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Conference noted::hackers_v1

Title:	-={ H A C K E R S }=-
Notice:	Write locked - see NOTED::HACKERS
Moderator:	DIEHRD::MORRIS

Created:	Thu Feb 20 1986
Last Modified:	Mon Aug 03 1992
Last Successful Update:	Fri Jun 06 1997
Number of topics:	680
Total number of notes:	5456

640.0. "Net prank halts IBM operations" by PRSTRA::DESVIGNES (Parlay Vooh Franglais ?) Wed Dec 23 1987 03:35

    Hello world,
    
    Attached is a copy of an article from yesterday's VNS. What I would
    like to know is whether something of this kind is possible on
    EasyNet...
    
    The mind boggles...
    
    /Ben
    
    


 IBM - Yuletide chain mil by prankster slows networks at IBM
   IBM has as much Christmas spirit as the next company, but it could have done 
 without the holiday greeting that circulated throughout the company last
 Friday.
   A prankster sent a message into IBM's internal communication network that 
 quickly turned into an electronic chain letter so large it slowed message 
 traffic to a crawl. The Armonk, N.Y.-based company needed several hours to 
 clean up the mess, which may have entered the computer networks of some
 customers and suppliers.
   The message consisted of an innocuous Christmas greeting plus a drawing of a 
 Christmas tree, an IBM spokesman said. But the message also contained a
 program that searched the computer files of the recipient's personal computer
 to find the automatic distribution list that would be used to forward notes to 
 co-workers, bosses or customers. Once the program found those names, it {D
 forwarded the message to them.
   When the program reached the next recipients' personal computers, it
 repeated the process, and the problem spread from there as the Ghost of
 Futuristic Christmas settled on the electronic-mail network at the world's
 largest computer company.
   "You're talking about an entire world-wide network that was affected here to 
 some extent,"  the spokesman said.
   He said IBM posted messages on its electronic bulletin boards world-wide on 
 Monday, warning employees about the message. "We are investigating to try to 
 prevent a recurrence,"  the spokesman said.
   The spokesman said no files were lost from IBM's computer network but wasn't 
 sure whether customers or suppliers had problems because of the message. He
 said IBM wasn't yet certain, but thought the program was brought into the IBM 
 network from outside the company.
   Nothing like this has ever happened before at IBM as far as he knew.
	{The Wall Street Journal, 17-Dec-87, p. ?}
	{Contributed by Rick Zwiep}

