| >What's the ISBN # of the Book then it can get traced by local bookstores?
The ISBN is 0-921791-02-7.
Title: "Can Israel Survive A Palestinian State?"
Author: Michael Widlanski, Editor and Project Coordinator
Publisher: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies,
Jerusalem
Contributors:
- Former US Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow
- Prof. Daniel Pipes, Director Foreign Policy Research Inst.
- Prof. Harvey Mansfield, Jr., Harvard Univ.
- Gen. Aharon Levran, former deputy cmndr, Israeli Army Intelligence
- Michael Widlanski, policy analyst, IASPS
- Prof. Robert Loewenberg, President, IASPS
Contents:
Section I: Military and Strategic Aspects
a. Military Dangers to Israel
b. Strategic Dangers to Israel
c. Regional Military and Strategic Considerations
d. Summary Conclusions
Section II:
a. Resolution 242 Today: Historical and Legal Aspects
Eugene V. Rostow
Document: Text of Resolution 242
b. Must the US Square the Arab-Israeli Circle?
Daniel Pipes
c. Outside Guarantees and an Arab-Israeli Peace
Michael Widlanski
Document: The Ford-Rabin Letter (One of several secret American
committments to Israel concerning territorial depth and the
Arab-Israeli peace process)
d. Dialogue of the Experts: Excerpts from four IASPS Task Force
Seminars and Correspondence. [Long list of contributors]
Document: The Allon Plan. (The first publication of the
top-secret plan presented to the Israeli Cabinet by Yigal Allon
in June, 1967.)
e. Secure Borders: A US-Labor-Likud Consensus
Michael Widlanski (An examination of the Pentagon Plan, the Allon
Plan, and the Camp David Accords.)
Document: The Pentagon Plan. (The first complete publication of
the plan presented by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning
the minimum strategic depth required by Israel for defensive
purposes.)
f. A Reflection on Peace in the Middle East
Harvey Mansfield, Jr.
g. What is Israel's Real Agenda?
Robert Loewenberg
don feinberg
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| From the book's summary (reproduced without permission):
A Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan River would not
bring a stable Middle East peace. Rather, it would likely lead to
chronic regional instability ending in a general Arab-Israeli war.
Such a state poses strategic and military risks for Israel that can
only be described as "unthinkable". Israel cannot rationally
acquiesce in the creation of an independent Palestinian state which
would reduce Israel's mid-section to a width of 9 miles, east to
west, put its sole international airport within range of
shoulder-launched missiles, and place four of its major cities
within 15 miles of the new state's border.
There is no two-state or two-sovereignty solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. If this conflict is perceived, as now it is,
as a struggle between the Jews of Israel and the Arab inhabitants of
the West Bank and Gaza, it is irresolvable by a two-state solution.
Considerations of such a solution inevitably involve modifications
or "options" such as demilitarized zones, no-man's-lands,
peace-keeping forces or even utopian and millennial speculations
about relations between Arabs and Jews. The compelling need to
offer these options only points up the study's finding that a
two-sovereignty solution does not exist.
By giving up the West Bank to and Arab state, Israel undermies
its security and gives away a key instrument of deterrence. The
military consequences of such a move, in addition to imposing
life-threatening reductions in Israel's mobilization time and
granting corresponding advantages to the various Arab war coalitions
in air and land attack time, include the dreaded prospect of pushing
Israel into a trip-wire mechanism. In other words, the creation of
an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza moves the
Middle East region (and not only this region) into the stage of
unconventional warfare: chemical, biological, and above all,
nuclear.
The Arab regular armies of the "eastern front" opposite the IDF
will create a numerical superiority of at least four to one agains
Israel. The odds grow worse for Israel depending on the size of the
Iraqi expeditionary force. If Egypt joined the fray, there would be
a force ratio of seven to one agains Israel (1,142,000 vs.
141,000). Because the West Bank is a natural tank trap, control of
the region by Israel will enable it to repel this war coalition.
