[Search for users] [Overall Top Noters] [List of all Conferences] [Download this site]

Conference tallis::celt

Title:Celt Notefile
Moderator:TALLIS::DARCY
Created:Wed Feb 19 1986
Last Modified:Tue Jun 03 1997
Last Successful Update:Fri Jun 06 1997
Number of topics:1632
Total number of notes:20523

1545.0. "Report of the International Body on Armd Decommissioning (The real report, not 1542.17)" by GYRO::HOLOHAN () Thu Jan 25 1996 12:22

                              [The Irish Times]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

          Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              January 24, 1996

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 28 November, 1995, the British and Irish Governments issued a
Communique which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of a ```twin
track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and
on all-party negotiations.''

2. One track was ``to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with
a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation,
structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive
negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent.'' This has
become known as the political track.

3. The other track concerned the decommissioning of arms and was set forth
as follows in the Communique:

``5. In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to establish an
International Body to provide an independent assessment of the
decommissioning issue.

``6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from
Irishpolitics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report
on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of
arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last summer and
autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for
political purposes.

``7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to: - identify and
advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable
decommissioning; and - report whether there is a clear commitment on the
part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve
that.

``8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures.
The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties
to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue
and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence
on its merits.''

4. We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake in Northern
Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the
ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent
perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This
assessment represents our best and our independent judgment. We are
unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.

5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two
series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, 15th through
18th December, 1995: the second, 11th through 22nd January, 1996.

In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on December 9th,
1995.

6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens
of government officials, political leaders, church officials and
representatives of other organisations and institutions. We received
hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met
with many others. We thank all for their submissions.

Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but
are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving.

All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

II. DISCUSSION

7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives
brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to
us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the conflict in
Northern Ireland, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are
already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be
addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can
proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce
progress.

8. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by
individuals and groups in advancing the process of peace in Northern Ireland
to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister
John Major and Taoiseach John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) have
been essential to the peace process. They have been joined by other
political leaders, institutions, organisations and individuals in the
promotion of peace.

9. We considered our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the
people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that
their democratic and moral expectations can be realised; and in the spirit
of serious efforts made by the British and Irish Governments to advance the
peace process.

10. For nearly a year and a half the guns have been silent in Northern
Ireland. The people want that silence to continue. They want lasting peace
in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part.

That was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we
received from those in the North and South, Unionist and Nationalist,
Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.

11. Notwithstanding reprehensible ``punishment'' killings and beatings, the
sustained observance of the ceasefires should not be devalued. It is a
significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the
commitment of the paramilitaries to ``work constructively to achieve'' full
and verifiable decommissioning.

12. Since the ceasefires, the political debate has focused largely on the
differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations
intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has
obscured the widespread agreement that exists - so widespread that it tends
to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far
apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.

13. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and
the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.

14. In paragraph five of the Communique we were asked ``to provide an
independent assessment of the decommissioning issue''. It is a serious
issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absence of trust.
Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why
the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned
acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.

15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue - or any other issue -
will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of
historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is
really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern ireland.

16. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many
years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a
lasting peace will call for reconciliation with those they hold responsible
for their loss and pain. Surely the continued suffering and bereavement of
individuals and of families should never be forgotten.

But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and
that is something no one can desire.

17. Everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with the need to
decommission. There are differences on the timing and context - indeed,
those differences led to the creation of this Body - but they should not
obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total and
verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That must continue
to be a principal objective.

18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not
lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many
issues involved in the political track. The parties should address those
issues with urgency.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE

19. To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the gun out of Irish
politics, there must be commitment and adherence to fundamental principles
of democracy and non-violence. Participants in all-party negotiations should
affirm their commitment to such principles.

20. Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such negotiations affirm
their total and absolute commitment: a. To democratic and exclusively
peaceful means of resolving political issues; b. To the total disarmament of
all paramilitary organisations; c. To agree that such disarmament must be
verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission; d. To renounce
for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or
threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party
negotiations; e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in
all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful
methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may
disagree; and, f. To urge that ``punishment'' killings and beatings stop and
to take effective steps to prevent such actions.

21. We join the Governments, religious leaders and many others in condemning
``punishment'' killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear that those
who have used violence to pursue political objectives in the past will do so
again in the future. Such actions have no place in a lawful society.

22. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so
out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, threaten to use
force, to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome
of negotiations with which they disagree.

Given the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern.
The principles we recommend address those concerns directly.

23. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove the threat of
force before, during and after all-party negotiations. They would focus all
concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of
Irish politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and verifiable
disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That should encourage the
belief that the peace process will truly be an exercise in democracy, not
one influenced by the threat of violence.

IV. COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING

24. The second of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the
Communique asks us ``to report whether there is a clear commitment on the
part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve''
full and verifiable decommissioning.

25. We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those
in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and
verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations;
but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such
negotiations.

26. After careful consideration, on the basis of intensive discussions with
the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security
forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilitary
organisations will not decommission any arms prior to all-party
negotiations. That was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the
representatives of the political parties close to paramilitary organisations
on both sides. It was also the view of the vast majority of the
organisations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is
not that they are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary,
many favour it. But they are convinced that it will not happen. That is the
reality with which all concerned must deal.

27. Competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning. One was that
decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were
told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles,
and of a permanent end to the use of violence, is the safe removal and
disposal of paramilitary arms, and that at this time only a start to
decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party
negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the need
for prior decommissioning before the ceasefires were announced and should
not now be able to avoid that requirement.

28. In the competing view we were told that decommissioning of arms prior to
all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the
ceasefires, and that had it been, there would have been no ceasefires; that
those who entered into ceasefires did so in the belief they would lead
immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior
decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the
ceasefires were declared, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such
negotiations. In this view, the ceasefires having been maintained for nearly
a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no
further requirements.

29. We believe that each side of this argument reflects a core of reasonable
concern which deserves to be understood and addressed by the other side.

30. Those who insist on prior decommissioning need to be reassured that the
commitment to peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of
politically motivated violence is genuine and irreversible, and that the
threat or use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process
of negotiations or to change any agreed settlement.

31. Those who have been persuaded to abandon violence for the peaceful
political path need to be reassured that a meaningful and inclusive process
of negotiation is genuinely being offered to address the legitimate concerns
of their traditions and the need for new political arrangements with which
all can identify.

32. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome this impasse. That
is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a
comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to
reassure all parties to the negotiations.

V. DECOMMISSIONING DURING ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

33. One side has insisted that some decommissioning of arms must take place
before all-party negotiations can begin. The other side has insisted that no
decommissioning can take place until the end of the process, after an agreed
settlement has been reached. This has resulted in the current impasse.

34. The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning
would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than
before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a
compromise. If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse
must be overcome. While both sides have been adamant in their positions,
both have repeatedly expressed the desire to move forward. This approach
provides them that opportunity.

