkpig.Wed Jun 19 1991 11:0615
>More specifically, the checking (or rather, re-checking) of the incoming 
>CRC, and the generation of the outgoing CRC, are done at the same place
>in the bridge (the same chip, if I remember correctly).

    A clearer statement:
    In DEC's 10/100 bridge, at no time is a forwarded frame not protected
    by CRC.  Whereas another bridge might use byte parity to protect a
    frame sitting in memory waiting to be transmitted, DEC's bridge uses
    byte parity AND the original or new CRC to protect forwarded frames
    in the memory.

    As Paul said, this is accomplished by re-checking the original CRC
    as the new CRC is being computed.  I suspect that the entire data
    path in our bridge, for forwarded frames, is protected by CRC--
    possibly even throughout the single chip that recalculates the CRC.