T.R	Title	User	Personal Name	Date	Lines
640.1	yes../no... Nice it happened to them	VISA::MONAHAN	I am not a free number, I am a telephone box	`Wed Dec 23 1987 12:12`	7
	Yes, that sort of thing happened on Easynet a few years ago. No, I won't tell you how it was done. A bit of thought about the above answers will tell you why we do not always give detailed explanations for security guidelines, or document exactly what a security related patch changes.
640.2		ERIS::CALLAS	I've lost my faith in nihilism.	`Wed Dec 23 1987 13:51`	23
	Aw, come on! Geez, Louise, Paul told this story at the VAX magic session at DECUS a couple of years ago. It's not like this is a secret. And besides, what happened here was very, VERY different to what happened at IBM. What happened here was a command procedure that Paul Winalski wrote to do some monitoring on the Enet. It had a bug in it, and it got out of control and swamped the net. It was a pain to track down. What happened at IBM was what is called a "letter bomb," for the obvious reasons. Block-mode terminals are especially prone to this type of hacking. Think of a terminal with a large answerback that is programmable by escape sequence. You just load a command procedure into the buffer, and send it from the terminal. The computer has no idea that you didn't type it, and merrily executes it. We're somewhat immune to this because MAIL filters out escape sequences. Now, of course, you can always EXTRACT TT, but that requires your participation, not merely reading the thing. We're even more immune to it because we don't really do block mode terminals and we don't have programmable answerback buffers or anything like that. Jon
640.3	Not as it may seem...	SMURF::REEVES	Jon Reeves	`Wed Dec 23 1987 16:41`	14
	Except -- according to some authoritative-sounding explanations posted to comp.risks -- no MAIL was involved; instead, on an IBM system, it's possible to ship executable command procedures around and get them run for you. There's also a log of everyone who's ever sent mail to you or received mail from you, which is what the program scanned to construct its victim list. From the posted explanations, it doesn't sound like it was written with malicious intent; however, it got sent to/run by some naive users. The only surprising thing is that it got through IBM's ultra-paranoid gateway mechanism. I strongly recommend digging out the appropriate issues of RISKS (5.80 and 5.81 are best) if you're interested.
640.4	Plug, Plug!	SNDCSL::SMITH	William P.N. (WOOKIE::) Smith	`Fri Dec 25 1987 00:15`	5
	The Risks digest volume 5 Notes file is at SNDBOX::RISKS_5, press Select or KP7... Willie Smith Risks Moderator
640.5		VIDEO::LEICHTERJ	Jerry Leichter	`Sat Dec 26 1987 16:05`	9
	In summary, what you'll find (about this particular incident) in RISKS is: On IBM systems, you can send someone a file. It appears in their directory, rather than being added to a mail file. What happened here was that two messages got sent: The "cover letter", which appeared as a mail message, and a REXX exec file - essentially the equivalent of a DCL .COM file - named CHRISTMA. (Good old IBM 8-character limit....) The "cover letter" suggested that you execute CHRISTMA. A lot of people did, without looking at it. Boom. -- Jerry
640.6		PSW::WINALSKI	Paul S. Winalski	`Tue Jan 05 1988 17:03`	38
	MAIL under VM/370 is a special case of file transfer which is done by (get your barf bags ready, folks) "punching" the message you want to send into your virtual machine's virtual card punch, after which the network software causes it to appear in the recipient's virtual card reader. Queue entries in the card reader/card punch queues are typed--one of the types is MAIL. The mail reader program looks for queue entries of type MAIL and reconsitutes them into disk files again. The CHRISTMA EXEC hack involved sending a MAIL message that was an EXEC file-- the VM/CMS equivalent of a DCL command procedure--with a comment at the front saying that if you execute the file, something interesting will happen. There were a lot of gullible people at IBM who did that, with the documented results. PROBE.COM, the procedure that I acidentally let loose on the ENET (it wasn't the EasyNet yet back then) was completely automatic and didn't require that a remote user do anything. It was a command procedure that: 1) did a SHOW NETWORK command with the output directed into a file 2) TYPEd the file back over the network link that caused PROBE.COM to execute in the first place 3) processed the file to determine which nodes are adjacent to the current one 4) for each adjacent node, COPYed PROBE.COM there and then executed it as a network task, with output directed back over the network link running the current incarnation of PROBE. The purpose of this command procedure was to determine the current network topology. This was in the days of Phase 2 DECnet, when you couldn't use NCP TELL on anything except immediately physically adjacent nodes. The bug in the procedure is that there was nothing to detect loops in the topology and prevent PROBE from running somewhere that it had already been. In particular, I forgot that if A is adjacent to B, B is also adjacent to A. Infinite loops were guaranteed, and the problem compounded itself geometrically. Yes, the same technique would work today, yes, I still have the source file for PROBE.COM, and no, I will not post it here. --PSW
640.7		PASTIS::MONAHAN	I am not a free number, I am a telephone box	`Wed Jan 06 1988 04:52`	10
	re: .1, .2 The one I was thinking of was not Paul's. It was let loose in Europe while Easynet was at phase 3 DECnet. Because of the rather unusual set up of the gateways to the U.S. I think no copies got across the pond (fortunately), but it did paralyse the European part of the net for a couple of days. It sounds as if it was similar to Paul's in design, but unlike it in that it was not even intended to serve a useful purpose.
640.8	Timeout for a stupid question?	DPDMAI::BEATTIE	But, Is BLISS ignorance?	`Wed Jan 06 1988 10:39`	16
	Re: .6, .7 Q1: Isn't what you discribed less of a threat now because SECURPAC turns off the ::"TASK=..." network object? Q2: I think I heard that SECURPAC is a requisite for joining the EasyNet (??). I'm not naive enough to believe that any security precaution is absolutely unbreakable, and recogise that any priv'd user could easily go back and turn on ::"0=", but what if they don't? As an ex-VAXcluster System manager turned PSS, whose customers are occasionally interested in network security, I'm curious... -- Brian
640.9		DISSRV::NORRIS	What is it, Miss Pfeffernuss?	`Thu Jan 07 1988 09:07`	14
	Re .8 SECURPACK does NOT turn off the TASK object. When you run option 7 (Security Enhancement of DECNET Default Account) it will provide you information on how to restrict access or elimate the TASK object, but SECURPACK will not change it for you. Chapter 5 of SECPACK_DOCUMENT.MEM will provide you with more information. DIS Policy 6.11 requires all VAX/VMS nodes on the EASYnet to have SECURPACK installed and running. I see nothing wrong with the TASK object as long as its access is via proxy or an access control string. Ed