35. In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to use the process of
decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations.
As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on
decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in
a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

36. The first of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communique
asks us ``to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for
full and verifiable decommissioning''.

37. We recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of
decommissioning. These recommendations are realistic in light of the nature
and scale of the arsenals in question, estimates of which were provided to
us by the Governments and their security forces. We believe these estimates
to be accurate.

38. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-party
negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting
confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined
by the parties themselves.

The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.

39. The ceasefires and the peace process are products not of surrender but
rather of a willingness to address differences through political means. This
essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the
decommissioning process, which should not require that any party be seen to
surrender.

The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an
independent commission.

40. The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an
independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be
appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations
with the other parties to the negotiating process.

41. The commission should be able to operate independently in both
jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity.

42. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and
technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments
and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should
be able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical expertise of
the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.

The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of
armaments in a manner that contributes to public safety.

43. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of
the armaments. Procedures for destruction would include the cutting up or
chipping of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of
ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions
disposal.

44. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods,
subject to negotiation, including: - the transfer of armaments to the
commission or to the designated representatives of either Government, for
subsequent destruction; - the provision of information to the commission or
to designated representatives of either Government, leading to the discovery
of armaments for subsequent destruction; and, - the depositing of armaments
for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by
representatives of either Government.

Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves.

45. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are
safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

The decommissioning process should be fully verifiable.

46. Whatever the options chosen for the destruction of armaments, including
the destruction of weapons by the parties themselves, verification must
occur to the satisfaction of the commission.

47. The commission would record information required to monitor the process
effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of
the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report
periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning
process.

The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution.

48. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process should not be
prosecuted for the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be
established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for
decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law
from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the
decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law
in either jurisdiction.

49. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise
their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge
appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit
armaments on their behalf.

The decommissioning process should be mutual.

50. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment
and participation of the paramilitary organisations.

This offers the parties another opportunity to use the process of
decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations.

VII. FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

51. It is important for all participants to take steps to build confidence
throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many urged
that certain actions other than decommissioning be taken to build
confidence. We make no recommendations on them since they are outside our
remit, but we believe it appropriate to comment on some since success in the
peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the decommissioning
of arms.

52. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in
the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities,
including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to
peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the
fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision
of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who
have been forced to leave their communities under threat.

53. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So
would early implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation,
consistent with the evolving security situation.

54. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned.
In the Communique, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is
limited to those weapons held by paramilitary organisations. We accept and
share that view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those held
by security forces. However, in the context of building mutual confidence,
we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of
the Communique, ``to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their
respective security authorities, as the threat reduces''.

55. We share the hope, expressed by many on all sides, that policing in
Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the security situation
permits. A review of the situation with respect to legally registered
weapons and the use of plastic bullets, and continued progress toward more
balanced representation in the police force would contribute to the building
of trust.

56. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body.
We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communique to ``whether and
how an elected body could play a part''. Elections held in accordance with
democratic principles express and reflect the popular will. If it were
broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-strand
structure, an elective process could contribute to the building of
confidence.

57. Finally, the importance of further progress in the social and economic
development of Northern Ireland and its communities was emphasised time and
again in our meetings, in the context of building confidence and
establishing a lasting peace.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

58. Last week we stood in Belfast and looked at a thirty foot high wall and
at barriers topped with iron and barbed wire. The wall, which has ironically
come to be known as the ``peace line'', is a tangible symbol of the division
of the people of Northern Ireland into two hostile communities. To the
outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselves they are fearful and
antagonistic.

59. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people
of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. There is a
powerful desire for peace in Northern Ireland. It is that desire which
creates the present opportunity.

60. This is a critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. The peace
process will move forward or this society could slip back to the horror of
the past quarter century.

61. Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions will simply
continue the stalemate which has already lasted too long. In a society as
deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching across the ``peace line''
requires a willingness to take risks for peace.

62. The risk may seem high but the reward is great: a future of peace,
equality and prosperity for all the people of Northern Ireland.

George J. Mitchell; John de Chastelain; Harri Holkeri.

January 22nd, 1996

THE MITCHELL REPORT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright, The Irish Times Contact: [email protected]
T.RTitleUserPersonal
Name
DateLines
1545.1GYRO::HOLOHANThu Jan 25 1996 12:317
  Well here we are folks, 17 months later, the prospects of peace looked 
  closer, but guess what, it's time for another British pre-condition.
  Yes, yet another new pre-condition.  This time it's a "new election  
  precondition".

                              Mark
1545.2PLAYER::BROWNLTyro-Delphi-hackerThu Jan 25 1996 13:104
    See 1542.<several> for a rather more balanced and objective, not to say
    exhaustive view on this than can be found in .1
    
    Laurie.
1545.3PLAYER::BROWNLTyro-Delphi-hackerThu Jan 25 1996 13:17277
    Here's the submission to the Mitchell committee from the Alliance
    Party. This bears *no* resemblence to the rhetoric I hear from the IRA.
    The more I hear of the Alliance Party, the more I feel they are the
    people who really care about peace and the future of NI. Please read
    it.
    
    Laurie.
    
    
Alliance Party Submission to the International Body
on Decommissioning

This is the full text of the Alliance submission to the International
Body chaired by former US Senator George Mitchell.

Introduction

In March 1991, after almost four years of what were described as 'talks about
talks', the British and Irish Governments, and four of the Northern Ireland
political parties (Ulster Unionist Party, Social Democratic and Labour Party,
Democratic Unionist Party and Alliance Party), reached agreement on
arrangements for formal negotiations about the future of Northern Ireland.
There would be three strands of talks, to address the three most important
sets of relationships. The British Government and the four Northern
Ireland parties would address the question of the divisions within Northern
Ireland, the British and Irish Governments, together with the four parties
would address the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic
of Ireland, and the two Governments would deal with relations between the
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, but would keep the four parties
informed of these discussions.

Talks were convened, were adjourned without agreement, and new talks
were recommenced the following year on the same basis, and with the same
participants. More progress was made on this occasion, and the outlines of a
possible settlement began to emerge, but agreement was not achieved, and a
view began to develop within the Irish Government of the time and the
SDLP, that a new process was needed, which would try, prior to the
achievement of a political settlement, to bring to an end the terrorist
campaigns which had been almost unremitting since 1969. This would
facilitate the involvement of Sinn Fein, and perhaps others in new and more
inclusive talks. Accordingly the Talks process which had taken four years to
establish, and which had been operative on and off for eighteen months, was
set aside in favour of a new process.