Above all, Israeli possession will deter this coalition from acting
in the first place. Conversely, the threat from these territories
(quite aside from a voluntary relinquishment of them), is a threat
to Israel's existence.
The strategic and military consequences of an independent
Palestinian state in the West Bank will exist no matter who governs
such a state and whether it is strong or weak. This is because of
the strategic realities imposed by geography and modern weapons
systems.
Page 2
An independent Palestinian state would be run by the PLO. It
would be a springboard for surrounding hostile states, Syria
particularly. Even if the intention of the PLO were not to destroy
Israel, a supposition contrary to fact, the temptation would become
irresistable as the means to do so improve. Thie perception woul
excite long-held Arab hopes to destroy Israel, and would tend to
radicalize the Arab states.
The conventional wisdom that the Arabs have learned that they
"can't destroy Israel" is not the perception of the Arabs. Neither
is it true. Creation of an independent Palestinian state would
focus this perception by greatly improving the likelihood, thus the
eventuality, of destroying Israel in fact. The new state under the
direction of the PLO woul stimulate by design (a non-PLO state would
do so simply by its existence) the nationalist aspirations and
anti-Israel sentiments of the Arabs inside Israel. In spite of
Israeli hopes and wishes, Israeli Arabs identify with West Bank
Arabs. An independent state would exacerbate the terrorist and
irredentist problems for Israel to a point of intolerability, and,
for the Arabs, at low cost. Precisely because the increase of Arab
unrest, world pressure would be raised against Israel. This in turn
would restrain Israel's ability to control resistance, further
stimulating revolt. In sum, an insependent Palestinian state is no
option for Israel.
While Israel's strategic and military experts differ in their
views about how to deal with the strategic and military dangers to
be posed by an independent Palestinian state, a firm consensus
exists that such a state would in fact pose an unacceptable,
"unthinkable" threat to Israel.
The two-sovereignty solution is untenable. There is no
two-state solution west of the Jordan River. No state, particularly
a democratic one, should ever be asked to commit suicide, or even
think of steps tantamount to it. Therefore, Israel has no rational
ground to accede to the creation of an independent state, or even to
talk about it.
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I've seen this summary before (Jerusalem Post?). It raises some
important issues and deserves careful attention. It does not follow,
however, that all its conclusions are valid.
>While Israel's strategic and military experts differ...a firm consensus
>exists that such a state would in fact pose an unacceptable,
>"unthinkable" threat to Israel
In some quarters such a consensus exists, but not in all.
> The two-sovereignty solution is untenable. There is no
> two-state solution west of the Jordan River.
That MAY be true, but there are people who think it is worth
discussing, and many of those people live in Israel.
> two-state solution west of the Jordan River. No state, particularly
> a democratic one, should ever be asked to commit suicide, or even
> think of steps tantamount to it
But who defines what those steps are? The thesis of this book is that
since it is an impossibility, Israel should not even talk about it.
There are others that argue that a two-state solution is a certainty
and therefore Israel has to be forced to talk about it. I don't happen
to agree that it is either, and I think that one way to find out is to
talk about it.
There is a mindset that equates words with actions and things; words
are powerful but they are not actions and they are not things. The
fact that we talk about something does not mean we must inevitably do
it. I too, am skeptical of Arafat's intentions, but I do not think
that talking to the PLO is equivalent to committing suicide, nor do I
advocate making decisions on the basis of good-will. The problem is to
find a solution which is in the self-interest of both sides; those are
the kinds of agreements that endure. There is no certainty that such a
solution exists, but we dimish the likelihood of finding it if we
refuse to even look for it.
Aaron
(I do see one positive sign in this notes file; Jews and Arabs have
managed to exchange several comments without screaming at each other,
which is what has usually happened within about 48 hours in the past.
I hope that can continue. It is not necessary that we find agreement
--although that would be nice; just being able to disagree in a civil
manner is progress.)
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