| From the Irish People:
June 7, 1994
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GIBRALTAR CASE RULING A VICTORY FOR RELATIVES
The relatives and legal representatives of the three unarmed Irish Republican
Army members shot dead by the British Army Special Air Services (SAS) in
Gibraltar six years ago have described as an important victory a decision to
refer the case to the European Court of Human Rights.
The European Commission of Human Rights, the court's junior body, in a
majority decision, however, found that the SAS members did not use unnecessary
force in shooting dead the IRA members in 1988 but it has left it to the court t
o
adjudicate finally on the controversial killings.
P.J. McGrory, the lawyer for the relatives taking the case, said that the
commission, in reaching an 11-6 verdict in favor of the British government's
assertion that it had not breached the European Convention on Human Rights,
was "hopelessly split."
In the past, the court has sided with the commission's findings in the majority
of cases, but nonetheless Mr. McGrory said he was delighted with the decision
to refer the case to the court. Although British-government sources might try
to put a favorable "spin" on the commission's decision, he said, the ultimate
decision lay with the court on whether Article 2 of the Convention on Human
Rights, safeguarding the right to live, had been broken.
McGrory said that the commission's function was to act as a filter to keep
"impossible" cases from reaching the court. Only two per cent of the cases
it considered were sent on to the court for final and higher adjudication.
"We can now join that elite two per cent, and we are delighted," he added.
The court was an independent body which would examine the case on its merits.
BROTHER
Niall Farrell, brother of Mairead Farrell who, with Daniel McCann and Sean
Savage, were shot by the SAS in Gibraltar in March 1988, said the decision was a
n
important victory for the relatives. "The British government stands before
Europe's highest human-rights court accused of what in plain English can only
be called murder," he said.
SINN FEIN
Sinn Fein's national chairman, Tom Hartley, said the decision to refer the case
to the commission was a significant move which "underlines the extent of
concern at the behavior of the British government and its military agencies."
Andrew Hunter, chairman of the Conservative backbench committee on north
Ireland, however, said he saw the commission's decision as a moral victory for t
he
British government.
The three IRA members were unarmed and were not carrying explosives when they
were shot--in all, 27 times. A car containing explosives believed ultimately
intended for a British army changing of the guard was later found across the
border in Spain.
The majority of the commission rejected the argument that the SAS had been
specifically ordered to kill the IRA members rather than make any attempt to
arrest them. The six commissioners who dissented from the majority view
expressed considerable scepticism about the credibility of the British army
witnesses. The Irish representative, Jane Liddy, concluded that the IRA members
could have been arrested and that the use of lethal force against them was
disproportionate.
She said that the British government case was a "chain of lack of care,
omissions, errors and misleading information" which contained fundamental
inconsistencies and inexplicable omissions. Another dissenting commissioner
said, "The team responsible for the killing was basically trained to kill
and not to arrest."
DISSENT
Three of the six commissioners joined in a dissenting opinion written by the
commission's Irish representative, Jane Liddy. The other three made similar
points in separate opinions.
Ms. Liddy noted that the SAS team was said to have been briefed that a
remote-control device could be used, but the members themselves testified they w
ere
certain that it would be used. This meant their briefing was inadequate,
indicating a serious degree of carelessness by the authorities.
There was a contradiction in saying that the IRA wanted to avoid civilian
casualties and then briefing that if approached, they might detonate a device
regardless of such casualties, she argued.
The authorities had said that the car driven by Savage was suspected of
containing a device, but the four SAS members were adamant they had been
told over the radio that a device was definitely in place.
Ms. Liddy said that the majority of commissioners had accepted that a
detonating device could have been concealed on the persons of any of the three I
RA
members . She, however, had experimented with a sample transmitter supplied by t
he
government to the commission, and profoundly disagreed. She said it was a
bulky and heavy object which could not have been concealed by the two male
suspects, dressed as they were. She described as an inexplicable omission
the fact that the SAS had not been briefed on the possible size of a
detonating device.
Furthermore, there appeared to be no reason why the suspects should be carrying
such a device at that time, since the changing of the guard was not taking
place until two days later. She said there was a fundamental inconsistency
between, on the one hand, the fear that the IRA members might embark on an
uncharacteristically suicidal action which would cause massive loss of life,
and on the other, the lack of concern that any of the 27 bullets fired would
strike "the detonating button." In addition, the button could have been
depressed as the three hit the ground, all of which indicated a degree of
recklessness.
In the shootings of Farrell and McCann, Ms. Liddy said the SAS had failed to
allow for innocent movements on their part. The British had opened fire
because of a change of expression on McCann's face and "the instinctive
movement of a woman to clutch her bag closer to her on being startled in the
street."
Ms. Liddy said other questions remained unanswered. There was a basic
inconsistency between the assertion that Savage's car might have contained
a device and the fact that it had been allowed into Gibraltar and left for
hours in an unevacuated area. No adequate explanation had been given as
to why the considerable number of plain-clothes personnel on the ground had
not been instructed to surround and pinion the suspects.
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