This new process was predicated on the notion that a set of principles could
be established which would be acceptable to unionists and would be
agreeable enough to republicans for them to suspend their campaign. The
loyalist campaign was stated to be in reaction to republican violence, and so
could be expected to remit following a Provisional IRA ceasefire. A period
of negotiations between the two Governments ensued, with consultations
with the various parties and on 15 December 1993, the two Governments
published a Joint Declaration, in which it was agreed that the future of
Ireland was a matter for the people of Ireland alone, but that the
constitutional position of Northern Ireland would be subject to the consent
of the people of Northern Ireland. This Declaration was welcomed by SDLP
and Alliance, grudgingly accepted by the Ulster Unionist Party, and rejected
by the DUP and Sinn Fein. At the end of August 1994, the PIRA declared a
cessation of military operations, and some weeks later the Combined
Loyalist Military Command followed suit. In February 1995, the two
Governments published Frameworks for the Future of Northern Ireland,
two discussion papers on the three sets of relations on which the earlier talks
had been based. Again these were welcomed by the SDLP and Alliance,
rejected by the DUP and Sinn Fein, but this time also by the Ulster
Unionists.

Since October 1994, the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, convened by
the Irish Government under the terms of the 1993 Joint Declaration has
been meeting in Dublin. neither Unionist party has attended, but SDLP,
Sinn Fein and Alliance have joined with the southern parties to explore
ways forward. To date no agreement has been reached on the central issue of
consent. All the parties except Sinn Fein have accepted the 1993 Joint
Declaration, but no statement has yet been able to be devised on this issue
which Sinn Fein feels able to accept.

We describe this background in outline because it is essential to be clear that
the process of Inter- Governmental and Inter-Party talks which was
established with difficulty in 1991, has now been on hold for three years, in
order to find a way to enable Sinn Fein, which represents 10% of the people
of Northern Ireland, to join the process. The Joint Declaration whose
purpose was to achieve this, has not been found acceptable, nor has any
other formulation which would be agreeable to anyone else. This has bred an
increasing sense of frustration and distrust all around.

The ceasefires have been most welcome of course. They have led to an
economic boost to the whole island, and have given a sense of hope to a
community which had only known the unremitting grind of terrorism, and
anti-terrorist measures for a generation. There has also been a lowering of
the security presence with a removal of the army from the streets, and
indeed some troops have been withdrawn from Northern Ireland. On the
paramilitary side however there have been consistent attempts to control
the people of certain areas through the use of vicious punishment beating
and murders, and all moves to decommissioning the significant illegal
stockpiles, have been dismissed.

Aware that from the start that this would be a serious problem, we proposed
to Prime Minister, John Major in September 1995, shortly after the PIRA
ceasefire that both governments should open up channels of communication
to those who control the weapons, rather than their political representatives,
who were insisting that they were in any case separate organisations. This
early appreciation by is of a need to address political progress, and the arms
issue separately, ultimately found expression in the launch by the two
Governments of a 'Twin-Track Approach' in late November 1995. Prior to
the launch of the twin-track we had already published our own proposals for
the political track. That document 'Let the People have their Say', proposes
elections to All-Party Talks, and should be read in conjunction with this
submission. For this reason we are enclosing copies for your information. 

The Need for Decommissioning

Illegal weapons pose a serious threat to society, and to peace. In South
Africa, where a remarkable political transformation has taken place, the
problem of illegal weapons is proving to be most difficult, and at a recent
visit to the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation in Dublin, Vice-President
De Klerk said that he felt it was an issue which they had not handled well,
and that this was now causing serious loss of life and high levels of crime.
Since much of the rationale for the three year diversion which we took from
the previous talks process, was in order to address the problem of removing
the gun from Irish politics, there is an additional political imperative in our
own process. Add to this the fact that the republican movement has not yet
been able to subscribe to any of the public political statements which have
been set out between the differing parties, and it begins to become clear why
the decommissioning issue has become such a central obstacle. It has not
prevented Alliance from engaging in talks with Sinn Fein or the Loyalist
parties, and we have had regular, and worthwhile meetings over the past
year, but in all of that time we have failed to make any progress on the arms
question.

It is clear that for the majority of people in Northern Ireland, and indeed
according to recent polls it would appear that this view is shared by the
majority of people in the Republic of Ireland, that the continued existence of
illegal weapons undermines the peace process by perpetuating communal
fears of a return to violence, and casting doubt on the real intentions of
those who say that they have given up violence. This is especially so when
there are almost daily prognostications from Sinn Fein of a return to
violence in certain circumstances. The retention of illegal weapons suggests
a preparedness to return to violence, and presents to those involved a
temptation to fall back to violence in the event of political frustration and
disappointments.

The fear that such weapons will be used for more common criminal activity
has been demonstrated to be well-founded, as evidenced by punishment
beatings and recent murders, and the risk that they might fall into the hands
of elements opposed to the peace process, must also be regarded with
increasing seriousness. 

Principles of Decommissioning

Our thinking might be summarised in the following principles: 

 1. The central importance of decommissioning lies in providing the
   necessary community reassurance which will facilitate political
   progress to be made, and a settlement acceptable to all achieved.
   Changes in security arrangements can be publicly observed. This is
   not so with illegal weapons. Given the suffering of all sections of the
   community over the past twenty-five years, and the hurt, anger and
   fear which are the inevitable residue of that experience, it is vital that
   the whole community be satisfied that there can be no going back to
   violence, if trust is to be established, and lasting political progress
   achieved. 
 2. There can be no equivalence of paramilitary weapons, and those of
   the legitimate security services. We do however note, and welcome,
   the progress which has been made since the ceasefires, in reducing
   security force levels of deployment, and the clear indications that
   this process will continue if circumstances permit. 
 3. If the decommissioning process is to succeed we recognise that
   sufficient assurances will be required by those involved that they will
   not compromise themselves by participating in it. This would include
   legal protections for negotiators. 
 4. Entering a serious process of decommissioning will not be an easy
   step for organisations which took great trouble to establish illegal
   arsenals. It is however necessary to provide proof of their good
   intentions, to those who necessarily profoundly distrust them. It is
   also the only way of ensuring that they make an irrevocable choice
   about their future activities. 
 5. The issue needs to be addressed now because it is providing serious
   problems for the peace process already, and potentially fatal
   problems further along as we engage in crucial and difficult
   negotiations. 
 6. The objective must be the removal of all illegal weapons and the
   standing down of the organisations which have held and used them.
   While it may be that this is unlikely to happen in a complete or
   comprehensive way in advance of overall political agreement, steady
   progress towards that end is essential. A plan or developing menu of
   action should be constructed to this end. 
 7. In Ireland the long history of the use of violence for political ends
   must be brought to an end. The three year detour in the Talks
   Process would be well worthwhile if as a result of it no future
   generation could look to this generation for justification of the use of
   violence as a political instrument. 

Methods of Decommissioning

Our observations here are preliminary - more in the nature of a first
comment, than of a final word, since we are still conducting discussions with
experts. 

 1. In order to be accepted, the procedures will need to be practical, and
   regarded as non-threatening to those involved. The actual operation
   may therefore need to be carried out by an independent international
   agency. The present commission, or another similar body, would be
   very suitable, but additional resources, and technical and field staff
   would be required, and its legal position would need to be adequately
   defined in both jurisdictions, so that its officers could deal with those
   possessing illegal weapons, and the weapons themselves, without fear
   of prosecution or other prejudice. 
 2. Initial work by this commission, in collaboration with the police and
   security services in both jurisdictions would attempt to establish
   expected inventories of materials. Work with the paramilitary
   organisations involved would need to construct inventories from
   their records and information. Comparisons could provide some
   initial verifications. 
 3. Inspection of stored materials by field officers would provide further
   verification of fact, and commitment to the process. 
 4. Physical decommissioning and destruction of armaments and
   materials could be accomplished by commission field officers, or be
   carried out in their presence and under their supervision. 
 5. At this point it is unlikely that useful forensic examination could be
   conducted. 
 6. Many people in Northern Ireland have legally held weapons. Some
   have been acquired for personal security purposes, often on the
   recommendation of the police. It would be useful if such weapons
   could also be taken out of circulation, and consideration might be
   given to the paying of financial compensation in such circumstances. 

Commitments

The Commission is briefed to report on whether there is a clear
commitment to decommissioning on the part of those who possess illegal
weapons. This is important in reassuring the community on the intentions
of these organisations, on both sides. A number of factors are relevant here. 

 1. The fact of the ceasefires for a substantial period, now in excess of 15
   months. Regrettably this must be set beside the continued evidence
   of punishment beatings, and murders, which are clearly under
   political control (e.g. they ceased prior to and during the period of
   President Clinton's recent visit, and then recommenced on his
   departure). 
 2. Statements by parties which claim to speak authoritatively for the
   paramilitary organisations, unequivocally ruling out any justifiable
   return to violence, or stating that violence could never in the future
   be seen as a legitimate means to further political end, would clearly
   be helpful, as would commitments to solely democratic methods, and
   an acceptance of the principle of consent as described in the 1993
   Joint Declaration. 
 3. Affirmative intelligence assessments on the activities of the
   organisations involved, may be of assistance. 
 4. Evidence of authorised representatives engaging in serious and
   practical work and planning of the modes and details of
   decommissioning, would show commitment. 
 5. The production and verification of inventories, and locations would
   be an important and persuasive indicator of commitment. 
 6. Site inspections, and ultimately the actual commencement of
   decommissioning would be a primary indicator of commitment. 

Some of these indicators are available to the public. The continuing reality
of intimidation and violence against persons will weigh heavily in the public
assessment of commitment, and would weigh against the significance of
some otherwise persuasive indicators of commitment.

Other indicators will only be accessible to the commission, which will have
to reach its own conclusions on the available evidence. This is of most value
where it results from direct contact with those who directly control the
material. The conclusions of the commission will be important. The
strength and value of the conclusions will depend not only on their
acceptance by those whose intentions and commitments are being assessed,
but on the persuasiveness of the conclusions to the responsible
governments, the various political parties, and most importantly, the people
of Northern Ireland.

Success in this track of the process will inevitably have implications for the
prospects of success in its twin track. We wish the Commission well, and
assure the members of our full co-operation and assistance in their difficult
task. 

Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, 88 University Street, Belfast BT7 1HE
Phone +44 1232 324274. Fax +44 1232 333147. E-Mail 
[email protected]
1545.4CHEFS::COOPERT1Te Nae Coutou Tamarekei NaFri Jan 26 1996 06:2410
    .1
    
    Is a condition of Sinn Fein "The I.R.A. must still be allowed to kill
    innocent civilians so they can get the monopoly on selling class A drugs
    to 12 year olds."
    
    Do you not see this Mark, or do you choose not to see this?
    
    
    CHARLEY
1545.5GYRO::HOLOHANFri Jan 26 1996 14:239
 re. .4

  Only the British propoganda machine, attempts to link the Provisional
  Irish Republican Army to drugs.  This propoganda attempt is as obvious
  as it is false.


                       Mark
1545.6Adams Rejects Major Proposal GYRO::HOLOHANFri Jan 26 1996 14:3674
                                   [Image]

                               25 January 1996

                        Adams Rejects Major Proposal

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sinn F�in President Gerry Adams speaking today said:

``In my statement yesterday I said that the Mitchell report had removed all
pre-conditions and accepted `that all issues should be dealt with in open,
democratic negotiations.' This provided a `basis for moving forward so that
all matters can be settled to the satisfaction of all sides as part of the
process.' In other words the Mitchell Report pointed to a possible avanue
into all-party talks. This does not suit Mr. Major.

John Major has rejected the Mitchell report. He has done so because he does
not want all-party talks and because he feared that Sinn F�in would not
reject the principles outlined in the Mitchell Report. The content of these
principles already coincides to a large degree with Sinn F�in positions
which are a matter of public policy.

The purpose of asking political parties to agree to these principles, is, as
I understand it, to underscore the commitment of all parties who will
participate in negotiations to a democratic outcome and to peaceful and
democratic methods of influencing that outcome. Sinn F�in's position on this
is absolutely clear.

This was most publicly stated in July 1995. Following a meeting in Dublin,
the Taoiseach John Bruton, the T�naiste Dick Spring, John Hume and I jointly
re-iterated our `total and absolute commitment to democratic and peaceful
methods of resolving political problems,' and the `objective of an equitable
and lasting agreement that can command the consent and allegiance of all'.

John Major does not share that commitment.

Instead Mr. Major has clearly acted in bad faith, rejecting the core of the
Mitchell Report, scuppering the twin track approach and the February date
for all-party talks, and in their place has produced a new pre-condition
based on a unionist proposal.

Even if this unionist proposal was implemented David Trimbe and Ian Paisley
have made it clear hat unionists will not engage in substantive
negotiations.''

In conclusion, Mr. Adams said:

``Let me reiterate Sinn F�in's opposition to Major's proposal.

It has nothing to do with consolidating the peace process, it has everything
to do with keeping Major in power and with satisfying Unionist resistance to
all party talks.''

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sinn F�in Press Office
44 Parnell Square
Dublin 1
Tel: +353-1-8726100 / +353-1-8726839
Fax +353-1-8733074

Released in the US by:

Friends of Sinn F�in
1350 Connecticut Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: +1-202-331-7886
Fax: +1-202-331-8117

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Sinn F�in Home Page | Sinn F�in Documents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[email protected]
1545.7you can't do that!OTOOA::CROOK&quot;my cat is in the doghouse...&quot;Sat Jan 27 1996 15:245
    this topic came up in a conversation lately and a friend made the
    suggestion that the 2 sides should turn over their arms to each other
    for disposal!
    
    naw, thats too simple.
1545.8CHEFS::COOPERT1Te Nae Coutou Tamarekei NaMon Jan 29 1996 06:3713
    .5
    
    I've said it before, and I'll say it again....you really have not got a
    clue what you're talking about Mark. Even though you pretend you do.
    
    That is one of the most pathetic notes I've seen you write.
    
    You live in a world of fantasy and imagination Mark and I think you
    need professional help.
    
    
    CHARLEY
                                                               
1545.9Are you a doctor?MKTCRV::KMANNERINGSMon Jan 29 1996 08:5315
     >  You live in a world of fantasy and imagination Mark and I think you
     >  need professional help.
    
    
    CHARLEY, what is that remark supposed to achieve? I think there has
    been some progress in improving the quality of debate in this file.
    There is no need to make comments questioning the mental health of
    other noters. Stick to the subject and leave out the personal crap,
    or shuddup.
    
    Kevin
    
    
    
    
1545.10CBHVAX::CBHLager LoutMon Jan 29 1996 09:1010
re .9,

whilst not condoning personal attacks, I do not think it is surprising in the 
least that Mark should be the subject of such comments, as he has quite a 
history of using this very tactic, amongst even more unpleasant ones, such as 
thinly veiled threats of various descriptions, against other noters in an 
attempt to intimidate them when he feels unable to defend some of his 
ridiculous claims.

Chris.
1545.11please don't start it again...MKTCRV::KMANNERINGSMon Jan 29 1996 09:502
    2 wrongs don't make a good omlette Chris. Anyway, wot are you doing
    here?
1545.12CHEFS::COOPERT1Te Nae Coutou Tamarekei NaMon Jan 29 1996 09:5317
    .11
    
    Kev, I don't see why I should have to listen to Marks opinionated rhetoric 
    about me being "A bootlicking Tory supporting Sycophant" and statements
    like "YOU are the problem."
    
    If I've got to listen to his opinions then he should listen to mine.
    
    .9 
    
    >>shaddup<<
    
    
    No.
    
    
    CHARLEY
1545.13CBHVAX::CBHLager LoutMon Jan 29 1996 10:033
>                      -< please don't start it again... >-

er, excuse me?  I don't think `it' ever stopped.
1545.14Oh yes it has...MKTCRV::KMANNERINGSMon Jan 29 1996 10:5115
    >Well, it's time to admit to myself: This conference is dead.  It serves
    >no purpose either in its original role or as a debating medium. 
    >Perhaps
    >I might look in again sometime to see if things have changed, but I
    >don't expect that they will.
    
    Chris, this was in your goodbye note in October. I suspect you have
    missed all kinds of excitement in the meantime. You may not even know
    where Santa Claus was born or who the traitor was who backed Holland.
    Who is the dangerous driver who killed that dog?  Or even the bit about
    peace with justice in CELT. I think 'it' has changed a bit for the
    better, but have a look yourself. 
    
    Anyway, I think all personal remarks should be decomissioned  without
    preconditions....  
1545.15CBHVAX::CBHLager LoutMon Jan 29 1996 11:2536
>    Chris, this was in your goodbye note in October. I suspect you have
>    missed all kinds of excitement in the meantime. You may not even know
>    where Santa Claus was born or who the traitor was who backed Holland.
>    Who is the dangerous driver who killed that dog?  Or even the bit about
>    peace with justice in CELT. I think 'it' has changed a bit for the
>    better, but have a look yourself. 

I've still visited the conference to see how things were going, I've just kept 
out of any arguments.  The following example seems to be the basis of the less 
desirable discussions that take place:

noter 1: "Here's a report which goes to prove that Sinn Fein are great, and
          that all the English are bastards"
noter 2: "That's a load of biased old tosh and says nothing useful"
noter 1: "You're English and therefore thick, shut up and go away you limey
          boot licking tory scum"
noter 2: "Up yours, you ignorant xenophobe"
noter 3: "Noter 2, please curtail your personal remarks"
noter 2: "But I didn't start it!"
noter 1, unperturbed by all this: "Here's another report which goes to prove
          that Sinn Fein are great, and that all the English are bastards"
noter 2: "Oh for ****s sake."
noter 3: "Will you please shut up, noter 2?"
noter 2: "It wasn't bloody me that started this, I've told you before"
noter 1: "Of course it's your fault, you're English scum"

etc, etc.

>    Anyway, I think all personal remarks should be decomissioned  without
>    preconditions....  

agreed.  The above dialogue becomes tiresome, and, at risk of sounding like 
I'm taking the piss, it'll take an effort from all parties to see that this 
doesn't keep happening.

Chris.
1545.16CHEFS::COOPERT1N.F.I. mate.Mon Jan 29 1996 11:399
    I totally agree Chris.
    
    On the other hand I don't see why I have to stand and be silent when
    someone slags my nation/country down. Just because he's read something
    that paints anything to do with Britain and her Armed Forces badly,
    whether it is blatantly untrue or not, it has to go in this conference.
    
    
    CHARLEY 
1545.17CBHVAX::CBHLager LoutMon Jan 29 1996 11:489
.16,

I'd suggest just pointing out, however eloquently you feel like, that any 
offending articles are a pile of crap, and why, rather than questioning the 
author's parentage or whatever.  I won't be drawn into any slanging matches, 
as they just go on and on, and will resist temptation to respond to offensive 
comments in kind but treat them with the contempt they deserve.

Chris.
1545.18Back to the topic at hand...NEMAIL::HANLYMon Jan 29 1996 12:3623
    Any chance of going back to the original topic?
    
    My opinion, for what it is worth, is that Major is threatening
    elections to appease the Unionist politicians and appear as a
    hard-liner to certain elements in the Tory party.  The Mitchell
    Commission and World Opinion will point out that Major's suggestion
    isunrealistic and counter-productive.  Then, he can say to the
    Unionists, whose political suppport he desperately needs, "sorry, lads,
    I tried my best, but it looks as if we will have to proceed with talks
    without the IRA handing over all their arms" or words to that effect.
    
    I find it hard to believe Major (as does Ian Paisley) ever since Major
    said that it "would turn his stomach" to have talks with the IRA when
    his own people were doing just that!  Also, so much goes on behind the
    scenes that all is not often as it appears.  The IRA or Sinn Fein will
    probably reply that if elections happen, it is back to the guns.  We will
    appear to be at the brink, everyone will have satisfied their own
    hard-liners, but common sense will prevail and the talks will continue. 
    The alternative is too frightening and too sad to contemplate.  The
    long-suffering people of Northern Ireland deserve peace more than any
    of us can imagine.  Let us hope for the best.
    
    Regards, Ken Hanly  
1545.19What's the ObjectionWARFUT::CHEETHAMDMon Feb 05 1996 05:1612
  Before proceeding further can I state that this is a request for information
rather than an invitation for abuse.

  What is the objection to elections to a body to conduct the proposed
negotiations. If all parties involved receive a democratic mandate, as I 
assume that they would, surely this would make the results of any such
negotiations binding. As I stated above I would be grateful if someone could
tell me why the SDLP, Irish Government and Sinn Fein object so strongly to
elections.

                              Dennis
 
1545.20IRNBRU::HOWARDLovely Day for a GuinnessMon Feb 05 1996 05:3012
>> If all parties involved receive a democratic mandate, as I 
>> assume that they would, surely this would make the results of any such
>> negotiations binding. As I stated above I would be grateful if someone could
>> tell me why the SDLP, Irish Government and Sinn Fein object so strongly to
>> elections.

    All parties involved already have a mandate from the last elections. An
    election would return the same people with the same share of vote, i.e.
    the status quo. This is why this election idea is perceived as
    stalling the process....
    
    Ray....
1545.21what's the next excuse ?MKTCRV::KMANNERINGSMon Feb 05 1996 06:1631
    Well, it seems to me that it is a question of good faith. John Bruton
    seems to think he had a deal with John Major which Major has bounced.
    The same seems to apply to John Hume, but I haven't followed his
    statements closely.
    
    It seems Bruton and Hume got Adams to string along on the basis that
    there would be all party talks in February. The grass roots of the IRA
    think Major is just stringing them along and want to start putting
    bombs in Basingstoke Railway Station again. So when Major made his
    election call Bruton and Hume had to shout foul in order to keep faith
    with Gerry Adams. 
    
    On a practical level, the election will put pressure on fragile
    relations and increase the risk that the hardline physical force school
    in the IRA will get the upper hand. For example there will be a big
    problem in west Belfast where Joe Hendron of the SDLP beat Gerry Adams
    last time with the help of Unionist votes. If John Hume pulls that
    stroke again there will be a big split in the Nationalist community
    with unforseeable consequences. On the other hand, Joe would like to
    keep his seat.
    
    The bottom line for me is that the Unionists still don't give a damm
    for the peace and are intent on dropping Hume and Major in it rather
    than negotiating.  The victims are the ordinary people who suffer most
    from the armed struggle. 
    
    Why can't they come to negotiations at once? Elections will happen in
    time anyway. And once the elections have happened, what is to stop the
    Unionists finding another excuse, or sabotaging negotiations through
    intransigence?        
                  
1545.22MOVIES::POTTERhttp://avolub.vmse.edo.dec.com/www/potter/Mon Feb 05 1996 06:196
I hate to say this, but this reads to me very much that
"Sinn Fein/IRA don't want elections becaust they know that they don't have the
support of the people"

regards,
//alan
1545.23CHEFS::COOPERT1Bring back Men-yes.Mon Feb 05 1996 06:234
    That just about sums it up Alan.
    
    
    CHARLEY
1545.24why not 32 county elections ?MKTCRV::KMANNERINGSMon Feb 05 1996 08:4117
    You are changing your question...
    
    Originally you wanted to know why Hume, the Irish govmt and SF/IRA
    don't want elections...
    
    On the question of whether the IRA feel they don't have support, you
    have to understand that as far as the IRA are concerned, elections in
    NI are fundamentally undemocratic as the border was established against
    the wishes of the people under threat of "terrible and bloody war"  and
    through the use of terror by HMG. 32 county elections would be fair as
    far as they are concerned.
    
    That is why they feel entitled to use terror in return and regard the
    debate about elections as a con. You may feel what you like about it, I
    am not trying to judge, only to understand the present situation.
    
    Kevin
1545.25Ch-Ch-Ch-Changing?WARFUT::CHEETHAMDMon Feb 05 1996 09:1114
    re .24 >You are changing your question...
    
    ???? I only entered 1 reply (.19) unless I've started noting in my
    sleep.
    
    re .20-.24 Thanks for the opinions. I can see why SF-IRA don't like the
    idea of elections since they don't recognise Ulster as a seperate
    constituency from the rest of Ireland, but why are the Irish Government
    so opposed to the idea? It would be interesting to know the nature of
    the deal that John Bruton thought he had with John Major, were certain
    outcomes to the proposed talks understood to be likely?
    
                              Dennis
    
1545.26MKTCRV::KMANNERINGSMon Feb 05 1996 10:3013
    oops, sorry, I thought .19 + .22 were from the same pen.
    
    Re the Bruton-Major deal. I think the Irish Johnny thought he had a
    gentleman's agreement with the English Johnny to the extent that talks
    would begin provided the IRA decommissioned on the basis of the Mitchel
    proposals. That was all. But I haven't been following the diplomatic
    small print...
    
    At the end of the day the nationalists may take up the election idea
    but it seemed to me at first that the Meath farmer felt that the failed
    London bus conductor was not playing with a straight bat. 
    
    Kevin                                                    
1545.27TALLIS::DARCYAlpha Migration ToolsMon Feb 05 1996 10:5542
>  What is the objection to elections to a body to conduct the proposed
>negotiations. If all parties involved receive a democratic mandate, as I 
>assume that they would, surely this would make the results of any such
>negotiations binding. As I stated above I would be grateful if someone could
>tell me why the SDLP, Irish Government and Sinn Fein object so strongly to
>elections.
    
    I think there are several reasons...
    1) This is seen as just another roadblock, after the "decommissioning of
    weapons" issue. What will the British come up with next?
    2) People want the issue resolved today. Most people want peace
    negociations to occur now, not 5 years from now. One thing I notice is
    that this delaying tactic is pissing off a great many moderates in the
    Republic. And in my opinion, once you lose their support, the peace
    issue will be harder to tackle.
    3) As mentioned in the previous notes, what do we gain from elections
    that we don't already know? The percentages of votes are probably not
    going to change radically. What will the British do the with results -
    only invite parties to the negociations that score over x percent in 
    the elections? How do you deal with the issues of gerrymandering and
    vote blocking? And are you going to invite the Republic to vote in the
    elections?
    
    The whole idea of the peace process is to let every party in Northern
    Ireland have some say in how the 6 counties should be governed. The
    whole problem stems from the minorities in NI not being fairly
    represented and protected. If the British truly want peace, they would
    stop the political maneuverings and say to everyone
       "We know there's a problem in Northern Ireland, let's all
        assemble in a forum, state each of our grievances, and not
        leave until we hammer out an agreement that is acceptable to
        all. Each party will have to compromise on issues, but at end
        of the day each of us will gain something, the best part being
        lasting peace in NI."
    That's all they have to do.
    
    I ask you -> Why cannot Britain be objective, fair, open-minded,
    and progressive in dealing with the issues in Northern Ireland?
    Must we labor for another 25 years?
    
    George
                        
1545.28MOVIES::POTTERhttp://avolub.vmse.edo.dec.com/www/potter/Mon Feb 05 1996 11:2018
    On the question of whether the IRA feel they don't have support, you
    have to understand that as far as the IRA are concerned, elections in
    NI are fundamentally undemocratic as the border was established against
    the wishes of the people under threat of "terrible and bloody war"  and
    through the use of terror by HMG. 32 county elections would be fair as
    far as they are concerned.

I asked .22, I think I also asked the same question as .19 somewhere else.

I'm obviously very naive; I realise that the people who will be affected
by NI becoming part of the Republic will be those who are currently living in
NI.  Therefore it seems reasonable that they should have the choice.

But then again, I don't have half a century's historical baggage and
religious hatred to carry around with me...

//alan

1545.29MOVIES::POTTERhttp://avolub.vmse.edo.dec.com/www/potter/Mon Feb 05 1996 11:2921
re .27

    What will the British do the with results -
    only invite parties to the negociations that score over x percent in 
    the elections?

    I ask you -> Why cannot Britain be objective, fair, open-minded,
    and progressive in dealing with the issues in Northern Ireland?
    Must we labor for another 25 years?

George,

Again, as one with no particular axe to grind, is it not reasonable that 
a certain percentage of support is required before a party is given a chance
to take part in the negotiations?  If there isn't a hurdle, how do you decide
who to allow?  Should we not invite the fascist and communist parties?  
Unless someone can prove that they do represent a significant portion of the
community (even 1 or 2 per cent) you have to invite everyone and his dog!

regards,
//alan
1545.30WOTVAX::DODDMon Feb 05 1996 11:3011
    I've been out of the country for 10 days or so so missed some of this.
    What is the proposed base of the elections? Is the proposal to use
    parliamentary constituencies? North and South? Or what?
    
    As I have said before I'd like to see the British withdraw, say 1/3rd
    of the armed forces and then sit at a table and invite others to join
    them.
    
    Thanks
    
    Andrew
1545.31Redrawn bordersTAGART::EDDIEEasy doesn&#039;t do itMon Feb 05 1996 11:509
    Re .28
    
    Alan,
    
    If you did "carry half a century's historical baggage" you would know
    that the NI border has been re-drawn several times to ensure a unionist
    majority.
    
    Ed.
1545.32Sombre warning from senator MitchellTAGART::EDDIEEasy doesn&#039;t do itMon Feb 05 1996 11:5679
Extracted without permission from today's edition of the Electronic Herald

                   Mitchell warns of return to violence

     By CHRIS STARRS

     THE IRA is in danger of splitting, with breakaway
     members returning to violence, former US Senator George
     Mitchell warned yesterday.

     Mr Mitchell, who headed the three-man advisory body on
     decommissioning of terrorist weapons, said all sides should
     redouble their efforts for peace.

     ''It seems clear that not all on the Republican side favour the
     ceasefire and the potential for some elements to take direct and
     violent action does remain,'' he said.

     ''I hope that is not the case. I do believe that the political
     parties that are closely associated with the paramilitary
     organisations on both sides -- Republican and Loyalist -- are
     committed to the process.

     ''That's why I believe it is important to draw them further into
     the democratic process by getting these negotiations going as
     soon as possible,'' Mr Mitchell told the BBC's Breakfast With
     Frost programme.

     His warning came after the IRA denied responsibility for a gun
     attack on the home of a policeman in County Tyrone. The IRA
     condemned as ''mischievous'' claims that it was behind the
     attack. Friday's shooting and the murder on Tuesday of INLA chief
     of staff Gino Gallagher raised fears that the ceasefire could
     crumble if the peace process was not moved forward soon.

     In the US, Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams said the drive for
     peace would not be ''capsized''. At the Pittsburgh Convention
     Centre yesterday, he said his party was ready to work with
     anyone.

     ''All the players are saying that the pursuit of peace will
     continue, that it is bigger than any personality, and that a
     historic moment can't be capsized by a domestic squabble,'' he
     said.

     Sinn Fein's senior strategist, Mr Martin McGuinness, told Radio
     Scotland's Eye to Eye programme that he did not believe there was
     any danger of splinter groups emerging from the IRA.

     ''I do believe . . . there is a very clear British Government
     strategy, not just to split the IRA, but to split the broad
     Republican family and even to split those families in the Irish
     Nationalist consensus, and even attempting to split the Dublin
     Government itself.''

     Asked about Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble's offer of talks
     with Sinn Fein after elections, Mr McGuinness said: ''David
     Trimble is trying to draw us into a trap, he has not been honest
     about what he intends to do in his Stormont convention. All of us
     in the North of Ireland who have had very bad experiences, since
     the partition of Ireland, of Unionist rule are very, very fearful
     about the prospect of such a scenario.''

     Mr Trimble criticised the IRA and other Republican groups,
     telling the Breakfast With Frost programme: ''They are
     quintessentially fascist organisations and within the last week
     we've had a murder committed almost certainly by the IRA, an
     attack on a policeman which may or may not have been committed by
     the IRA or it may have been committed by some splinter
     organisation.

     ''This ties in with the increased tempo of violence since the
     Mitchell commission started work in December and that doesn't
     augur well for the future.''

     * A 22-year-old man is recovering after a so-called IRA
     punishment squad forced its way into his home in the Creggan area
     of Londonderry and beat him with baseball bats. - Feb 5
    
1545.33On the subject of the objectWARFUT::CHEETHAMDMon Feb 05 1996 12:2821
    
>    I ask you -> Why cannot Britain be objective, fair, open-minded,
>    and progressive in dealing with the issues in Northern Ireland?
>    Must we labor for another 25 years?
    
    George
          the objectivity, fairness, open-mindedness and progressivness of any
proposals are somewhat dictated by the point from which you are observing them
(are in fact subjective :-} ). 

           I do however feel that it would be highly regrettable if the chance 
to tie all parties into non violent means by including them in talks is lost 
due to this election requirement being introduced. Given that the election 
requirement is seen as a means to make the process more acceptable to the 
majority population, what alternative ways could be employed to gain acceptance 
of the process by Unionists, since the process would be meaningless without 
their participation. (A thought, how about a referendum, what would the 
question be?)

                            Dennis
                        
1545.34TALLIS::DARCYAlpha Migration ToolsMon Feb 05 1996 12:3422
>Again, as one with no particular axe to grind, is it not reasonable that 
>a certain percentage of support is required before a party is given a chance
>to take part in the negotiations?  If there isn't a hurdle, how do you decide
>who to allow?  Should we not invite the fascist and communist parties?  
>Unless someone can prove that they do represent a significant portion of the
>community (even 1 or 2 per cent) you have to invite everyone and his dog!
    
    Hi Alan,
    
    I think that all groups and parties should be represented, as long
    as they have some nomimal support. That is the purpose of the "all-party"
    talks. If representation percentages are such an important issue for
    the British, then simply take the last election results. But let's move
    forward with the issue. I doesn't really bother me that fascists or
    communists take part in negociations. It does bother me greatly if
    negociations are not initiated. Britain has a historical opportunity
    here to take a leadership position, right the many wrongs done in the
    past, and promote peace in a progressive manner in Northern Ireland.
    Generally speaking, the Irish people have been very patient and
    deserve better. I don't know what else can be said...
    
    George
1545.351/2 a century of brutal oppression..MKTCRV::KMANNERINGSMon Feb 05 1996 12:4556
    re .28
    
   > I'm obviously very naive; I realise that the people who will be
    affected
   > by NI becoming part of the Republic will be those who are currently
    living in
   > NI.  Therefore it seems reasonable that they should have the choice.
    
   > But then again, I don't have half a century's historical baggage and
   > religious hatred to carry around with me...
    
    I don't know about all that Alan. Maybe if you had had to put up with
    what the minority population in the ghettos of NI have had to put up
    with during the last 50 years you would feel differently.
    
    On the question of self determination, it would seem to me that the
    we should try and understand how we got to where we are in order to
    progress.  The question of  how Ireland should relate to the UK has
    been on the agenda for a long time and it obviously affects all the
    people living on these islands, not just those in the 6 counties. That
    is to say, whether a part of an entity should be allowed to break off
    from an entity, lets say today Scotland from the UK, is a question which 
    would have to be voted on at Westminster wouldn't it ? At least that
    was the consensus which dominated British politics in the 50 years or
    so down to 1914. 
    
    And indeed the question of whether there should be home rule for Ireland
    was voted on at Westminster by MP's from the whole of Britain and
    Ireland several times. I am relying on my memory here, but i think the
    first home rule bill was defeated in the House of Commons  after
    Randolf Churchill and Joe Chamberlain split the Liberals and voted
    Tory on the issue. Mr Gladstone went back to the electorate, obtained a
    majority and duly won the vote in the House of Commons. The Bill was
    thrown out by the Lords, who at that time had a veto. The next Liberal
    government reformed the Lords, removed the veto and at last the Home
    rule Bill became law. At that point two things happened: first the Unionists
    formed a private army and started their campaign of terror against
    Catholics. Secondly there were all party talks called without
    preconditions at Winsor castle under the chairmanship of the King.
    Before these really got going Archduke Ferdinand got himself shot in
    Sarajevo and WW1 broke out. The Home rule Bill was suspended, the talks
    stopped, and in 1916 an unfinished war began which lead to the division
    of Ireland.
    
    You may call this historical baggage Alan, but by ignoring it and
    pretending it did not happen it sounds to me that you give tacit
    support to the terror which lead to the partition of Ireland and the
    monstrous injustices done to the minority community since then.
    
    And I would say to all those who take that position, this intransigence
    is as much part of the problem to be solved as SF/IRA.
    
    That is the historical baggage which Unionism in NI has and it was time
    they dropped it and came to talks. 
    
    Kevin
1545.36MOVIES::POTTERhttp://avolub.vmse.edo.dec.com/www/potter/Mon Feb 05 1996 12:4921
re .31

Eddie,

I know that this has been done.  My "historical baggage" point is that I can 
accept that, say that it may well have been wrong, and then try to see where
we can go from here rather than complaining of the injustice of it all.

re: .34

George, 

Your point is well taken.  To tell the truth, I have difficulty understanding
the reasoning behind the elections plan.  I can see a strong moral reason for
demanding that illegal organisations give up their weapons, but if Major is
willing to give way on that I cannot understand why he thinks an election will
make everything all right.  Sinn Fein has stood in elections before, yet
refused to condemn murder.

regards,
//alan
1545.37MOVIES::POTTERhttp://avolub.vmse.edo.dec.com/www/potter/Mon Feb 05 1996 13:1449
re .35

    I don't know about all that Alan. Maybe if you had had to put up with
    what the minority population in the ghettos of NI have had to put up
    with during the last 50 years you would feel differently.
    
    The question of  how Ireland should relate to the UK has
    been on the agenda for a long time and it obviously affects all the
    people living on these islands, not just those in the 6 counties. That
    is to say, whether a part of an entity should be allowed to break off
    from an entity, lets say today Scotland from the UK, is a question which 
    would have to be voted on at Westminster wouldn't it ? At least that
    was the consensus which dominated British politics in the 50 years or
    so down to 1914. 

Major recently (6 months ago?) said that if over half the Scottish electorate
voted for a party or parties which supported independence for Scotland, then
that should start the process in motion.  As a Scot who is fiercely opposed
to independence, I still believe that no-one other than the Scottish
electorate has the right to have any say in the issue.

    [interesting historical description deleted]

    You may call this historical baggage Alan, but by ignoring it and
    pretending it did not happen it sounds to me that you give tacit
    support to the terror which lead to the partition of Ireland and the
    monstrous injustices done to the minority community since then.

No, I don't support it - but I don't believe that it should stop movement
into a better way.  It's the same argument as says that the British government
should be willing to sit down with Sinn Feinn/IRA and negotiate.  And even 
though that is much closer, and the wounds hurt even more, I think that that
should be done.
    
    And I would say to all those who take that position, this intransigence
    is as much part of the problem to be solved as SF/IRA.
    
Accepted.

    That is the historical baggage which Unionism in NI has and it was time
    they dropped it and came to talks. 

You surely can't ask only one side to drop its historical baggage?

regards
//alan

PS This is about the most civilised debate about NI that I've ever seen or
heard; I am enjoying it and learning too...
1545.38MKTCRV::KMANNERINGSTue Feb 06 1996 06:3122
   > I still believe that no-one other than the Scottish
   > electorate has the right to have any say in the issue.
    
    Well of course, given the imperial nature of British domination I would
    naturally support this 'extremist' nationalist position. The point I am
    making is that the Irish question was voted on at Westminster AND in
    Ireland with a clear answer to the question. That is why Unionist
    intransigence is not on. It is worth remembering that if Ireland were
    still part of the UK Major would be dependent on the votes of Irish
    Nationalist MP's today. Also, the IRA leader Michael Collins accepted
    the Treaty and voted for it in Dail Eireann on the expectation and
    understanding that there would be a county by county referendum on the 
    question in Ulster.  
    
    I don't think any historical baggage should be brought to the talks.
    There should be no preconditions and anyway the whole 'national' issue is 
    much less relevant in an EC context. But here in the South of Ireland
    it seems execreble that the likes of John Taylor won't even meet with
    Dick Spring or John Hume, when it is obvious that these two are
    prepared to try anything to reach a permanent end to violence. 

    Kevin 
1545.39Is the shuttle diplomacy working?NEMAIL::HANLYFri Feb 09 1996 12:5411
    It has been fascinating to watch the shuttle diplomacy to the US. 
    First Ancram, then Adams, now Spring.  Mitchell has advised the parties
    that Clinton will remain neutral.  Clinton has not been too neutral to
    date (personally, I think he has really helped the process) so he may
    find it hard to stay on the sidelines.  I am sure the Kennedys, Dodd,
    Moynihan, etc. are urging him to contact Major and voice his
    disapproval of the elections plan.  On the other hand, Clinton does not
    want to appear to be too meddling.  But, this is election year.  What
    would you do if you were him?  
    
    Regards,  Ken Hanly
1545.40CHEFS::COOPERT1Captain Compassion.Sat Feb 10 1996 11:219
    Judging from the explosion around Canary wharf on Friday you might find
    it's a little bit tooo late for that.
    
    Complete proof that only one side does not want peace.
    
    I expect the I.R.A. are really pissed off that no-one was killed eh?
    
    
    CHARLEY
1545.41TERRI::SIMONSemper in ExcernereMon Feb 12 1996 03:259
re I expect the I.R.A. are really pissed off that no-one was killed eh?
    

Mr Holohan, I know of a nice little newspaper stand in London that
you can buy your papers at.

Oh, sorry, I forgot, that has gone now, your friends blew it up
and MURDERED the two men working in it.

1545.42CHEFS::COOPERT1Captain Compassion.Mon Feb 12 1996 04:297
    >I expect the I.R.A. are really pissed off that no-one was killed eh?<
    
    My apologies for this. At the time of writing that note there were no
    confirmed deaths. Sorry.
    
    
    CHARLEY